1A year after the great general strike had compelled Nicholas II to issue the October Manifesto, disagreement was rife among the Russian Social Democrats as to the significance of those and subsequent events, what lay ahead, and the line the Marxist party should take. Prior to 1905 there had been general agreement on the proposition, formulated by Plekhanov and the Emancipation of Labor Group more than two decades earlier, that Russia was bound to have a bourgeois revolution and then an extended period of bourgeois-democratic rule before a socialist revolution would become possible. But, as Parvus wrote, « Revolution drives political thought forward. » In the course of 1905 two new perspectives emerged : Lenin’s idea that autocracy would give way not to a bourgeois-democratic regime but a « revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry » ; and Trotsky’s even more daring conception of « permanent revolution, » a rapid and uninterrupted progression from the bourgeois to the socialist revolution2. In the heady atmosphere of 1905, a considerable number of the Mensheviks, including such leaders as Dan and Martynov, were impelled to make common cause with Trotsky. Such others as Akselrod, Martov and, most prominently, Plekhanov, remained faithful to the older revolutionary outlook. The crushing of the December insurrection and the spreading tide of reaction demonstrated the strength of the government and its supporters, and led those Mensheviks who had been mesmerized by Trotskyism to lose faith in its apocalyptic projections and, seemingly, to close ranks with Plekhanov once again3. At any rate, at the Stockholm Congress of the Party in May 1906, the Menshevik delegates outnumbered the Bolsheviks, Trotskyism was inconspicuous (both Trotsky and the like-minded Parvus were in prison), Plekhanov was elected to the three-man presidium, and the resolutions adopted were generally consistent with his line.

2 Despite the apparent triumph at Stockholm, Plekhanov was hardly complacent. The Bolsheviks vigorously contested Menshevik views and policies both at the congress and afterwards. The rather astonishing influence that Trotskyism had exercised on many Mensheviks signalled some basic dissatisfaction with Plekhanov’s two-stage revolutionary theory. Because conditions were unstable and found a reflection in shifting political attitudes, the views of the Lenins and Trotskys might yet prevail. Moreover, Plekhanov’s links with the Mensheviks were rather tenuous : he had offended many by his alliance with Lenin at the Second Party Congress ; he represented no party group at Stockholm, having been invited in recognition of his past services ; and, whether on personal or political grounds, he was frequently at odds with Menshevik leaders in the 1905-1907 period4. He felt himself to be out of step, once likening himself to Ibsen’s Dr. Stockmann, and could not but recognize that his influence had declined. Though he spent a great deal of ink writing in defense of his views and counterattacking his foes, especially the Bolsheviks, he was far from confident that his publicistic activity would achieve its ends. In October 1906, he formally solicited the opinion of leaders of international socialism on the Russian situation, counting on their prestige to help redress the balance in his favor. My paper centers on this inquiry, its surprising results, and Plekhanov’s efforts to cope with a strategem gone awry.

3The inquiry was a device resorted to not infrequently in the politics of the left. In 1899, for example, apropos the Millerand case, the French paper La Petite République Socialiste had solicited the views of socialist leaders of a number of countries, Plekhanov among them, on the question of socialist participation in a bourgeois cabinet. The following year the Polish newspaper Krytyka sought the opinion of various political leaders on the question of Polish independence, and again Plekhanov was one of those who submitted a reply5. Plekhanov made his own inquiry from his home in Geneva, but in his capacity as an editor of Sovremennaia zhizn’, a Moscow journal that began to appear in April 1906. He promised to print replies to the three questions he posed :

41. What is the general character of the Russian revolution ? Do we stand before a bourgeois or a socialist revolution ?

52 In view of the desperate efforts taken by the Russian government to isolate the revolutionary movement, what should be the position of the Russian Social Democratic Party with respect to the bourgeois democracy, which, in its fashion, also fights for political freedom ?

63. How can the tactics of the Social Democratic Party with respect to the elections to the Duma utilize the forces of the bourgeois opposition parties in the struggle against the old regime, while remaining [true] to the viewpoint of the Amsterdam resolution6 ?

7Plekhanov received twelve responses. The answers came from two British figures (Harry Quelch and Fedor Rotshtein) ; three Belgians (Camille Huysmans, Emile Vandervelde, and Edouard Anseele) ; four Frenchmen (Jules Guesde, Paul Lafargue, Edouard Vaillant, and Edgar Milhaud) ; two Italians (Enrico Ferri and Philippo Turati) ; and one German (Karl Kautsky)7. One is struck by certain peculiarities of this cohort. Although the German party was the largest and most important, it was represented by only one respondent. The Austrian party was not represented at all, despite the fact that Victor Adler was one of the leading personalities in the International. The Dutch party, another significant section, was unrepresented ; and the same was true of the Scandinavian, Spanish, Swiss and Polish parties. It is curious that Britain was represented by Quelch and Rotstein, the latter a naturalized Russian, while such notables as Keir Hardie and Henry Hyndman are not among the respondents. The French socialists were represented most amply, but Jean Jaurès is conspicuously absent.

8Very likely for want of space, Plekhanov did not intend to make a comprehensive survey, and this might account for the omission of some parties. Still, there is a distinct lack of balance in the cohort. In all probability, the explanation is that responses were returned by only a fraction of those to whom the questionnaire was sent. There is no surviving list of all those who were circularized, but one document makes plain that Jaurès was among them8. Apparently he chose not to reply, despite the urgency of Plekhanov’s request, and others no doubt did the same. Thus it is reasonable to suppose that he sent his questions to Keir Hardie and Hyndman, to August Bebel, and a few other Germans, to Adler, and perhaps to one of the Dutch leaders, but did not hear from them. A review of the respondents strongly suggests that Plekhanov employed as a principle of selection present or recent membership in the International Socialist Bureau, in which he himself was one of the two Russian members. Seven of the respondents (Anseele, Ferri, Kautsky, Quelch, Turati, Vendervelde, and Vaillant), were members in 1904 or 1906, and another, Huysmans, was Secretary of the ISB. This principle of selection was as good as any for sampling the opinion of the leadership of international socialism on the situation in Russia9.

