Integration or Disintegration
A New Canadian Partnership
p. 285-300
Texte intégral
From Unity to Disintegration
1Federalism refers to the dual notion of unity and diversity: the search for unity through the concentration of power in the hands of a central government for the sake of effectiveness and integration of constituent parties; and recognition of diversity through division of power between the constituent units for the sake of greater freedom and greater equity in spite of the risks of disintegration of the whole. Unity and diversity have thus always been at the very heart of the notion of federalism.
2These notions also have an impact on the distribution of powers in the federations. As Ronald Watts has said, “Generally the more the degree of homogeneity within a society, the greater the powers that have been allocated to the federal government, and the more the degree of diversity, the greater the powers that have been assigned to the constituent units of government.”1 In addition to the division of powers and their use by the different federated governments, other sources of stress might lead to disintegration in a federation, in particular, the concentration or dispersion of ethnocultural groups within the territory, the institutionalization of ethnic or linguistic tensions and conflicts, and especially ethnic or community bipolarity.
3Canada cannot avoid the tensions between the search for unity and recognition of diversity, between the will to integrate and the risks of disintegration. More particularly, there are two major factors of disintegration in the Canadian federation: first, the bipolarity defined by the presence of two ethnocultural communities or groups within the same federal territory, where one is the majority and the other the minority; and second, the concentration of the minority ethnocultural group within one area of the national territory where it is nevertheless the majority and is represented by a political authority. This combination tends to aggravate conflicts and make the recognition of mutually acceptable solutions more difficult.
4Since the double defeat of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown accords, the Canadian political scene has been dominated by two major and totally irréconciliable options which are presented as possible solutions to the current impasse. On the one hand, the status quo option which suggests that Canada can easily put up with the current situation, although it may require some new administrative arrangements which might bring about a small degree of decentralization; and, on the other hand, the sovereignty-partnership option which was vigorously relaunched by the Parti Québécois during the October 1995 referendum, an option that was supported by 49.4 percent of Quebecers.
5Is there room somewhere between the two models for other options that could break the impasse and give each of the partners in the Canadian federation the feeling, if not conviction, that it has won something or, at least, that it has gained more than it has lost?
6I shall attempt to answer this question in this paper, not by proposing a new distribution of powers between the components of the Canadian federation, but by focusing essentially on possible institutional arrangements within the new forms of partnership that can be envisaged to solve the current crisis.2 Only two of the many likely scenarios will be analyzed here, that is, the sovereignty-partnership or new confederal Quebec-Canada union proposed by the Parti Québécois (pq), and a federalism redefined on new bases involving greater participation by the provinces. In each case, I shall examine the partners involved, the mechanisms used for managing the partnership and, to a lesser extent, the main powers that will be assigned to them.
A partnership Between Equals
7The concept of partnership has always been at the centre of the Parti Québécois’ approach. The Mouvement souveraineté-association, which was founded by René Lévesque in 1967 and which gave birth to the pq, was based on this concept. In its first program, adopted in October 1968, the party indicated its willingness to negotiate the procedures for Quebec’s accession to sovereignty, as well as the anticipated economic association agreements with Canada, that is, the principal elements of a customs union or a “common market” and a monetary-union agreement.3
8In a document published in May 1993, the pq Executive Council reiterated its willingness to maintain a Canadian economic space— either in the form of a treaty of association or through special agreements. This space would be characterized by a monetary union and the free flow of goods, services, capital and persons, and would be administrated by three main bodies: a Council with decision-making power made up of ministers or representatives from both governments; a Secretariat responsible for the application of the treaty; and a Tribunal for the resolution of disputes.4
9A few months before the October 1995 referendum, an agreement was signed by Jacques Parizeau, president of the pq, Lucien Bouchard, leader of the Bloc Québécois in Ottawa, and Mario Dumont, leader of the Action démocratique du Québec. The June 12th agreement addressed the question of accession to sovereignty, of course, but mainly dwelt upon the treaty proposal for a new Economic and Political Partnership. This agreement added two new points to the previous positions. First, it broadened the terms of the treaty. In addition to the traditional agreements on customs and monetary union, the free flow of goods and the mobility of the labour force, it raised the possibility of agreements in many other areas of common interest, such as internal trade, international trade, international representation, transportation, defence policy, financial institutions, fiscal and budgetary policies, environmental protection and postal services. In other words, this was not a simple treaty of economic partnership but rather a new federalization of relations between Quebec and Canada, or more precisely, a confederal union embracing a range of sectors.
