Indonesia

1. Introduction

1In the 2004 general election, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) found itself in the limelight of domestic as well as international media, when its share of national votes surprisingly increased to 7.4%, from previously 1.7% in 1999. It drew wide attention not because of its huge electoral success, which was also experienced by another new democratic party, but rather because of its overt Islamist ideology (Aguswandi, 2006). The PKS is one of the most conservative Islamic parties in the country, adopting a political ideology and agenda of gradual Islamisation from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimun). It sparked controversies at the domestic level because it reminded Indonesians of the divisive and costly political battle between Islamist politicians who want to insert religious provisions into the constitutions and the nationalists and communists who vehemently reject it. In addition, the party claims religious authority upon its members and followers, which causes it to collide with a number of Islamic mass organisations.

2Its electoral success also triggered anxiety at the international level. Analysts and reporters worried that an Islamist party like the PKS, with a strong agenda of Islamisation, would jeopardise the prospect of democratisation in the country. A journalist even wrote articles suggesting that ballots for the PKS were as threatening to democracy in Indonesia as bullets for the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist organisation (Dumme, 2005). Indeed, students of party studies have labelled the Islamist party a “democratic dilemma” in which their ideology contains elements incompatible with democratic values, such as a proselytising tendency and an unfavourable perspective on gender equality. It is dilemmic because allowing such parties to take part in and play an important — let alone dominant — role in the political system could mean democratic suicide. Yet banning them would also be an undemocratic option as it would disenfranchise a significant portion of the community (Jonasson, 2004). When the party confidently targeted 20% in the 2009 election and prepared to nominate its own candidate for presidency, the public waited in apprehension.

3The result of last January's election, when the PKS' share of votes increased only slightly to 7.8%, has however caused mixed reactions. In fact, this result is contradictory. On the one hand it is still quite an achievement given how other Islamic parties fared and the fact that the PKS is now the biggest Islamic party around. The National Awakening Party (PKB) of former president Abdurrahman Wahid held fourth position in the 2004 election with 12% of votes, which dropped to 5%; the United Development Party's (PPP) votes dropped from 10% to 6%; the share of the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Amien Rais also fell from 7% in 2004 into 6% in 2009; the Crescent Stars Party's (PBB) from 3% to 1%; and the Reform Star Party's (PBR) from 3% to 1%. The last two parties even failed to pass the electoral threshold and were not eligible for the next election. On the other hand, it can be said that the PKS failed if one refers to the fact that votes increased only slightly and disproportionately to the larger growth in the number of supporters and funding, particularly in comparison to previous election campaigns.

4This article will discuss the electoral performance of the PKS in the 2009 elections in the context of the downturn of political Islam. It will start with an extensive exploration of the history of the party, its ideological orientation, its place on the map of Muslim politics in Indonesia, its organisational structures as well as its political behaviour on national and local levels. The article will then explore a number of interconnected factors that determined the electoral results obtained by the political parties during the last election and examine three factors: the general trend of ideological dealignment and salient political competition, the failure of Islamic parties to formulate empirical programmes that respond to the real need of their constituents and the popularity magnet, Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. It will also argue that electoral failure does not signify the end for Islamic parties, especially for the PKS. Democracy is a political system specifically designed to provide opportunities for losers to take revenge and win in the following rounds, provided they can improve the parties’organisational robustness and are able to formulate responsive policies. However, if Islamic parties are unable to produce the two requirements they will not only endanger their own prospects during the next elections, but more dangerously, they will foster the emergence of radical Islamism as an outlet for disappointed Muslim constituents.

2. The PKS and Political Islam in Indonesia

2.1. The Origin and Development of the PKS

5The story of the PKS started with a network of student activist groups popular on university campuses during the 1970s and 1980s, known as the Tarbiyah movement. The Arabic word tarbiyah literally means “education”, but in the context of the movement it has at least two meanings: Firstly, it refers to activities in relation to religious studies. Supporters of the movement — who were by and large students of secular universities and colleges — organised extracurricular classes studying “traditional” subjects of Islamic studies: such as tauhid (theology), syariah (rituals), ahlaq (ethics), tarikh (Islamic history), and siyasah (politics). For students of secular universities these subjects appeared novel and interesting. Secondly, tarbiyah also represents a political agenda to build an Islamic society through an evolutionary process. The scenario is that the ummah or Islamic community should be built from the bottom up: by nurturing Islamic individuals, who then form Islamic families as the basic units for socialising Islamic values and preparing the new Islamic generation. Those model families will then constitute an Islamic society where Islamic values become public norms. At this point, demands for the implementation of an Islamic polity and Islamic public policies are just a matter of time (Abdulaziz et al., 1996).

6There are three different versions of the story of the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement. The first version claims that it was rooted in the activities initiated at Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). One of its founders was Dr. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim — a.k.a. Bang Imad or Brother Imad — who introduced to the Salman community the thoughts and organisational traditions of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that were to shape the way the community organised its activities, not only as a centre for learning and studying Islam but also as a laboratory for developing an Islamic way of life for individuals (learning and studying Islam), families (marriage counselling, childcare and children education) and society (Islamic business, Islamic banking, Islamic politics etc.). It was this model which was then copied by other universities in major cities across the country (Djamas, 1989: 207-86).

7The second version suggests that the Tarbiyah movement was a product of a religious propagation project (da’wa) embarked on by the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), an organisation founded by a number of ex-Masyumi leaders after the New Order regime rejected their demand to rehabilitate the biggest Muslim party that had been disbanded by Sukarno in 1960 because of the involvement of a number of its leaders in the PRRI regional revolt. Thwarted from power politics, Mohammad Natsir, and other senior Masyumi figures such as Mohammad Roem, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara turned to religious propagation activities instead. Firstly, the DDII actively contributed to the building and development of mosques and Islamic communities on secular campuses. These eventually came to constitute the Tarbiyah network. Secondly, the DDII was assigned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to organise scholarships to Middle Eastern universities, especially to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Among the students sent by the DDII was Abdi Sumaiti a.k.a. Abu Ridho who became the ideologist and key figure in the Tarbiyah movement and later in the PKS. Lastly, the DDII translated and published works of major contemporary Middle Eastern authors, including Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutub and Said Hawwa. Their books came to represent the canon for Tarbiyah members (Furkon, 2005).

8The third version suggests that the Tarbiyah movement was initiated by graduates of Middle Eastern universities who returned to Indonesia in the early 1980s and who included Hilmy Aminuddin, Salim Segaf Al-Jufri, Abdullah Said Baharmus, and Acep Abdul Syukur — later joined by Abdi Sumaithi, Rahmad Abdullah, and Yusuf Supendi (Salman, 2006: 189-1990). The organisation was founded to respond to government policies repressing Islamic radicalism and student activism in the mid 1970s, which made Muslim students victims of double repressions. To secure the regime’s domination in the upcoming 1977 election, the state intelligence agency under Ali Murtopo secretly mobilised remnants of the Darul Islam rebel networks with the purpose of anticipating the re-emergence of the communists, and their migration from mainland Southeast Asia to Indonesia, after the fall of Vietnam in 1975. A number of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested hundreds of people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called Komando Jihad, committed to following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII) (ICG: 2002: 5). The real purpose of the move was to discredit political Islam before the election. Simultaneously, the government curbed political activities on university campuses by enacting the so-called Normalisation of Campus Life/Student Coordination Body (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan, NKK/BKK), anticipating the mounting protests by students against government policies that could repeat the chaos of the student protests of January 1974 (Schwarz, 1999: 33-35; Kingsbury, 2002: 84-86).

9At this point, it is safer to view the three versions as complimentary rather than contradictory. Studies on the origin of political Islam in the contemporary Muslim world also take into account the following three factors: Firstly, contemporary political Islam has its roots in the introduction of the modern secular education system. In their classic study on Muslim politics, Eickelman and Piscatory found that modernisation had produced the contradictory effect of motivating religious interests among Muslim students — what they call the “Objectification of Muslim Consciousness” (Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 5-20). Secondly, there were also contributions from the veterans of pre-independent Muslim politics whose political carriers were thwarted by postcolonial secular regimes. A study by Imaduddin Shahin on political Islam in North Africa shows that, during the period of struggles for independence from colonial occupations, Muslim leaders contributed significantly to the mobilisation of mass support for the struggles. However, they were denied political rights in the postcolonial governments. They were even systematically discriminated against and marginalised by the status quo in their respective countries — and they switched from struggles in power politics to da’wa (Shahin, 1998: 34-47). Thirdly, the contributions of students and the ulama who have returned from the Middle East have always been substantial in Muslim politics and social reform in Indonesian history. In the late 19^th century a group of Middle Eastern returnees embarked on a programme of social and religious reform in West Sumatra, known as the Paderi movement. In the early 20^th century other returnees introduced the ideas of Islamic modernism advanced by Muhammad Abduh and founded Muhammadiyah. Thus nothing was new when, during the 1970s, another generation of Middle Eastern graduates initiated another new sociopolitical religious movement (Reid, 1967: 269-273; Bubalo and Fealy, 2005: 55).

10During the 1980s the movement was a clandestine organisation hardly known to outsiders. However, the situation changed in 1990, when a number of prominent Muslims in the country founded the Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI) and elected the then Minister of Science and Technology, B.J. Habibie, as chairman. This moment was very crucial politically since it marked a new era of political alliance between Suharto and the Muslim community. A legion of prominent Muslim figures and intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais, Dawam Raharjo, Adi Sasono — to name but few — were members of the organisation. This represented the massive surge of Muslim politics in Indonesian history at the close of the century. A leading member of the association even boasted that it was the third moment in the century when Indonesian Muslims joined forces to form an organisation representing Indonesian Islam after the formation of Central Sarekat Islam (CSI) in 1914. The organisation had originally started out at the local level as Sarekat Islam in 1912, later becoming a national level organisation in the form of the CSI (Ramage, 1995: 77).2

11The friendly political atmosphere of the 1990s allowed supporters of the Tarbiyah community to publicise their activities. Firstly, they founded “Nurul Fikri” in Jakarta, an association providing study assistance (bimbingan belajar) to high school students in their preparation to enroll in university. The organisation was led by Suharna Suriapranata in collaboration with Hilmy Aminuddin. Tarbiyah activists, coordinated by Abul Hasib Hasan, also founded an Islamic boarding school, Al-Hikmah, in South Jakarta. In addition, they set up “Khairu Ummah”, an organisation that provided preachers for religious speeches and propagations (lembaga dakwah) led by Yusuf Supendi (Damanik, 2002: 152-157). Secondly, they promoted the publication of magazines, the most well known of which was Sabili magazine, founded by Zainal Muttaqien and Rahmat Abdullah (Damanik, 2002: 158-160). Thirdly, they set up Studies and Information of Contemporary Islamic World (SIDIK, or Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer) — organised by the chairman of the PKS in Parliament, Mahfudz Sidiq — a think-tank that provided information and analyses on international Islam, especially on conflict areas such as Palestine, Afghanistan and Bosnia. (Damanik, 2002: 169-175). Fourthly, by the mid 1990s Tarbiyah activists started to dominate university student organisations on major campuses in cities like Jakarta, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya. Major figures were the PKS MPs Zulkieflimansyah and Rama Pratama. Finally, when Indonesia was hit by financial crisis and resentment toward the government started to mount, the network of Tarbiyah activists from various campuses across the country formed the Action Union for Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia) in March 1998. PKS MPs Fahri Hamzah and Andi Rahmat were former KAMMI chairmen (Siddiq, 2003).

12The regime changed after Suharto’s resignation on March 21^st 1998. Vice president Habibie took charge of the presidency, forming what many believed to be a transitional government, one of whose main tasks was to prepare democratic elections. Joining the euphoria of democratisation, Tarbiyah activists founded a political party named Justice Party (Partai Keadilan) in Jakarta on 20^th July 1998. The declaration was signed by 52 activists from different backgrounds. Most of them were university graduates from Indonesia and abroad. Three of them held PhD degrees, five of them were women, and one person was of ethnic Chinese descent. Nur Machmudi Ismail (then 37 years old), who holds a doctoral degree in food production technology, was elected to the post of party president (Damanik, 2002: 231-232).

13In January 1999 the government passed an election bill that set the requirements allowing parties to participate in the elections. Creating a political party was relatively easy. The conditions included: the signatures of at least fifty citizens aged twenty-one or over, plus registration with a court and the Ministry of Justice, which was then recorded in the government gazette (lembaran negara). However, in order to be able to present in the elections, parties needed to complete a more difficult task: to have branches in one-third or nine of the provinces and half of the district or municipalities in each of those provinces. In addition, the law also stipulated a threshold, with delayed effect, of a minimum of 2% of national votes to be able to participate in the next election of 2004 (King, 2003: 51). Although creating a party was relatively easy for the Tarbiyah community, meeting requirements to establish branches in half of the districts in nine provinces was a Herculean task that forced them to do their outmost. At provincial level the task was still easy, yet in setting up organisational branches at district levels they could not rely on their own network, and needed to recruit personnel externally. As a consequence, the party fared poorly in the 1999 general election, collected only 1.7% of the national votes and failed to pass the electoral threshold — though it still managed to obtain seven seats in the parliament (Permata, 2008:107-108).

