Thailand’s 2023 General Election: Process, Key Issues, and Future Trajectories
p. 45-55
Résumé
The Move Forward Party surpassed predictions in the election, with demographic factors, especially the support of the younger generation and advancements in communication technology, playing a significant role in their success. This election marked a departure from the past, witnessing the emergence of various political ideologies and a diverse range of policy platforms. The election results suggested a growing dissatisfaction with the military-backed government and a desire for change among the Thai population. The traditional influence of provincial politics and dynastic patronage was being challenged by the rapid expansion of urbanization and the role of social media. These factors have triggered a transformation in how politics is conducted and how voters engaged with political parties. Nevertheless, the military-appointed Senate allowed pro-military parties to join in the new coalition government. The coalition government formed between these two opposing factions represented a significant shift and realignment in Thailand’s new era of political conflict.
Entrées d’index
Mots-clés : Thaïlande, Move Forward Party, Pheu Thai Party, Pita Limjaroenrat, Prayut Chan-o-cha, autoritarisme concurrentiel
Keywords : Thailand, competitive authoritarianism, Move Forward Party, Pheu Thai Party, Pita Limjaroenrat, Prayut Chan-o-cha
Index géographique : Thaïlande
Texte intégral
1On May 14, 2023, Thailand held an election within the framework of a hybrid regime and “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler, 2013; Diamond, 2002). The 2016 constitution was crafted with the intention of establishing appointed senators as a counter-majoritarian mechanism. In order to form a government, a minimum of 376 legislative votes out of 750 in the two chambers is required. Among these, 250 senators appointed by the military junta also play a part in the selection of the prime minister along with members of the House of Representatives (MPs). Approximately 52 million Thai voters directly elected 500 MPs for a four-year term using the parallel voting system. The first-past-the post method was employed to elect 400 members to represent each constituency. The remaining 100 members were chosen through proportional representation from closed nationwide party lists ranked by political parties. In total, 4,781 candidates ran for constituency MPs, and 1,898 candidates were listed on party ballots from 70 different political parties. Prior to election day, 63 candidates were nominated for the prime minister (Bangkok Post 2023). To be eligible for nominating a prime minister, a party needed to secure at least 5% of the House members or 25 seats. Each party had the option to propose up to three candidates.
The Process at a Glance
2The electoral process raised some concerns, including the use of state resources, electoral manipulations, gerrymandering, and an uneven playing field favouring ruling parties. These issues were generally less severe than in the 2019 election (Sawasdee 2020). For example, the ballot design assigned different numbers for the party-list ballot and the ballot for constituency candidates, creating confusion among voters. The constituency ballot did not include candidates’ names or party affiliations, aiming to reduce the advantage of parties with popular banners and encouraging candidates to focus on personal votes.1 Additionally, the Election Commission of Thailand implemented a 10% limit on the variation among constituencies to avoid malapportionment, resulting in the redrawing of constituency boundaries that might benefit certain candidates over others.
3The electoral campaign period lasted 44 days and was marked by a strong wave of enthusiasm. Political parties employed a range of strategies, such as rallies, door-to-door canvassing, patronage, distributing materials, and digital media to engage voters. Broadcasting debates and the widespread use of social media platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and Twitter played a pivotal role in evaluating prime minister and House candidates, shaping public discourse, and capturing voters’ attention. Thailand’s 2023 general election set a record for voter turnout in the country’s history, with 75.71% of eligible voters participating.2
Key Electoral Issues and Party Positions
4Classifying Thai political parties as strictly left-wing or right-wing can be challenging, as their primary aim often revolves around securing cabinet positions rather than embodying strong ideological differences. Furthermore, Thailand’s historical political centre has leaned right, largely due to the absence of a prominent left-wing party. However, when comparing Thai political parties (though not necessarily to parties in other countries), certain distinctions become evident based on campaign policies and positions:
5Move Forward Party (MFP): Emerged as the successor to the dissolved Future Forward Party, due to a Constitutional Court order, has a distinct emphasis on tackling Thailand’s structural challenges through three core areas: demilitarization, de-monopolization, and decentralization. They believe these changes can bring about significant transformation, as expressed in their slogan, “Choose MFP, and Thailand won’t be the same.” The MFP exhibits elements of left-wing populism3, combining left-wing politics with populist rhetoric. The party takes a progressive stance on issues like anti-establishment sentiments, military reform, the abolition of conglomerate monopolies, and the amendment of Section 112 (Lèse-majesté legislation that bans criticism of the monarchy), which is seen as a sensitive subject. Its character might alternatively be described as techno-populism (Bickerton and Accetti 2021) as the party actively engages with voters through social media, involving academic leaders and experts.