10Second, the agreement also broke new ground in the field of common institutions. Beyond the three traditional bodies—Council, Secretariat and Tribunal—there would also be a Parliamentary Assembly made up of Quebec and Canadian members appointed by their respective Legislative Assemblies and responsible for making recommendations to the Council and adopting resolutions. For the first time there was talk of a common Parliamentary Assembly, which admittedly would still not be elected through universal suffrage, but would nevertheless resemble a legislative body. This was in contrast to the draft agreement published in 1979 prior to the 1980 referendum in which it was emphasized that the “Québec government does not think it is advisable to propose establishing a parliamentary assembly, believing instead that it is preferable for the member of the Community Council to remain, politically, responsible to the parliament where they sit....”5
11The institutions proposed in 1995, borrowed directly from the European mode, warrant closer examination here. The Partnership Council would be made up of an equal number of Ministers from the two states and have decision-making power regarding implementation of the treaty. It was unquestionably the key component of the confederal framework proposed at the time of the October 1995 referendum. It should first be emphasized that this Council would be responsible for implementing the treaty. However, the proposed treaty would not only include the conventional elements of an economic association, but could be broadened to include much more extensive areas such as international representation, defence policy, transportation and environment, as well as financial institutions and fiscal and budgetary policies. Already, the broadening of the fields of jurisdiction governed by the partnership treaty clearly showed that the proposed course had been directly copied from the one embarked upon by the European Community following the Maastricht Treaty. Apart from the pillars of supranational institutions which were redefined in some cases (for example, the Council of Ministers was renamed the European Council), the Maastrich Treaty created two new pillars, namely that of intergovernmental cooperation in matters of foreign policy and security, and that of intergovernmental co-operation with regard to internal affairs and justice. Similarly, the Quebec-Canada draft agreement was no longer limited to economic fields, but opened the way to bilateral cooperation in matters of international representation and defence, even creating the possibility of agreeing in areas concerning internal affairs and justice (such as the fight against arms trade and drug trafficking).
12On the other hand, the Partnership Council proposed in the June 1995 tripartite agreement provided for decisions to be made unanimously, and for each state to have a right of veto. This provision contrasts sharply with the decision-making processes within the European Council where a simple majority vote (confined mainly to procedural decisions) co-exists with a qualified majority vote requiring at least 62 votes out of 87, and with the unanimous vote provided for by a general clause in section 23 5 of the treaty, and which also applies “in matters that are considered to be sensitive pertaining to foreign policy and common security and internal affairs and justice.”6 Obviously, the two-member partnership does not lend itself to either the single majority vote or the qualified majority vote. All decisions must be made unanimously, which tends to block many initiatives. Herein lies the principal danger of this type of partnership, which, if concluded, is likely to move along hesitantly and adapt only with difficulty, since each of the partners would be trying to preserve their advantages.
13The two-member partnership is much more difficult to administer than the current 15-member partnership in the European Union. In the latter case, none of the four countries which dominate Europe economically or politically have a veto in qualified majority votes. Even two large states cannot prevent a resolution from being adopted unless they have the backing of two small states (Ireland and Finland, for example) to form what is then called a blocking minority (26 votes). This is the core issue of any new Quebec Canada agreement: shifting majorities or blocking minorities are out of the question because the same two partners/adversaries must always either agree or disagree. Thus, everything would depend on the conditions for the adoption of the new partnership: if each member believes that this is the last possible, but necessary, means to satisfy Quebec’s claims and ensure the survival of Canada while benefiting itself, such an agreement might work. If these conditions are not met, there is little chance for a successful partnership. This is the currently prevailing situation. The chances of such an agreement succeeding would be enhanced if it were discussed and concluded before Quebec were actually to secede. However, none of the English-speaking political partners, especially at the federal level, are ready to embark on such a course, for this would mean recognizing both the validity of the next referendum in Quebec and its chances of success. However, the Supreme Court, in its Reference concerning the secession of Quebec,7 has declared that, following a clear question and a clear majority in an upcoming Quebec referendum, federal and other provincial political authorities would be obligated to negotiate the conditions of secession as well as the act of secession itself. This latter statement reinforces the Parti Québécois’ stance, that of negotiations after a referendum in its favor.
