Introduction

1There is a wealth of studies on Libya’s history, politics, economy, and culture. However, the asymmetrical relationship between Libyan and Western academic production on Libya in which the former has been and continues to be underestimated or overlooked (especially at the Western international level), is a highly problematic matter.

2Seminal publications on Libyan politics have predominantly been presented by Western scholars such as Evans-Pritchard3, Peters4, Davis5, Vandewalle6, Mattes7, Hüsken8, and Lacher9. Only a few Libyan scholars, such as Ali Abdullatif Ahmida10, Mansour El Kikhia11, Amal S. Obeidi12 and Youssef Sawani13 have attracted attention in Western academia14.

3On the other hand, there are a large number of national research centres in Libya itself, such as the Centre for Research and Consultation, which was established at the University of Benghazi in 1973, the Libyan Centre for Archives and Historical Studies, which opened in Tripoli in 1978, and other research centres established by the National Institute for Scientific Research. These centres have conducted extensive and detailed research, from colonial history and anticolonial resistance to all aspects of Libyan politics, economy, and culture. Unfortunately, exchanges and cooperation between these institutions and international researchers were severely hampered by the isolation policy of the Qadhafi regime (1969-2011), and the sanctions imposed on Libya by the United States in the 1980s and later by the United Nations Security Council in 1992. Moreover, developments in Libya since 2011 have certainly not contributed to the improvement of these centres or increase their international visibility. Instead, international think tanks based in the global North dominate the coverage of Libya. In academia, specific programmes for Libyan studies are currently almost non-existent, and thus the study of Libya largely takes place within Middle Eastern studies programmes. 

4Since 2011, Libya has witnessed the often violent competition between a number of different political models and practices (state-like, tribal, Islamic, jihadist, federalist, and separatist). As a result, Libya has been used as a blueprint for state collapse, conflict, and crisis. The main historical regions of Libya (Tripolitania, Fezzan and Cyrenaica) are also affected by the events and discussions surrounding it.

5The region of Cyrenaica covers the entire eastern part of Libya, and is one of the three main regions of the country, along with Tripolitania in the West and Fezzan in the South. Historically, Cyrenaica has differed from its neighbours in its heavy reliance on a desert pastoral economy and its Arab nomadic Bedouin society15. Nevertheless, Cyrenaica has played a very influential role in the cultural, political, and social formation of modern Libya. It was the heartland of the Sanusiya Order (1843-1969), a hotbed of militant resistance against Italian colonial rule in Libya (1911-1947), and the cultural home and political base for the establishment of the Libyan monarchy under King Idris (1951-1969)16. During Qadhafi’s rule (1969-2011), Cyrenaica suffered from a process of marginalisation and administrative neglect17, partly due to the reluctance of traditional authorities to accept Qadhafi’s policies, and more explicitly due to the resistance of opposition forces, mainly with an Islamist background18. In addition, the gap between the region’s rich oil reserves and the lack of redistribution of this wealth in Cyrenaica led to a collective sense of marginalisation and mistrust of the economic policies of the Qadhafi era19. In 2011, Cyrenaica became the focal point of the revolutionary uprising against Muammar Qadhafi20. For the people of Cyrenaica, however, this engagement did not improve their political position within Libya. The fall of Qadhafi did not lead to any significant changes in the alleged or de facto political asymmetry between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica21. In the context of the civil war in Libya, Cyrenaica has been characterised as the opponent of the internationally recognised government in Tripolitania. Despite this categorisation, academic publications (including think tank papers and journalistic work) on Libya tend to neglect Cyrenaica and are often based on research conducted in Tripolitania or in the parasovereign city of Misrata22. Our contribution aims to provide a conceptual and empirical perspective that goes beyond such categorisations and the prevailing neglect of Cyrenaica in much of the work of contemporary scholarship.

6This chapter combines two disciplines (political anthropology and political science) and two different perspectives of academic tradition and education: those of a German ethnographer and a Libyan political scientist. Through our joint work, the chapter engages with the postcolonial critique23 that deals with the hegemony of Western academic production on the Global South in general and Libya in particular. In this way, the chapter contributes to the “decolonisation of Libyan studies”.

