1Arriving at a consensus on the typology of piracy seems to be as difficult as arriving at a unanimous definition of this phenomenon. Each one’s interest broadly determines the modes of classification. In August 1992, Eric Ellen made a distinction between attacks affecting ships and those targeting goods187. Further, he differentiated between social and commercial threats. On his part, Daniel Perret, researcher in the Ecole française d’Extrême Orient (French School of the Far East), made a distinction between “artisanal” piracy and that which relied on international networks. The former would target the personal effects of the crew and light equipment; the latter would be more interested in freight and fuel188.

2The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore and the Singapore Shipping Association (SSA) agree on this distinction. Both of them emphasise on the differences, decisive according to them, between piracy stricto sensu, on a large scale targeting the cargo of ships sailing the high seas, and coastal armed robbery. The SSA desires that nations take interest particularly in the first category, pertaining to organised crime and attacks against ships in transit. Besides, it speaks of the risks that threaten the environment in case an oil tanker runs aground.

3During a seminar in Newport (United States) in 1995, Kwek Siew Jin, who led the Singaporean Navy, laid emphasis on the duration of the hijacking. He thus brought up distinctions between temporary seizures, detentions of longer duration, “the disappeared boat is detained for several days, the time taken to unload the cargo”, and permanent sequestrations189. The first two cases would be characteristic of the South China Sea; the last would primarily concern Southeast Asia and the Malay Straits.

4As far as typology is concerned, we can hardly consider the nationality of the ships as a criterion of analysis due to the fact that there are many flags of convenience. Except in rare cases (some Chinese pirates exclusively attacked Russian ships), the motivations are more pecuniary than nationalist. This constitutes one of the main differences between piracy and terrorism: the flag does not matter as long as the cargo is taken. We will note however that thirteen ships attacked in 1998 were Malaysian, whichprobably had some influence on the awareness of the phenomenon in Kuala Lumpur. Likewise, it is the number of Japanese ships, subject to pirate attacks which that prompted the Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi to moot an international conference on the issue.

5As far as the definition is concerned, we will for our part refer to the IMO classification190. Between 15^th June 1998 and 15^th June 1999, a specialised website termed 84% of the recorded attacks as “random incidents191”. They were cases of “minor armed robbery” (MAR). But 9% of the attacks ended in the capture of cargo (“Armed robbery and aggression of intermediate degree”-ARAID). Finally, 7% of the attacks led to the disappearance of the ship, probably transformed into a “phantom ship” (“serious criminal hijacking”-SCH).

3.1. Minor Piracy (“Minor Armed Robbery”-MAR)

6“Minor armed robbery” concerns the attacks and robbery that take place in the ports and in the vicinity of the coasts and whose victims are fishermen and yachtsmen. By MAR, the IMO means an opportunistic attack, led along the coasts on small, very rapid boats and perpetrated by bandits (maritime muggers), habitually equipped with knives. They generally target cash locked up in the safe and personal valuables. The value of items stolen most often ranges between 5000 and 15000 dollars192.

7In most cases, these pirates originate from the world of seamen. We find in their midst fishermen, sailors, even former soldiers from the Navy, who are therefore perfectly wellinformed about the environment of maritime transport. During the eighties, the Kuala Lumpur police would have identified 24 bands of pirates in the vicinity of Borneo alone193. In 2000, six of them were still sailing (Kumpulan Pipi Uwah,, Kumpulan Sarikal Alihal, Kumpulan Akil Jani, Kumpulan Tandanan, Kumpulan Madjuran and Kumpulan Akil Dewan).

3.1.1. Attacks on ports

8In Southeast Asia, more than three-quarters of the incidents occur in territorial waters, most often within the ports (at moorage or on the quai)194. This is especially the case in Malaysia, where, in 1999, several incidents occurred on the quais of Bintulu, in the State of Sarawak (to the north of Borneo). In general, men armed with parang (long knives) and pistols board anchored ships with the help of motor boats. A collaboration with the air force should have been envisaged to strengthen the security near the port facilities.

9Despite the efforts of the Singaporean authorities, the Malacca Straits also faced attacks against ships in transit within its ports. This was how in 1998, the navigational equipment of one of the tugs of a French maritime company operating in Southeast Asia was completely dismantled and stolen near the port of Batu Ampar (Batam).