9If there was another principle of selection, it was less disinterested. Plekhanov had known Guesde since the early 1880’s, they were personally close, and they generally agreed on questions of theory and practice10. Although not acquainted with Lafargue quite as long, the latter, like Guesde, had been a leader of the Marxist wing of French socialism before the party was unified in 1905, and he and Plekhanov had often collaborated on one matter or another. Plekhanov may also have been close to Milhaud, who was a professor at the University of Geneva – the city where Plekhanov long resided – and an activist in the Swiss labor movement. Little is available on his relations with Rotstein, but is seems not unfair to deduce that, aside from members of the ISB, Plekhanov addressed his questions to persons with whom he was more-or-less intimate, and whose views were likely to coincide with his own11. By the same token, he no doubt excluded from his list individuals whose views or personalities he found particularly uncongenial. For example, he surely left out Eduard Bernstein, on whose revisionist outlook he had waged protracted warfare. Similarly, he quite certainly did not circularize Rosa Luxemburg, though she had been a member of the German delegation to the Amsterdam Congress in 1904 and in 1906 was Polish representative on the ISB, because the two were deeply hostile to each other12. Overall, then, the respondents were partly an ex officio sample, partly hand-picked, and, as not all the recipients of the questions replied, partly self-selected.

Plekhanov’s letter of inquiry began on a neutral-sounding note :
« The ever-increasing importance for the world labor movement of international socialism’s opinion prompts me to turn to you... to learn your views on the present, extra-13
ordinarily serious situation in Russia  »

10.

Yet he was quite clear in his own mind as to the « correct » answers to the questions he put. More than that, his queries were framed in a manner calculated to elicit the desired responses. The first has about it a pseudo-naive quality. Who in his right mind could possibly imagine that backward Russia was on the eve of a socialist revolution ? If not, then it must follow that Russia still had to achieve its bourgeois revolution. Given the bourgeois character of the revolution Russia faced – this was the import of the second question – what must be the attitude of the social-democrats to the bourgeois struggle for political freedom ? Again, there could be no two answers. The social democrats must support the efforts of the bourgeoisie in so far as it fought against absolutism and for a democratic political order. The social democrats had long sought the overthrow of autocracy in the interest of the working class, and so it was eminently sensible for them to support other forces committed to that goal14. The third question, perhaps because it was most specific, was least open to an easy reply. How, while acting consistently with the Amsterdam resolution should the social democrats relate to the bourgeois oppositional parties in the Second Duma electoral campaign ?

11The resolution in question had been adopted at the congress of the International in 1904, in a continuing effort to deal at the international level with the problems raised by Millerand’s acceptance of a post in a bourgeois cabinet and, more broadly, by Bernstein’s revisionist heresy. The resolution had been drafted and passed initially at the congress of the German Social Democratic Party at Dresden in 1903. Several weeks later, at their congress at Rheims, the French socialists adopted it, and it was they who presented the resolution at Amsterdam. As amended by the Germans, it was passed by a vote of twenty-five in favor to five opposed, with five abstaining. The two Russian votes, Plekhanov’s one of them, were cast in its favor15. The preamble to the resolution rejected all efforts to replace the class struggle for socialist revolution by an accommodation with the capitalist order, all efforts to transform the revolutionary socialist parties into reformist organizations. Several articles followed through on the theme of the preamble, with prohibitions against socialist participation in bourgeois cabinets or other measures that would foster rapprochement with the bourgeoisie. On the positive side, the resolution emphasized propaganda and parliamentary activity in support of the extension and consolidation of political rights, opposition to militarism, imperialism, and exploitation, and « the perfection of social legislation. »

12 The Russian Social Democrats supported the Amsterdam pronouncement with a resolution adopted at their Stockholm congress, stipulating that the central organizations of the party were to be guided by the Amsterdam resolution’s stand on « relations with the bourgeois parties16. » How the general principles set down in the Amsterdam resolution should be applied to the particular circumstances of the Russian situation was by no means self-evident, however. To be sure, another resolution adopted at the Stockholm congress endorsed the presentation of Social Democratic candidates for the Duma, while « not entering into blocs with other parties17. » Plekhanov was one of the authors of this resolution, which, though unambiguous at first glance, was in fast subject to differing interpretations. Plekhanov became aware of this, although to his way of thinking the correct line followed from the anticipated answer to his second question. If the social democrats were to support the bourgeoisie in the struggle for political freedom, then they would be bound to relate positively to the bourgeois oppositional parties. Although he employed the word utilize to describe their relationship, it is amply clear from his writings of the time that he really meant to work with them, at least within certain limits.

13In a piece that must have been written before he launched his inquiry, he had observed : « The forthcoming elections have a colossal, decisive significance. » After citing Bebel in support of the stand he would take, he continued : « Electoral agreements are obligatory... wherever essential for victory over reaction. » He then adduced various arguments to prove that his line was consistent with the Amsterdam resolution18 : To form a bloc with the bourgeois parties would be impermissible because it would dim the class consciousness of the proletariat ; but to form temporary and limited electoral agreements, while explaining their merit and limitations to the workers, would have the contrary effect. Such explanations would involve criticism of the bourgeoisie, the necessary accompaniment to a policy of limited collaboration. « The art of political representation of the working class in such transitional epochs as we are living through, » he affirmed, consisted in

« knowing how to avoid the Scylla of sectarianism [read : Bolshevism], which suffers from political hallucinations, and the Charybdis of opportunism, distinguished by incurable nearsightedness19. »

Of course, Plekhanov invoked the Amsterdam resolution to demonstrate that his position was in line with international socialist orthodoxy, and all the more because the Bolsheviks regularly tarred him with the brush of opportunism.

14Judging by the one surviving copy of the letter of inquiry, Plekhanov sent his questions out on or about October 1120. By the end of the month eight replies had come in, and they were printed in the November number of Sovremennaia zhizn’. The responses, which varied in length from barely more than half a page to the eight-page statement of Rotshtein, could hardly have pleased Plekhanov. To begin with, five of the eight respondents expressed considerable diffidence about their ability to deal effectively with the questions. Turati directed a good half of his brief statement to this point, arguing that it is « not possible for a foreigner, » unless he had « made a special study of the Russian revolution and Russian conditions, to answer any of the questions soundly » ; therefore, to make pronouncements « from afar is possible only in an extraordinarily doctrinaire spirit21. » Observations of others on this matter ranged from Vaillant’s concern with propriety « I do not think a foreigner, no matter how well-informed he may be, can or should give advice to friends who are in the thick of the liberation movement » ; to Rotshtein’s sense of the pitfalls even for one of Russian background : « I am a Russian... but I have lived abroad fifteen years and therefore I know too little.* He realized that, « in judging from afar so complex a situation as that in Russia now, it is easy to make a fool of oneself22. » Taking a different tack, Vandervelde exclaimed irritably :

« I must say frankly that I don’t understand how it is possible, at a time when everyone should be involved in action, to discuss the bourgeois or socialist character of the Russian revolution23. »

15In sum, these remarks intimated that Plekhanov’s inquiry was an ill-advised endeavor, whose results were apt to be of questionable worth. Moreover, though unintended, repeated references to the difficulty of making judgments from afar implicitly raised doubts about Plekhanov’s own ability to gauge the situation in Russia accurately, and the hazard of falling into doctrinairism24.