6Pheu Thai Party (PT): As the third incarnation of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s parties, the PT has consistently secured the most seats in five successive general election since 2001. The party’s key policy proposals include providing a 10 000 THB (approximately 285 US $) digital wallet for every individual aged 16 and over and raising the minimum wage to 600 THB (17 US $) by 2027. The PT has a more centrist stance, emphasising previous economic achievement rather than striving for structural and institutional reforms.
7Palang Pracharath Party (PPRP): Characterized as a big-tent party comprising veteran politicians from various factions, including many former members of the PT, and teams of technocrats. The PPRP’s main campaign promise centres on increasing entitlements for state welfare cardholders. The party positions itself as a party of reconciliation without strong adherence to any specific ideology. It has nominated General Prawit Wongsuwan, the eldest among the “Three ‘Por’ Brothers” (a group of three former army chiefs) as its premier candidate, in place of General Prayuth Chan-o-cha.
8Democrat Party (DP): Being the oldest functioning political party in Thailand, the DP holds a conservative and pro-market stance. However, the party’s popularity has faded, and it has experienced a significant exodus of members. This is owing to the belief that its anti-Thaksin stance proved ineffective, and its previous image as a defender of democracy has been tainted by its cosy relationship with the military.
9Bhumjaithai Party (BJT): Known for attracting more than 40 defectors from other parties, is also recognized for its advocacy to legalize marijuana. The BJT takes a conservative populist stance with the motto “said and done.”
10United Thai Nation Party (UTN): Established approximately one year prior to the election to endorse General Prayuth Chan-o-cha, the UTN primarily appeals to those who see him as the guardian of national identity and traditional institutions. The party leans much farther right than most traditional parties in Thailand. It places a strong emphasis on conventional morality and upholding national and cultural values.
11Leading up to the 2023 election, most parties struggle to effectively communicate with voters and have not made significant efforts in party building. Instead, they rely on old-school practices to garner votes, including providing patronage, co-opting incumbent candidates, and leveraging local political networks. These techniques often require substantial financial resources and become less effective over time.
Electoral Results: A Tornado of Changes
12In the overall picture, a total of 18 political parties were elected to the House of Representatives, among them were seven single seated parties, as demonstrated in Table 1. The MFP won more than 14 million votes (38.4%) nationwide, winning party list votes across 43 provinces, including Bangkok, vicinity, and the eastern region. Additionally, it obtained the second highest party list votes in the remaining 33 provinces. The electoral results reflected a thirst for change, especially in urbanized areas across country, where conventional clientelistic and dynastic politics (Nishizaki 2023; Meechan 2023) were being challenged by high mobility and evolving media consumption habits.
Table 1: Electoral Results, 14 May 2023
Political Parties | Constituency | Party list | Total | |||||
Seats | Votes | % | Seats | Votes | % | Seats | % | |
Move Forward | 112 | 9,665,433 | 25.989 | 39 | 14,438,851 | 38.480 | 151 | 30.20 |
Pheu Thai | 112 | 9,340,082 | 25.114 | 29 | 10,962,522 | 29.216 | 141 | 28.20 |
Bhumjaithai | 68 | 5,133,441 | 13.803 | 3 | 1,138,202 | 3.033 | 71 | 14.20 |
Palang Pracharath | 39 | 4,186,441 | 11.257 | 1 | 537,625 | 1.433 | 40 | 8.00 |
United Thai | 23 | 3,607,575 | 9.700 | 13 | 4,766,408 | 12.703 | 36 | 7.20 |
Democrat | 22 | 2,278,857 | 6.128 | 3 | 925,349 | 2.466 | 25 | 5.00 |
Chartthaipattana | 9 | 585,205 | 1.574 | 1 | 192,497 | 0.513 | 10 | 2.00 |
Prachachat | 7 | 334,051 | 0.898 | 2 | 602,645 | 1.606 | 9 | 1.80 |
Thai Sang Thai | 5 | 872,893 | 2.347 | 1 | 340,178 | 0.907 | 6 | 1.20 |
Pue Thai Rumphlang | 2 | 94,345 | 0.254 | 0 | 67,692 | 0.180 | 2 | 0.40 |
Chartpattanakla | 1 | 297,946 | 0.801 | 1 | 212,676 | 0.567 | 2 | 0.40 |
Thai Liberal | 0 | 277,007 | 0.745 | 1 | 351,376 | 0.936 | 1 | 0.20 |
New Democracy | 0 | 13,583 | 0.037 | 1 | 273,428 | 0.729 | 1 | 0.20 |
New | 0 | 1,365 | 0.004 | 1 | 249,731 | 0.666 | 1 | 0.20 |
The Party of Thai Counties | 0 | 1,202 | 0.003 | 1 | 201,411 | 0.537 | 1 | 0.20 |
Fair | 0 | 9,653 | 0.026 | 1 | 184,817 | 0.493 | 1 | 0.20 |
Plung Sungkom Mai | 0 | 20,353 | 0.055 | 1 | 177,379 | 0.473 | 1 | 0.20 |
Thai Teachers for People | 0 | 4,464 | 0.012 | 1 | 175,182 | 0.467 | 1 | 0.20 |
Valid Votes | 400 | 37,190,071 | 100 | 37,522,746 | 500 | |||
Spoiled Ballots | 1,457,899 | 1,509,836 | ||||||
Voter Turnout | 39,514,973 | 39,514,964 | ||||||
Eligible Voters | 52,195,920 | 52,195,920 |
Source: Author’s calculation based on the data provided by the Election Commission of Thailand (Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, 2023, The 2023 Election Results, an official report by the Election Commission of Thailand, https://ectreport66.ect.go.th/overview).