10The Manila Bay and the coastal facilities of Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are hardly spared, even though the majority of the incidents are never reported. In 1994, it was hoped that the incidents that occurred in the Indonesian ports of Dumai and Surabaya195 for example, were isolated cases. But the weekly reports of the Regional Centre for Piracy in Kuala Lumpur clearly reported the gravity of the phenomenon, warning that “the boats contacting the Indonesian ports of Belawan, Dumai, Merak, Samarinda and Tanjung Priok mentioned numerous attacks (…). Attacks were also reported in Chittagong and Mongla (Bangladesh), as also at Chennai (India). Boats here were victims of thefts of zinc plates welded on the sides or the stern of the ships…”196.

11In South Asia, raids led from the west coast of Sri Lanka by organised gangs increased in number197. There too, the boats were often attacked by a small commando of two to five men, often armed only with knives. The attack was often brief, the pirates looking only for money and personal effects198.

Type of attacks reported between 2000 and 2001

3.1.2. The coastal attacks

12Fishermen are the main victims of the recurrent piracy in the Malaysian waters. Is it due to lassitude? The fact remains that the acts perpetrated against them are rarely reported199.

13Things are different for the incidents targeting yachts which the Western press does not fail to report. Some fishermen too engage in buccaneering, sometimes reduced to this extremity by the increasing pressure on the environment, the concomitant impoverishment of the fishing resources and the economic crisis which recently shook the region.

14They therefore hunt the small yachts, easy targets for groups without either special equipment or any particular skills. But in 1995, an entire village took control of a 120 foot luxury yacht used for diving in the south of Ambon (in the Moluccas, in Indonesia).

15At the exact time when dinner was served to the twenty-two guests, fishermen, armed with lances, climbed on board. The chief of the village demanded 10000 dollars. Following a tussle between the crew and the assailants, the worst was finally prevented. The incident would have cost the crew only 500 dollars200.

16Despite the fact that they are relatively rare, these attacks arouse fantasies and some even go to the extent of thinking that there is a pirate slumbering within every inhabitant of Southeast Asia.

17Strangely enough the weekly magazine Newsweek reported the words of a German yachtsman advising his colleagues against fraternizing with the natives if they did not want to find themselves robbed201. Along the same lines, Voile magazine published in November 1998 an article by Vincent Goudis, also the author of Cap’tain Vagabond (Albin Michel):

18“As for Thailand, the fishermen, who can no longer exploit the boat people, now attack yachts more seriously (previously there were only a few rare disappearances). North of New Guinea and Irian Jaya: do not lay anchor, the pirates arrive on boats at night. Coasts of Vietnam: the pirates are real professionals. Between the Indonesian islands: the pirates are very well equipped and attack especially the cargo ships, but be careful, don’t be too confident at night. As for Sulu: do not go there. The pirates are poor, cruel and nobody controls="true" them202”.

19To sum up, the periodical seems to suggest that one should not leave the Grau-du-Roi or Port-Camargue…203. The racing boats themselves felt threatened: an annual race between Darwin (Australia) and Ambon (in the Moluccas) was cancelled in 1999. Only the competitors of the Vendée Globe Challenge, in the latitude below the fifties, seem to be protected.

20Bordering on armed robbery at sea, our “artisan pirates” sometimes venture into more ambitious operations.

21For example: an attack suffered by a Malaysian boat, the Antara dua, and its ten crew members. In August 2000, they were carrying Protons (national car of Malaysia) from Port Klang (near Kuala Lumpur) to Kuching (in Sarawak, in Eastern Malaysia). Nine pirates, armed with machetes, boarded the ship early in the morning to lay their hands on 7200 ringitts (around 1900 euros), a television, mobile telephones, watches, shoes and clothes204.

3.2. Organised Piracy (“Armed Robbery and Agression of Intermediate Degree”-ARAID)

22This involves violent action aiming at pillage or theft of boats on the high seas or on territorial waters. This practice is not as common as armed robbery at sea, but is more likely to upset navigation insofar as the crew is overpowered for a longer time whereas the boat is not immobilised. In order to be thus categorised, the attacks must be led by wellorganised gangs, usually heavily armed. The distinction is therefore made according to the identity of the pirates. It may be a question of rebels from the national army who act from a boat205 which serves as a base or a port. The bands are sometimes affiliated to a local personality. In this case, they act as private militia.

23Following a drastic reduction in the forces, former Vietnamese servicemen turned to piracy to compensate the loss of their job by attacking ships206, just like the soldiers in Athens, after the Peloponnesian war when it started to decline (5^th century B.C.). In Europe, the Greenpeace’s British office even proposed the services of ex-servicemen skilled in the handling of explosives. They were trying to reorient themselves, believing that they had found an opportunity in the development of environmentalist militancy in the maritime milieu207.