14Following the PK’s failure to pass the electoral threshold and hence its inability to participate in the next election, the Tarbiyah community founded a new party named Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Jakarta on 20^th April 2002, with Al-Muzammil Yusuf as chairman and Hario Setyoko as general secretary. Among the 50 founders were Umar Salim, Zulkifliemansyah and Suswono (THE PKS, 2004). The smoothness of the merging process indicated that the PKS was carefully prepared to function as a new political vehicle for the Tarbiyah community after the failure of the PK. During the 8^th National Meeting of the PK’s Majelis Syuro in April 2003, the party officially decided to merge with the PKS (Kompas, 16 April 2003).

2.2. Mapping Post-Suharto Islamic Parties

15The emergence of the PKS in Indonesian politics was phenomenal. Even when it garnered only 1.7%, much lower than many other Islamic parties, the media paid special attention to it. In fact, there were many Islamic parties after the collapse of the New Order regime, although only a few have managed to survive to this day. Therefore, in order to find out why the PKS seems so unusual, I will discuss in more detail the map of Islamic parties in Indonesia in this section.

16To begin with, it is rather misleading to classify Islamic parties based exclusively upon their ideological orientations or programmatic platforms (Baswedan 2004: 679-681; Ufen 2005). It is true that, in modern democracies, those two elements are perhaps the most important factors that differentiate political parties from their competitors (Budge-Laver, 1996). In post-Suharto Indonesia, however, this is not the case for at least two reasons: Firstly, Indonesian political culture is patrimonial in character and is seen as being directly linked to interpersonal matters and business. As such, political processes, negotiations, competitions and deals are always done personally and informally, and do not necessarily reflect formal institutional structures or legal procedures. Culture takes precedence over structure (Pye 1985: 111-120). Secondly, most Muslim politicians participating in post-Suharto democratic competitions had no previous experience on the field, and thus they formulated their party ideology and platform based not on experience but rather by borrowing from normative principles or theories of Islamic politics, which are mostly derived from the middle ages of Islamic history. The fact that the majority of Indonesian Muslims follow Sunnite Islam means that the spectrum of interpretation is not very diverse. Thus abstract and normative formulas such as “translating Islamic values into public principles” or “advancing an Islamic Indonesia” or “endorsing good governance and law enforcement based on Islamic spirituality” etc., appeared again and again in the platforms of different Islamic parties, in only slightly different sentences (Amir 2003: 59-188; Setiawan-Nainggolan, 2004).

17Writers sometimes differentiate between Islamic and Muslim-based parties, or Islamist and pluralist Islamic parties. The former category (Islamic or Islamist) refers to political parties that officially adopt Islam as their political ideology, such as the PKS, PPP, PBB, and PBR. While the latter points to parties that do not officially adopt Islam as their ideology they nevertheless receive their main ideological inspiration as well as major constitutional support among Muslim communities. The PKB and PAN are in fact rooted in the two biggest Islamic organisations in the country, i.e. NU and Muhammadiyah respectively. It is also widely assumed that these two categories of Islamic parties represent two distinct ideological orientations in Muslim politics regarding the role of religion in politics. The former is believed to have a conviction that religion is inseparable and has to inform politics, while the latter is regarded as limiting religion to the private domain (Baswedan 2004: 679-681; Ufen 2005). This categorisation, on closer inspection, applies only at a basic level. The former continuously requires Islam to be inserted into the constitution, while the latter consistently rejects it. However, in many other aspects this fails to explain the actual pattern of behaviour of Muslim politicians. For example, regarding the bills on National Education (2003), when Muslim politicians split not along party lines but rather along their religious backgrounds: NU politicians from various parties opposed the bill, while lawmakers with modernist Muslim backgrounds from various parties supported it. This also occurred during the drafting of the controversial Anti Pornography law last year.

18A more effective way to identify the dividing lines of Indonesian Islamic parties is by differentiating them based on the religious trends of their main constituents. Scholars commonly classify Indonesian Muslims according to four major streams, but propose differing terms to designate internal variants within Indonesian Muslim society: Firstly, nominal Muslims, or non-practicing Muslims. It is very important to note here that nominal Muslims in this category do not prefer any sort of secular outlook, but rather, their religious values and practices are heavily influenced by pre-Islamic, Hindu-Buddhist traditions. Thus, sociologically – and not theologically – they are as religious as other Muslim groups, only with a different set of religious symbolisms. Secondly, the traditionalists who follow traditional interpretations of major Muslim scholars and theologians from earlier generations and strongly recognise the special status and authority of the ulama. Thirdly the modernist group that follows a more rational, yet puritan, interpretation of Islam combined with a disbelief in the special status of the ulama. Fourthly, the fundamentalists, who adopt a Qur’anic cosmological history, and believe that they live in a period that dates back to the time of Prophet Muhammad — i.e. a continuation of pre-Islamic Indonesia — and they commonly have a stronger psychological bond with Muslims overseas than with non-Muslim Indonesians (Permata, 2005: 98-107; see also Geertz 1976; von der Mehden 2008: 12).

19The first category of Muslim — the non-practicing kind — seems not to bother whether or not politics should be handled the Islamic way. Thus concern about Islamic politics begins with the second category: the traditionalists. The traditionalists’ common umbrella organisation is Nahdhatul Ulama (or the awakening of the ulama) and the word “awakening” is highly significant for Islamic parties with traditionalist roots. (a) The biggest among traditionalist Islamic parties is the PKB, founded by Abdurrahman Wahid. (b) Another big party rooted in this group is the PPP. Although initially a fusion of traditionalist and modernist parties (especially the NU and the Parmusi) the traditionalist camp has become more dominant since the reform era. (c) Another party belonging to the traditionalist group is the PBR (Partai Bintang Reformasi or Reform Star Party) a PPP offshoot founded in January 2002 resembling the composition of the PPP. It received 2.6% in the 2004 election, but failed to pass the electoral threshold in 2009. (d) The fourth traditionalist party was the PNU (Partai Nahdhatul Ummah or Ummah Awakening Party), founded in 1998, which competed in the 1999 election with 1.09% but failed to pass the electoral threshold in 2004. (e) The fifth party was the PKU (Partai Kebangkitan Ummah or Ummah Awakening Party) founded by Yusuf Hasyim (Abdurrahman Wahid’s uncle) in 1998, and present in the 1999 election but failed to get any seats. (f) The sixth party of this group was the PTII (Partai Thariqah Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Mystical Orders Party), and (g) the seventh party was the PCD (Partai Cinta Damai or Love Peace Party) both of which were founded by followers of mystical orders that make up a significant portion of the traditionalist Muslim group. Both were present in the 1999 election but received no seats. (h) The eighth party was the PKNU (Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama or Ulama National Awakening Party) founded in 2006 as another split from the PKB. (i) The last of the Islamic traditionalist parties was the PPNUI (Partai Persatuan Nahdhatul Ummah Indonesia or Indonesian Ummah Awakening United Party), founded in 2004 as the replacement of the PNU, which failed to pass the electoral threshold.

20The second category of Islamic parties is rooted in the modernist Islamic community. There are three subcategories in this group: Firstly, those who identify themselves as the continuation of the Sarekat Islam, which include: (a) The PSII (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Syarekat Islam Party) originally founded in 1927 and present in the 1955 and 1971 elections. It was revived in 1998, participated in the 1999 elections and received 1 seat in parliament, but failed in 2004. (b) Another party that identified itself as the heir of the glory of the PSI was the PSII 1905 (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905 or Indonesian Syarikat Islam Party of 1905). The year 1905 refers to the initial foundation of the Islamic Commerce Association (SDI, Sarekat Dagang Islam), the embryo of Sarekat Islam (founded in 1911). It joined the 1999 elections but failed to receive a seat. The second category of modernist Islamic parties consists of the romanticists of the Masyumi party from 1960. After the Masyumi was banned, its supporters formed a loose alliance called “Crescent Star Big Family” (KBBB, Keluarga Besar Bulan Bintang — referring to the symbols of the party) to preserve the glorious memory of the party, and which after the regime change in 1998 founded a number of political parties: (c) The biggest one is the PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang or Crescent Star Party) founded by Yusril Ihza Mahendra in 1998. It received 2.8% in 1999, 2.4% in 2004, and but only 1.7% in 2009. (d) The second party of this sort was Partai Masyumi Baru or New Masyumi Party founded by Ridwan Saidi in 1995, and was present in 1999 election but failed to get a seat. (e) The next party of the Masyumi romanticists was the Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (Partai Islam Indonesia Masyumi) which was also present in 1999 but failed to send its representative to the parliament. (f) The last party in this group was the PUI (Partai Ummat Islam or Islamic Ummah Party) founded by prominent scholar Deliar Noer in 1998, but which also failed to get a result in the 1999 election. The third category of modernist Islamic parties is associated with Muhammadiyah: (g) The biggest has been PAN, founded by Amien Rais (former chairman of Muhammadiyah). (h) The next party, and an offshoot of the PAN, is the PMB (Partai Matahari Bangsa or Nation Sun Party) founded in 2006 by younger activists of Muhammadiyah who felt disenfranchised from PAN. It competed in the last election but failed to get seats in the national legislature.

21The third category of Islamic parties is that of the Islamist group, to which the Justice Party (PK) and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) belong. What differentiates this last category from the previous Islamic parties is not so much their political platform, because parties like the PPP or PBB are also pursuing Islamist agendas, but rather its visions on international politics. In the words of a founder of the PKS, the members and supporters of the party represent a new generation of Indonesian Muslims – what he calls “global santri” – who see themselves as an integral part of the dynamics of the Islamic world, thus they also have to actively participate in it. Hence it is unsurprising that PKS supporters have always accorded special attention to events that affect Muslims overseas through rallies, statements, fundraising etc. This is typically related to three main issues: support for the struggle of the Palestinian people, condemnation of Israeli political and military actions, and condemnation of the United States of America as Israel’s allies and for double standard foreign policies with regard to Muslim countries.

3. Ideology and Organisation

3.1. Key Ideological Issues

22Religious interpretation is thus an important factor to understanding the political ideology of the PKS. There are at least three key conceptual points that define the PKS' unique ideological position: its notions on politics, religious pluralism, and gender. It is interesting to see that the party does not use Islam or another Arabic word in its name. It uses the Indonesian word “Keadilan”, meaning “justice”, instead. In fact, the word “justice” summarises what it sees as the most important principle in Islam, adopted from a Qur’anic verse (V: 8): “Justice brings you close to Allah.”

23Furthermore, for the party the word justice has three simultaneous meanings. Firstly, the “cosmic sense” of the word, i.e. that justice refers to the order of the universe. Natural laws are God’s laws since He created them and looks after them. The word “justice” was chosen as the name of the party to affirm the party’s acknowledgement of divine authority. Secondly the “moral sense”, in which justice is the highest ideal of human life. God is the creator and humans are creatures. Therefore, the most appropriate thing for humans to do is to follow God’s guidance — which means embracing Islam. The founders and supporters of the party believe that Islamic teaching is comprehensive, encompassing all aspects of human life. Thirdly, the “technical sense” of the term “justice” is seen as a fundamental law that governs human activities as well. Thus, justice is the most effective way to reign, with injustice representing the road towards total destruction (Permata 2008: 128-129).

24As such, the notion of justice implies that, for the PKS, politics are inseparable from morality, and that moral law is equal to natural law since both are God’s laws. As a consequence, political enterprise must be pursued according to moral laws, i.e. the Qur’anic laws, in the way engineers follow natural laws in building constructions. In fact, there is a key passage in the Qur’an that underlines the political vision of the party (XXIV: 55): “Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the country, as He granted it to those before them…” For the PKS, then, politics is none other than moral enterprise, and therefore it must be handed over not to the hands of clever strategists, but rather to the pious people, or the ulama.3 The party has a unique concept of ulama, however. Unlike other groups, such as the NU and Muhammadiyah, that understood ulama as a special class of learned specialists educated and trained in Islamic studies, for the PKS the word refers more to willingness and spirit rather than expertise. Ulama, therefore, means anyone who has a strong will and passion to follow Islamic teachings (Permata, 2008: 134).