7Research and fieldwork in times of contestation and (violent) transition is challenging, raising fundamental questions about research methodology and ethics24. Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa have become “No Country for Anthropologists”25 by hindering, banning, and even threatening ethnographic fieldwork or any other kind of empirical work in the field. As a result, researchers and their counterparts may be placed in danger or become targets of state and non-state repression as a result of their interactions in the field. Despite current debates about the need for institutionalised ethics review boards in the social and cultural sciences26, we believe that research ethics must be based on a jointly negotiated and socially embedded morality that develops through the interactions between researchers and their counterparts. Awareness and shared anticipation of risk are part of such a process, so embedding of research in local assessments of risk and local safety practices, based on the competence and experience of our counterparts, is an essential part of our approach27.

8However, there are particular challenges for a team consisting of a German and a Libyan researcher. While a German ethnographer may maintain or claim a certain academic distance from politics (in the field and afterwards), a Libyan political scientist is automatically involved and is held accountable in ongoing political debates. It is therefore important to emphasise that our focus on Cyrenaica does not imply any political positioning with regard to ongoing debates and disputes about regionalism in Libya. However, despite the undeniable shared history of Tripolitania, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica, these regions have also played distinct and independent roles in the history of modern Libya. The populations of the three regions have distinct cultural traditions and practices, identities, and transnational references. Tripolitania is closely linked to the countries of the Maghreb, Fezzan forms part of the trans-Saharan continuum, and Cyrenaica is closely linked to the Mashreq. We believe that a close, empirically-based analysis of one of Libya’s regions will also provide a better understanding of the country as a whole28.

9This chapter examines current developments and issues in Cyrenaica in three interrelated areas: 1. Politics in Cyrenaica: State, Non-state, and political economy; 2. Identity making in Cyrenaica; and 3. Politics, practices, and understandings of justice. These discussions will then be followed by some concluding remarks.

Politics in Cyrenaica: State, Non-state, and political economy

10The political landscape of Cyrenaica can be described by the term “heterarchy”29, in which state and non-state actors, as well as various forms of interconnections between them, pursue their political goals and act as “producers of order”30. These include local politicians with tribal, Islamist or jihadist, federalist or separatist, entrepreneurial or military backgrounds and agendas, elected or appointed city mayors, civil servants, members of the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk, as well as civil society actors, intellectuals, youth movements, women’s movements and, most importantly, the camp of the self-proclaimed leader of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. Since 2014, women have experienced massive restrictions on their rights and opportunities for political action31. Nevertheless, they remain important socio-political actors. Moreover, the relationality (Spies, Seesemann, 2016) of the local/regional with the global has become an important issue in Cyrenaica: it involves transnational Islamist groups and multinational organisations and companies as well as foreign states. This relationality can take the form of cooperation and alliance-building between local and global actors, but it can also mean the rejection of global influence by local actors. It accelerates processes of political heterarchy at the local level and contributes to the multiplicity of political models and practices in Cyrenaica. Although a significant part of politics has shifted into the hands of non-state actors, public administration and public servants are still at work, albeit under changed conditions. The daily practices of the state have been described as “practical norms”, a term introduced by Olivier de Sardan32 in his studies of the state and the public service in West Africa. Practical norms are various de facto, tacit or latent norms that underlie the practices of actors, which diverge from both official and social norms. In their seminal study States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies, Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan33 have shown that state-making in Africa is a sphere of negotiation between different, usually competing actors, organisations and normative ideas. In Cyrenaica too, the practices of public servants are shaped by improvisation, bricolage, and the sharing of sovereignty, responsibility, and tasks with non-state actors34. In addition, the division of the country into opposing camps has redirected the practice of statecraft towards the local regional levels. The current plans and practices of public administration are thus being generated from within Cyrenaica itself, particularly in cities such as Benghazi, Darna, al-Bayda, and Tobruk. Some of these practices may represent the beginning of secession and the permanent division of the country35.

11The concepts of “heterarchy” and “practical norms”, and the perspective of “states at work” outlined above have been influential in the anthropological study of contemporary politics in Africa and, to some extent, in political science36. However, they have never been brought together in an integrated empirical approach. We believe that heterarchy and practical norms are highly complementary. Taken together, they provide a more detailed understanding of the current complexities and dynamics of Cyrenaican politics. By focusing on different processes and forms of intertwining and the sharing of sovereignty37 between non-state actors and state actors, both local and global, we are able to discover the “real practice of governance”38 in Cyrenaica. In addition, we believe that the study of these processes offers a unique opportunity to understand and explain the ongoing renegotiation of the post-independence political order in Cyrenaica, Libya in general, and beyond. Within this renegotiation, both the Weberian model of the Western state and post-independence political models are being challenged and most probably transformed into new forms.