14The fact that this Council would have decision-making power over the implementation of the partnership treaty between Quebec and Canada means that it would have, in effect, legislative power. The Parliamentary Assembly, recognized officially for the first time as part of a Quebec-Canada partnership, would be responsible for examining the draft text of Council decisions and making subsequent recommendations. It would also have the power to pass resolutions on any aspect of implementing Council decisions, particularly after receiving periodic reports from the Secretariat. Clearly, this Parliamentary Assembly would not have any real legislative power and would have to be content with remaining a deliberative body responsible for formulating recommendations.
15The Parliamentary Assembly would be made up of Quebec and Canadian members appointed by their respective Legislative Assemblies on the basis of representation by population, with 25 percent of members consequently coming from Quebec. Thus, alongside the Partnership Council with decision-making power, there would also be an essentially consultative assembly, with members chosen on the basis of the population distribution between Quebec and Canada. Adding such an assembly to the previously-proposed common institutions fulfils two desires: on the one hand, many Quebecers wish to maintain a parliamentary assembly to govern relations between Quebec and Canada; and, on the other hand, many Canadians are opposed to the idea of giving parity representation to each partner within such an institution. The proposed assembly takes population distribution into account but would not be directly elected by the population and would only have the power to make recommendations. It is therefore unlikely to generate much enthusiasm, since it does not entirely satisfy the expections of either side.
16The European experience is instructive in this regard. It has evolved from a non-elected assembly into a European Parliament elected, since 1979, by direct universal suffrage. However, the distribution of seats only partially reflects the demographic weight of each member state, therefore small countries are clearly overrepresented. One particularly interesting aspect of the European experience would appear to lie in the assembly’s powers. The European Parliament is consulted in different ways, such as compulsory advisory opinion on certain subjects and legal notice in other areas. The Single European Act, which came into force in 1987, broadened Parliament’s powers through the cooperation process with the Council. However, it is mainly the Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, that is to reinforce the parliamentary function by instituting a joint decision process for certain matters. As Doutriaux and Lequesne point out, “the establishment of a parity conciliation committee that unites the Council members and Parliament’s representatives, as well as the capacity of the Parliament to prohibit the adoption of a law, are the two main innovations of the new joint decision process introduced by the Maastricht Treaty.”8 Apart from exercising legislative power through joint decision and co-operation processes, the European Parliament also takes part in preparing the budget and controlling community expenses.
17It is almost certain that a Quebec-Canada parliamentary assembly with power to make recommendations only, would, in drawing on the European model, eventually demand broader power enabling it to participate more directly in the legislative process. It should also be noted that the European Parliament itself is calling for “the full and entire exercise of joint decision-making in all the community’s legislative activities,” as well as “the full and entire exercise of budgetary jurisdiction concerning revenues.”9 At that stage, the European Union will have shifted from its still generally confederal framework to a distinctly federal framework in which the Parliament would have power to adopt laws and levy taxes.
18Is Canada ready to take the opposite course of action? Will it adopt a confederal framework, as proposed in the June 12th partnership agreement, hence abandon its current federal system? It does not seem to be the case. Admittedly, the European model is attractive and, according to the sovereigntist movement, the concept of a confederation would reconcile the objectives of political autonomy and economic partnership. However, since the proposal is being made by the Parti Québécois, it is unlikely to receive immediate acceptance. We need only recall the climate during the October 1995 referendum campaign and, in particular, the climate that prevailed in the days following the referendum when proposals were made for the partition of Quebec and for a possible Plan B which would set out the terms for the next referendum and the ensuing secession. Moreover, the strong emotional attachment to Canada on the part of a great number of Canadian federalists should also be kept in mind.
19This new Quebec-Canada partnership of equals entails a complete redefinition of Canada. What would remain of a federal Canada where Ontario would largely dominate through its economic clout and demographic weight? Canada without Quebec would probably be forced to remodel itself.10 Above all, would this Canada without Quebec be willing to accept the proposed institutional arrangements based on parity with Quebec? In my view, it is not so much the pooling of powers within a confederal Canada that is likely to create the greatest problems, as it is the very nature of this confederation in which not ten or eleven players must collaborate, but only two.