25It is under these understandings of politics and morality that the party calls itself a da’wa party — a party of Islamic propagation. Its political mission is to Islamise society and the polity, because only by abiding by moral laws will Indonesian people be able to solve the multidimensional problems they have been facing. The original statute of the Justice Party (1998) states that the party’s objectives are:

a. To pursue an Islamic system at societal and state level.
b. To establish political communication to persuade people to participate in politics by: (i) building public awareness for the importance of Islamic politics as the solution to the nation’s and the state’s problems, (ii) strengthening the credibility and effectiveness of the communication between the party and society.
c. To establish political cultures by: (i) enhancing the role of Islam as the source of cultural values in politics, (ii) developing egalitarian and democratic patterns of political behaviour, (iii) developing rational political behaviour and (iv) developing an inter-party solidarity.
d. To endorse political participation by: (i) nurturing conditions that could appeal to the people’s willingness for political participation through the PKS. (ii) Preparing a favourable atmosphere to attract the voluntary participation of the people in the party programmes.
e. To build external relations by collaborating in order to achieve goodness and piety, and avoid sins and moral transgressions. Moreover, the relation with other Muslims would be based on a flexible amity (wala), and the connection with infidels would be founded upon strict commitment to the Islamic principles (barra), through: (i) collaboration and loyalty towards the Islamic party, its organisations and its institutions at the national or even at the international level, (ii) active participation in creating conducive conditions for the realisation of collaboration and unity among Muslim organisations, (iii) positive thinking toward other Muslim organisations, (iv) denying a compromise with all institutions flying the flags of infidelity.

26Following the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideological scheme, the PKS formulated stages of the Islamisation agenda into several successive phases called “orbits” (Arabic: mihwar): The first is Ta’sisi, referring to the initial process of the formation of the da’wa movement. The second is Tandzimi, the foundation stage, which refers to the establishment of organisations, including the recruitment of cadres as well as the development of organisational networks. The third is Sya’bi, the socialisation stage, in which the da’wa movement starts to introduce its activities to the wider public, and to openly recruit members. The fourth is Muasasi, the penetration stage, which consists in the participation of the da’wa movement in institutional political processes, such as joining elections. The last stage is Dauly, the government phase, in which da’wa actors eventually occupy governmental positions. These stages are continuous in that the initial ones are preparations of the subsequent ones (Sembiring, 2005; PKS 2008: 50-56).

27Another important ideological issue is the PKS’ view towards religious pluralism or rather its perception of people of other persuasions. At first glance the party documents are ambiguous regarding this topic. On the one hand they seem to endorse political equality among Indonesians – regardless of ethnic, cultural or religious background – under the common umbrella of nationhood. In fact, party membership is open to all Indonesians. The party’s manifesto states:

28It is through the state that human rights are guaranteed, and human dignity is protected equally in spite of different religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds (PK Manifesto, 1998).

29At this point the position becomes obvious that the party acknowledges the equality of the Indonesian people, regardless of their respective background, guaranteeing them similar rights in front of the state and equal treatment. Yet, on the other hand, the party documents often differentiate between the Muslim community and other religious groups within the Indonesian population.

30The Justice Party seeks to crystallise the ideals of the Indonesian nation and represent the spirit of intellectual and social reforms (tajdid and islah). We try our best to become a safe place for everyone who is concerned about what is happening with the Muslim ummah and the Indonesian people (PK Manifesto, 1998).

31Democracy has become the spinal cord of the struggle to accommodate political aspirations of the entire society. Starting from this understanding, we are forming a political party as a vehicle of religious propagation (da’wa), in order to bring about universal ideals and to promote political aspirations especially from the Muslim community and also the Indonesian people in general. This party will from now be called the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS Declaration, 2002).

32The passages clearly show that the PKS differentiates between Muslim and non Muslim actors, and it prioritises the Muslim community without neglecting the interests of other Indonesian people. Of course this is simply a general principle since, in practice, politics are no more than a rivalry of interests. Another notion in the standpoint of the PKS party is that it insists on a “proselytising” ideology. In the first citation, the PKS seeks to promote tajdid and islah - two basic concepts in Islam - which in fact means reforming and developing society in Islamic ways. The newest party platform of 2008 still reiterates the idea that the objective of the party’s political missions is da’wa: propagating Islam through the transformation of Muslim individuals into agents of cultural, social, and structural Islamisation: (i) The social mission of Islamisation will be carried out through the deployment of party activists into society to prepare, persuade and mobilise others to accept an Islamic way of life. (ii) Cultural Islamisation will be achieved through the deployment of party activists into society to empower the people and mobilise their participation in Islamic public activism. (iii) Structural Islamisation will be pursued through the promotion of party cadres into various political and public institutions in legislative, executive as well as judicative sections to implement Islamic policies from the top down (PKS 2008: 36-39)

33Finally, the fundamental issue in the PKS ideology pertains to “gender equality”. Recent studies suggest that gender equality is the lowest priority within Muslim democracies (Norris and Inglehart, 2003). Traditional Islamic values — derived from Qur’anic teachings — strongly discourage women’s participation in public activities and especially in politics. Among the most popular Qur’anic verses being used to discourage women’s roles in politics are (4: 34) “The men are leaders of the women, as God has granted superiority to the former over the latter, and because men earn a living for themselves and their families. Good women obey Allah and take care of themselves”; and a prophetic tradition which says: “A nation would not be in luck if it gave the leadership to a woman.” Again, one finds that the PKS stance regarding gender equality is ambiguous. The standard statement is that women basically have the same rights as men in politics but since they are – by nature – different from men they must adjust their equality according to their nature. The PK Manifesto states:

Civil society is the model for a just society, when plurality becomes the potential for the development of a nation. When members of parliaments are thoughtful and critical, ministers are professionals, and judges and attorneys are wise and brave. Businessmen become a blessing for the state and the people, religious leaders and artists are a vanguard of the nation’s culture and civilisation. The military men are professional soldiers who provide security for the people without losing their political rights as citizens. Women are sisters of men with equal rights and obligations according to their respective natures, working together equally for the good of the nation (PK Manifesto).

34Yet this is a sensitive issue for the party. During the PK period, the Shariah Council (Dewan Syariah) issued a statement regarding women’s participation in the party. The statement imprints a strong patriarchal perspective of women as naturally inferior, incapable of leadership, less rational, and naturally inclined towards sexual attraction:

Religious values (ibadah) apply to politics in Islam. Therefore, women have equal opportunities to men according to the natural division of labour. If women become active in politics, they must obey the guidelines prescribed by Islamic ethics: (1) Dress decently in clothes that are not tight and not transparent (2) Do not resemble men in appearance and in behaviour; (3) Do not use perfumes, wear accessories or show off beauty; (4) Women should not artificially soften their voice, or whisper sensually when they speak; (5) They should control their gaze; (6) They should not cause controversies; (7) They should not neglect their main tasks as housewives (Dewan Syariah PK, 3/III/1999).

35The same Council, now part of the PKS, issued another fatwa on women’s participation in politics regarding female nomination for legislature. Here, women’s participation in politics is only allowed in emergency situations.

(1) Politics is an integral part of Islam, (2) Seeking the good and refusing vice are collective duties of both men and women; (3) Since politics are part of the effort to seek the good and to refuse the bad, women’s participation in politics is needed; (4) Female participation, including becoming an MP is allowed on the basis of real benefits and emergency needs, under the following requirements: [a]. permission by their husbands, [b]. non-interference with their family duties, [c]. have the moral and structural ability to avoid controversies, [d]. strictly follow Islamic rules in meeting with men, in dress and in speech, and in getting along with men other than their relatives; (5) The minimum and maximum number of women in the parliament is confined to need, and not a certain quota (Shariah Council PKS, 17.07.2003)

36Another document, an anonymous fatwa included in a volume published by the PKS on women’s participation in politics, points out that women are not allowed to become national leaders. It cites various sources to support the argument, especially from classical Muslim jurists, who deny women the right to occupy any position of national leadership, and from the history of Muslim politics, during the course of which women were never elected as caliph (PKS DIY, 2004).

3.2. Membership, Organisation and Leadership

37The PKS is well-known for the large number of its cadres, which is worth a detailed explanation. Another interesting fact is that, although it is an Islamic party with an explicit Islamisation agenda, the PKS has a policy of open membership. Not only Muslims, but all Indonesians, are eligible to become party members by fulfilling the following requirements: be an Indonesian citizen, be seventeen years of age or over, or married, have no criminal record, agree with party objectives, apply to party branches, comply with party regulation, and pledge a membership oath.

38There are six different levels of membership: (i) Newbie (Anggota Pemula), whose membership is granted by Sub-District party branches (DPC)]; (ii) Junior Member (Anggota Muda) whose membership is assigned by a party branch at district level (DPD), who has the right to participate in official party activities at district level (DPD), to join training sessions organised by the party, and to hold a party ID card; (iii) Intermediate Member (Anggota Madya), whose membership is assigned by a party branch at district level (DPD) and legalised by a party provincial branch (DPW). To achieve this level of membership one needs to participate in second level party training; (iv) Senior Member (Anggota Dewasa), whose membership is assigned by a party provincial branch (DPW), and who has participated in advanced-level party training; (v) Specialist Member (Anggota Ahli), whose membership is assigned by the party’s central office (DPP) and who holds an ID card issued by the central office; (vi) Top-Level Member (Anggota Purna), whose membership is assigned by the party’s central office and who has participated in expert-level party training; (vii) Honorary Members (Anggota Kehormatan), a special membership granted by the party to non-member individuals who have made an exceptional contribution to the party (PKS Membership, Art. 6).

The PKS organizational structure

39All party members from all levels are subject to general duties, which include:

(a) To follow Islamic values and norms in their personal activities. (b) To adopt Islamic interpretation specified by the party as is elaborated in the decrees passed by the National Congress and the Deliberation Assembly. (c) To participate in Islamic programmes and events organised by the party. (d) To protect the party from any accusation according to his/her own ability and opportunity. (e) To seek to become public exemplars in doing good deeds and patriotism. (f) To comply with party guidelines in daily activities. (g) To do their best to achieve the objectives and ideals of the party. (h) To participate actively in party meetings. (i) To seek to build and strengthen the relations between the party and other organisations. (j) To be loyal to the leaders and follow the will of the majority. (k) To seek to strengthen the ties between the party and the wider public. (l) To avoid any action that is counterproductive to the objectives of the party. (m) To carry out responsibly any mandate assigned by the party. (n) To take care and to protect property belonging to the party. (o) To follow the edicts and suggestions passed by the party with regards to public issues. (p) To pay membership dues regularly. (q) To give alms and charities to the party. (r) To raise funds and contributions for the party (PKS Membership, Art. 12).

40The previous paragraphs show that the statement that the PKS has an open membership policy is deceiving. Firstly, one of the membership requirements is pledging a membership oath which includes reciting the Islamic Shahadah (‘I witness that there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger’). This suggests that one is, at least nominally, a Muslim. Secondly, membership duties that stipulate the enactment of Islamic values and norms in members’personal lives mean that they are forced to become Muslims in a practical manner.

41At the organisational level the PKS has a unique structure in which it claims religious authority over its members through the party’s Shari’a Council. It issues religious edicts (fatwa) that are binding on party members. This has caused tensions between the PKS and other Islamic organisations as the latter feel that the PKS has infringed on their territory. The most controversial case was perhaps an official decree issued by the Muhammadiyah Central Board, warning members of the infiltration of PKS activities into the organisation (SK PP No. 149/2006). Many PKS members, activists and leaders had parents who were active in the Muhammadiyah organisation, such as Hidayat Nurwahid, Anies Matta and Tifatul Sembiring, who were functionaries of Muhammadiyah. As such, both organisations are quite close at grassroots level and many hold double memberships. Problems started to emerge when members of the PKS, who happened to be functionaries of the Muhammadiyah organisation or employees in Muhammadiyah institutions, preferred to follow the PKS Sharia Council fatwas instead of those issued by the Muhammadiyah.

42Many within the Muhammadiyah leadership believed that the development was not accidental, but rather a systematic manoeuvre by the party to incrementally co-opt Muhammadiyah institutions — i.e. schools, universities, hospitals, orphanages etc. — for political advantage. Haedar Nashir, a member of the Muhammadiyah central board, for example maintains that Muhammadiyah and the PKS have a fundamentally different perspective and agenda when it comes to politics. Muhammadiyah believes in the finality of the Indonesian state with Pancasila as the national ideology, while the PKS – inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, which has carried out violent acts in the past – strives for the enactment and implementation of an Islamic political system. Perceiving this as a threat to its internal solidity, Muhammadiyah issued a decree to oust members who supported the PKS from its organisation (Nashir 2007). Similarly, NU activists, including mosque caretakers (takmir masjid) in particular, gathered on several occasions to consolidate against the infiltration of outsiders into their mosques while also referring to PKS activities. The NU also organised various gatherings to discuss what they call threats posed by transnational Islam, which includes Wahabism, Hizbut Tahrir, and Ikhwanul Muslimin (i.e. the PKS). As a response, the PKS issued an official clarification stating that it never mobilised its cadres to infiltrate, or interfere with, other Islamic organisations (NU Online, 28.11.2006).

