1 - Surayud Chulanont’s Government (2006-2007)

1.1 - The Policy Documents

1The Coup of 19^th September 2006 put an end to Thaksin Shinawatra’s government and to his policy of open confrontation in the South. Immediately after his appointment, General Surayud Chulanont, the new Prime minister, announced a new policy for the Southern border provinces. He said that the unrest was rooted in the “historical injustice” done to the local people and that only a solution to this issue would appease the tensions – a strikingly new language from the mouth of an official of the Thai government. He also announced an end to the controversial policy of “black lists” implemented by Thaksin, a process whereby suspected militants were arrested on the basis of blacks lists established by the military and supported by weak intelligence.

2Nevertheless, the Southern issue was barely mentioned in the policy documents published by the new government. The Policy Statement of the Council of Ministers of 3^rd November 2006 devoted only two lines to the topic, saying that the “critical issue” of the South had to be solved following the royal advice “understand, empathize and develop.”95 In the same way, the Briefing on Policies and Directions of the Ministry of Defence of 6^th November 2006 brandished the royal mantra, gave the overall responsibility for the region to the Internal Security Operational Command (ISOC, headed by army chief and Coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin) and reestablished the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center (SBPAC) and the Civilian-Military-Police task force or CPM 43.96 Remarkably, there was no mention at all of the National Reconciliation Commission’s Report despite the fact that the army chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, had given vocal support to the NRC under Thaksin’s government.

3These policies statement were followed by two Prime Ministerial orders, 206 and 207, which framed in more details the approach of the coup-installed government concerning the southern border issue. It recognized that mistakes were made by the state and that it was necessary to change tack in order to rehabilitate the state authority and legitimacy in the eye of the Malay Muslims. According to Marc Askew, a new “officially sponsored conciliatory text” appeared, “centered on the imperatives to promote ‘justice’, ‘participation’ and ‘peaceful means’”97 and development under the royally endorsed concept of “sufficiency economy”.

4Prime Ministerial Order 207 dealt specifically with the re-establishment of SBPAC. The new SBPAC presented key differences with the one dissolved by Thaksin in 2002. First of all, it was under the authority of ISOC and needed its approbation for all programs, budgetary decisions and disciplinary sanctions against civilians or police officials (military were excluded from SBPAC’s scope). In theory, SBPAC was in charge of the development sector and ISOC in charge of security issues, but the military were very keen on being also involved in development in order to improve their image.

5The force of the old version of SBPAC was its ability to transfer officials who were causing troubles with local people. Moreover, the networks of communications which had been established formerly over a long period between the SBPAC and local religious authorities as well as with Malay community leaders had been annihilated by Thaksin’s destructive policies. CPM 43, in charge of coordinating the work between the Border Patrol Police, the Rangers and the military, was also put under the aegis of ISOC. The result of this change was to take away the power in the region from the hands of the police and of civilian administrators to give it to the army.

6On the 2^nd November 2006, Surayud Chulanont made an historic trip to Pattani, where he addressed a large assembly of local religious and community leaders. On behalf of the Thai State, he presented his excuses for the way the officials had behaved in the past. The atmosphere in the C.S. Pattani hotel’s ballroom where he pronounced the speech was buoyant. Because of the new language used, many in the audience were feeling that a turning point had come. Despite, or maybe because, of this reconciliation speech, the violence caused by insurgents increased notably in the following months in number and intensity, with a wider use of bombs over 15 kilograms. In parallel, the militants’ propaganda focused on denouncing this reconciliation policy as a devious scheme to deceive local Malay Muslims.

1.2 - Analysis of the policy’s implementation

7From the beginning, the new policy promoted by Surayud was hindered by the need to take into account the views of the conservative elements within the security forces and the bureaucracy, but also the opinion of a large part of the Thai population which supported a harsh approach in the South and had never contested Thaksin’s brutal policies. In March 2007, bypassing cabinet’s approval, army chief and Coup leader Sonthi Boonyaratglin appointed military officers as deputy-governors in the three provinces.