16If, as the evidence seems to indicate, Plekhanov was most concerned to secure supportive replies to his third question, he obtained little satisfaction from the first eight respondents. True, none of the eight spoke against electoral agreements, but only three (Quelch, Milhaud, and Rotshtein) had anything to say in their favor, and two of the three (Quelch and Milhaud) mentioned them only in passing. Apparently most failed to understand the question, deemed it inconsequential, or felt incompetent to deal with it, and made no comment. Yet several did address a related and seemingly more important question, that had not been put to them. Socialist leaders outside Russia were aware that some sections of Russian Social Democracy, both Bolshevik and Menshevik, had boycotted elections to the First Duma. Judging by the comments of the respondents, in general western socialists regarded that tactic as a costly mistake, and warned against its repetition. Even Rotshtein, the respondent who justified electoral agreements at some length, gave at least as much space to the case against boycotting the elections. However, these warnings had been overtaken by events. At the Stockholm congress (May, 1906), the Mensheviks who had favored boycott changed their tune ; and, at the November conference of the party in Tammerfors, the Bolsheviks also abandoned the tactic of boycott.

17As they had not expressed opinions on electoral agreements, a majority of the respondents apparently saw no need to judge the compatibility of such agreements with the Amsterdam resolution. Rotshtein alone made a reasoned case in favor, advancing the same sort of arguments as Plekhanov, but only two others even mentioned the resolution. Milhaud merely asserted that « electoral coalitions, » if properly framed, would not violate the Amsterdam resolution. On the other hand, Vandervelde irreverently observed :

« If the liberation movement triumphs, I simplemindedly admit that for me it will be a matter of indifference if its victory occurs in a way contrary to the rules established by the Amsterdam resolution. »

Obviously, matters of tactics (and doctrine) that Plekhanov considered of high importance were of little concern to pragmatic Western socialists, typified by Vandervelde. He and others (Vaillant and Milhaud) went out of their way to urge as a task of the highest priority the unification of the factions of Russian Social Democracy25. Probably contrary to Plekhanov’s expectations, all the respondents considered the first two questions the critical ones, most perceiving them as too closely interrelated to be treated separately. The replies to these questions varied a good deal, yet some general tendencies are apparent. Taken together, they constitute the most significant – and surprising – results of the inquiry. Six of the first eight respondents, evidently radicalized by the stirring events of 1905 in Russia, leaned in varying measure toward the views that Plekhanov had hoped to discredit. Only two, Lafargue and Rotshtein, envisaged the upheaval in terms largely congruent with Plekhanov’s view. « The Russian revolution is a bourgeois revolution, » Lafargue wrote, and the Russian socialists must remember the admonition of the Communist Manifesto : « the communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order. » As there could be no question of a socialist organization of production in Russia at the present time, the proletariat could not avoid a period of « parliamentary, bourgeois class rule. » Plekhanov could not conceal his delight with Lafargue’s response, editorializing : « The famous French Marxist writes with a clarity that leaves nothing to be desired. »

18With his more intimate knowledge of Russian conditions, Rotshtein fleshed out propositions that Lafargue evidently deduced from theory, and, in the process, repeated almost verbatim some of Plekhanov’s leading ideas. Those who believed that a socialist revolution impended in Russia, he remarked, were misled by the great power the proletariat had manifested in 1905. They failed to understand that its hegemony was temporary ; it was incapable by itself of completing the revolution, and any attempt to do so – he probably had the December insurrection in mind – was bound to be overwhelmed by counter-revolutionary forces. Rotshtein stressed the importance of social-democratic tactics that would draw the peasants into action – but he thought of such tactics as a means to topple tsarism, not to transcend a bourgeois revolution. Despite its primary thrust, Lafargue’s reply was somewhat more equivocal. Contrasting Russian conditions with those of France in 1789, he noted the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the strength of the proletariat in Russia. Though he judged it impossible to skip a historical stage, the proletariat, « as the most powerful motive force of the revolution, » might succeed in shortening the era of bourgeois rule.

19At the other pole from Lafargue (and Rotshtein) stood his compatriot Vaillant. Like Lafargue he believed that circumstances in Russia had propelled the proletariat to the fore, but for that very reason he avoided the term « bourgeois revolution » to describe what was occurring. Vaillant emphasized the political and psychological rather than the doctrinal aspects of the situation. The « Liberation Movement » was an « astounding » phenomenon with a « grandiose » character, and therefore capable of achieving prodigies. If its potentialities were fully exploited, if the proletarian and socialist forces remained attuned to the march of events, sensitively used propaganda, were active and vigorous, exercising inspired leadership and drawing into their train other popular forces, then they would « impart an increasingly socialist character to the revolution. » Vaillant did not expect a socialist revolution in Russia immediately, but if the movement should lead to that result, he urged, there was no reason to waver. This of course implied that the level of Russian economic and social development should not be taken to set absolute limits on revolutionary actions and goals. Vaillant’s response must have made Plekhanov blanch for, though lacking in specificity, it resembled the ideas some of his Russian foes advocated. He sought to dismiss this response or to blunt its force, by prefacing it with the remark that Vaillant was « a well – known Blanquist. » As he had recently proposed that the names Bolsheviks and Mensheviks ought to be scrapped in favor of Blanquists and Marxists, the message was clear26.

20All the other responses fell somewhere between Lafargue/Rotshtein and Vaillant, though on the whole they inclined more toward the Vaillant than the Lafargue/Rotshtein definition of the situation.

« Taking into consideration the backwardness of so large a part of the population, » Turati reasoned, « it is impossible to believe that we are facing a socialist revolution. However, as the labor question has already arisen in Russia, the bourgeois revolution will to some extent be penetrated with socialism. »

He was unprepared to say what the relative proportions of the bourgeois and socialist elements in the resulting amalgam might be. In the revolution under way in Russia, Quelch wrote,

« we observe socialist influence, and we hope that it will not be just a bourgeois revolution. But we doubt that Russia is sufficiently developed economically for a complete socialist revolution. »

According to Ferri, the Russian revolution was « a bourgeois revolution with clearly expressed socialist tendencies. » There should be no illusions about skipping a stage ; but because the spirit of the Russian revolution is more socialistic than the French in 1789, the lifespan of the bourgeois phase would be shorter in Russia. Then, seeming to contradict himself, Ferri added that the Russian socialist party is strong enough to dominate any bourgeois government, and steer it in the interest of the urban and rural proletariat.