43The PKS organisation can be classified according to several layers of authority. The first and most important is the Deliberation Assembly (Majelis Syuro), which is the ultimate decision-maker in the party. However, the assembly has possessed slightly differing statuses throughout the PK (1999-2003) and PKS (after 2003) periods. During the former period, the Assembly was the second highest institution after the National Congress, whereas it became the highest decision making institution during the PKS period. The development reflects what scholars of party studies call an oligarchy (Mitchell, 1911:) or organisational maturation (Katz, 2004: 87-115) in which, for the sake of organisational effectiveness, the party hands over authority to a few leaders in expense of the rights and aspirations of its members.

44The tasks and the rights of the Majelis Syuro are of fundamental importance to the party:

(1) The Majelis Syuro prepares and organises the National Congress. (2) It selects and appoints the DA chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary. (3) It selects the chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary, and the members of the Party Advisory Assembly. (4) It selects the chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary, and the members of the Shariah Council at the national level. (5) It selects the chairman and the vice chairmen, the general secretary, the general treasury, and other personnel of the Party Central Office. (6) It drafts party objectives, decrees and recommendations for the National Congress. (7) It has the capacity to amend party statutes. (8) It drafts the party’s budgets and oversees the reports, (9) It drafts party programmes and oversees their implementation. And (10) it has the responsibility to protect and to take necessary measures against any action considered harmful to the party’s public image (PKS ART, Art. 7).

45The second most important institution in the PKS central office is the Party Advisory Assembly (Majelis Pertimbangan Partai). The number of PAA members is limited to maximum one third of the number of DA members. Members of the Party Advisory Board are also selected from among the members of Deliberation Assembly. Its formal status is that of caretaker of DA tasks on a daily basis: (1) It elaborates the policies carried out by the National Congress and the DA as part of the party’s programmes. (2) It supervises and oversees the implementation of party policies. (3) It is part of its responsibility to respond to general public issues. (4) It prepares National Congress and DA sessions and meetings. (5) It submits recommendations for party programmes and strategies in elections, and verifies (legalises) party candidates for public office. (6) It selects party representatives and delegates to other organisations, institutions or events. (7) It drafts the operational guidelines for party programmes and strategies. (8) It ratifies the budgets proposed by the Central Leadership Council to the DA. (9) It assigns personnel to the party’s Central Office. (10) It is its responsibility to protect and to take necessary measures against any action harmful to the party’s public image (PKS-ART, Art. 8-9).

46The third institution in the party’s central leadership is the Shariah Council (Dewan Syariah), which provides interpretation of and guidance on Islamic laws in relation to the party’s programmes and policies. It issues edicts from an Islamic perspective on politics and other matters both for party members and for wider society. In fact, the SC’s edicts, recommendations, and guidelines cover a wide range of topics, from international politics (such as terrorism and the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan), to the dynamics of national politics (such as elections and ethnic conflicts), to general religious discourse (like the role of women in politics and political parties), to very detailed guidelines on religious conduct (such as fasting during Ramadhan, religious alms, even whether or not a milking mother should fast). It also acts as an arbitrary body that solves disputes between party members based on Islamic law (PKS-ART, art. 12).

47The last institution in the party’s central leadership is its executive body: the Central Leadership Council (Dewan Pimpinan Pusat). It has three types of responsibility. The first is a conceptual function: (a) To draft the party’s annual programmes and budgets for the executive bureaucracy at the national and lower levels, and present them to the Party Advisory Assembly. (b) To draft the proposal for the amendments of party statutes for the PAA. (c) To provide strategic policies for the party bureaucracy at the lower levels. The second function of the Central Leadership Council is structural: (a) to be responsible for accepting legal contributions to the party. (b) To write annual accountability reports on party programmes and spending to the PAA. (c) To propose a list of potential party candidates. (d) To write reports to the Deliberation Assembly every two months. The third function is managerial: (a) to assign personnel for the party bureaucracy. (b) To lead, supervise and oversee the party bureaucracy at the lower levels. (c) To initiate and to coordinate the supporting institutions of the party. (d) To legalise the leadership at the provincial level. (e) To supervise and evaluate the party programmes at the provincial level. Finally, the fourth function is operational: (a) it implements party policies and programmes formulated by the Deliberation Assembly. (b) It issues the party’s official statements. (c) It recruits members and develops human resources for the party. (d) It coordinates the party representatives who hold positions in public offices (PKS ART, Art. 14-117).

48The PKS gives a strong impression of organisational solidity. It is perhaps the only major party that has not suffered from internal splits that have generally occurred within other parties. The PKB was divided into the PKU and the PKNU; the PBR emerged from the PPP; and friction within the PAN led to the creation of the PMB. Even the PBB suffered from internal rifts that caused the socalled “group of 16”, led by Masyumi veteran Anwar Haryono, to exit the party. However, this does not mean that everything has gone smoothly for the PKS. There are tensions and conflicts within the party’s leadership.

49In fact, disagreements started from the very beginning of the party’s history. In 1998, many Tarbiyah activists did not agree with the idea of forming a political party. Some thought that it was not ready to participate in an open political competition. Some even preferred forming a mass organisation instead of a political party. Hidayat Nurwahid was among the latter (Permata, 2008). So heated was the debate that they eventually needed to resolve the issue by vote. No less than 6000 questionnaires were distributed across the country and abroad. More than half of the forms were returned, of which around sixty percent agreed with establishing a political party to advance their aspirations.

50It seems that the historic debate sheds light on internal divisions among the PKS leaders. On the one hand, there are some figures that tend to be more aggressive and pragmatic in targeting and pursuing political objectives, such as Hilmi Aminuddin, the chairman of the mighty Deliberation Assembly (Majelis Syuro).

51He is a mysterious figure. While the PKS activists love to promote their leaders by profiling them in publications as well as internet sites, no single biographical profile of Hilmi Aminuddin can be found among them. He is known as the son of Danu Mohammad Hasan, a leading figure of the Darul Islam (DI/TII) movement and a close associate of Kartosuwiryo. Following a period of political unrest during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the government cracked down on a subversive group called Jihad Commando, Hilmi was detained for two years without trial.4 Another figure in this group is the party’s general secretary, Anis Matta. Born in South Sulawesi in 1968, Anis is gifted with eloquence both in speech and writing, which makes him very popular among the PKS activists. After finishing high school in his home province he continued his studies at the Saudi sponsored LIPIA institute in Jakarta, and graduated with a bachelor’s degree in Islamic Law. He wrote several books that tactfully explain why a da’wa movement should participate in democratic competition, and why members and followers of a da’wa group are strongly advised to follow wholeheartedly any decision made by their leaders. Hilmi Aminuddin and Anis Matta are reportedly masterminds of pragmatic political manoeuvres.

52On the other hand, there is another group of leaders who tend to be more progressive and reformist in their political strategy. Among the most prominent figures in this camp is current chairman of the PMR (People’s Consultative Assembly), Hidayat Nurwahid. He was born in Klaten Central Java in 1960, and completed his secondary education at the famous Gontor pesantren in Ponorogo, East Java. Subsequently he received a scholarship to continue his tertiary education at the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, where he acquired a doctoral degree in Islamic theology in 1992. After returning to Indonesia he taught Islamic theology in postgraduate programmes at a number of universities. He held a top leadership position in the PKS, as party president from 2003 until his appointment as chairman of the MPR in 2005. In terms of leadership style and participation in general political activities, Hidayat behaves in a characteristically Javanese manner that is calm and self-restrained, particularly while giving comments or statements in public. This makes him a highly respected figure in the party. Also in this group is the current PKS president Tifatul Sembiring. Born in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, he is an IT engineer by training, and worked for more than a decade at the State Electric Company (PLN). He also spent several months studying politics in Islamabad, Pakistan, and took on the party leadership in 2005. As a Sumatran — and in contrast to Hidayat — Tifatul has a more direct and open personality, easily giving public statements or criticising political opponents.

3.3. The Role of Women

53It is important to add more points about the role of women in the PKS. Although, as was pointed out in the previous paragraph, the party is ideologically inclined towards the discrimination of women, in reality it provides relatively open opportunities for women. Female politicians and activists have contributed a great deal to the party’s activities and achievements. Women were among the original founders of the party, at five out of fifty, and the party allocates seats for women in every organisational structure. In the powerful Deliberation Assembly, ten out of one hundred members are women; on the Party Advisory Board three members are women; there are even two women members in the Sharia Council — something very unusual for Islamic organisations. In addition, the PKS also has a special department for women, which deals with special women’s issues.

54Women also constitute a major portion of the party’s workforce. In the socialisation of the party and especially during election campaign activities, women have always made significant contributions. In 2002 the PKS created a filial organisation called “Justice Women” (Wanita Keadilan), intended to empower female activists and members, providing training for women in knowledge and skills, as well as in politics. The organisation subsequently created local posts (POS Wanita Keadilan), which have been growing in number, with more than one thousand such posts across the country claiming to have forty-five thousand participants (PKS-online, 24.12.2007). According to its statute, the objectives of the organisation are: (i) to improve the relation between the PKS and society; (ii) to help society to improve living conditions; (iii) to improve women’s roles in maintaining healthy and happy families; (iv) to train women as problem solvers for female and family issues; (v) to provide reserve resources for society in emergency situations; (vi) to improve the skills of PKS women activists in socialising the party; and (vii) to promote female activists as leaders in society. Interestingly, the statute includes a “disclaimer” article to disband the organisation if the party perceives it to “be disadvantageous, impede party programmes, or trigger internal conflicts” (see, Guidelines for Justice Women, 2003)

55A closer inspection of the ‘curriculum’ of the Justice Women organisation shows that the PKS seeks to combine training methods aimed at producing women activists who are on the one hand highly committed and loyal to the party ideology and programmes, while on the other hand they are progressive and capable of socialising and carrying out party programmes. Referring to the PKS ideological vision on women’s participation in politics, the programmes look unusual, because in a sense they contradict the party’s discouraging views on female public activism. The organisation’s programmes can be classified according to three clusters: Firstly, ideological training, to strengthen the understanding and commitment of female activists to party ideals, which mostly consists of learning the details of Islamic theology and ethics. Secondly, domestic training to endow female activists with the knowledge and skills to handle family management ranging from household economy, children education, emergency assistance, to reproductive health. At this point, there is an explicit suggestion that the primary — or the proper — role of women is in domestic affairs as the managers of their husband’s properties, while public activism remains secondary and requires explicit permission from their husbands. Thirdly, political training, where activists learn not only the party’s objectives and strategies, but also the wider sociological and economic aspects of why such programmes are necessary, as well as analysing other political parties’ programmes, their strengths and weaknesses (see, Guidelines for Justice Women, 2003). The programmes, then, are intended to produce female activists who are submissive and complementary in domestic affairs, but at the same time active and independent in public affairs.

56The PKS also presented a significant number of female candidates in the parliamentary elections. During the 2004 election it had 446 candidates for national, provincial and district/mayoral legislatures and all of them passed the qualification requirements, although there is no further information on how many of them were actually elected as MPs. In comparison, the female candidates of other Muslim parties were as follows: PPP-497 candidates; PKB-551 candidates; PAN-554 candidates, and PBB-372 candidates. With regard to the recommended 30% quota for female candidates the PKS did even better, where it fulfilled the quota in 65 electoral regions (Daerah Pemilihan), which was the highest number compared to all other parties, while the PAN and PKB managed to achieve this in 45 regions, the PBB in 42 regions and the PPP only in 30 electoral regions (Republika, 29.01.2004). At the national legislatures, the PKS had one female out of seven MPs (14%) during the 1999-2004 period. While it has more female MPs in the current period of 2004-2009 their percentage is lower, i.e. three out of forty five (6%). Although small in number, PKS female MPs are active in parliament. For example, Yoyoh Yusroh is vice-chair of Commission VIII of the DPR, and is the secretary of the Women Caucus in Parliament (Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen), an informal forum that organises and mobilises support for women’s roles in the legislative bodies and promotes and supports regulations and laws that deal with women’s interests. Yoyoh acknowledges the impact of the new party law which stipulates the 30% quota for female candidates. Although the law does not make the quota mandatory, it does have a significant impact, in that more female candidates have been nominated by parties. She points out an interesting by-product situation in which, following the stipulation of the quota, some parties put more female candidates on the second list, thus when replacement of MPs occurred, many females entered the legislative body. At the beginning of the 2004-2009 term, for instance, the number of female MPs was only around 11.3%, but this increased mid-term to around 12% (Interview with PKS MP Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007).