8Despite the obstacles, Surayud took a few steps to try to diffuse tensions. A number of suspects under detention were released under bail. Negotiations were tentatively engaged with two historic militant movements, the PULO (Patani United Liberation Organisation) and the BRN-C (National Revolutionary Front-Coordinate).98 As a Coup installed government, Surayud’s government did not have to worry about its political future and, thus, would have been able to push the reconciliation policy further, at the risk of discontenting a part of the population. But he chose to play safe, maybe because some tragic incidents, like the death in January 2007 of Juling Pangamoon, a Buddhist teacher who had been beaten, and subsequently died, by villagers and militants at a school in Narathiwat in May 2006, made it almost impossible to justify more meaningful concessions.

9On the key issue of delivery of justice on past abuses, there was no progress despite the clear recommendations made by the NRC. No military officers were brought to trial for either the Krue Se or the Tak Bai incidents. 42 million Baht was given to the victims’ families under the express condition that they gave up all possibilities of judicial pursuits.99 It was the umpteenth illustration of the impunity of security forces in the recent Thai history.

10Despite the strictures imposed by ISOC, SBPAC was able to launch a large number of development projects – from students scholarships and justice programs to “quality of life” projects – under Surayud Chulanont’s administration and then under his elected successor Samak Sundaravej. It gave some content to the new discourse on reconciliation and justice. The obligation to be under the yoke of ISOC for budgetary matters was nevertheless both an irritant and an impediment for SBPAC officials. Another obstacle was the insecurity prevailing in rural areas, which penalized civilian officials more than the military for the projects implementation. As a consequence, SBPAC officials were quite reluctant to get in touch with villagers on the field, and most seminar and workshops were organized in towns and district centers.100

11The wealth of recommendations made by the NRC served as an inspiration for the more conciliatory policies of Surayud, but was not implemented as such. One of the key recommendations of the NRC – to “declare Pattani-Malay as an additional working language in the southern border provinces to facilitate communications between the people and state authorities” – had been shot down by Prem Tinsulanonda, Chairman of the Privy Council. As a staunch defender of Thainess, he estimated in a speech in 2006 that such a thing was “impossible because Thai is the language of all Thai people.”101 Nevertheless, there was an attempt to include the teaching of Malay language at the kindergarten and primary levels. But the idea was not to upgrade the knowledge of their Malay native language for the children, but rather to “have an efficient teaching method of the Thai language for children using Malay language in their daily life”. And thus, a curriculum was designed to teach Thai by using standard Malay (i.e. the Malay language used in Malaysia, which is different from the Pattani Malay). In any case, the Buddhist teachers felt quite uncomfortable about having to use Malay and giving more space to Malay culture and identity. The scheme was never really implemented.

12Overall, despite a change in tone, the policy of Surayud’s government did not fundamentally alter the situation. The wave of optimism which prevailed immediately after the ousting of Thaksin quickly vanished. Malay Muslims and State officials were as far from each other as they ever were. The argument that Thaksin was the root of all evils in the South – an argument advanced, for instance, by former Thai foreign minister Surin Pitsuwan – was preposterous.

2 - Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government (2008-2011)

2.1 - Policy Statement

13Upon taking office in December 2008, Abhisit Vejjajiva pledged to reclaim the policy on the Southern insurgency from the hands of the military, by allowing the SBPAC to operate independently from ISOC. He used the old ambiguous cold war expression “Politics leading the military” to label his policy. The ambiguity is that under this policy in the 1980s the military got heavily involved in development work both in Northeastern and Southern areas. And since then development has become part and parcel of the “security forces duty”. So, it was not clear if this “Politics leading military policy” was really giving the upper hand to civilian authorities or rather enlarging the scope of military influence.

14A key point of Abhisit’s policy was to free the SBPAC from the yoke of the ISOC and to give to the civilian agency the power to transfer officials, civilians and police officers, without ISOC approval. In his policy statement, he committed to set up a Southern Border Province Administrative office “as a permanent organization”, under the rubric “Urgent policies to be implemented in the first year.”102 Abhisit also declared that he wanted to prioritize issues of justice by “applying a stringent and just judicial process to perpetrators” as well as of economic development. He said that the Southern border provinces will be “designated as special development zones which will receive support from low-interest soft loans, special tax preferences and promotion of Halal industries.”103

15Overall, the new Prime Minister was clearly concerned not to let security concerns hijack the whole policy on the southernmost provinces.