13The MFP, known for its anti-establishment stance and alignment with the 2020-2021 Youth Movements, received robust support from the younger demo-graphic (Lertchoosakul 2023; Jatusripitak 2023). Notably, six of the MFP’s elected Members of Parliament were activists during these movements. Young voters, including more than three million first-time electors, high school and university students and the middle to upper-income segments of the electorate favoured the MFP over other parties. According to my research on the Youth’s perspective during 2020-2021, over 75% of young people prioritize democratic values over conservative and traditional principles (Sawasdee 2022).
14The MFP’s popularity extended beyond the younger generation, resonating across different age groups and spanning both urban and rural areas. Despite spending less than other parties, the MFP’s constituency candidates won 112 seats, negating the popular narrative that money is the primary determinant of electoral success. The MFP’s extensive use of social media platforms, especially TikTok, have weakened provincial bosses, family politics, and conventional vote canvassing based on patronage.
15The PT has experienced a decline in its electoral dominance, slipping to the second place in the House of Representatives with nearly 11 million votes (29.2%) nationwide. While the party was successful in winning the party list votes in 26 provinces and securing seats in its stronghold region of Northeast Thailand, it failed to win any seats in the South and managed just one seat in Bangkok. Several factors contributed to the PT’s unexpected loss: 1) The confusion surrounding its prime ministerial candidates. The party fielded three candidates, including Thaksin Shinawatra’s daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra and real estate billionaire Srettha Thavisin. However, the party never stated clearly which candidate would be its top choice for prime minister, and none of them participated in the pivotal prime ministerial debates; 2) the party’s ambivalence about forming a coalition with the military-aligned parties; 3) the disconnection with young voters, who were seeking a more transformative political agenda rather than mere economic policies. These challenges point to the need for the party to reevaluate its goals, messaging, and internal dynamics in order to regain its political standing in the future.
16The BJT is the third-largest party, obtaining seats mostly in its heartland of the northeast. Although it also won seats in the South, Central, and North regions, it did not collect the most popular votes in any province under the party list system, receiving just over 1 million votes (3.0%). This underscored the BJT’s primary strategy of gaining votes through political brokers and from political network support. The party lacked the potential to establish itself as a national party.
17The DP has experienced a significant decay in popularity, with its propor-tional representation votes plummeting from 12 million (40.4%) in 2007 to 925 245 (2.4%). It won 25 seats in the lower house, and even its stronghold in the southern region faced challenges from the MFP.
18The PPRP, once the core coalition party that obtained 116 seats in 2019, has now captured 40 seats and only 537 625 votes (1.4%) from the party list system. The United Thai Nation Party (UTN), a newly created party supporting Prime Minister General Prayuth, received 4.7 million votes (12.7%) from the party list ballot, resulting in a total of 36 seats in the lower house. Together, the two military-backed parties won 76 seats, with their combined vote share dropping from 23.7% in 2019 to 14% in 2023. The internal conflicts among conservative elites that led to the breakup of the PPRP and the UTN highlighted the flaws and limitations of the competitive authoritarian model in maintaining power through the electoral arena. The coalition government was held responsible for economic difficulties and a poor response to the Covid-19 pandemic.