57In the last general election the PKS had the highest number of female candidates for national legislators among major parties — 212 out of 579 or 36.1%. However, when it came to the number of candidates who were elected as parliamentarians, the party experienced the lowest number — 3 out of 57 or only 5.2%. This discloses the reality of the situation of women politicians in the party who suffer from a paradox: on the one hand, at a personal level, female leaders and activists of the PKS have a high level of education and skill and have played substantial roles in contributing to the party’s achievements. The existing system, under the provision of Law No. 8/2008 endorses parties to have 30% quota for female candidates in elections. It is these rules of the game that motivate the party to create opportunities for female politicians. In the aftermath of last June’s general election the PKS held a national workshop for PKS female politicians entitled “The Role of Women Politicians in the Aftermath of the 2009 General Election: Opportunities and Challenges” (pk-sejahtera online 19/06/2009)

58On the other hand, at institutional and communal levels, women politicians in the party are still facing huge ideological and cultural obstacles. The party’s Islamist ideology perceives politics and other public activities as the domain of men while women are naturally responsible for domestic activities, strongly discouraging women politicians and activists from expressing their aspirations and creativity. As a result, according to the party head of the Women Department, Ledia Hanifa, female politicians in the party can only have limited networks and alliances, and thus have a very limited capacity to mobilise funds which are the most important resource in real political competitions. She complained that many of the constituents of her party still regard politics as not the right place for women. She stated that her party is working hard to improve the capacity of its women politicians, and is preparing them to compete as candidates for local elections in the years to come (Lampung Post, 16.11.2009)

Female candidates 2009

Female MPs 2009-2014

4. The PKS in National and Local Politics

4.1. Behaviour in National Politics

59Since its first appearance on the Indonesian political scene, the PKS’ organisational policies and decisions have been met with two opposing responses: On the one hand, those who aspired to advance Islam as the solution to the nation’s crises as well as to convey Muslim political aspirations, had cheered the party and had high expectations of the young, well-educated, highly dedicated and pious party leaders and activists. On the other hand, those who were traumatised by the history of religious politics, as well as those who perceived the party as an embodiment of the new Islamic conservatism, vehemently criticised the party for intending to turn Indonesian society into a Middle Eastern society. Observing the actual political behaviour of the party, however, both camps must have been disappointed. Instead of introducing Islamist political programmes, the PKS seemed to have been absorbed by the mainstream of Indonesian politics.

60My own assessment found that the party, which intended to Islamise Indonesian society and polity, has been trapped in a democratic political game. Indonesian politics has significantly been under the influence of what scholars of party studies call the “Americanisation of party competition”. Instead of mobilising people into distinct, almost always ideologically oriented programmes, as in the 1950s, political parties now feel compelled to promote their programmes — commonly ameliorative — to a political market of plural societies. This means they have to address the mainstream in order to get a bigger share of votes. It has been very interesting to see how PKS behaviour has moved into the centre of the political spectrum without significant ideological revision. In other words, its ideology is consistently conservative, yet its behaviour is increasingly pragmatic (Permata, 2008).

61During the earlier years of political participation, the party’s behaviour was conspicuously ideological. The first political move made by the PK as a political organisation was the formation of the Communication Forum of Islamic Parties (FSPPI, Forum Silaturrahmi Partai-Partai Islam) in mid-1998 during a meeting between Indonesian Islamic parties and the Malaysian PAS in Bogor, West Java. Participants included the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Justice Party (PK), the Islamic Ummah Party (PUI), the Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (PII-Masyumi), the Ummah Awakening Party (PKU), the Nahdatul Ummah Party (PNU), the Indonesian United Islamic Party (PIPI), the Indonesian Islamic Thariqat Party (PITI), the Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII). The Forum’s first political action was a statement requesting the government to call off Law No. 3 and 8/1985 that required mass and political organisations to adopt Pancasila as their sole foundation so that Islam would constitute their base ideology. Having realised that they had received a very low share of votes, eight of the Forum’s members — minus the PPP and the PBB — agreed to join their remaining votes in the election to receive additional seats. This led to the so-called Stembus Akkord (Wahono 2003: 117-120). However, there were different interpretations of how the accord should be carried out. The Forum construed it as an agreement among parties to combine their remaining votes and get additional seats. This controversy led to prolonged debates that caused the General Election Commission (KPU) to propose to abolish the accord and the remaining votes would be distributed to all parties according to rank — meaning the Forum would receive 43 seats, and the PK would have 7. Eventually, the Election Commission (KPU) unilaterally cancelled the Stembus Accord (IFES, 2002: 5-7).

62Another example of the party’s ideological behaviour unfolded during the presidential election. Even before the 1999 election, in December 1998 specifically, it had carried out a selection process for its presidential candidate and had come up with Didin Hafiduddin, a less well-known Muslim preacher from Bogor, West Java. In its official statement dated March 1999, the party explained that Hafiduddin was chosen because he met the PK’s requirements: He had considerable religious knowledge and moral integrity, common political visions with the party and he was independent from the previous regime (PK Bayanat, 13 March 1999).

63However, although the PK had already nominated Hafiduddin for president, when the selection took place in October 1999 it voted for Abdurrahman Wahid. However, this support was not unreserved. The party leaders harboured strong negative sentiments toward Wahid, who they saw as being too liberal as a Muslim and as having overly close relations with the Christians. Thus they said that their support for Wahid was conditional, i.e. not because Wahid was favourable, but rather because the other candidate, Megawati, was much less preferable.

64In reward for the PKS’ support for his candidacy, Wahid appointed the party’s president, Nur Mahmudi Islamil, as the Minister of Forestry and Horticulture in his cabinet. Initially, the party eagerly pursued a moralist and reformist agenda by chasing suspects of illegal loggings. More than a dozen major names were prosecuted (The Jakarta Post, 16.05.2001). However the policy pursued by the ministry of Forestry and Agriculture brought him in conflict with the president who had close relations with big-time loggers, and he was sacked after less than ten months in office (Tempo Interaktif, 27.03.2001). The idealist stand still continued after Wahid was impeached, and vice president Megawati was sworn in to head the government. The party refused to join the cabinet for a number of reasons that appeared more ideological than political. Firstly, the Megawati presidency was seen as controversial among conservative Muslims because of her gender. The PKS conservative ideology perceives political leadership to be the privilege of male politicians, and thus Megawati did not represent a viable choice when there were many capable male politicians.

65Secondly, joining the government under the Megawati presidency was not considered preferable from a policy point of view because she and her party were perceived as the reincarnation of the secular-nationalist PNI from the previous era, and thus the archrival of Islamic politics. Thirdly, another form of anti-Megawati sentiment existed because many people perceived the PDI-P as the political camp for Christian politicians. One of the most notorious figures was Maj. Gen. Theo Syafe’i, one of Megawati’s closest aides, who was believed to have strong anti-Islam sentiments. Fourthly, PK leaders felt that they needed to improve on party organisation as it failed to pass the electoral threshold and was unable to compete in the next election.

66Nevertheless, the situation changed dramatically after the party was renamed in 2003. The first major shift took place in the election arena. During the 1999 elections there was a strong impression among leaders and activists that the party was merely a tool for da’wa. Therefore, party activities — including those conducted during the elections — were not seen as the yardstick for party success or failure because what mattered were individual efforts to achieve personal piety. In an official decree for Election Day, the party suggested that its activists and members: (a) purify themselves by repenting to God upon their wrongdoings, (b) intensify religious activities such as prayers and reciting the Qur’an to bring them closer to God, (c) intensify social activities and welfare activities through party organisations, (d) be prepared for any difficulties and challenges and be patient with them, (e) seek to find the positive in people, and persuade them accordingly to support the party's mission, (f) do not forget to pay alms because material capability is fundamental for da’wa (PK Central Office, 13.5.1999). By the 2004 election the party’s tone had changed dramatically. It no longer used ideological jargon as part of its agenda to Islamise Indonesia, but rather a reformist one, i.e. promising to build a democratic and clean government. It declared itself a “clean and caring” party. The PKS Syariah Council released a statement suggesting that mobilising as many followers as possible was permitted in the context of the da’wa movement. A passage of the statement reads:

67Our society has heterogeneous cultures, and as a party which represents the state, it would be unethical for us to refuse people’s participation only because they do not match our standard. The party needs to function like the state, to protect and to accommodate the plural inspirations of its members and sympathisers, although we have regulations to select and to filter people’s participation in line with our principles. But the principle is, vote first and later on we can propagate them. (Syariah Council, 17.07.2003, italic added).

68The new electoral strategy paid off. The party successfully increased its votes by almost 600% and became one of the major Islamic parties in parliament. When the presidential election was called, it joined in with a very different, more rational and pragmatic intention. Initially, it attempted to initiate a grand coalition of Islamic parties — whose combined votes made up 37% — but to no avail, as Islamic parties were becoming increasingly fractionalised. The PKS decided to join the race by supporting candidates of other parties, as it had not received the required 20% of votes to nominate its own. The question was which candidate it would support. Amien Rais – mentor and inspirist to PKS leaders who was ideologically and organisationally very close to the party – constituted an obvious choice. However, internal conflicts complicated the matter as the forum was split into two different camps. One consisted mainly of younger leaders who preferred Rais because of his Islamic as well as reformist credentials, in addition to the increasing pressure from supporters to back him (Kompas, 17.04.2004). However, groups led by the more senior leaders highlighted more pragmatic elements such as the chance to win the race. They found that former military chief commander Wiranto was preferable to Rais because he was most likely to win. Another line of argument suggested that the PKS’ main concern was not winning the election, but rather stopping Megawati and thus Wiranto was their choice (See, Syu’bah Asa, Tempo 5-11 July 2004). When Rais failed to win in the first round, the PKS supported SBY in the second round of the presidential election, and became a coalition member after its candidate won. It received four cabinet positions: Soeripto for Attorney General, Adhyaksa Dault for Minister of Youth and Sport, Anton Apriyantono for Minister of Agriculture, and Yusuf Asyari for Minister of Housing — but only the last three were actually accepted.

69During the Yudhoyono administration, PKS behaviour was also different from that exhibited during the period of the Wahid government. Perhaps the most heated public debate surrounded its support for the government’s policy to increase oil prices by 30% in March 2005. The government maintained that the national budget was in deficit by 23, trillion IDR (Approx. 2.3 billions USD), thus it needed to cut oil subsidies from 113 trillion to 89 trillion. Immediately, six factions — FPDI-P, FKB, FPAN, FPPP, FPDS, and FPBR — categorically rejected the government plan, while the PKS, as a member of the ruling coalition, remained undecided. The PKS’ position triggered protests among its supporters, and a group of students from the KAMMI handed over a chicken (as a symbol of cowardice) to the PKS faction leaders (Detikcom, 15.03.2005). Under widely publicised pressures from its supporters and regional branches, the PKS leaders in parliament immediately changed their mind, and joined the fractions that had rejected the plan. The PKS senior politicians told the media that they strongly opposed the plan, and convinced their constituents that the party would be on their side. Nurwahid even confidently said that such a decision would not affect relations with the president because one of the agreements in the coalition between his party and Yudhoyono was that the PKS would still be critical toward government policies (Tempo, 04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005). However, after its chairman Tifatul Sembiring met with president Yudhoyono to discuss the topic, the PKS changed sides again by supporting the government’s plan to increase oil prices. The PKS was not alone in changing sides because the PPP also did the same thing. Thus during the parliament session the majority of parliamentarians supported the government plan (Tempo, 04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005). The PKS decision prompted resentment and protests from its supporters. Some local branches in Yogyakarta and West Nusatenggara provinces demanded that the party withdraw from the government coalition (see, Tempo Interaktif, 18.10.2005; 19.10.2005; and 28.11.2008).

70As was said earlier, the change of the PKS’ policies from ideological to pragmatic was not accompanied by a significant revision of its ideology. When the moment was right ideological actions emerged, this time around in the shape of the controversial Bill of Anti Pornography and Pornographic Acts (UU Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi), which would regulate ethical standards for the media and public. On the one hand, it was widely supported by conservative Muslim organisations and communities who believed that moral decadence was the root of all crises and miseries suffered by the country. On the other hand, it was rejected by non-Muslim communities who believed it would intervene in their religions and cultures (Bali Post, 12.03.2006), and by secular political parties as well as moderate Muslim communities who perceived the bill as merely constituting the political agenda of Islamist groups. According to the female PKS MP Yoyoh Yusroh, pornographic materials that are widespread and easily accessible have motivated people to conduct sexual violence and crimes, can cause work ethics and performances to deteriorate and can cause students to lose their motivation to study. She also added that, in her investigations, she found that there were business organisations that systematically disseminate pornographic materials, some of them acting under purely economic motivation but others apparently had social and political agendas to degenerate the morality of the Indonesian people, of which the majority are Muslims. However, former PKS chairman Hidayat Nurwahid rejected allegations that the bill was part of his party agenda to Islamise the political system by pointing out the fact that it was inherited from the previous era of the Megawati administration (fpks-dpr-ri. com 12.12.2007]).