21Milhaud did not regard the Russian revolution as a socialist revolution but he refused to call it a bourgeois revolution. In the first place, it was far more the product of worker and peasant than bourgeois action. Secondly, it would simultaneously wrest political freedom and social reforms in the interest of the worker and peasant masses. Thirdly, it would not open an era of bourgeois dominance but a period of :

« social skirmishes which may soon conclude with the liberation of the proletarians. Therefore, having destroyed the temporary equilibrium of political forces in Europe, [the Russian] victory will indirectly pave the way for the establishment of socialism in all Europe. »

Vandervelde saw the Russian revolution as the last of a series, which « more than any of the others would bear the stamp of the socialist proletariat. » It would not lead to the immediate victory of socialism, however, for a country whose population was nine-tenths peasant and mostly illiterate could hardly be riper for socialism than lands where the industrial proletariat comprised the majority. He hoped that the Russian revolution would at least provide the Russians with the means to carry on the struggle for final liberation.

22These five responses have in common a disinclination to see the events in Russia as a bourgeois revolution tout court. The worker and socialist components were too prominent for that, and this circumstance could not but affect the outcome of the revolution. Yet the upheaval in Russia did not portend a socialist revolution, these respondents believed, because the economy and the population were too backward to allow for a socialist organization of production. These respondents, to a greater or lesser degree, were aware of the contradiction at the heart of the Russian revolution, the contradiction between the primary moving forces of the revolution and the economic and social backwardness of Russia. What lay ahead, they sensed, was something that Europe had never before witnessed, a revolution which in some ways would transcend earlier bourgeois revolutions and yet fall short of a socialist revolution. As the situation was unprecedented, individual judgments of the results differed considerably. They varied also according to the relative weight each observer assigned to the moving forces and the level of Russian development. At a minimum, the regime that replaced tsarist autocracy would be penetrated or influenced by socialism – a question-begging formula if ever there was one. But Ferri deemed the socialist forces capable of dominating the bourgeois government – a situation that suggests the likelihood of the latter’s rapid displacement by the socialist forces. As for Milhaud, he spells out a scenario that is almost indistinguishable from Trotsky’s, even to the role of socialist revolution in Russia as catalyst in bringing socialism to all Europe. To anticipate, two of the three replies later received and then published in the December number of Sovremennaia zhizn’ are properly assigned to this same group. Particularly notable is an idea some of the others seemed to grope for that Huysmans managed to articulate rather clearly : « I do not think that one can always infer from similar events of yesterday the results of tomorrow’s events. » Then he elaborated :

« The chief force in the present revolution is the socialist proletariat. Therefore, it is a revolution of the socialists. The latter may either stop halfway or go on to achieve at least a part of what is the essence of their creed27 . »

23 Leaving the Huysmans response out of account, as we must for what we now consider, the first eight replies to Plekhanov’s questions could only have caused him consternation. An initiative he had undertaken to bolster his position in Russian Social Democracy bid fair to produce the opposite result. Just two of the eight – and it is noteworthy that both were his handpicked respondents – had taken the stand he expected to prevail. From his perspective, the others no doubt appeared to be weak on or indifferent to theory, muddleheaded as to where the realm of the possible ended and that of fantasy began, untrustworthy guides despite the eminent positions they held in the International28. He may have regretted ever having begun the inquiry, but since it could not be wished out of existence he looked frantically for ways to minimize the damage. These circumstances form the background for certain moves Plekhanov made in November 1906. To Charles Rappaport, a Russian-born activist in the French socialist movement, and a confidant of his, Plekhanov wrote from Geneva on November 1 : « I beg you to secure replies [to my questions] from Guesde and Jaurès. I have received a reply from Vaillant29. » As we know, he was upset by Vaillant’s response and, accordingly, the more eager to hear from others, above all, Guesde. In the same letter, Plekhanov emphasized his own view of the most critical item in the inquiry, confident that Rappaport would communicate it to Guesde, with whom he was closely connected.

« An electoral agreement is indispensable for us. Otherwise the pogromists will triumph ; but our anarchists, that is the ’’Bolsheviks”, do not want [electoral agreements]. It would be fine if Guesde would explain that an agreement is of course not a mandatory bloc. Il s’agit de tuer le tsarisme. Et il s’agit bien de cela. »

As a long-time associate and friend, Plekhanov was confident that Guesde would see things « correctly, » and he counted on Guesde’s authority as a left-wing spokes-man to buttress his own position.

24It was therefore maddening that ten days later Guesde had still not responded, and so his statement could not be included along with the eight that were printed in the November number of Sovremennaia zhizn On November 11, he wrote to Rappaport once again – this time from Paris30. He wanted his presence there kept strictly secret, admonishing Rappaport « not to speak of this to a single soul. » « I want to see only you and Guesde, » he advised, and suggested where and when they might meet. Plekhanov had come to Paris in desperation, intent on securing from Guesde a response that might offset the effect of the majority of replies already in hand. He wished to keep his presence in the French capital secret, undoubtedly, in order to conceal an action that violated the integrity of what was ostensibly a disinterested inquiry.

25The meeting was scheduled for the 13th, and it brought the desired result. A statement over Guesde’s signature, dated November 15, appeared along with those of Huysmans and Anseele in the December number of Sovremennaia zhizn They were in error, Guesde argued, who assumed on the basis of the large role the working class played in the liberation movement that the proletariat’s conquest of power would be accelerated. Russia was too little industrialized for that, its urban and rural proletariat comprising only one-third of the population. Rather originally, he characterized the Russian upheaval as « simultaneously a bourgeois and worker revolution, » in the sense that both groups were repressed under autocracy and therefore shared an interest in its overthrow. Accordingly, concerted action was « not only possible but indispensable. » Moreover, there was no need « to fear the conclusion of open agreements » with the Kadets « in those cases where this would facilitate the destruction of one or another prop of the old regime. » This tactic would accord with rather than run counter to the Amsterdam resolution, which forbade cooperation with a bourgeoisie entrenched in power but not one struggling against autocracy. Guesde left no room for doubt – though he did not address the matter directly – that the result of this « bourgeois and worker » revolution could be only a bourgeois-democratic regime. In other words, the proletariat should recognize Russia’s unreadiness for socialism and concede power to the bourgeoisie.