Workers unloading rubber sheets in Yala market (Photo François May, March 2011)

16At the level of structural political reforms, Abhisit took a bold step in June 2009 when he said that he was willing to talk about a special form of local governance. But as we will see, his subsequent actions did not match his words.

17One of the policies which was implemented at the beginning of 2011 was the “quasi-amnesty” policy initiated by the military in the four districts of Songkhla province, where the emergency decree has been lifted and replaced by the Internal Security Act. Section 21 of the Internal Security Act allows ISOC to drop criminal charges against an alleged offender if the confesses and agrees to undergo a “re-education training” of up to six months. This policy resembles closely to the one implemented at the beginning of the 1980s by the government of Prem Tinsulanonda in order to weaken the communist insurgency. As seen in chapter two, there was also an amnesty policy implemented rather efficiently with the southern insurgents in the 1980s, but it was not coupled with a reeducation stint.

2.2 - Analysis of the Policy’s implementation

18Despite his efforts, Abhisit could not fully implement his pledges because his fragile government badly needed the support of the military in light of the Red and Yellow shirt’s political challenges. He was trapped by a paradox: how to reinforce the hand of the civilian authorities in the deep South when those authorities depended fully on the military to maintain themselves at the top of the state?

19The military strongly resisted the plan to strengthen the power of the SBPAC and make it independent from ISOC. Under the leadership of Lt General Pichet Wisaijorn, they established a number of major show case projects in order to assert their crucial role in development. Pichet established a demonstration farm opposite the Sirindhorn military camp in Yala, where he was very keen to bring visiting foreign dignitaries. “This army publicity was an attempt to affirm the military expertise in development, and indirectly perhaps, to contest the government’s claims that civilians could do better.”104

20Up to the vote of the SBPAC’s bill, ISOC had insisted in having control over most of the projects, such as the village development funds project or the jobs creation schemes, even as these projects were, actually, implemented by the SBPAC. For instance, SBPAC gained just 13 per cent of budgeted programs for the year 2009.105 This desire to exert ultimate authority over this flow of funds was a key reason why the military did not want to let the SBPAC acting independently. The huge budget for the South – 199 billion Baht overall from 2004 to 2010–had somehow created what the International Crisis Group calls an “industry of insecurity.”106 As the Indonesian army in Aceh before the tsunami of December 2004, the Thai military did not have strong incentives to bring about a peaceful solution of the Southern conflict because of their keen interests to continue receiving the flow of funds. At the same time, local people consider that they benefit little from this financial flow. The SBPAC bill aimed to break this unwholesome dynamics.

21Another sensitive point was the section of the SBPAC bill stipulating that SBPAC’s secretary general could discipline and transfer misbehaving civilian officials, including police officers but excluding “serving soldiers, prosecutors, Islamic judges and judges”. The expression “serving soldiers” embarrassed the military because the rangers, of which there are a large number deployed in the South, are not technically considered as regular soldiers even if they are hired by the army. The military pushed vigorously and successfully for a change in the wording of the section – putting the term “the military” instead of “serving soldiers.”107 The end result is that the military, in the South as in other parts of the Kingdom, are exempt from review by civilian authorities. This privilege granted to the military encourages impunity. Abhisit’s administration had to make some other key changes to the bill so that the military drop their opposition.

22Despite these alterations, the bill, which was passed by the parliament in November 2010, delineates clearly the responsibility of the military and the SBPAC. The army’s role is limited to the security aspect while the SBPAC is responsible for development and justice, which is a blow to the military who wanted to keep the control of the large budget devoted to development.

23The Abhisit’s government has followed suit on his pledge to focus on development in the region. 63 billion Baht have been allocated for a four-year special development plan. While the focus on development, if effectively implemented, is welcome, one of the dangers is that it gives the impression that pouring money on the South is the way to resolve the conflict. It must not occult the fact that the core issues are linked with the respect of Malay cultural identity, language, political participation and justice.