71The culmination of the trend of the PKS’ pragmatic policies occurred during the National Congress held in Bali on February 2008. Bali is the home of the country’s Hindus, and the fact that the most conservative Islamic party held a crucial event there signified an important occasion. It had a special agenda, which was to widen its electoral support by targeting non-Muslim voters. The PKS aimed to garner 20% in the upcoming 2009 elections, and thus it believed that it had to move further into the centre of the ideological spectrum. Ahead of the conference the PKS spokesmen made statements to the media that their party considered becoming an open party that would accommodate not only non-Muslim voters but would even allow the nomination of non-Muslim candidates. Days before the meeting, the party’s high-ranking officials — including former president Hidayat Nurwahid and the chairman of the respected Syariah Council Surachman Hidayat — visited local Hindu temples to show their seriousness in approaching Hindu voters. Finally, during the opening speech the party president Tifatul Sembiring reiterated that, in line with the Indonesian constitution, political parties should not discriminate against people based on race, religion or other primordial identities (pk-sejahtera. org. com 31.01.2008).

72The manoeuvre successfully generated headlines in the national and local media, and became a hotly debated issue in Muslim and Hindu internet discussion forums. Well-known Hindu writer and spiritualist Anand Khrisna wrote an article in a Balinese paper congratulating the PKS’ goodwill to become an open party that accommodates the aspirations of non-Muslims. Yet he implicitly doubted that the party would be able to do so, as its programmatic platforms expressly listed Islamisation agendas (Krishna, 2008). And this is exactly what happened. During the conference, the powerful Deliberation Council rejected the idea to change the PKS into an open party, and the historic moment – that perhaps would be comparable to Germany’s SPD Bad Godesberg Congress 1955 – did not take place. A few days after the conference the party issued an official statement, signed by the Chairman of the Syariah Council Surachman Hidayat and the party president Tifatul Sembiring, clarifying a number of issues: Firstly, that the PKS would always respect the religious plurality of Indonesian society, and if eligible and meeting all the requirements the party could nominate non-Muslim candidates. Secondly, the idea of changing the PKS into an open party was merely a discourse put forward by several local party leaders from Muslim minority provinces, the PKS being an Islamic party that makes Islamic sharia mandatory for its members and functionaries. Thus for the sake of avoiding further controversies the party demanded that its activists stop discussing the issue. Thirdly, the party electoral jargon was “clean, caring, professional”, to be promoted by all PKS supporters, which summarises the mission of a politically moderate but ideologically consistent party (PKS Central Office, 06.02.2008).

4.2. Behaviour in Local Politics

73One of the major points in the process of transition and consolidation of democracy in Indonesia is political decentralisation — the others being political liberalisation and de-militarisation (King, 2003). Decentralisation is, in fact, an old agenda in Indonesian politics, dating back to 1903 during the colonial era, when Dutch rulers initiated a similar programme. Political decentralisation is a response to the Suharto regime’s centralistic politics, where the people were disenfranchised from almost all decision making processes. Thus the new system intends to bring the people into equation in policymaking.

74The first legal basis was Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government. Yet it contained ambiguous and inconsistent ideas that hindered the initial spirit of transferring power from the centre to the region and of furthering democracy. The most serious problem was that it stipulated that local legislators (DPRD) choose and dismiss heads of local government. At a glance there is nothing new to this regulation, since the same rule was in place during the New Order era. However, in reality, during this period, heads of local government were selected by the Minister of Interior and local legislatures merely reflected the decisions made by the central government. Law no. 22/1999 gave tremendous power to local DPRD’s, and triggered corrupt practices. It was common practice for candidates to buy votes in order to be elected. Thus the law clearly failed to produce qualified local leaders and was eventually replaced by Law No. 32/2004 on local government, which stipulates that regional heads have to be elected directly by the people. This new law was intended to avoid unchecked power of the legislatures by giving the people the right to choose leaders directly. This enabled them to select real local leaders, figures that the local people were familiar with, and figures who were familiar with the dynamics of local politics. This was also intended to prevent money politics, as it was thought to be impossible to pay every voter or to ensure that they would actually vote in a particular way (Sulistiyanto-Erb, 2009: 19-19).

75Initially, the new rule produced the expected results. Direct election has facilitated the emergence of local leaders from various backgrounds — politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, academicians, religious leaders, military officers, media personalities, NGO activists, or even ex-political detainees — as well as mobilised greater civilian participation. As time goes on, however, serious weaknesses started to emerge. One that is relevant to this discussion relates to the important role of the party in deepening democracy in regional politics. One major issue is that the party system is still centralistic because the central office created local branches and thus holds a higher authority. During regional elections this often caused clashes between the party central office and its local branches based on disagreements over which candidate to nominate or support. The former claimed it had the authority, while the latter insisted they knew the situation on the field better. Secondly, the law required candidates to be nominated by a party or a coalition of parties with minimum 15% of regional legislative seats. This rule has forced smaller parties to join in a coalition in order to be able to nominate candidates. Unfortunately, such coalitions tended to disregard ideological lines, and parties were willing to join any coalition with any party from any ideological position, as long as it gave them opportunity to win offices and share power. In this way, parties’ behaviours in local elections were detrimental to the efforts in consolidating democracy as they blurred what parties represented — i.e. the role of political parties and political vehicles to accommodate aspirations of different interests. Thirdly, the power-oriented behaviours of parties in local elections brought about a further problem: Many candidates who won the elections had only minor support among the legislatures. There was the apparent phenomenon of split voting, in which people voted for candidates nominated by parties other than those voted for in the legislative (or general) elections. This is because, in legislative elections, people relied on their ideological alignments to parties, while in the elections for regional heads voters tended to vote based on candidates themselves instead of the parties that nominated them. By 2006, out of more than 300 elected local heads, 56% only received support from a minority — i.e. less then half — of the members of local legislatures. Thus only 43% of the elected local heads managed to collect political support from the majority of the members of local legislature. To a significant extent, this contributes to political instability as well as governance ineffectiveness. Lastly, the whole process has created a vicious circle of money politics: On the one hand politicians still believe that the Indonesian people are a floating mass susceptible to material incentives. On the other, the people are persuaded to believe that it is within their right to receive money, often believing that money may possibly be the only thing they can get out of a political system run by corrupt politicians.

76It is this situation that frames the PKS participation in local politics. The party also suffered from the aforementioned dilemmas. Firstly, the nomination of local heads oftentimes involved conflicts between local branches that had better understandings of local aspirations and the party’s central organisation, which had the authority to determine which candidates would be nominated. As a result of this, some parties simply failed to present in the local elections because the local branches and their central leaderships were unable to reach agreement regarding which candidates they were going to nominate. Others saw their frustrated local party leaders deflect their supporters to other candidates when the central leaderships decided to nominate candidates other than the parties’ cadres. The PKS is, in fact, the most centralistic party. This is because for the PKS functionaries’ compliancy towards higher leadership structures is not only a matter of organisational discipline or political loyalty, but also a moral commitment. For PKS members politics is an integral part of religion, and therefore political behaviour is no different from religious and moral behaviour. To faithfully follow leaders is a fundamental notion in Islam. This is even so for the PKS because its central leadership claims that every decision is made through deliberation. According to PKS general secretary, Anis Matta, deliberation (Arabic: syuro) is an Islamic way of collective decision making. It is a procedure through which a group of people apply “collective reasoning” which is considered superior to “individual reasoning”. He acknowledges that there is no guarantee that deliberation will produce the best result because information can be inaccurate and human analyses are never perfect. It is possible that collective deliberation may produce a decision that is later proven to be wrong. However, being a collective effort, mistakes made in deliberations are more likely to be noticed and corrected since participants have different views and perspectives, which allows for scrutiny. And if they do make a wrong decision, collectively made decisions will enable participants to share the burden of the mistake and address the consequences. Therefore, the most difficult part with regards to deliberation as a method of decision making is how to accept a decision when someone knows from their personal perspective that it is not the best alternative (Matta, 2002).

77However, organisational strength is not always beneficial. In some cases, the central leadership often unilaterally decided which candidates to nominate, ignoring information from local branches on the negative records of these candidates. There are two examples at hand. The first was the mayoral election in Semarang, the capital city of central Java, when the party decided to join a coalition to support Sukawi Sutarip, who eventually won the race. However, it was controversial as the mayor was accused of corruption and other abuses of power during his previous tenure. The party’s local activists initially refused to support Sukawi, because doing so could jeopardise its reputation as a clean and anti-corruption party. Another case occurred during the government elections in South Sumatra when it the party supported Syahrial Usman who lost the race. The former governor was accused of occasionally visiting casinos in Highland Malaysia. Groups of protesters rallied in front of the PKS’ central office in Jakarta rejecting his nomination. Yet the party leadership maintained that the nomination had been carried out through appropriate procedures and that it had considered the professional as well as moral aspects of the nominee (Muslimdaily. net [26.08.2008]).

PKS coalitions in local government

78The next point, and perhaps the most controversial, pertains to PKS behaviour in local politics while dealing with party coalitions. As was mentioned, Law No. 32/2004 stipulates that only a party or a coalition of political parties with 15% seats in legislature can nominate candidates in local elections. And because the PKS are only a minority in many regions, it needed to enter into a coalition in order to be able to nominate candidates. Up until 2008, the PKS had won in 92 regional elections, 8 of which were provincial while the other 84 were at district level. There are two important points in this case: Firstly, out of the 92 regional government positions won by the party, the PKS won independently and without coalition in only five districts (or 5.4%). The other 86 wins were in coalition with other parties. Out of these 86 coalitions won by the PKS, only twelve (or 13.9%) of the elected leaders were PKS members. As such, in these regional elections the PKS was only a rather unimportant junior coalition partner or it recruited candidates from outside the party. Secondly, and perhaps more interestingly, in the regional elections, the PKS joined a coalition not only with Islamic parties (60%) but also with secular ones (40%), and even with a Christian party, although they did not win in this case. Of those 86 coalitions 33 were with the PAN (Muslim-based party), 29 were with the Golkar (secular party), 24 were with the PPP (Islamic party), 22 were with the PD (secular), 20 were with the PKB (Muslim-based party), 17 were with the PBB (Islamic party), 14 were with the PDIP (secular party) — and a lost coalition with the PDS (Christian party).

79Thirdly, as a consequence of the electoral system and the pattern of party behaviour in local elections, there is a typical phenomenon during regional elections in which people tend to be attracted by candidates instead of the parties behind them. Consequently, there are many occurrences of split voting in local elections. The PKS is among those who benefit from the situation. In almost all local elections, in which the parties nominated their own candidates, its share of votes always increased significantly compared to legislative elections. This is because PKS cadres have been known for their personal qualities, such as morality and commitment, anti-corruption efforts etc.

The PKS in Regional Elections

80The data shows, however, that although the PKS almost always significantly increased its share of votes, it did not necessarily win the race. One of the key factors, as can be seen from the figures, depends on the number of candidates who competed in the elections. It tended to win when there were many candidates in the race, as they would get fewer votes. In the District of Bekasi, for instance, it won the competition even though it garnered only 25.05%. On the contrary, when the there were only two candidates, the PKS tended to lose even though it received a significant amount of votes, as seen in Jakarta Province, where it eventually managed to collect 42.20%, and in Pekanbaru, where it collected 35.13% (LSI 2007).

81Lastly, the new rule of directly electing heads of local governments proved to be useless in preventing the questionable practice of money politics, although it was designed to do just that. The idea behind the rule was that it would be impossible to pay every voter to vote for certain candidates. But the flow of money in politics is much more complex. There are at least five types of money politics in the election of local heads. Firstly, the so-called “renting the boat”: Candidates not attached to a political party, or with insufficient seats in legislature, need to invite parties to nominate or to support them — which typically implies financial compensation. Though there is no solid data available, the PKS was notorious for its willingness to seek funds from candidates who asked for its support, commonly dubbed as “dowry”. The party has a very strong appeal for candidates. Surveys confirmed that it had highly loyal voters, allowing it to give an accurate estimate of how many votes they could mobilise. Secondly, illegal political money also came from the business community with donations of huge sums of money well beyond the legal limit — i.e. IDR 50 millions (equal with US$ 5,000) for personal donors, and IDR 350 millions (equal with US$ 3,500) for institutions. The money might eventually have been distributed to voters – not to all voters, but only to some in order to sufficiently increase the winning margin. No data is available on the PKS’ behaviour in this matter, but in major cities the party has fairly good relations with both Muslim and non-Muslim business communities. Thirdly, parties that competed in local elections also supplied money as well as gifts and other facilities to prominent figures and local leaders in exchange for moblising voters under their authority. Again there is no solid data available on the use of money and other illicit gifts by the PKS, although party activists have been very diligent in approaching local leaders (Surbakti, 2007).

