1 - The Policy Document

1.1 - Overview

1The National Security Policy for the Southern Border Provinces (1999-2003) is a broad policy document assessing the impact of previous policies on the situation in the Deep South and giving guidelines for the coming five year period. It was produced in 1998, when Khachadpai Burapatana was secretary-general of the ONSC. In it, there is an assessment of the situation in the deep South, defined here as including five provinces – Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat, Songkhla and Satun. Another section articulates a “vision for the resolution of security problems in the Southern Border Provinces”. Cultural and religious issues and the positive value of cultural diversity are discussed.

2The third section goes down one level towards the ground and addresses the actual policy to be implemented by government agencies in the South. Cultural diversity comes up again with “local wisdom” and the importance of all public and private concerns being addressed to contribute to solving the problems.

3The conclusion put the 1999-2003 policy, defined by the ONSC, in perspective with the previous policies followed since 1978 and also elaborated by the NSC.

4The process by which this policy document was devised by the NSC differed markedly from the process used for previous policies. At the end of the 1990s, an informal think tank was established within the National Security Council, gathering some academics around Mark Tamthai, an expert on peace studies. This committee was put in charge of “changing the paradigm” of the National Security Policy on the southern border provinces through taking into account the views of the local population and taking some distance with the usual focus on the state security. Quite a few people within the National Security Council were not so happy with the encroachment by academics on their turf. Despite this reluctance, the advisory committee played the key role in elaborating the 1999-2003 National Security Policy on the southern border provinces.

5According to Mark Tamthai, the starting point of the policy was no longer “what would make the State strong in the South?”, but “what would make people in the South feel safe?”59 Accordingly, this also requested a change in the way the policy was devised; “In order to find out what caused people in the area to feel insecure, afraid, uncomfortable, and distrustful of the authorities, the people had to be consulted. Therefore, a new process that involved the people in the policy decision was added, resulting in meetings between officials and the people, and joint efforts to draft policy proposals.”60 The 1999-2003 policy was the result of wide consultation with government agencies, local agencies and seminars held by public, private and citizen sectors. Those academics involved visited scores of villages and met with different actors from rubber tappers to military officers and religious leaders. Two closely related reasons were found to explain the feelings of insecurity the Malay Muslims harboured: the near impossibility to protest against unfair treatment by government officials because of the fear of being accused of separatism; the confusion made by officials between the demand of their democratic rights by the local people and an alleged sympathy for the separatist movement.61

1.2 - Detailed Analysis

6The tone is given in the introduction of the policy document, signed by Khachadpai Burusapatana. It says that the “people in the region should be able to live as Muslims in Thai society in peace and unity”. This very simple mention is highly significant in that it had never figured in any previous policy documents on the South.

7The document proper starts with a diagnosis: until recently Thai society considered that cultural diversity was a weakness, an impediment to social development. This attitude is rooted in the concept of Thainess, which implied that all residents of Thailand, whatever their ethnic and cultural background, should behave according to the same cultural standard, built around the reverence for monarchy, the use of the standard Thai language and a set of recognized social norms. The policy does not directly challenge the concept of Thainess, but calls for “All people to realize the value of cultural diversity, as a source of power and wisdom which helps create security, peace and sustained development.”62

8Cultural diversity must be seen as a strength, not a weakness. Further down in the document, under the “policy section”, the theme of acceptance of cultural diversity is reiterated: “Build up awareness and understanding for all concerned so that they appreciate the value of cultural diversity as a strong point of the society and a creative power for problem solving and development, enabling them to work together when a problem arises or when danger is near.”63

9These excerpts show clearly that the National Security Council had gone way beyond the passing references to the necessity of “appreciating cultural differences” mentioned in the 1988 and 1994 policy documents. Here, the acceptance and celebration of “cultural diversity” became key instruments for problem solving in the southern border provinces. The expression is repeated eight times in the 1999-2003 policy document.

10The second strong theme of the 1999-2003 National Security Policy for the southern border provinces is the one of “full participation” of all actors involved. Contrary to previous NSC policies which were centred on the needs of the central state, the 1999-2003 policy is clearly people-centred, as stipulated in the document: “The policy focuses on the development of people in society as the centre for the solution of all problems by creating and developing the people’s potential.”64

11The document sets as an objective “the development of the participation of all [...] to take part in development and problem solving, especially public disorder and narcotics problems”. This includes the people, as well as “agencies under central administration, local administration and at the community level”.