26Plekhanov printed Guesde’s response without comment although, far more than Lafargue’s from his perspective, it deserved the appraisal : « it leaves nothing to be desired. » And well it might, for it represented in good part a playback of promptings that Plekhanov gave Guesde either via Rappaport in his letter of November 1 or in person. Plekhanov proceeded to make the most of Guesde’s deposition. In the December number of Sovremennaia zhizn’, he devoted some pages to the published replies to his inquiry, but he used the evidence in a highly selective manner31. Having earlier dismissed Vaillant in a brief editorial comment, he made no mention of him now. He failed to deal with Milhaud either, though in a later piece he implicitly disposed of him by labelling him a Jauresist32. In fact, he completely neglected to characterize and discuss the eleven replies he had published, a sure indication that he was miffed by their predominant tendency. Instead, he reserved his comments for Lafargue and Guesde alone, intending to convey that the seasoned orthodox Marxists envisaged the Russian revolution as he did. Even Lafargue received only a few lines, and then Plekhanov concentrated on Guesde’s reply, quoting from it at length despite the fact that it was published in full in the same number. He particularly emphasized Guesde’s tactical dicta, the very matters on which he had prompted his friend. After completing this narcissistic exercise, he smugly concluded :

« Perhaps it is clear that the real ’’orthodox” speak in quite a different tone than our pseudo-Marxists of the Leninist persuasion33 . »

27Any more than casual reader would have noticed Plekhanov’s biased handling of the data that he himself had collected. No one could have known that he was guilty of a worse sin, the deliberate suppression of testimony adverse to his case. Some days after Guesde’s reply was in his hands, a communication from Kautsky reached his desk. In a brief accompanying note, dated November 24, Kautsky apologized for his lateness, explaining : « as a german [i.e., a non-Russian], it has been difficult for me to find the [proper] answer[s]34. » Plekhanov did not include Kautsky’s response in the December number of Sovremennaia zhizn’, and not in all probability because of its tardy arrival. After all, he had printed the replies of others dated October 24,25, and 28 in the November number. Besides, if Kautsky’s response was indeed too late, it ought to have appeared in the January 1907 number. However, it was not printed there either. We may conclude that Plekhanov deliberately suppressed Kautsky’s response because it was so inimical to the position he was espousing. But he miscalculated. He was not aware – his correspondent gave no hint of this – that his questions had stimulated Kautsky to write a considerable tract on the character, import, and direction of the Russian revolution. This must have been the reason for his delay in responding. Kautsky published his analysis and reflections as a two-part article in the November numbers of Die Neue Zeit35. Toward the end of the article, he took notice of « my friend » Plekhanov’s inquiry, indicating his intention to comment on the questions rather than give exact answers. There followed what was surely a repetition of the reply – which has not survived elsewhere – that he sent to Plekhanov. Because it was based upon a good deal of study and reflection, Kautsky’s reply was the most comprehensive and balanced of the lot. It included elements that occurred in one or more of the other replies, but Kautsky’s was a thoughtful synthesis, not the least of whose merits was that it was open-ended.

28Kautsky said virtually nothing about electoral agreements and their compatibility or incompatibility with the Amsterdam resolution, and little more concerning the relations of the social democrats to the bourgeoisie. His neglect of these matters reflected his conviction, explicitly stated, that the era of bourgeois revolution was over, that the bourgeoisie ceased to be a revolutionary force when, as in Russia, the proletariat came forth as an independent class with its own objectives. The proletariat was now the revolutionary avant-garde, but because it was not sufficiently strong to take and hold power by itself the Russian revolution could not be characterized as socialist either. However, Kautsky deemed it « extremely possible » that in the course of the revolution power would fall to the social democrats ; and, though this was much less likely, that they might even be in a position before long to inaugurate a socialist system of production. As he saw it, the sine qua non for the victory of the revolution was support of the proletariat by the peasantry. The agrarian situation was Russia’s most critical problem, in Kautsky’s opinion, and only the socialists could solve it. By backing the economic demands of the peasants, the social democrats would win their support and, in the process, they might well come to power. They must be prepared for that, since « it is impossible to fight successfully while refusing victory in advance. »

29There should be no illusions, though, that the overthrow of the old regime would ipso facto clear the way for the socialist organization of production. Paradoxically, if the revolution were victorious, it would promote the emergence of a peasantry devoted to private property, a powerful impediment to the fulfillment of the proletariat’s socialist aspirations. Yet the situation was fluid, Kautsky thought, and, depending upon such indeterminate circumstances as the duration of the revolution, its impact on the proletarian movements in the West, and the effect of the latter upon Russia, there might be an outside chance for a rapid transition to socialism in Russia. Kautsky summarized his views in these words :

« We must assimilate the idea that we are confronting entirely new situations and problems, to which none of the old clichés (shablony) are appropriate. We shall behave most correctly in relation to the Russian revolution and the tasks it presents to us if we regard it not as a bourgeois revolution in the usual sense of the term, and also not as a socialist revolution, but as a completely original development, taking place on the boundary between bourgeois and socialist society, facilitating the liquidation of the first, preparing the conditions for the creationn of the second, and in any case giving a powerful impetus to the progressive development of the countries of capitalist civilization36. »

30Kautsky was obviously sensitive to the peculiarities of the Russian situation, to the role of contingency in revolution, and to the ultimate unpredictability of the course of events – perceptions and attitudes which may mirror the influence of Rosa Luxemburg. Personally close to Kautsky, she served as an assistant editor of his Neue Zeit and its chief adviser on Russian questions both in 1905 and in late 1906, after she returned from a nine-month stay in Poland37. The events of 1905 prompted her to fresh thought on the subject of revolution, that she embodied in her pamphlet The Mass Strike. There she opposed to « the rigid and hollow scheme of an arid political action carried out by the decision of the highest committees » the « pulsating life » of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. For her « the element of spontaneity plays a great part... because revolutions do not allow anyone to play the schoolmaster with them. » It was the nature of revolutions to be volatile and unpredictable : « new and wide perspectives of the revolution » may « suddenly » open « when it appears to have already arrived in a narrow pass, and where it is impossible for anyone to reckon upon [its further course] with any degree of certainty38 . » Kautsky implicitly criticized Plekhanov for adhering to a « rigid and hollow scheme, * and it was no mere coincidence that at the 1907 congress of the RSDLP * Luxemburg assailed Plekhanov for, in effect, attempting to « play the schoolmaster* to the revolution39.