5. The PKS in the 2009 Election and the Prospect of Political Islam

5.1. Explaining PKS Electoral Performances

82Before the 2009 election, many were expecting the PKS to repeat its success in 2004 by spectacularly increasing its votes. The party itself promised to collect 20% with an additional agenda of nominating its own presidential candidate. And the party seemed to have the credentials to back up the claim. Firstly, it is still the most organisationally solid among the Islamic parties — if not among all parties — with no visible friction in its leadership. Secondly, it was able to maintain its image as the cleanest party with the least scandals exposed by the media, and thus its politicians appear trustworthy. Thirdly, in the last five years — with three ministers in the administration — the party has increased the number of its activists and improved logistics. Yet in last June’s election it collected only 7.8%, far below its realistic target of 12% of votes. The result is perplexing. On the one hand, referring to its own target as well as the preparations made in the run-up to the elections, the party simply failed. Yet on the other hand, given the fact that other Islamic parties are in decline – some significantly – the ability of the PKS to increase its vote — though only slightly — is a substantial achievement.

83To achieve deeper insight, it is useful to explain the pattern of the PKS’ electoral behaviour and compare its spectacular popularity increase from 1999 to 2004 and a rather stagnant period from 2004 to 2009. The PKS was very successful in 2004, multiplying the share of votes it had gained in the previous elections. To most people this was surprising in spite of the fact that the party and its key leaders were well-known to the Indonesian public – compared to the 1999 period – and had a reputation of being a moralist party with an unparalleled record of honesty and integrity. Firstly, the PKS was less wellknown than other Muslim parties, such as the PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. These parties have prominent figures in their organisations who are widely known by the Muslim community because they have been active in politics or other public activities since the New Order era, while all the PKS figures appeared in public after the regime change. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, other Muslim parties are commonly regarded as the heirs of previous Muslim organisations: The PPP was the official political party for Muslims during the previous regime, the PKB was created by the largest Muslim organisation, the NU – similar to the PAN – was formed by Muhammadiyah activists, and the PBB claims to be the reincarnation of Masyumi. Therefore, they have permanent supporters in the Muslim communities; while the PKS, stemming from a network of student organisations, is regarded as having only a narrow and transient societal basis. However, pre-election surveys had actually predicted that the PKS would be able to pass the 3% electoral threshold and gain between 3-7% of the national votes (Mujani, 2004a).

84There are two factors which analysts believe to have substantially contributed to the PKS' electoral success: the first is its track record as an anticorruption party, with its parliamentarians rejecting bribes and returning kickbacks repeatedly, which was covered by the media. Before the 2004 election, the PKS was a very small party. Nevertheless, it was able to raise the issue that the nation’s multidimensional crisis was rooted in a moral crisis, and that the country needed to find a moral solution by bringing pious people to power. The public easily bought this rhetoric. It also had a good record of not only being able to "talk the talk" but also "walk the walk". The second factor deemed to have helped the PKS to succeed was its willingness to change its campaign focus from communal issues, such as religious reforms or Islamisation, to institutional concerns, like clean government and anti-corruption measures. This shift enabled the party to move into the centre of the political spectrum and to mobilise support from a wider portion of society (Mujani, 2004b).

85The PKS’ success has motivated students of Indonesian politics to examine Indonesian political behaviour in detail. There are currently two different camps attempting to theorise the recent developments. The first follows the psychological approach of William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, suggesting that the PKS’ success was not unique, since there is another party, the Democratic Party, which did not yet exist in the 1999 election but managed to collect 7.8% of the votes in 2004. This reflects a more fundamental change in political behaviour, i.e. the increase of rational voters and the waning of communal politics (politik aliran). The last term originates in Clifford Geertz’s theory on religious variants among Javanese people and has been popularly used to explain the political streams in Indonesia, which are divided along religious and cultural lines, i.e. secularist and nationalist (abangan) vs. Islamic (santri) camps, the latter being further subdivided into traditionalist and modernist factions. Using data from four national opinion surveys conducted after the 1999 and 2004 elections, and after the presidential elections, Liddle and Mujani state that, in order to explain the electoral behaviour of Indonesian voters, party identification and social background (the main components of communal politics) are insignificant compared to the leadership factor. The data shows that in the 1999 elections, 88% of the respondents who preferred Megawati voted for her party, the PDI-P, 89% of those who preferred Habibie voted for his Golkar Party, 95% of those who preferred Abdurrahman Wahid voted for the PKB, and 75% of those who preferred Amien Rais voted for the PAN. This pattern was similar during the 2004 elections. Yet, the most telling data was collected during the presidential elections, when S. B. Yudhoyono – who barely had any party support – won the election and gained the votes of 82% of the Golkar partisans, 78% of the PPP partisans and even 29% of the PDI-P supporters – at a time when the national leaderships of these three parties pledged to support Megawati. For Liddle and Mijani, this is clear evidence of the significance of the leadership factor in structuring voter behavior (Liddle and Mujani, 2000, 2006; Mujani 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).

86Although Liddle and Mujani's arguments appear very convincing, other analysts have different opinions. Using district level data, Dwight Y. King compared patterns of voting behaviours in the democratic elections of 1955 and 1999. He found that there were strong correlations between the two elections despite the four-decade interval: In 1999 the major Muslim parties — the PPP, PKB and PAN — collected support from regions which had supported Islamic parties in the 1955 elections (Masyumi, NU, PSII), while the secular parties, i.e. the PDI-P and Golkar, garnered support from areas which had supported secular parties in 1955 (PNI, PKI). Referring to Liddle and Mujani's theory, King argues that communal politics — including religious, regional, and social factors — are still useful in structuring the voters’choices in the 1999 elections, and that party identification is the source of the political leaders'popularity, rather than the other way around, which Liddle and Mujani had suggested (King 2003, Ch. 7). King’s findings are affirmed by Anis Baswedan's analysis of vote circulation during the 1999 and 2004 elections. Focusing on the spectacular success of the PKS and the PD, Baswedan shows that PKS voters in 2004 were modernist Muslims who had voted for the PPP, the PAN and the PBB in 1999, while the PD voters had formerly been supporters of nationalist parties such as the PDI-P and Golkar. This means that the behaviour of these voters can be explained by religious, sociological and regional factors (Baswedan, 2005). King et al also present data from the 2004 elections, which further supports this point: firstly, the rising number of votes for the PKS, which had no prominent leadership figures compared to other Muslim parties; secondly, Golkar's success in collecting votes despite the fact that it had not nominated any presidential candidates; thirdly, the personal success of S. B. Yudhoyono referred to by Liddle and Mujani, might also have been influenced by other factors, such as the massive media coverage following the Bali bombing in 2002 when he was the minister in charge and gained people’s sympathy after being mistreated and sacked by Megawati, and lastly, poverty and education levels — which explain the voters' party choices: Poorer regions voted for the PDI-P and the PKB, whereas electors with higher education levels preferred the Golkar and the PAN. According to King et al, all of this evidence indicates that the emergence of rational voters in Indonesia as claimed by Liddle and Mujani cannot be supported and that the Indonesian voters’ behaviour is still strongly influenced by communal factors (King, Baswedan, Harjanto, 2005).

87Which theory, then, is better to explain the PKS’ 2004 electoral success? Interestingly, it seems that both have the capacity to explain the party's success in the last election. King and Baswedan provide solid empirical data showing that the PKS voters came from regions that are traditional supporters of political Islam, and that the party did less well in the regions of traditional supporters of secular parties. This means the people voted for the PKS because of its religious credentials, and the PKS was able to promote its image as the party of pious people who not only preach high politics, but also practice them. This is reminiscent of the famous Downsian theorem stating that a party may shift its position within the political spectrum but cannot leapfrog its neighbours since, in a multi-party system, a party articulates the political interests of a given cleavage which embeds the party position in the political spectrum (Downs, 1957). However, Liddle and Mujani are also correct in pointing out the emergence of rational voters and the diminishing influence of old-style communal politics. This is supported by the fact that a large portion of the traditional supporters of political Islam decided not to vote for the inheritors of their old favourite parties, but voted for the brand-new Islamist party because the PKS had been better in articulating its political interests. And this is undeniable evidence of the rationality of — at least — the PKS voters. Both theories on the pattern of Indonesian electoral behaviour sum up the findings of this study. There are two factors which have simultaneously contributed to the PKS’ success in increasing its votes, the first being its ability to build up and maintain Islamist credentials, and the second being its willingness to use democratic rhetoric, applying slogans like “clean government” and “anticorruption” rather than ideological ones.

5.2. The PKS and the Downturn of Political Islam in 2009

88The 2004 elections were in fact a triumph for Islamic parties since 1955. As is seen from the figure, the heyday of Islamic parties took place during the era of liberal democracy of the 1950s, when three Islamic parties successfully collected 42.2% of the national votes, and also dominated the country’s politics in terms of policy agendas. As for subsequent elections Islamic parties could only mobilise 29.3% during the 1977 elections, and at worst the number slumped to 16% in 1987. It is beyond doubt that the decline of Islamic parties’ electoral performance — as well as in political competitions in general — was a product of systematic engineering by the New Order regime, which perceived political Islam as a remnant of the previous regime’s ideology-oriented politics that brought only schism and instability and the last potential challenger to the regime’s developmentalist policies after the leftists had been crushed in 1965. The regime, backed by the military, was quite successful in executing their strategy: It thwarted the comebacks of the senior patrons of the legendary Masyumi party and forcefully fused Islamic parties into one and continuously interfered in their internal leaderships. It additionally discredited political Islam by setting up clandestine organisations of radical Muslims who carried out terrorist attacks against the state’s properties, who were then crushed by the military (as a French saying goes: “A fire-fighter who starts the flame and becomes the hero”). Finally, the regime ratified a law that made it mandatory for Islamic organisations — including political parties — to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological base and thus detaching its Islamic ideology.

Votes of Islamic Parties 1955-2009

89As is clear from the previous sections, although the New Order regime successfully curbed political Islam in public spaces, it was never able to cut its roots. Meanwhile, at the societal level, interest in Islamic politics started to grow just as Islamic parties were failing. In fact it was during this period that the discourse of “cultural Islam” — as the alternative to its structural counterpart — started to gain currency among Muslim activists. Islamic activism gradually shifted its focus from struggles for power politics to efforts to empower Muslim communities. The manifesto was embodied in Nurcholish Madjid’s revolutionary article: “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No”. Bachtiar Effendy is accurate in identifying that the emergence of so-called “cultural” Islam is not an opposition to — but rather a compliment of — the structural type. It was a product of the instinctive struggle for survival of activists of political Islam who decided to shift their energy from the struggle for power politics to da’wa activities after the former struck the impenetrable wall of the authoritarian military regime (Effendi, 2003: 249). Thus the potential and the power of political Islam was relatively constant, simply waiting for the right moment to emerge. The first window of opportunity opened during the establishment of the ICMI, when top Muslim activists gathered in a single organisation. The ICMI penetrated the country’s top power circles and built alliances with powerful actors within the regime.

90The real opportunity for political Islam to raise its flag took place after the regime change in 1998. A great number of Islamic parties were formed, although only around a dozen presented in the 1999 elections, and only six managed to get seats in the national legislature. The first post-authoritarian election witnessed the Islamic parties collecting around 36% of the national votes. Interestingly, analysts have shown that the political map of the 1999 elections very much resembles that of 1955. Dwight King listed some continuity in the political support for parties based on ideologies: (a) regions that supported the PNI and the PKI in 1955 tended to support the PDI-P in 1999; (b) regions that supported the NU in 1955 tended to support the PKB in 1999; and (c) regions that supported Masyumi in 1955 tended to support the PAN and the PBB in 1999. This means that the old “politik aliran” that separated nominal Muslims (abangan) from devout Muslims (santri) as well as the internal segregation between tradition-oriented and modernist-oriented Muslims are still intact despite political engineering by the New Order regime. When the regime collapsed the old political system was quickly revived (King, 2003: 133). The votes collected by Islamic parties slightly increased during the 2004 elections, the party having been in 5^th place in 1999 and in 3^rd in 2004, but the political map remained virtually unchanged. A closer analysis of the parties’ regional support at district level clearly shows that the increase of votes for the PKS was accompanied by the decline of support for the PAN and the PBB (Baswedan 2005).

91One of the key strategies that successfully transformed the PKS from a small party into an average-sized party was moderation. It went from being a radical party that advocated Islamisation agendas to a moderate party that promotes democracy and clean government. In theory, parties commonly use the previous election as a stepping stone for formulating strategies for the upcoming election, which is what the PKS did. Having realised that moderation was proven effective in collecting more votes, it repeated its strategies for the 2009 race, of which one of the highlights was the controversy during the 2008 National Congress in Bali surrounding the idea of an open party. Then again, the party’s target was not met. The votes collected even decreased from 8,325,020 to 8,172,425, although the percentage increased from 7,3 to 7,8. This was because the valid ballots during 2009 also decreased, i.e. 104,099,785 or 60,78% of the total 171,265,442 registered voters — minus 17,488,581 (10,21%) invalid votes and 49,677,076 (29,01%) abstained — while in 2004 the number of valid ballots was 113,462,414.