12The political economy of Cyrenaica has changed dramatically since the days of Qadhafi39. Some of the region’s cities have become “markets of violence”40 where militia leaders or the godfathers of organised crime use violence as a political strategy to satisfy their market interests. In Cyrenaica’s borderlands, illicit transgressive practices41 have contributed to the rise of new economic elites, or at least severely affected preexisting socio-economic hierarchies. This is particularly true in the border town of Tobruk. Since the beginning of the civil war in 2013, there has been a construction boom fuelled by illicit trade profits and increased demand for housing due to the presence of the parliament and foreign actors.

13New shopping malls line the main streets of a city that lacks electricity, sanitation and waste management. In Benghazi, an apparently newly formed elite celebrates in luxury restaurants while the old city centre still lies in ruins. These entrepreneurs often belong to or cooperate with established transnational networks (involved in both licit and illicit trade). However, they also have links to the new political elite in Cyrenaica, to the Egyptian regime, and especially to the Egyptian military. These connections protect their transactions and allow them to convert illicit profits into legal investments in Libya (and Egypt). In addition, the enormous profits enable them to occupy privileged positions in Cyrenaica, displacing older elites and becoming oligarch-like figures in business, politics, and society. Wolfram Lacher42 shows how entrepreneurs and the emerging new elites are part of an ongoing privatisation of the state in Cyrenaica. This process reproduces old patterns of the Qadhafi era, such as personalisation and patronage based on kinship networks, albeit with new personnel.

14However, like the rest of Libya, Cyrenaica’s economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues43. As most of Libya’s oil reserves are located in Cyrenaica, many actors claim a greater share of the oil rent for Cyrenaica. These claims are linked to the politicisation of regional identity and the creation of Tripolitania as an adversary by Cyrenaican federalists and separatists.

15One of the most interesting institutions in which the full complexity of heterarchic relations and the basic pattern of the real practice of governance in Cyrenaica can be observed is the marbu‘a (pl. marabi‘), the men’s space and the room where guests are received in the Cyrenaican house. Traditionally, the marbu‘a was the part of the Bedouin tent reserved for men and guests. With sedentarisation, it became part of the new Cyrenaican house and has a strong cultural significance for the people of Cyrenaica. In its current form, the marbu‘a represents the transformation of the Bedouin tent tradition into new settings and needs. It is to the marbu‘a that local (tribal) politicians invite allied or rival local politicians, individuals, and groups concerned with political and legal issues. Since 2011, the marbu‘a has also become the practical and symbolic site where local and regional politics and the production of order take place. Thus, much of the political practices in Cyrenaica could also be described as “politics of the marbu‘a”44. 

16The politics of the marbu‘a represent the complexity of heterarchic political orders: the marbu‘a politics can take place within the state and represent sovereign non-state conduct, or can operate in an intermediate position between the (tribal) population and the state. The case of the Arab Spring and the subsequent civil war in Libya shows that it can also replace the state and maintain order over longer periods of time. The marabi‘ are certainly not power-free zones where a discourse between equals takes place. Although inferior men also have the right to be heard and to articulate their point of view, this does not mean that their demands are actually taken into account. In particular, women are traditionally not allowed in the marbu‘a, and it can be difficult and challenging for female actors to insist on attending meetings. The unequal distribution of power between the various kinship groups and tribes in Cyrenaica is also reflected in the way politics are negotiated in the marbu‘a. The voice of the powerful is simply louder, and their ability to influence political decisions in their favour is considerable. While the politics of the marbu‘a is part of this power setting, it does not transcend it. Nevertheless, different groups and actors negotiate politics with each other and come to decisions and binding agreements at meetings in the marabi‘, and thus one could call the outcome of the politics of the marbu‘a a “negotiated participative order”45.

17However, the above-mentioned changes in the distribution of power and the allocation of resources pose major challenges for institutions such as the marbu‘a. This is particularly true of the delicate balance of socio-political and economic relations within and between tribes and extended families in Cyrenaica. In Tobruk, a number of extended families and tribal factions benefiting from current economic developments (see above) are seeking to renegotiate the traditional socio-political and economic hierarchy between the ‘Obeidat, the Qutu‘an, and the Minifa tribes46. These attempts can be seen simply as a form of socio-economic change, but they are causing considerable social tension, the consequences of which are yet unknown. In fact, they have led to considerable fears of possible inter-tribal conflict in a city that has traditionally enjoyed local and even transregional stability (i. e. across the border in Egypt). 