31Kautsky’s essay was entitled The Moving Forces and the Perspectives of the Russian Revolution At about the same time it was written, Trotsky produced Results and Prospects, the tract in which he first elaborated his theory of permanent revolution. Remarkably, the sub-title of Trotsky’s work was The Moving Forces of the Russian Revolution, and the two pieces had more in common than just the title. Both looked at the Russian revolution as one of a series, with the Russian upheaval featuring a different constellation of forces than its predecessors, therefore presaging a different outcome. Trotsky actually cited Kautsky (though not the piece under discussion) in support of his theory, particularly in reference to the low level of capitalist development in Russia, the weakness of the bourgeoisie, the great strength of the proletariat, and the possibility of accelerating the * RSDLP : Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.

advance to socialism40. They drew different conclusions, however, Kautsky’s being more cautious, less apocalyptic. On the whole, Kautsky’s reflections on the likely outcome resembled Lenin’s anticipated dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry more than Trotsky’s permanent revolution. This made his reply all the more repugnant to Plekhanov, for Lenin was his chief adversary, and probably explains his failure to publish Kautsky’s reply. For the same reason, the Bolsheviks quickly seized upon Kautsky’s essay and early in 1907 published it in Russian translation not once but twice41. One of the editions, pointedly labeled Answer to G.V. Plekhanov, was supplied with a preface by an anonymous author. Lenin himself must have inspired the other edition (published under the original title), as he equipped it with a biting foreword. Both introductions gleefully noted that Kautsky had refused to be taken in by the « unintelligent » – as one of them put it – questions Plekhanov had contrived. Not without some reason, Lenin crowed that Kautsky’s analysis was « the most brilliant confirmation of the tactics of the revolutionary wing of Russian Social Democracy, that is, the Bolsheviks. » As for Plekhanov, Lenin now dismissed him as « the chief of our present-day opportunists, » a person whose stance would harm the Russian workers a hundred times more than Bernstein’s had the German proletariat42.

32Plekhanov could not ignore Kautsky’s views once they were made known to the Russian public. Nor could he dismiss Kautsky as a Blanquist or a Jauresist. He had endeavored to validate his position by reference to the authority of Lafargue and Guesde, but no one in the international movement enjoyed such great authority on questions of Marxism as Kautsky43. In the February 1907 number of Sovremennaia zhizn’, reluctantly, Plekhanov took up the Bolshevik claim that Kautsky’s reply had struck him « not in the eyebrow but [squarely] in the eye44 . » For one thing, he made an awkward retreat, now arguing that the question whether the Russian revolution was bourgeois or socialist was not his question but one the « anarchists » regularly raised. He had put it to the Western socialists only to expose the naïveté of those who thought that the revolution could be anything but bourgeois. Unfortunately for him, though he refused to face this, his inquiry revealed that most of the Westerners considered it naive (or doctrinaire) to regard the revolution as bourgeois and nothing more. Further, he remarked, if, as the Bolsheviks represented Kautsky, it was a vulgar cliché to regard the Russian revolution as a bourgeois revolution, then Lenin, as a member of the old Iskra editorial board had subscribed to this view. This rejoinder was no more effective than the first. Plekhanov seemed oblivious to the possibility that the march of events might lead observers such as Lenin (and Kautsky) to recognize the inadequacy of earlier formulated positions and to change them. Indeed, he himself read the events of 1905 as necessitating a change in tactics, as we shall presently see, but in a different direction.

33He endeavored, unconvincingly, to demonstrate that on various counts the Bolsheviks had misinterpreted Kautsky, though he correctly noted certain areas of agreement between himself and the German leader. For example, he rightly recalled that he himself had predicted a good fifteen years before that the proletariat would play the leading role in the struggle against autocracy, and has strained to ensure that the proletariat would enter that struggle as an independent, class-conscious force But he refused now as before to see that the fulfillment of his prophecy was likely to entail results different than those generally covered by the term « bourgeois revolution. » He tried to show that Kautsky agreed with him on the matter of electoral agreements with bourgeois parties, but was compelled to acknowledge that Kautsky rated the peasantry more important than the bourgeoisie. (His chagrin on this score was compounded by the admission he was obliged to make in the same article, that the Kadets had shown a disinclination to enter into electoral agreements45.) Conceding that Kautsky might be closer to the Bolsheviks than to him on a few points, he stressed that the two were hardly in total disagreement. If there were genuine differences, moreover, he saw no reason to substitute Kautsky’s views for his own – Kautsky was not infallible, the two had disagreed before, and, he asserted, time had proved him rather than Kautsky correct.

34Clearly, Plekhanov’s rejoinder to Kautsky and the claims concerning the latter’s stand that the Bolsheviks made was lame. It featured a good deal of circumlocution, scholasticism, and unsubstantiated argument. Most serious of all, as in his treatment of the sum of the replies to his inquiry, Plekhanov dealt selectively with Kautsky’s ideas, emphasizing areas of apparent agreement, and sidestepping or dealing glancingly at best with some of the most significant points in dispute. He construed Kautsky’s remarks to mean, in the final analysis, that the Russian revolution was and could be only bourgeois, while ignoring Kautsky’s judgment that the era of bourgeois revolutions was over. He assented (unenthusiastically) to Kautsky’s dictum that it was impossible to fight successfully while refusing victory in advance ; but Kautsky’s notion that the social democrats might come to power was so contrary to his own sense of what was legitimate that he in effect ignored it. Above all, he failed to confront and deal satisfactorily with Kautsky’s conclusion, quoted above, that seriously called his entire outlook into question46. As with his inquiry as a whole, he sought only corroboration of his views, and met contradiction by ignoring it or attempting to talk it away. So firmly wedded was he to a long-held set of propositions, that he was incapable of seriously entertaining other possibilities.

35To be more exact, in Plekhanov’s calculation the events of 1905 necessitated some change in tactics, but in the direction of moderation rather than greater militancy. Thus he tacitly dissociated himself from certain advanced positions he had earlier taken. Years before, for example, as a corollary of his anticipation that a class-conscious proletariat would play a leading role in the struggle against autocracy, he had envisaged a shortening (though not elimination) of the era of bourgeois-capitalist domination in Russia. Also, he had considered that the overthrow of Russian autocracy might trigger socialist revolution in Europe, and in turn European developments might facilitate a swift transition to socialism in Russia47. Plekhanov did not second these views in 1906, when some of his respondents advanced them. To do otherwise, he probably thought, would be to blur the distinction between himself and the Lenins and Trotskys, when clear demarcation was indispensable. The revolution of 1905 made palpable to Plekhanov the possibility that attempts would be made to bypass the bourgeois revolution – attempts that he expected would have catastrophic results for the proletariat.