20Finally, this two-partner marriage in which votes are shared equally in a decision-making Council is likely to lead to impasses or create insurmountable obstacles, especially since the partnership would be concluded between two entities that are clearly unequal in terms of population and wealth. Of course, in the past, the European Community has successfully overcome obstacles arising from the need for unanimity among its different partners. This has allowed it to evolve gradually towards other forms of partnership in which the unanimity rule was replaced by a special majority rule. Could Quebec accept a formula of unequal votes in which it would likely remain a minority, thus reproducing current conditions, in other words, the very situation it now wants to change? Would Canada without Quebec agree to this two-partner marriage, which would mean dismantling the current Canadian space, even if the proposal were ultimately to allow it to be maintained?
21Under these circumstances, it seems appropriate to envisage another formula, one that would increase the number of partners involved in the political institutions governing the partnership.
The Provinces Have Their Say
22The second scenario presented here, federal in nature, attempts to make a minimum of changes to existing institutions and bases a new Canadian partnership on a Council of the Federation.
23The following main principles would form the basis of this new partnership.
- The principle of subsidiarity, which is already included in the Constitutional Act, 1867, to the effect that matters of a local nature that are exercised at this level or that can be exercised efficiently at this level, should be entrusted to the provinces.
- The principle of asymmetry, which recognizes that the unity sought through federalism is not synonymous with uniformity and that it should respect diversity, which may result in power being granted, if not exercised, through a variety of channels which are the very reflection of this diversity.
- The principle of co-decision, which recognizes that federalism is not only an expression of self-government but is also and above all a form of shared sovereignty, implying that in several fields, a real joint decision-making process should be set up to ensure the interdependence of the players involved.
24As has already been suggested by some authors,11 this Canadian partnership would include the following two components. First, a more extensive economic union could be contemplated, not only within a Canadian common market, but also in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta). This proposal means that the main jurisdictions having to do with the economy would be entrusted to the central power, as is currently the case. Currency, banks, postal services, the conclusions of international treaties, foreign and interprovincial trade, practically all intraprovincial trade (as stipulated by the Supreme Court in 1989 General Motors case), telecommunications, certain aspects of regional development, unemployment insurance, equalization and the majority of financial institutions already fall under federal jurisdiction. On the other hand, the provinces would make decisions regarding these federal jurisdictions through the Council of the Federation. Rather than attempting to have the Council play a parliamentary role in which it would be called upon to accept or refuse each federal decision in these matters, the aim would be to define minimal standards in economic matters with which everyone, including the federal government, would then comply. In other words, each partner would recognize that it is the federal government that can best exercise these powers aimed at strengthening the Canadian and even North American economic union (subsidiarity on behalf of the federal government), but that the methods of implementation may vary by province (asymmetry) as long as the provinces respect a certain number of standards that have been jointly determined (co-decision). This could also mean, for example, that the principles governing any broadening of nafta would be defined by the federal government and the provinces, as would be major regional development objectives or the main standards related to unimpeded interprovincial trade.
25The second component relates to the social union. It deals not only with health, social affairs and income security, but also labour force training and post-secondary education, fields that are already largely under provincial jurisdiction but where the federal government intervenes extensively through its spending power. The federal government’s use of this power has often been criticized by the provinces. André Burelle notes the “improper use” of spending power, but believes that it can be used wisely if it ceases to be a “national” invasive power and becomes an authentic “federal” spending power.12 The partners would then have to recognize that the provinces are in the best position to exercise powers in the field of social affairs (subsidiarity), but that the methods of implementation may vary from one province to another (asymmetry) in respect of minimal standards that are jointly determined (co-decision). In fields related to the Canadian social union, the Council of the Federation would be expected to define the major objectives and determine the principal standards to be respected by each partner. This proposal alone would help reverse the federal government’s current tendency to define standards on its own and impose them on its “partners,” who are treated more like subordinates. This way of doing things has long been poisoning federal-provincial relations. Unilateral decisions lead to subordination, which goes against the very principles of federalism. True partnership, on the other hand, involves co-decision.
26The Council of the Federation would be responsible for the overall management of the Canadian economic and social union by determining principal objectives and minimum standards. It would be made up of provincial premiers and the federal prime minister or, as the case may be, ministers competent in particular fields (e.g., finance, trade or health), depending on the subjects on the agenda. This Council would be breaking new ground in two ways. First, national standards would be established jointly by the provincial and federal governments and would be applicable to both federal and provincial jurisdictions. Such a practice of co-decision expresses the very essence of federalism in which sovereignty is shared, not only in the sense that jurisdictions are divided up between two orders of government, but also because these governments are expected to share their decision-making power with their partners.