18As noted above, academic interest in civil servants in Africa has increased in recent years47. In addition to the concrete practices of civil servants, researchers are also interested in their motivations, rationales, and professional ethics and values48. Today, public servants in Cyrenaica represent the remains of bureaucracy and state order in that the region. However, they currently face enormous challenges. Coming from a history of Qadhafi’s anti-state rhetoric and hostility to bureaucracy, the disintegration of the Libyan state after 2011 has left civil servants in a precarious situation. Without budgets and clear options for action, civil servants of Cyrenaica are manoeuvring between powerlessness, informalisation, and privatisation of the state. However, apart from those who merely seek to profit from the current situation or who owe their positions to patronage and clientelism, there is a significant group of genuine civil servants who certainly meet the criteria of Max Weber’s rational bureaucracy49. It is too early to say what role these officials will play in the future. As a functional elite with concrete knowledge of bureaucratic administration, they could play a role in the rehabilitation of statehood in Cyrenaica. It is also possible that they will have to operate permanently in an informalised and privatised state.

19However, despite notions of fragmentation50, failure and disintegration in Libya, municipalities in Cyrenaica, and indeed throughout the country, have managed local communities remarkably well in the absence of police, state security and formal armed forces. In most cities, public servants are now working with non-state actors and marabi‘ politicians in the production of political order. For the Libyan political scientist Ali Abdullatif Ahmida51, this development is linked to a long tradition of self-organisation in Libyan society. This self-organisation and its agency are rooted in, among other things, local identity, kinship and tribal organisation.

The Making of Identity in Cyrenaica

20The construction of identity and the invention or reinvention of tradition52 have long been core issues in social anthropological research and in political culture studies by political scientists53. In political science, identity is often seen as the basis for the formation of the nation-state and societies in general. Since 1951, the issue of identity in Libya has been directly linked to Islam and Arabism at the national level, which were seen as alternatives to local identities based on ethnicity, cities, tribes and regions54. The political socialisation process introduced by the Libyan monarchical regime (1951-1969) through the school curriculum and the media played a crucial role in inculcating values associated with Arab nationalism and Arabism, influenced by the Egyptian revolution in the 1950s and 1960s55. However, there is strong evidence to suggest that during the period of the Libyan monarchy, Libyans were also very attached to sources of local identity such as tribalism and regionalism, especially in Cyrenaica.

21During the Qadhafi era, the ideological factor played a crucial role in imposing the same two sources of identity – Arabism and Islam – on Libyans. For many Libyans, the two concepts are the same, or at least closely related. This very much reflected the ideology of the Qadhafi regime, which was transmitted through re-education and socialisation programmes via school curricula, the mass media and the personal meetings that Qadhafi held with different strata of Libyan society56. After the fall of Qadhafi in 2011, the question of identity became a political issue. Local and sub-identities were highlighted and became a source of conflict. Regionalism, ethnicity (Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg) and tribalism became strong sources of identity and were used as tools to achieve demands at local and national levels. Yet this trend was rooted in the unwillingness of the emerging political elites after 2011 to mediate between conflicting identity politics. Instead of finding solutions to these problems, these elites often mobilised regional and local forces for their own political purposes57.

22The highly sensitive nature of the issue of identity in Libya has often discouraged researchers from exploring the topic. However, some research has been conducted; in the mid-1990s, Amal S. Obeidi conducted a survey of 500 Libyan students at the University of Benghazi to explore their attitudes towards identity. The results of the survey showed that Libyan students were very attached to Islam and Arabism, and also to some localist sources of identity – mainly tribe and city. The lack of a sense of belonging to the state was particularly striking. While another study conducted by Uqba Mariami in 2008 showed the same trends, the results of Abdel Aziz Agila’s research project in 2015 showed that the most important source of identity among Libyans was Islam, and that Arabism was significantly less important. Moreover, since the Libyan revolution in 2011, several sub-sources of identity related to ethnic groups such as Amazigh, Tuareg, and Tebu have emerged58. Today, the question of identity has become a political issue and one of the main sources of conflict in Libya. This was obvious in the process of drafting the constitution in 2017. This constitutional process failed to resolve numerous issues, including the constitutional status of minority languages in Libya, the question of decentralisation, and the equitable participation of all ethnic and regional groups in the Libyan economy. The process was further hampered by the violent conflict in the country59.