3.2.1. The attacks in the South China Sea

24During the nineties, the number of testimonies pertaining to acts of piracy perpetrated by individuals who bore a striking resemblance to the soldiers of the People’s Army was so high that the Chinese army was accused. At the end of 1999, the British Foreign Office explained that launches loaded with men in uniform were forcing ships sailing the seas to enter Chinese territorial waters in order to be able to accuse them of smuggling.

25Only upon the payment of a heavy fine were the boats allowed to go on their way208. In October 1997, the Vosa Carrier from Hong Kong was hijacked near Huilai (Guangdong) by a Chinese launch209. The pirates rapidly seized the money and got a document signed by the crew in which they acknowledged that they were engaged in smuggling operations. The Captain was subpoenaed to appear in Huilai and the containers were confiscated. The boat and the crew were finally released following payment of a fine of 100000 dollars to the police.

3.2.2. The attacks in the Malay world

26The Indonesian army has long been accused of all kinds of trafficking210. In 1995, a little before the resignation of President Suharto and the decline of his orde baru (the new order), the provincial military commanders were entrusted with extended powers that allowed them particularly to dominate civil administration. Their contacts with the local business world were facilitated, a fact that allowed them also to engage in economic activities that sometimes bordered on illegality. Some even took advantage of the situation by engaging in veritable acts of piracy211. It seems, in addition, that many attacks associated real criminals with commandos of the Navy212. These men of the Indonesian army, probably in active service, would have allowed the pirates to seize cargos and then transfer them quickly.

27It is still too soon to know if the efforts undertaken by the Indonesian Government of Abdurrehman Wahid (also known by the name of Gus Dur) to control the army more efficiently have really borne fruit and if these efforts continued with the same intensity since Megawati Sukarno Putri’s nomination as Head of State (23^rd July 2001). The tie-ups between certain local potentates and pirate bands are in any case too tight to be undone easily.

28Likewise, south of the Philippines, due to the main conflict between the State and the secessionists, the inhabitants have had to compromise with the private militia. Now, in the rural provinces, the members of surveillance committees, usually linked with the army, very often act as substitutes for the administration in place. Thanks to the means available to them, pirates, smugglers or even arms traffickers constitute a veritable economic elite213.

29Although they reveal the problems faced today by the Indonesian army, and to a smaller degree by its Filipino counterpart, the acts of piracy involving military units as such remain marginal in Southeast Asia. And though criticised, the institutions entrusted with the maintenance of law and order, nonetheless get significant results.

30On 12^th October 2000, three men around 25 years of age were arrested by the Malaysian police. They were accused of about thirty attacks which brought them more than 260000 dollars. A fast boat and knives were seized.

31On 23^rd October, during an ambush along the Klebang Kecil beach, the police defeated the chief of a pirate syndicate and arrested four of his accomplices. The latter were surprised while in the process of loading smuggled motorbikes on board a boat en route to Sumatra. Twelve other interrogations followed and, since then, the number of attacks would have reduced considerably. It seems that the Malaysian authorities, who had declared a while ago that they had important information in their possession, had waited for the international meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 2000 to act…

32Better equipped than simple fishermen, sometimes having links with the business world or corrupt officials, these bands are nowhere near having the power of the mafia and other triads who can engage in large-scale trafficking through the technique of kapal bantu in Indonesian or phantom ship.

3.3. International Piracy (“Serious Criminal Hijacking”-SCH)

33Hergé, in Le Crabe aux pinces d’or (Crab with the golden claws), touches upon the tricky problem of the hijacking of merchant ships, when Captain Haddock’s Karaboudjan is renamed Djebel Amilah. But in order to apprehend the question of SCH in its totality, we should not only take into account its forms (" planned international criminal activities taking advantage of important resources, using large gangs of well-trained and heavily armed men, fully prepared to use firearms”) but we should also look into its consequences (“disappearance of ships hijacked and renamed in order to engage in illegal traffickingphenomenon which today is called “phantom ship "”)214.

34A hijacking always occurs in the same manner. Broadly, we find the schema traced by Eric Ellen, director of the IMB215.

35First stage: the capture of a ship. It is then that the act of piracy stricto sensu comes into play. The techniques of boarding are classical: throwing of grapnel, overpowering the crew and ransacking as a rule.

36Then, the criminals disguise the boat while the cargo is hijacked. Following this, the vessel receives a new registration, granted by the maritime bureau of a consulate (often of the Honduras or Panama) in a city of the Far East (Bangkok, Singapore). There are many arrangements possible, which are more or less legal.