27This Council would also be innovative with regard to the rules of decision to be applied in determining common objectives and minimal standards. Perhaps at first, in order to manage this reform, it will be necessary to operate on the basis of the unanimity of all partners. Ideally, other rules would be established within a short period. We could think about adopting the rule that is already used in the current constitution’s amending formula which requires the consent of seven provincial legislatures representing at least 50 percent of the Canadian population. In my view, it would be preferable to establish a regional consent formula involving five regions (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies, Pacific), whereby the consent of each region would be required to adopt objectives and standards.13 Whatever the formula used, in all matters relating to social union, each province could be given the choice to opt out, a choice that comes with fair compensation.
28Together, subsidiarity, asymmetry and co-decision create a formula that would allow us to rediscover the very origins of federalism, since the application of these principles would help maintain Canadian unity while respecting the federation’s diversity. This would benefit both the central government, which is fighting to keep the country together, and the provinces, which are struggling to have their diversity respected. Thus, each would gain under this formula, even if some might see these gains as being of little significance.
29Of course, the federal government would be expected to give up its “imperial” domination, which has allowed it to unilaterally determine the standards necessary for establishing the major social programs of the Canadian welfare state. Co-decision is incompatible with all forms of unilateralism. It is an improvement that would clearly reverse the trend of central government domination. The latter would, from then on, be urged to abandon its “dominating” federalism in favor of a federalism based on partnership where it would have to make joint decisions with the other provinces. Even if all parties can benefit from this option, to some it may seem only minimally beneficial. For example, Quebec would rather have more powers, recognition of its distinct character or even a confederal formula of sovereignty-partnership. However, the above option can nevertheless be seen as a progressive step compared with the current situation.
30This scenario would mean abandoning mega constitutional politics, which are now viewed with suspicion after repeated failed attempts, the first of which dates back to the 1960s, to transform the Canadian federation. It would result in few changes to the current Canadian federal system, something which Quebec might be inclined to reject since it is calling for a transfer of powers and fundamental changes to the federation. On the other hand, Quebec might get satisfaction regarding numerous complaints against the central government, which would no longer be able to set the standards of operation of jointly-funded social programs alone, nor establish the major objectives and minimal standards of operation in economic matters alone. As André Burelle pointed out, “...if association in a truly federal and partnership mode is not only viable but desirable for Quebec, any inclusion in a one-nation mode represents a threat to a minority society and will always give rise to a withdrawal reflex on the part of the Quebecers.”14 Thus, what I am proposing here is precisely an association “in a truly federal and partnership mode.”
31Aside from creating a Council of the Federation to replace the current Senate—which has become totally useless—this scenario would have little effect either on the current division of powers or on the existing institutions. On the other hand, it presumes a new form of management of the Canadian federation on the basis of a principle of equality between the provinces and the central government. The recognition of the principles of subsidiarity and asymmetry and the acceptance of a joint decision-making process would already be a “revolution” in a country which prefers the status quo.
Conclusion
32Canada is trying to survive from crisis to impasse. The pluralist nature of Canadian society must be recognized in order to resolve the crisis. Generally, the recognition of religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic pluralism does not create insurmountable problems, although bilingualism tends to be tolerated rather than fully accepted, and multiculturalism is likely to create cultural ghettos.15 Above all, it should be recognized that in Quebec this pluralism coincides with a political boundary. Canada’s French-speaking minority is mainly concentrated in Quebec, where it represents a majority which is culturally and linguistically distinct from the other Canadian provinces. This is an inescapable reality.
33Arend Lijphart, drawing on the work of Charles D. Tarlton, uses the concepts of congruent and incongruent federations to express this reality.16 Congruent federations are composed of territorial units having a social and cultural character which is similar in each of the units and in the federation as a whole. Such is particularly the case in Australia, Austria, Germany and even the United States, in spite of the concentration of Spanish-speaking people in the southern border states. On the other hand, incongruent federations are made up of territorial units with social and cultural compositions different from each other and from the country as a whole. For example, in Switzerland, Canada and especially Belgium, the fragmentation in the component units is less pronounced than in the whole country. In other words, the federated units are more homogenous than the society as a whole.
