1In a country where changes in the power structure are most often limited to a competition between different elite groups, the rising of the civil society movement in the mid-1990s and especially in the wake of the 1997 constitution has been a major political and social phenomenon. The interests of the bureaucratic-military alliance vis-à-vis the interests of the few, that are led by politicians, was suddenly disturbed by the apparition of new actors, more reflective of people needs. After a lull at the beginning of Thaksin’s administration, these civil society groups have been playing a larger role and have been extremely active in the southernmost provinces. Less constrained by national ideological imperatives and more aware of the “reality on the ground”, their contribution to building a peaceful compromise in the region cannot be ignored. To illustrate this contribution, we have chosen to present two examples of activities by civil society groups.

1 - The Strategic Non-Violence Commission

2As we have seen in Chapter three, an informal advisory committee to the National Security Council had been set up at the end of the 1990s, in order to try to change the approach of the NSC regarding the southern border issue. This committee included a few academics – among them Mark Tamthai – who deeply influenced the content of the 1999-2003 NSC policy on the South.

3When Thaksin became Prime minister, he decided to make this committee more visible and more official. It became the Strategic Non-Violence Commission, which was operating with the support of the Office of the National Security Council, but was only accountable directly to the Prime minister, not to the Secretary General of the NSC. This Commission used its power to push through many regulations in order to appease the tensions in the South, such as the obligation for all officials sent to the border provinces to undergo training on conflict regulations. The Commission was disbanded in 2007 under the government of Samak Sundaravej.

4When Abhisit came to power at the very end of December 2008, he wanted to revive the Commission, but not as part of the official government structure. The Strategic Non-Violence Commission became a think tank of a very new kind in Thailand, financed by the Thai Research Fund. Its role was not to propose policies or to contribute new data, but rather to give critical advice about how to “strengthen processes” in order to help this or that proposal actually being accepted by the different parties and implemented. “Our work now is about analysing some new directions which are taking place and to make suggestions to policy makers. We are more interested in the process than in the substance. For instance, several propositions have been done on “local governance”, we are trying to give advice about how to make them go forward so that they are not killed from the beginning”, says Mark Tamthai, deputy-chairman of the Commission.109

5For instance, regarding the peace talks taking place between insurgents and representative of the Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government, the Commission suggested that the dialogue should not take place only between the movement and the government, but also between the movement and civil society groups. Concretely, the Commission asked the government not to black list the members of civil society groups who enter into contact with insurgent leaders. Another suggestion dealt with the advisory council of the SBPAC, after the passing of the 2010 law. The Commission insisted that the advisory council should also have decision making powers; otherwise its role would be viewed as useless.

6The overall philosophy behind the setting up of this new think tank is that proposals for a solution to the conflict are well known, and have been for decades: autonomy, decentralization, language policy, political participation etc. Therefore, the issue is not so much to find new ideas, but rather to help these existing initiatives progress. The Commission is also adamant that the most legitimate interlocutors of the authorities must be the people of the southern border provinces themselves, and not academics from Bangkok or Muslim elites for the South. According to Mark Tamthai, the better way to know if we are progressing towards a solution is not to examine the monthly average of violent incidents, but rather to see if “there are more pieces being put in place, little by little, which will help achieve a solution”. “Contrary to some other conflicts, I don’t think this conflict will end by the different parties signing an agreement, but by things being better in the South and by a change in the government’s attitude”, he says.

2 - A Proposal of “Special Local Governance”

7Proposals of a reframing of the political relationship between the southernmost provinces and the central state have been steadily presented as a possible way out of the Thai-Malay conflict. The earliest instance was the “seven demands of Haji Sulong”, and, as we have seen in chapter one, it was devised by a committee of local leaders without much consultation of the people.110 But since 2009, several new proposals for a change in the political framework have been done either by political parties or by civil society groups. Among these proposals, one has been promoted by 23 groups of the civil society, active in Southern Thailand, and supported by the King Prajadhipok Institute (KPI); it appears a promising initiative. This proposal has been conceived after extensive consultation of the local residents in the three provinces through workshops and focus groups in 2009 and 2010.

8The main idea is to implement a “special type of local governance” for the three provinces, following the model already in place in Bangkok and Pattaya. It means a direct election for governors and the establishment of people’s assemblies. In one of its version, the proposal would borrow the concept of monthon or “cluster of provinces” implemented under King Rama V during the administrative reform at the beginning of the 20^th century. Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat would be regrouped in one entity managed by one elected governor. A council of religious leaders would advise both the governor and the people’s assembly, also directly elected, on matters which have religious implications. In another version, each of the three provinces would have its own elected governor.

9Alongside this administrative reform, the educational system would also be restructured with the introduction of a bilingual system, using Thai and Malay. Malay would become an official language, in parallel with Thai, and both languages used throughout primary and secondary levels.

10At the time of printing of this paper, the proposal had not been fully finalised yet. Dr. Srisompob Jitpiromsri, dean of the faculty of political sciences at the Prince of Songkhla University, Pattani Campus, who has been an advisor to the civil society groups, explained that the proposal will be presented under the banner of decentralization, and not of autonomy, as this latter term is often confused in the Thai language with independence.111 Even then, there could be a strong reluctance from the authorities, especially the military, to accept the initiative. “Some military and other conservative groups see decentralization as contrary to the idea of the monarchy; they confuse unitary state and monarchy”, says Dr Srisompob Jitpiromsri. After having been disseminated through a campaign of information, the proposal, endorsed by 10,000 signatories, should be forwarded as a bill to the parliament after the June 2011 elections.