36As opposed to such tactics, he emphasized the importance of parliamentary activities. The times called for electoral campaigns, agreements with other oppositional parties, participation in the Duma. He had no qualms about working with the Kadets even though, in labeling them the Party of People’s Semi-Freedom, he recognized the half-heartedness of their progressive aspirations48. If the Russian revolution was destined to be bourgeois in character, what alternative was there ? Moreover, such tactics might make sense under the then existing circumstances – the failure of the December insurrection and the dim prospects for a new surge of revolution in the near future – ; but Plekhanov’s efforts to legitimize them as the truly revolutionary way evoke skepticism. Marx and Engels did not become less revolutionary in their later years as some supposed, he asserted in an obvious attempt at analogy ; rather, conditions had changed and, accordingly, they had adopted methods of struggle better suited to the circumstances. He invoked the tactics of the German Social Democrats in support of his line too. Having developed a productive mode of activity, the leading Marxist party would rightly consider insane anyone who urged upon it the preparation of an armed uprising49. This was of course true, but Plekhanov overlooked the fact that the German Social Democrats had accommodated themselves to a semi-absolutist regime, that while employing revolutionary rhetoric and condemning reformism they actually pursued reformist policies50. Plekhanov followed suit, adopting an essentially reformist stance while representing it as the most effective revolutionary line. Significantly, it should be recalled, the Amsterdam resolution that figured so prominently in his inquiry had been formulated primarily by the Germans, and it embodied that mix of revolutionary rhetoric and reformist practice which has come to be recognized as the distinguishing mark of German Social Democracy in the pre-World War I era. No doubt Kautsky was as responsible as anyone for the policy of his party, but the Russian revolution opened his mind to new perspectives which, as he observed in his reply to Plekhanov, might be of the greatest importance for the German party51.

37Plekhanov proved less sensitive than Kautsky and other respondents to the potentialities disclosed by the events of 1905, and less flexible than other Russian Social Democrats in making adjustments in tactics. Most foreign socialists and the other Russians were particularly impressed by the moving forces, as revealed in the revolution of 1905, and prone to see this as the decisive factor. He too recognized the leading rôle of the proletariat, but he minimized the significance of the deviations of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry from his revolutionary prognosis. In general, he under-rated the importance of the composition of the moving forces, instead taking the level of Russia’s economic development as the critical factor for the definition of its revolutionary potentialities. With the qualifications noted above, therefore, he held fast to the scheme he had elaborated well before 1905. Conditions after the revolution seemed to vindicate his stand. Though organization-ally he was at odds with the Mensheviks much of the time, they shared his basic views on the nature and perspectives of the future revolution, and they took the lead in working out adjustments to the semi-constitutional regime52. So long as Russia, despite all its problems, avoided revolutionary situations, these views and tactics could be upheld with impunity. When a new revolutionary wave broke in February 1917, Plekhanov’s outlook was put to the test again. The deficiencies that had surfaced in 1905-1906 emerged more acutely than before. They grievously impaired the effectiveness of the Mensheviks (and the moderate socialists generally), and they ultimately spelled disaster for them, for him, and for the outlook they shared.

38Perhaps because they had no such investment as he in a particular scheme, most of the Western socialists who had responded to Plekhanov’s inquiry proved more perceptive with regard to the kind of revolution Russia was likely to have. In effect, they foresaw that the moving forces of the revolution were such as to foreclose the possibility of an old-style bourgeois revolution. As to where the revolution would end and what it would bring forth, they were uncertain or in disagreement53. But whatever the particulars of one viewpoint or another, none betrayed anxiety as to the implications of a revolution that might transcend bourgeois limits. Though aware of Russia’s economic and social backwardness, they underestimated its significance. Consequently, they were more or less oblivious to the decisive rôle it would play in shaping a new regime after the imperial order and bourgeois capitalism had both been cast down. Plekhanov’s contrary emphasis prevented his playing a leading rôle in the 1917 revolution, but enabled him to sense the enormous difficulties of establishing a genuinely socialist regime in Russia.

DISCUSSION

39Abraham ASCHER (City University, New York)

40J’aimerais poser une question au professeur Baron sur sa communication si intéressante, même s’il doit être difficile d’y répondre.

41Je pense qu’il serait vraiment intéressant de savoir pourquoi les socialistes occidentaux ont réagi comme ils l’ont fait, et cela permettrait en outre d’élargir les perspectives de votre communication. Il nous serait possible de plus de mieux saisir l’évolution du socialisme russe lui-même au cours des années qui suivirent.

42Avraham YASSOUR (Haifa)

43Pourriez-vous donner quelques précisions complémentaires sur le concept de la dictature démocratique des ouvriers et des paysans chez Lénine, car je pense qu’elle est à mettre en relation avec l’attitude de Kautsky. Ils interprétaient me semble-t-il la révolution à cette époque de manière comparable.

44Samuel BARON (North Carolina)

45Dans ma communication j’ai mentionné à titre d’explication l’opinion selon laquelle les socialistes occidentaux ont été radicalisés par les événements de Russie. Je pense que ces événements leur ont donné une sorte d’espoir qu’ils attendaient peut-être depuis longtemps ; après tout, la Russie tsariste étant le grand rempart de la réaction, s’il pouvait être renversé !... Si je ne me trompe, ce fut même le moment de son histoire où la IIème Internationale manifesta le plus d’activité en faveur d’un parti donné, car ses membres mettaient de très grands espoirs dans ce qui se passait alors en Russie. Ce point, que j’ai placé au centre de ma communication, a dû jouer, je pense, un rôle certain. Lorsqu’ils considéraient la Russie avant cette période, bon nombre d’entre eux étaient très vraisemblablement portés à insister sur son retard économique et social ; pour cette raison, il était impensable que la Russie pût ouvrir la voie à une révolution socialiste. Et seul l’impact des événements de 1905, où le prolétariat a joué de manière si active le rôle moteur, leur fit penser que l’essentiel était peut-être moins le degré de développement économique que les forces motrices. Et c’est à cet aspect des choses qu’ils donnèrent la priorité.

46Avraham YASSOUR

47Il se pose ici le problème du millénarisme et celui de la relation au parlementarisme au sein de la IIème Internationale. Et il ne faut pas oublier non plus que ses membres n’étaient pas des historiens de la révolution russe, mais bien des hommes politiques.

48Samuel BARON

49Je pense que c’est exact. Dans une des notes de ma communication j’ai essayé de faire remarquer que cette contradiction se trouve réellement chez Marx. Dans certaines de ses affirmations, Marx voit la révolution permanente passant en 1850 directement de la révolution bourgeoise à la phase suivante, et il exprime aussi en 1859, dans « La critique de l’économie politique », l’idée qu’« aucun système ne quitte la scène historique avant que ses possibilités de développement n’aient été épuisées ». Ce sont là deux jugements contradictoires ! Et ils entrent en jeu ici, en 1905, comme jamais auparavant, me semble-t-il, dans l’histoire du socialisme.