Military patrol in Yala city market (Photo Arnaud Dubus, October 2006)

12The document rightly recognizes the importance of the drug issue. This is hardly a new problem; it has been around for a long, long time. And if it is worse in the South than in some other provinces, it is because of the proximity of the Malaysian border but also because of the highest level of corruption among the civil servants sent to the South. Several informants working at the village level and who preferred to stay anonymous affirmed that a sizable number of police officers are heavily involved in drug trafficking.65

13Some other paragraphs are relevant, like the one stipulating that the policy of “Politics Leading Military” should be continued. This slightly ambiguous expression, devised by Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda in 1980, was part of the Thai military doctrine during the cold war and used to affirm the importance of civil operations and development projects in order to quell the communist insurgency.66 In the 1999 Cabinet resolution, it grants the leadership of the Southern policy to the civilian government. This is certainly a step in the right direction in a country where the military have a disturbing tendency to meddle in politics, but it also opens the opportunity for the military to get involved in various development projects in order to “win the hearts and minds” of villagers and even militants – thus lies the ambiguity.

14At the environmental and economic level, the document stipulates the need “to protect and safeguard the way of life of the people in the area, including their livelihood and the conservation of forest resources, mangrove forests and native coastal fishery.”67

15This paragraph shows an understanding that the tensions in Southern Thailand, as well as in Southern Philippines, are often triggered by resentment over the exploitation of local natural resources by large external conglomerates. This is particularly true as far as fisheries are concerned as this economic activity is traditionally a crucial source of income for Muslim villagers.

16The document mostly gives broad guidelines to frame the work of various government agencies and ministries concerning the southern border provinces, but these guidelines are of crucial importance, especially for budgetary reasons. All projects proposed by a ministry or a government agency have to be related to the content of the NSC policy on the south in order to obtain a budgetary allowance from the central government. The change of paradigm in the NSC policy caused a repositioning of a number of projects in the South, but also the discontent of some high ranking civil servants whose projects did not fit the new policy.

2 - Analysis of the Policy’s Implementation

17The more open political atmosphere in the wake of the adoption of the “people’s constitution” in 1997 and the attempts by government agencies to better diagnose the roots of the unrest in the Malay South, led to an improvement of the situation. Some positive changes were done within the education system, albeit the use of Malay language in government schools was still banned.68 Overall, Malay Muslims felt that their voice could be better heard than before, through their representatives, within the political system. The active membership of the insurgency movement continued apparently to decrease and the government encouraged local politicians to participate more actively in national politics.

18By the turn of the century, many analysts assessed that the newly found peace was there to stay. Overall, when Thaksin Shinawatra came to power at the beginning of 2001, the situation had steadily improved. It all changed for the worse at an amazing speed due to one key policy of Thaksin’s at the provincial level: “Governors as CEO programs.”69 Governors were supposed to be more decisive without bothering about bureaucratic guidelines or the supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

Border Patrol Police protecting a school in Narathiwat Province (Photo Arnaud Dubus, 2005)

19This new mindset led, as we will see in the next chapter, to the dissolution of the Southern Border Provincial Administrative Centre (SBPAC), the agency under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, who had overall administrative authority over the southernmost provinces. Despite its vital role as a link between the local Malay Muslims and the government, the SBPAC presented itself a number of weaknesses. Because of corruption and central government neglect during the 1990s, the intelligence capacity of SBPAC and CPM 43 was lessened and they were unable to spot the emergence of new militant groups from the mid-1990s.75 The co-optation of Muslim leaders by the SBPAC, while closing the gap between Muslim elites and high ranking government officials, also led to a loss of credibility of these leaders among the Malay villagers. The new generation of militants exploited this gap.76

20An added element was the state policy that violence was a legitimate means to resolve issues like personal conflicts or drug trafficking in the South, as later graphically illustrated by the “war on drugs” at the beginning of 2003. It created an environment where “violence became the only way to settle conflicts”, which also had a deep influence on the local youth.77

21These first missteps were compounded by further poor judgment by the administration. In 2002 and 2003, the number of killings of government officials in the South rose to fifty, a toll not seen since the beginning of the 1980s. But the administration insisted that criminal gangs were the culprits and refused to acknowledge a resurgence of the insurgent movement. It is only after a daring raid by insurgents against a military camp in Narathiwat province in January 2004 that the government began to recognize that Thailand was again confronting separatist activity.