92There are at least three factors that explain the ineffectiveness of the PKS strategy of moderation as well as the decline of Islamic parties in general. Firstly, the changing pattern of party competition: Until 1999 party competition in Indonesia had still been defined along ideological lines in that party alignments were based on ideological, cultural, or religious identities; and political parties differentiated themselves from their competitors using those signifiers. During the period of liberal democracy in the 1950s, parties used religion (Islam and Christianity), or class identities (communist and socialist) as well as cultural factors (nationalist, regionalist, ethnicity) as their programmatic platforms. During the New Order era from 1965 to 1998 party competition was also arranged based on a schematic differentiation with Islamic parties on the right, socialist and Christian parties on the left and the state party at the centre. Scholars of party studies call this pattern a “spatial competition” in which parties represent different political segmentations in society (Downs, 1957). Meanwhile, party competition has changed into what scholars call “salient competition” (Robertson 1976). Parties no longer advocate particularistic — mostly ideological — agendas and mobilise support from certain segments in society, but rather put forward ameliorative policy packages marketable to all segments of society. The phenomenon has been characterised by the emergence of catch-all parties (Kirscheimer, 1966). This was evident during the 2009 elections as Islamic symbols — such as rituals, communions, clothing, and Arabic sayings — were no longer the exclusive properties of Islamic political actors, but became political cards played by politicians from virtually all sorts of parties. Politicians from secular parties such as the Golkar party, the Democratic Party and even the PDIP eagerly exposed themselves to the public by attending public prayers, wearing headscarves, as well as decorating their speeches with Arabic phrases or quotations from the Qur’an. This strategy significantly weakened the claims of Islamic parties as the main representatives of the political aspirations of Muslim communities.

Comparison of the PKS votes 2004 and 2009

PKS vote percentage in 2009

93Secondly, in the last five years Islamic parties have been unable to produce policies that effectively respond to the real needs of the Muslim community. Islamic political actors have tirelessly pushed symbolic agendas in an effort to moralise society by, for example, advocating Islamic regulations. Up to this day no less than thirty Islamic bylaws have been implemented at local, provincial and even national levels. In general those bylaws focus on three targets: (i) Improving morality by forbidding social crimes; (ii) Ordering religious enactments by making certain rituals mandatory, such as the ability to recite the Qur’an in Arabic for students or attending Friday prayers for male Muslims; and (iii) Regulating female clothing and behaviour as benchmarks of social ethics. Islamic politicians seemed to confuse what their constituents agree with and what they really need. Surveys show that the majority of Muslims support the implementation of Islamic laws: 67% of respondents agreed to Islamic governance based on the Qur’anic teachings; and 70.8% supported the implementation of Islamic Sharia as a public norm (Liddle, 2003). However, when asked what really concerns them, a completely different picture emerges: 55% said expensive basic needs; 33% said unemployment; 12% said unaffordable health and education services; 5% criminality and social unrest; 2% said political uncertainty (IFES, 2001-2005). In the context of increasing political rationality as a result of democratic institutionalisation and consolidation, the failures of Islamic politicians to respond to the real needs of their constituents will certainly reduce their legitimacy as the representatives of their political aspirations.

94Two factors caused Islamic parties to experience failure. Firstly, the ideological factor: Most Islamic politicians have strong confidence in the idea of “Baraka” or divine blessings, with morality as a key issue for societal well-being. Thus, instead of addressing the real problems faced by the Indonesian people, they have busied themselves with symbolic programmes of moral refinement. They assume that by reordering the people’s morality, they will improve social harmony and economic productivity. But this has not materialised. Secondly, Islamic politicians appear to lack skill and experience. They are social activists rather than politicians. They seem to be faced with formidable difficulties in conducting political competitions. Thus many Islamic parties were exhausted by internal rifts, friction and splits that left them no more energy to formulate policies.

95The third factor that contributes to the decline of political Islam is the magnetic popularity of current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono that has been institutionalised through his Democrat Party. His unique credentials include a military background symbolising his potential to provide strong leadership, a non-ideological and thus impartial commitment to national interests, extraordinary political skills in projecting his image as a fatherly figure who is calm, patient and attentive to the need of the people, as well as brilliant political strategies, especially in establishing sociopolitical stability and corruption eradication policies. His popularity among the electorates has also been amplified by the diminishing clout of other national civilian figures such as former presidents Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, and former chairman of the MPR Amien Rais. SBY’s extraordinary popularity has been reflected in the rocketing electoral achievement of the Democrat Party. It was founded in 2003 by his supporters to facilitate his nomination for direct presidential election. Within a year, albeit with a relatively weak network and a hastily structured organisation, the party managed to collect 7.4% in the 2004 elections. In 2009 its share of national votes virtually tripled to 21%. The rise of the PD with SBY as its central figure reiterates the Indonesian people’s general aspirations as well as the pattern of political competitions. The Democrat Party has consistently declared itself as a nationalist cum religious party. In doing so the party has accurately reflected the mood of political aspirations in a moderate combination of religion and nationalism — i.e. the Indonesian version of secularism. From the perspective of rational political competitions, the centre represents the strongest ideological and programmatic position.

5.3. Consequences and Future Prospects

96The battle has just ended and Islamic parties find themselves on the losing side. This of course is not the first time political Islam has failed. During the previous three decades it played only a marginal role. Yet proponents of political Islam always found excuses and scapegoats, claiming manipulation by the regime and interference by state agents. This time around, however, those excuses are no longer valid as there are no longer systematic discriminations toward political Islam. Even more, the failure of political Islam is unfortunately occurring in a time when there is increasing conservatism among Muslim communities.

97Could this be the beginning of the end of the story of political Islam in one of the most institutionally democratic Muslim countries in the world? Will this again fuel debate on the incompatibility of political Islam and democratic politics? I believe the situation is not that extreme. Election is just one out of four basic arenas of party behaviours. The other three are party organisation, government formation, and policy formulation and implementation. Thus in the next five years Islamic parties will have the opportunity to gain positions, provided they can meet the requirements. And the PKS seems to be most capable of achieving this. Organisationally, the PKS is much better off than its cousins: Its leadership boasts a solid corporate culture and its activists base themselves on a single tradition, i.e. the Tarbiyah movement and are bound by strong ties of solidarity. In addition, the PKS has better human resources as almost all its functionaries are graduates of modern universities. The party has also been eager to develop and improve its capabilities, for instance, by training its leaders in how to deal with the media as well as how to act in front of the cameras. The PKS is also the only party that has the capacity to recruit new activists through religious activities, especially at grassroots level, which guarantees that it will have more and more workforce in the years to come.

98The PKS is very capable in that its leadership has sharp instincts with regards to taking sides with potential winners. We saw that the party took a prompt decision to join the Democrat Party during the presidential election. The strategy was effective when together with the Crescent Star Party (PBB) it supported SBY in 2004 election. So when in 2009 many more parties joined the caravan the PKS had special status as an old comrade. What remains to be seen is whether the PKS — and other Islamic parties — will be able to appoint the right people in its cabinet in order to formulate and implement responsive policies. Unfortunately, with regards to the last point, Islamic parties have rather weak records. So far, they have merely formulated symbolic policies directed towards the moralisation of society without touching on the real issues of good governance, law enforcement, economic empowerment or the eradication of poverty. They are also prone to becoming trapped in political pragmatism by supporting unpopular government policies and jeopardising the aspirations of their constituents, as was seen when the PKS supported the government’s decision to increase oil prices and consequently faced protest from its own supporters. The capacity to formulate and implement concrete policies that respond to the real needs of the people, as well as the willingness to consistently advocate and support populist issues, is the key to the future success of the PKS and other Islamic parties.

99However, if the PKS and other Islamic parties are unable to do those things, they will not only jeopardise their own prospects in the following years, but will also – and more alarmingly – facilitate the increasing popularity of radical Islamic groups. In this case the PKS assumes the most responsibility, as it is sociologically the most conservative Islamic party. The party has so far been successful in mobilising political support and in accommodating the political aspirations of conservative Muslims. It has been the hope for those Muslims to eventually advance an Islamic polity in the country. When the party started to shift its political orientation towards the centre of the ideological spectrum and receive more support from mainstream Muslims, it also started to disenfranchise conservative groups. An unpublished research survey on Islamic organisations in five provinces by Maarif Institute, a Jakarta-based Islamic NGO working on democratisation and human rights – in which I am the research coordinator – found that leaders of Islamic organisations started to view the PKS as no longer being concerned with Islamic political agendas, but rather busied with power politics. This happened in a somewhat unfortunate way: Leaders of mainstream organisations such as the NU and Muhammadiyah expressed strong negative sentiments toward the PKS as they perceived it as systematically intruding on their organisations. Meanwhile, leaders of more conservative organisations such as Hizbut Tahrir, the Indonesian Mujahiddin Council (MMI), and the Islamic Defender Front (FPI), also shunned the PKS for no longer having the courage to promote Islamic sharia. Interestingly, the PKS leaders had anticipated this instinctively when on several occasions they issued edicts that prohibit Muslims from abstaining in the election. They even successfully persuaded the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) to issue a controversial edict stating that abstaining from the election (Golput in Indonesian) is religiously prohibited (haram). This clearly explains the situation. If supporters of other Islamic parties are disappointed with their choice of party they switch to the PKS, but if PKS supporters are no longer confident in the party, there is no other party they can turn to since the PKS is at the top end of the political spectrum. The only other possibility involves the more conservative and more radical groups outside the system. This could mean bad news for the prospect of Indonesian democratic consolidation.

6. Conclusion

100Although Islamic parties experienced a decline in the 2009 elections, they are certainly not out of the picture. The Prosperous Justice Party is a special case. Since its first appearance on the country’s political stage eleven years ago it has always been able to attract strong public attention. It grew from a new brand of Islamic organisation, run by a new generation of Islamic activists dominated not by graduates of religious studies but rather by engineers, along with a new trend of strong international Islamic solidarity. Its strategy included a process of gradual Islamisation adopted from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood: Islamising individuals, nurturing Islamic families, establishing Islamic societies and eventually setting up Islamic politics and policies. The party also fared very well in the national and regional electoral arenas. At the national level it started out with a rather modest achievement with 1.7% and 7 seats in 1999. After changing the party’s name — from Justice Party (PK) to Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) — its share of votes spectacularly increased to 7.4% with 45 seats in 2004. In addition, it joined the government coalition and became part of one of the ruling parties. During the June 2009 election its achievement appeared somewhat perplexing. From an electoral point of view it managed to increase its votes — although only very slightly — to 7.8% with 54 seats and became the biggest Islamic party while other Islamic parties’results fell significantly. From another point of view, however, the PKS achievement in the recent election signifies a decline: its votes decreased from 8,325,020 in 2004, to 8,174,469 in 2009. It managed to receive more seats with less votes because the votes now mostly come from provinces outside Java with a lower Vote Division Number (BPP). The recent achievement also represents a failure in relation to the party’s increasing number of activists as well as its political clout and financial capital.

101There are at least three factors that caused the failure of Islamic parties in the 2009 elections. Firstly, the changing pattern of party competition in which secular parties were increasingly willing to use Islamic discourse and symbols that consequently weakened the claims and legitimacy of Islamic parties as the exclusive representatives of the political interests and aspirations of Muslim voters. Secondly, a serious weakness of Islamic parties has been their inability to formulate and implement concrete policies that meet the requirements of their constituents — such as economic empowerment, the eradication of poverty, law enforcement, and the eradication of corruption. What Islamic politicians have done so far is merely confined to symbolic policies of moralising society through the implementation of so-called Islamic bylaws, especially at provincial and district levels. This has caused voters who prefer Islamic parties to turn to other parties they consider capable of formulating and implementing concrete policies, such as the Democrat Party. Thirdly, one must consider the magnetic personal charisma of president SBY — who boasts an image of firm leadership due to an ex-military personnel background and of friendliness toward Muslim communities — that has been translated and institutionalised through his Democrat Party, which has in turn become a new hope for the disappointed voters of Islamic parties.

102For the PKS the recent electoral result has a double meaning with regard to its future prospects. On the one hand, its ability to increase its vote percentages and its seats in the parliament as well as achieve top ranking among Islamic parties is a result of its strategy to shift its ideological orientation from a conservative to a moderate position. On the other hand, this strategy has disenfranchised its conservative supporters. These hardcore constituents of political Islam have started to perceive the PKS as no longer representing their interests and thus have become prone to be attracted by radical Islamic groups. If the PKS — and other Islamic parties — are able to formulate and implement responsive policies that meet the real needs of Muslim constituents in the years to come, they will still have the opportunity to thrive in Indonesian politics. Yet if they are unable to do so, not only their own prospects, but also the reputation of Indonesian Muslims as representing a pluralist and peaceful community, will be at stake.