23However, Libyan scholars have underestimated the issue of identity in general and tribal identity in particular. At the international level, primordial notions of “tribes and tribalism” still play an important role60. Scholars such as Ali Ahmida have even argued that:

[…] the literature on the Libyan crisis focuses on tribal identities and politics as if the whole society were a collection of fragmented pre-modern tribes. That assumption is a misleading myth that reproduces colonial ideology and orientalist gazes. It is misleading when it assumes that Libyan society comprises tribes that are ageless and not affected by capitalism, social change, urbanization, class formation, gender identity and detribalization during the past 100 years61.

24Although we agree with Ahmida, we are convinced that tribes and tribal identity represent a vital and important socio-political, economic, legal and cultural practice both in Cyrenaica and in Libya in general. However, in our perspective, tribes serve as resources for the formation of “we-group identities”62 or as “relational possibilities”63 that are used to understand and organise the social, political, legal and economic world. Amal S. Obeidi’s book Political Culture in Libya (2001) revealed the importance of tribal identity among young Libyans at the University of Benghazi. Her study even showed how tribal affiliation became an “alternative to civil society”64 in Libya. As in any form of human social organisation, flexibility and innovation are as important as the continual invention of tradition and the production of we-group ideology. This includes the fact that politicians or political movements may fabricate tribal affiliations according to their strategic calculations in order to reinforce their position of power or to gain legitimacy. They may also politicise ethnicity to create movements and enemies.

25In our view, we can currently observe a (re)invention of Cyrenaica as a distinct and independent historical, social and cultural entity65. The renaissance of the tribe and tribal identity in Cyrenaica is closely linked to this. This process represents a development in which local and regional identity and “basic narratives”66 about history and the present are (re)discovered and (re)created. The rise of localism, tribalism and regionalism in Cyrenaica stands in stark contrast to the notion of nationalism and the idea of Libya as a nation-state. Although nationalism still exists among certain actors and groups in Cyrenaica, it has come under pressure from localists, regionalists, federalists and separatists67. The division of the country into opposing political camps and military alliances has turned the question of identity into a political struggle in which not only political allegiance but also regional affiliation becomes decisive. This is particularly true for the opposing forces of Cyrenaica (or East) and Tripolitania (or West), but also for Fezzan, which has been drawn into this conflict dynamic by shifting its political alliances with both sides. Thus, the political struggle for power also involves politicised identity. Cyrenaica is also confronted with the ethno-political awakening of the Tebu68 in the southern areas of the region69.

26The question of how localism, tribal belonging and regionalism relate to remaining notions of nationalism is of utmost relevance. It will determine the future of Libya as a unified nation-state or as an entity characterised by heterarchy and division. In order to understand these questions, it is essential to look at the historical and recent experiences of discrimination, inequality and neglect in Cyrenaica that fuel the emerging identity politics. These experiences relate to Italian colonial crimes in Cyrenaica, which have not been openly addressed or socially negotiated70; the discriminatory policies of Qadhafi; and the trauma caused by the civil war, as well as discrimination based on ethno-political affiliations, as in the case of the Tebu.

27Since 2011, female identity and female political positioning in Cyrenaica have been redefined by neo-traditional, Islamist and authoritarian discourses and practices dominated by men71. These dynamics correspond to women’s experiences of discrimination and the return of conservative gender relations in the aftermath of the Arab Spring across North Africa72. Since 2011, women in Libya in general73 and in Cyrenaica in particular74 have struggled with patriarchal understandings of femininity and gender relations fuelled by male conservatism and often also by political Islam. However, based on our research, we can also say that there has been a systematic resistance and self-assertion by women against these challenges. This applies both to insisting on the emancipatory gains of the Qadhafi era and to concrete resistance to efforts to remove women from leadership positions such as judgeships. If we look beyond activists and politicians and focus on emerging narratives and practices concerning Cyrenaican identity among ordinary people, that is people within extended families and tribal kinship groups, or among the subaltern and non-professionals75, we can also observe a fundamental search for orientation combined with insecurity. But identity construction in Cyrenaica is not just about conflict; it is also about creativity. In the border town of Tobruk, for example, inter-tribal youth groups are currently discussing how to combine and integrate tribal, local and Libyan identity. They see their activities not only as a reformulation of identity, but also as a contribution to the creation of a new Libyan civil society, drawing on both contemporary and traditional elements. What is particularly interesting is that even elements of youth organisations from the Qadhafi era are being used by these groups in their search for new forms of social integration. All this is part of a fundamental renegotiation of Cyrenaica’s identity and society. 