24On the issue of justice for Human rights abuses, Abhisit’s government was less forthcoming. Two judicial rulings fuelled the feeling of unfair treatment among the local Malay Muslims. Regarding the Tak Bai incident, a court ruled that the security forces had acted in line with their duties and in a justified manner. On the case of Yapha Kaseng, an imam who died while under detention by the military, the court recognized that the cause of the death was physical abuse by military officers “which left him with broken ribs and a ruptured lung while in custody of officers who were carrying out their duties”. Five soldiers were transferred out of the region, but none were prosecuted.

25The delivery in November of an arrest warrant for a ranger suspected of being implicated in a massacre in June of the same year of ten persons at the Al Furqan Mosque was seen as a small positive step: it was the first arrest warrant delivered against a member of the security forces (and against a Buddhist) since 2004. But the police dropped the charges against this ranger in August 2010, further strengthening the feeling of unbalanced delivery of justice in the Southern border provinces.

26The quasi-amnesty policy, initiated by the military, reflects a certain lack of imagination in confronting the Southern insurgency. This old “political tool”, which had been used thirty years ago with the communist insurgents and southern separatists, has been dusted off and put to use again. The reliance on re-education to help solve the Southern issue is indicative of a rather narrow analysis of the conflict: there is no real basis for the Malay Muslims’ demand for a better recognition of their cultural identity and their yearning for some level of political autonomy, but the problem is that they have not yet well understood the goodness of Thainess, and all the benefits of being assimilated in the Thai way of life. This policy worked well in the 1980s, with the communist insurgents who were, for most of them, urban Thais, as well as with the southern separatists who were then organized as guerrillas groups living in the jungle. The amnesty allowed them to “come home”. But it remains to see if the recipe will be as effective for the new generation of militants who are living among the villagers and are, so to say, already at home. According to Abdullah Asis Tade-In, an advisor to the Young Muslim Association of Thailand, those surrendering to the authorities are not militants, but rather people who are on the black lists of suspects established by the security forces.

27As with previous governments, Abhisit’s administration has never had an official policy of negotiating with Southern insurgents. But there have been, at least since 2005, unofficial contacts between representatives of the Thai State and leaders of some militant organisations, as for instance, the talks mediated by former Malaysian Prime minister Mahathir Mohammad on Langkawi Island. One of the difficulties in this process is to determine the exact level of control these organisations – most of them created decades ago and based overseas – have on the militants on the ground. In 2010, negotiations between Thai State representatives and leaders of the PULO and the BRN-C made some progress, and both organisations – regrouped under the umbrella of the Pattani Malay Liberation Movement or PMLM – signed an agreement in January of that year to foster a joint commitment to the search for a political process. In June 2010, these two organisations, as a gesture of goodwill, declared a one-month unilateral cease-fire in three districts of Narathiwat province. Despite the declared truce, a few violent incidents happened in these districts, and the Abhisit’s government considered that there was no certainty about the level of control the PMLM asserted over the militants. Negotiations were suspended for some time, but, according to one well informed source, resumed after a while.108

28The same overly cautious approach of Abhisit’s administration left avenues for a rethinking of the political relationship between the Southern regions and the Central State unexplored. Despite an early mention of his interest for a “special form of local governance”, Abhisit quickly had to comply with the view, held by the military but also by a majority of the Thai population, that any kind of autonomy granted to the three provinces would be a breach of the sacred principle of the Thai unitary state. Even a status of “Special administrative region” with elected governors (as in Bangkok and Pattaya) is considered as unthinkable. Given the nationalistic pressures of the Yellow shirts on Abhisit’s government concerning the contested temple of Preah Vihear, on the Thai-Cambodian border, it is understandable that the Prime minister is not willing to give more fodder to his new political enemies. At the same time, it is clear that without recognizing the failure of the assimilation of the Malay Muslims and the need for a status granting them some kind autonomy at the local political level, the process of reconciliation cannot begin. The Thai State cannot consider the three Southern provinces in the same manner as other provinces of the Kingdom.