34Federalism is used precisely to accomodate this diversity rooted in political units. This was recognized by the Fathers of the Canadian Confederation in 1867. They believed that the adoption of a federal structure must be accompanied by the recognition of asymmetry for the benefit of Quebec, even though a centralist will was clearly expressed from the outset.17 Therefore, the recognition of asymmetry rather than uniformity also becomes an undeniable reality in today’s Canada.
35It should be stressed that Quebec as a political unit, and not French Canada, is at the centre of the perennial Canadian crisis. In the 1980s and 1990s, a model was put forward in an attempt to solve the crisis. This model originated with the central government and was based on former Prime Minister Trudeau’s vision, a vision that was imposed with the 1981-1982 patriation of the Constitution. This model sought to defeat the crisis, not by recognizing its fundamental parameters but by firmly opposing them. The objective was to impose a pan-Canadian vision capable of transcending duality and regionalism. The vision was based on sharing common values, in particular that of equality: equality of the provinces, since no one must have special powers nor special status; and equality of individuals, who essentially enjoy a common set of rights recognized in the Charter. Duality amounted to recognizing bilingualism and, in the process, burying everything else in the concept of multiculturalism. According to Guy Laforest, this spelled the end of the “Canadian dream”18 of a duality that is both linguistic and cultural. The rejection of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 and the Charlottetown Accord in 1992 marked the triumph of Trudeau’s vision of equality of individuals and equality of the provinces in an immutable Canada where the central government would retain a predominant role by avoiding the decentralization of powers.
36In order to make our way out of the current impasse we must think of approaches to a renewal that will shake the current framework to its very foundations. However, it will inevitably displease some people since change is not easy to accept. This is evident from the many previous attempts to reform Canadian federalism.
37Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that the first scenario presented here, which resolutely opts for a confederal framework, would be accepted easily. For the time being, the second scenario seems to be the most acceptable, provided that the federal government agrees to put an end to the “imperial” and “dominating” federalism of recent decades.
38In short, a crisis or an impasse can only be resolved if you truly want to find a solution. At the present time, however, the will to do so does not appear to exist.
Notes de bas de page
1 Ronald Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1996), p. 31.
2 This study is broadly based on my paper “Institutional Arrangements of a New Canadian Partnership” published in a book edited by Roger Gibbins and Guy Laforest, Beyond the Impasse, Toward Reconciliation (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1998), p. 301-330.
3 Parti Québécois, Programme, 1969, p. 28-29.
4 Parti Québécois (Conseil exécutif national), Québec in a New World: The PQ’s Plan for Sovereignty (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1993), p. 56-60.
5 Government of Quebec, Québec-Canada: A New Deal, p. 70.
6 Yves Doutriaux and Christian Lequesne, Les institutions de l’Union européenne (Paris: La Documentation française, 1995), P-41.
7 Reference by the Governor in Council concerning certain questions relating to the secession of Quebec from Canada, 1998, August 20.
8 Doutriaux and Lequesne, Les institutions de l’Union européenne, p. 63.
9 Egon A. Klepsch, L’après-Maastricht: les grands défis de l’Europe - le rôle du Parlement européen (Florence: European University Institute, 1994), p. 11-12. It should be noted that Klepsch was President of the European Parliament when he gave this talk in Florence in November 1993.
10 For example, see the article by Roger Gibbins, “Speculations on a Canada without Quebec,” in Kenneth McRoberts and Patrick Monahan (eds.), The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 264-273.
11 For example, see André Burelle, Le mal canadien. Essai de diagnostic et esquisse d’une thérapie (Montréal: Fides, 1995), as well as Thomas J. Courchesne, ACCESS-A Convention on the Canadian Economie and Social Systems, working document prepared for the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs, Government of Ontario (August 1996).
12 Burelle, Le mal canadien, p. 113.
13 The consent of a least two out of the four Atlantic provinces and of at least two out of the three Prairies provinces would be required. The methods of participation of the territories, and eventually of Aboriginal peoples, would also need to be defined.
14 Burelle, he mal canadien, p. 200.
15 On this subject, see Neil Bissoondath, Selling Illusions: the Cult of Multiculturalims in Canada (Toronto: Penguin), 1994.
16 Arend Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 179-183.
17 Réjean Pelletier, “Constitution et fédéralisme,” in Manon Tremblay and Marcel R. Pelletier (eds.), Le système parlementaire canadien (Ste-Foy: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 1996), p. 20-26.
18 Guy Laforest, Trudeau and the End of a Canadian Dream (Montréal and Kingston: McGill - Queen’s University Press, 1995).
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