Politics, Practices, and Understandings of Justice

28Georg Elwert76 has argued that the question of justice and conflict resolution is central to social cohesion, trust and reliability in society at the individual and collective levels. Since 2011, conflict resolution in Cyrenaica has shifted from the state into the hands of (neo)traditional authorities through committees formed by tribal sheikhs and based on customary law ‘urf, local politicians, leaders of armed groups77, or based on shari‘a (Islamic law)78. The different actors sometimes work in separate forums, or they overlap and form interconnected institutions. The entanglement of the forums is further enhanced by the fact that the actors have multiple and simultaneous identities and positions79. However, civil society activists are only occasionally invited to participate in the reconciliation processes80. This development is partly rooted in the history of legal pluralism in Cyrenaica81, but also reflects the dynamics of the recent conflict. With the concept of “legal pluralism”82, social anthropology introduced an approach to better understand legal systems in which different legal models and practices operate in parallel, establish a division of labour, or compete with each other. Klute and Embaló83 have analysed how the current emergence of socio-political orders within and alongside existing state structures in Africa affects conflict resolution. These authors have been particularly interested in the ways in which the “violence problem”84 is solved85. In their view, solutions to the violence problem vary widely, ranging from avoidance and regulated forms of intrasocial violence, such as feuds, to coercive intervention by central powers. In this context, codified state law is only one option among a variety of legal practices. In political science, on the other hand, the notion of transitional justice has played an important role, especially after the upheavals associated with the Arab Spring86. Transitional justice refers to processes, practices and forms of organisation that aim to address the crimes of a community’s violent past following socio-political transition, in order to support the process of transition from dictatorship to democracy or from war to peace. The 2011 uprising against Qadhafi brought with it high hopes not only for democratisation, but also for transitional justice to address the many abuses that had taken place in the country, both during the uprisings and in the decades before. Protesters demanded not only the removal of a corrupt and abusive leader, but also the protection of human rights in general, including socio-economic, civil and political rights87. The concept of transitional justice has a clear normative standpoint that differs from the empirical and relativistic perspective of legal pluralism in social anthropology. However, the combination of both perspectives is also instructive. In Cyrenaica, individual and collective “disenchantment and grievance”88 about justice and reconciliation before, during and especially after the uprising against Qadhafi, is a widespread phenomenon. The search for conflict resolution and justice has become a major challenge for the population in general and the underprivileged in particular. At the same time, collective and individual experiences of victimisation and trauma related to the ongoing conflicts in Libya remain legally unresolved.

29From an anthropological perspective, the “real practice and understanding of justice” in Cyrenaica is shaped by legal pluralism89. Nevertheless, the tension between de facto legal pluralism and the demands of civil society and activists for transitional justice also highlights a crucial legal-political conflict in Cyrenaica90.

30Access to justice in Libya can take place through a number of different channels and mechanisms, one of which is the state judicial system. However, for many decades this system has failed to meet its international legal obligations regarding the independence of the judiciary and has been continuously undermined by executive interference, corruption and inadequate capacity building, resulting in a shortage of properly trained staff91.

31The Libyan judiciary was also adversely affected by the establishment of a parallel court system during the Qadhafi era, including the People’s Court, established in 1971 to try members of the former Libyan royal family and officials of the monarchical regime. Other parallel institutions included military and revolutionary courts, which tried cases related to political crimes against the regime. All this directly undermined the independence of the judiciary and public confidence in its decisions92.

32Despite the negative aspects that affected the judicial system during the Qadhafi era, the regime adopted a number of laws that promoted women’s participation in the judiciary, including Law n° 8 of 1989, Article 1 of which states that:

Women may take up positions in the judicial system, including posts within the public prosecution service and in the administration of justice, under the same terms and conditions as men.

