1Until 1999, government policies towards the southernmost border provinces have been constructed in order to force change, so that the Malay Muslims would adapt themselves to the general model promoted by the Thai society. Thai language was heavily promoted and Malay children enrolled in government schools. The local Malay language was marginalized, and the establishment of media using the vernacular discouraged. Pondok were suspected of colluding with insurgents against the Thai state. The overall objective was to make the state feel “safe” by bringing a culturally different portion of the population into the fold.

2A change intervened in 1999, when, under the influence of a group of academics working within the National Security Council, cultural diversity began to be seen not as an impediment but as an opportunity to make the country stronger. From then, changes were not only planned to take place among Malay Muslims, but also among government officers representing the state in the southern region, and beyond, among the Thai Buddhist population. Such a complete attitude reversal takes a long time to crystalize, because cultural prejudices and behavioral patterns are resilient. The first steps taken in this direction can appear as very limited: an introduction of a few hours of Islamic teaching in primary schools, possibility of choosing Rumi Malay as a foreign language in secondary schools, attempts to increase the participation of the Muslim local elites in the decision making processes etc.

3The basis of the new policies is not yet completely clear. Will the state just give some ground in order to appease the tensions, but stay strongly focused on an obstinate defense of the one hundred year old imagined national ideology, Thainess? Or is it ready to open its arms and accommodate a part of the national community which is radically different from the population group emblematic of Thainess? Do the state and Thainess have to be transformed in order to integrate Malay Muslims? Or do the Malay Muslims have to changes themselves in order to accommodate Thainess? If we rely on the 1988 NSC policy document, which said that there was a need to “increase the openness the Muslims’society”, the burden seemed to more on the Malay Muslims side.

4But it is not a one-way road. There has been an interesting research, led by Kritiya Archavanitkul, Deputy-Director of the Institute for Population and Social Research of Mahidol University, studying ways to evolve Thainess so that it could become more relevant to today Thailand.112 Dr Kritiya concludes that “The imagined Thainess, if we refer to bibliographical sources, appears as a large and diverse concept, from history [...] to arts, culture, language and daily way of life, but at the same time this wideness sometimes reflects a certain narrowness, an imagination which is closed on itself and create frustrations for those different. This is a question we have to ask ourselves today.”113

5There seems to be an excessive focus on the standard language in the conception of Thai identity and Thai nationalism. This tends to lead to a narrow and fragile basis to unite people living in a shared territory and to the banning of more inclusive values as foundations of the country unity. As Ernest Renan said in his speech “What is a nation?”:

“This exclusive consideration of the language [...] has its dangers and inconveniences. When it is exaggerated, one closes oneself in a determined culture, given as national; one limits oneself, one shuts oneself up”.114

6Other than remodeling Thainess to make it more open and more flexible, a restructuring of the political arrangements between the southern border provinces and the central state is a possible path to explore. What do the Malay Muslims want? The various surveys point to a desire that their cultural identity be respected at all levels: customs, language, arts and religion, way of life. A degree of political autonomy, under whatever label (in order to preserve sensibilities), would be a way to create a sufficient space for the Muslim population of the deep South to live the way they wish to without derogating to the Thai constitution. Therefore, the choice for the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Muslims can be seen as choice between sharing a common destiny together with an understanding of mutual tolerance and respect, or taking some political or administrative distance from each other and avoid making the effort of putting oneself into question.