19It is worth noting that the disparity in constituency votes between the MFP (9.6 million), the PT (9.3 million), the BJT (5.1 million), and the PPRP (4.1 million) was less pronounced compared to the difference in party list votes. This implies that political brokerage and clientelistic patterns continue to influence voters at the constituency level in many parts of Thailand, while anti-military sentiments, a desire for change, and programmatic issues play a more prominent role in shaping voters’ decisions at the national level. This underlines Thailand’s changing political landscape and the complexity of election campaigns in a country where urbanisation and mobilisation spread into rural areas and the youth versus conservative cleavage is more visible, especially among the MFP supporters.
The Long Road to a Government Formation
20Thailand’s political landscape post-election was both challenging and intricate. The MFP’s leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, formed an eight-party coalition MOU, commanding 312 seats in the 500-seat lower house. However, to become prime minister, Pita needed support from the appointed senators. Many of these senators, who had previously voted for the military-backed government in the 2019 election, refused to vote for Pita due to their opposition to the MFP’s progressive stance.
21After more than three months of political deadlock, the second-placed PT successfully formed a government, led by Srettha Thavisin, with the support of 11 parties, some of which were backed by its longtime rival, the military. This unusual alliance was a result of a transitional provision in the constitution, which made it highly improbable for election winners not favoured by the traditional establishment to assume power. However, the Senate’s authority in selecting the prime minister, as stated in the transitional clause, will cease in May 2024.
22The coalition created by the PT and parties affiliated with the previous junta-backed government, along with the return of former Prime Minister Thaksin after 17 years in exile with a royal pardon, represented an audacious attempt to bridge a two-decade political conflicts between the PT and its adversaries in the military and established political circles. The PT made crucial commitments, such as not altering the lèse-majesté law and pledging to defend the monarchy.
23However, the alliance with junta-linked parties has infuriated many Thais who believe their votes are being neglected. Consequently, the PT may face animosity from the MFP’s supporters who feel deceived by what they perceive as a collusion with the elite’s machinery, as well as some of its own voters who may see the PT’s union with pro-junta parties as a deviation from the party’s stance as a defender of electoral democracy. This could culminate in the PT losing ground in the electoral arena to the surging MFP. Ironically, for a party like the PT, which has built its reputation on campaign promises and its past accomplishments in improving the economy, the inability to form a government after being out of office for more than nine years could be more damaging than partnering with its old enemy.
The Future Trajectories
24The election outcomes in Thailand reflect a growing weariness among the public with prolonged military-dominated governance and a strong desire for a fresh direction. The perception that a pro-military ruling coalition has held power for an extended period and has demonstrated inefficiency in governance has played a significant role in their electoral setback. The MFP, with its progressive agenda, has resonated with voters disenchanted with the leadership of military figures like General Prayuth Chan-o-cha. However, the MFP’s commitment to reform powerful institutions, including the monarchy and the military, have alarmed royalist conservatives.
25The electoral landscape, traditionally influenced by provincial network politicians, local power brokers, and patronage-based vote canvassing, is being contested by the emergence of the MFP and the growing impact of social media platforms like TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter. The use of digital media has introduced a new sense of intimacy and is increasingly superseding traditional clientelism in influencing voting behaviour. This results in shifting voter expectations and inspirations.
26The future trajectory of Thailand’s political landscape is likely to evolve towards a multi-party system divided into three major political camps: the left-wing techno-populist MPF, the centrist populist PT, and various clientelistic parties. While both the MFP and PT are generally seen as pro-democracy parties, their key distinction lies in their priorities. The MFP places a strong emphasis on significant institutional reforms, while the PT focuses on delivering economic performance.
Bibliographie
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Notes de bas de page
1 Allen Hicken, “What’s in a Number? The Implications of Thailand’s Ballot Design,” Thai Data Points, Available from: https://www.thaidatapoints.com/post/what-s-in-a-number-the-implications-of-thailand-s-ballot-design [accessed May 12, 2023].
2 Office of the Election Commission of Thailand, The 2023 Election Results, an official report by the Election Commission of Thailand, Official Report available from: https://ectreport66.ect.go.th/overview.
3 Two examples of the left-wing populism are Corbynism in the United Kingdom and Podemos in Spain (see Piquer and Jäger 2020).
Auteur
Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee, PhD is a Professor at Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science. Her research interests embrace comparative political parties and electoral systems, political behaviour, institutional design, Thai politics and civic education. Her research entitled “Voting Behaviours and Pattern of Political Participation of the Thai Electorate in the Conflict Situation” won an award from the National Research Council of Thailand for the Excellent Research. She writes in academic journals on a regular basis and participates in public debates about Thai politics. Her recent publication in English includes “Youth Study Thailand 2021-2022,” “Thailand” in Strengthening legal frameworks for political parties,” and “Two Tales of Identity Politics in Thailand.”
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