50Robert F. BYRNES (Indiana University)

51Dans quelle mesure est-il exact que les socialistes européens se sentaient concernés par les événements de Russie ? Pensaient-ils à cette époque que ces événements auraient un impact sur la pensée européenne, alors qu’ils semblaient avoir une attitude condescendante envers les Russes ? Ce qui se passait en Russie était vraiment très différent de ce qu’on avait imaginé ; et ceux des socialistes qui sont arrivés par la suite au pouvoir disaient que la Russie pouvait faire ce qu’elle voulait aussi longtemps que cela ne les affectait pas.

52Samuel BARON

53S’il y avait une certaine condescendance pour la Russie – et elle paraît bien avoir existé – il me semble que durant cette période on ne la remarque plus guère.

54A coup sûr certains socialistes comprenaient que ce qui était en train de se passer en Russie concernait réellement l’Europe occidentale. De ce point de vue, E. Milhaud était, à mon avis, le cas le plus caractéristique ; Kautsky tenait à peu près le même langage, ainsi que Rosa Luxembourg.

55Avraham YASSOUR

56Et Karl Landauer l’anarchiste aussi.

57Marc SZEFTEL (Seattle)

58D’après un jugement de 1927, le prolétariat russe en 1905 était évidemment beaucoup plus avancé que le prolétariat allemand en 1848. Sous quel angle peut-on souscrire à ce jugement ?

59Samuel BARON

60Si l’on prend en considération le degré de concentration, les grands ensembles industriels, le niveau de conscience politique, d’organisation et autres choses semblables...

61Marc SZEFTEL

62Et le niveau d’éducation ?...

63Samuel BARON

64Non ! mais nous parlons de forces révolutionnaires, et personne en Europe n’avait fait une grève générale avant 1905...

65Claudie WEILL (EHESS, Paris)

66Ah ! si ! en Belgique !...

67Samuel BARON

68Mais les grévistes avaient-ils paralysé tout le pays ?... Le pays avait été paralysé ? Oui ? Bien ! Mais le prolétariat allemand en 1848... Das ist etwas anderes !!...

69Avraham YASSOUR

70Ce que vous dites je l’ai dit dans ma communication.

71Samuel BARON

72C’est-à-dire que la position de Kautsky semblait proche de la position qui était alors celle de Lénine, et c’est la raison pour laquelle Lénine a accueilli ce qu’il disait à bras ouverts !

73Avraham YASSOUR

74C’est une demi-réponse ! Pouvez-vous revenir un peu sur la notion léninienne de dictature démocratique des ouvriers et des paysans ?

75Samuel BARON

76Je croyais que c’était là votre spécialité ?

77Avraham YASSOUR

78Sans doute mais j’aime apprendre...

79Valdo ZILLI (Naples)

80A propos de la dictature révolutionnaire démocratique du prolétariat et des paysans, je suis convaincu, quant à moi, que Lénine est avant tout un homme d’action et un politicien plus qu’un théoricien. Au moment où il trouve cette formule nouvelle, il fournit la preuve de son réalisme politique, parce que cette formule n’existait pas chez Marx. Cela a été souligné par les historiens soviétiques et, sur ce point, je suis d’accord avec eux. Lénine se souciait avant tout du succès de son action politique – le renversement du tsarisme, ce pour quoi l’appui des masses paysannes lui paraissait indispensable. Dès lors, il fallut trouver dans la tradition marxiste une connexion entre le mouvement ouvrier dans les villes et le mouvement paysan dans les campagnes. Et on aura l’expérience tragique de la révolution de 1905 : comme Trotsky l’a dit : les mêmes paysans qui brûlaient les résidences seigneuriales, tiraient, une fois sous l’uniforme, sur leurs frères ouvriers. De multiples témoignages confirment cette incompréhension des paysans envers les ouvriers « qui se révoltent contre leur tsar », ou envers les propagandistes dans les campagnes. Les paysans, dans leur majorité, n’étaient pas contre le tsar, mais Lénine pensait que la force destructrice du mouvement paysan était indispensable au succès de la révolution. Et c’est pourquoi il élabore cette formule nouvelle qui témoigne de son pragmatisme. D’un point de vue purement théorique les menchéviks étaient plus orthodoxes que Lénine, mais c’est lui qui a su adapter le marxisme à la réalité russe, d’où son succès final.

81Valerian BOVYKIN (Moscou)

82J’aimerais apporter quelques précisions complémentaires. Si les paysans ont pris part à la révolution, ce n’est pas parce que les ouvriers les entraînaient mais parce qu’ils étaient eux-mêmes impliqués dans la révolution. Car la révolution posait la question agraire et était à ce titre une révolution paysanne-bourgeoise agraire, et pour cette raison la révolution fut également paysanne. Il n’est pas tout à fait exact de prétendre que les paysans ont tiré sur les ouvriers, tout en participant en même temps à la révolution. C’est là une question assez complexe. Comment cela : ils tirèrent sur les ouvriers et ils participèrent à la révolution ? Qu’est-ce à dire ? La vie est faite de telles contradictions, et l’on trouve bien des contradictions de ce genre dans la révolution de 1905.

• (interjection) et dans toute révolution !
• Oui, mais la révolution de 1905 est peut-être plus remplie encore de contradictions que toute autre révolution, car la lutte des paysans pour la terre et pour la solution démocratique de leurs problèmes s’y conjugue avec la lutte des ouvriers contre la bourgeoisie, et parce qu’il s’avéra que la bourgeoisie était apolitique et contre-révolutionnaire. C’est dans ce contexte que s’est posée la question d’unifier ouvriers et paysans dans la lutte pour résoudre leurs problèmes communs. On ne réussit pas toujours à trouver des slogans appropriés, mais cette alliance des forces ouvrières et paysannes fut souvent réalisée dans la lutte pratique, et en même temps, simultanément, les paysans se laissèrent placer dans la situation de soldats qui tiraient sur les ouvriers. En cela consistait, cela est vrai, la tragédie de la révolution. Mais ce n’est là, il importe de le souligner, qu’un aspect de la question ; l’autre aspect, c’est que les paysans se révoltaient. Sans quoi on ne saurait comprendre le sens de la révolution.

83Samuel BARON

84Permettez-moi de rappeler qu’il est prévu une communication qui traitera précisément et fort pertinemment de ce sujet.