33However, since 2011, there has been a decline in the number of women working in the Libyan judicial system, and two petitions have been filed challenging the right of women to hold positions in the judiciary. In addition, a number of women’s rights defenders and public figures have been kidnapped or assassinated93. 

34Another channel of access to justice is through non-state institutions, namely tribal councils that operate on the basis of ‘urf (customary law). The number of these councils has increased since 2011. Local reconciliation processes in Libya have generally adhered to traditional resolution mechanisms and principles. Committees are formed by tribal elders directly from the conflict area or by elders from neighbouring tribes acting as third parties. However, these processes are more akin to crisis management mechanisms than genuine reconciliation between parties to a conflict. They seek to end violence and achieve a ceasefire through security guarantees. However, in the context of the politicisation of local conflicts, these tribal councils face difficulties in achieving sustainable reconciliation, and the problems between the conflicting parties often resurface. 

35The results of Amal S. Obeidi’s research on the local reconciliation processes in Libya since 2011, conducted through a series of interviews, showed that 90% of respondents said that none of the reconciliation process they were involved in had failed at the social level, especially in marriage and divorce cases and land disputes94. However, reconciliation initiatives at the national level – dealing with cases of disputes between tribes or conflicts between towns – have been less sucessful according to interviewees. They explained that because transitional justice and national reconciliation are fundamentally linked, there can be no “national reconciliation without justice”95.

36Ninety percent of respondents said that the main challenges to local reconciliation were usually limited compared to those at the national level. Seventy per cent of respondents stated that the challenges facing the reconciliation process at the national level included the proliferation of weapons, armed groups, the intervention of external parties, and the lack of cultural tolerance and reconciliation in society96.

37Despite the strong presence of women in Libya’s judicial system and in the public sphere, their absence from local reconciliation processes is widespread. As we saw in our discussion of marbu‘a politics above, this is due to the fact that it is socially unacceptable for women to participate in meetings, negotiations or reconciliation events that are considered to be the exclusive domain of men. The same also applies to young people, as reconciliation is the preserve of tribal elders.

Final Remarks

38Cyrenaica is irrevocably entangled in the current renegotiation of the political order of Libya. This process is open, contradictory and conflictual. Despite the hardships it has imposed on the Libyan population in general, it is not an exceptional case. Historically, the creation of political orders has rarely been a peaceful process, but rather one marked by controversy, contradiction, fierce antagonism and, not least, violence. The ongoing renegotiation of Libya’s post-colonial and post-independence political, social, economic and legal realities is an enormous challenge. But it is also full of opportunities and possibilities. It may represent a development that signals the end of the European model of the state in some parts of North Africa, but it may also lead to new forms of political order in which local and non-state actors come to terms with central governments, albeit with a much stronger power position and new forms of shared sovereignty between state and non-state political actors and entities97. 

39The issue of the equitable management and distribution of oil revenues at the national level is central to the political economy of Cyrenaica. However, the politicisation of this issue through the ongoing conflicts between the two Libyan governments and the fault lines between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania make it difficult to resolve. In addition, the increasing informalisation of the Cyrenaican economy due to the lack of formal regulation, illegal cross-border trade and the growing clientelism of the new elites pose a challenge, and could lead to further conflict.

40The tension between the de facto legal pluralism and demands for transitional justice is a key legal-political conflict in Cyrenaica, especially as the constitutional process at the national level is also overshadowed and hampered by political conflicts. Although non-state forms of conflict regulation work at the local level, i. e. within kinship groups and between tribes, they have their limits when it comes to resolving conflicts at the regional and national levels. 

41The search for regional identity in Cyrenaica (as well as in Tripolitania and Fezzan) offers many opportunities, but is also fraught with many problems. The question of identity is inextricably linked to fundamental political questions. The relationship between regional identity and national identity touches on the very sensitive issue of national unity or division. However, identity (re)formation does not necessarily have to be exclusive or discriminatory. It can also be the basis for recognition and peaceful exchange. In a country where the question of identity, history, and regional belonging has been shaped by the ideological framework of Qadhafi for many decades, these issues need to be addressed.

42We agree with Ali Abdullatif Ahmida98 that the historically acquired capacity in self-organization of the Libyan people in the face of the incompleteness of the state during the Libyan monarchy and the arbitrariness of the Qadhafi regime will be particularly important here. However, given the early stage of our research, we have to admit that we are not yet in a position to answer these questions fully.