37The next stage: the sale of the boat to a shipper in a hurry. East Asia has witnessed a rapid increase in trade. In some areas, the demand is higher than supply as far as maritime transport is concerned. It so happens that a supplier holding a documentary credit which has almost expired is urgently looking for a ship.

38Thanks to their network of agents, the criminal organisations of the region are informed of the requirements. They propose one of their boats. The shipper seizes the opportunity, ships his cargo and receives his Bill of Lading216.

39It is now time for the second hijacking. Instead of heading for the destination indicated on the Bill of Lading, the ship heads for a port known only to the pirates. Here, they hand over the cargo to an accomplice or a bona fide buyer. Then to avoid any police intervention, the ship changes registration and appearance.

40The boat can then receive another cargo load. The operation can even be repeated a number of times. In the end, if it is not found, the phantom ship may be sold once more to an unscrupulous ship owner, used as a den by the pirates, sold as scrap, unless it begins a second career in the smuggling of arms, clandestine immigration or drug trafficking.

41In September 2000, Noel Choong, of the Regional Piracy Centre, estimated that the hijackers of an average cargo load could make a profit of two to three million dollars218. With the utilisation that could be made of the ship, and then its resale, a phantom ship could, in a good year, bring between forty and fifty million dollars to the criminal organisation that hijacked it219.

42Pirates generally avoid organising hijackings in their country of origin. Honourable merchants of some standing, they restrict their illicit activities to territories falling under another jurisdiction. This screen makes it very difficult to combat criminality.

43In May 2000, Captain Pottengal Mukundan of the IMB estimated that there were five or six gangs run by big businessmen heading shipping companies. They are, for the moment, protected against the extraditions laid down by the 1988 Rome Convention, as they reside in countries which did not ratify it. The text in fact facilitates extradition in cases where there is a threat to maritime security.

44In 1999, the MT Siam Xanxai with seventeen persons on board left Singapore loaded with petroleum for Songkhla in Thailand.

45On 8^th June 1999, a little before midnight, it was attacked by two launches near the Tioman islands, in the waters off the South-east coasts of Malaysia. The pirates, armed with pistols and knives could not prevent one sailor from escaping on a little boat. He was later rescued by the fishermen of Sibu (near Borneo), as were the other crew members, abandoned by the pirates at sea.

46The MT Siam Xanxai was traced in mid-July under the name of Auo Me 2, in a port of the Guangdong province, in South China.

47According to Xie Yongpeng, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Public Safety of Shantou, the leader of the Indonesian pirates would have attacked the ship at the order of a resident of Singapore.

48The same year, the MV Marine Master flying the Panaman flag was found in Fangcheng, another port in South China. It was then called the Nuovo Tierra and flew the flag of the Honduras. Headed for Calcutta from Nantong on 1^st March 1999 with a cargo of soda on board, it made a halt in Singapore two weeks later.

49On 17^th March, on the Andaman Sea, twenty pirates, some of whom were clad in military uniforms, boarded the ship from two fishing boats and a launch. All of them were wearing masks and were equipped with pistols. The crew members had sit in two fishing boats in the company of around ten criminals. Four days later, the bandits abandoned them on a small raft from which they were rescued nearly a week later. When the ship was traced at Fancheng, thanks to an alert sent out by the IMB, fourteen Burmese found on board were arrested by the Chinese authorities and the boat returned to its owner.

50In late 1999, it was in China that traces of a large majority of stolen ships were found. There, the dubious vessels desirous of selling questionable goods found favourable conditions and partners who hardly seemed concerned by the need to respect international regulations. In some Southern ports, the triads would even have bought out some highly placed government officials of the Port administration so that they stop questioning the veracity of the furnished documents220. In the IMB’s jargon, they furnish what is called “noquestions-asked commodities”221. The most accused port is that of Beihai, between Hong Kong and the island of Hainan. Further to the north, the special economic zone of Xiamen also caused eyebrows to be raised…

51The following year, 300 investigators sent by Prime Minister Zhu to Fujian arrested nearly 200 local worthies. Suspected of having accepted the bribes from Lai Changxing in order to permit him to clandestinely import arms, crude petroleum, cars as also petrochemical by-products, they were given heavy sentences222. It should be said that they would have set up the most important smuggling network discovered since 1949. Thanks, among others, to the usage of “phantom ships”, more than ten billion dollars worth of goods would possibly have been exchanged.

52Various clues enable the detection of a “phantom ship”223: registration in the Honduras or Panama, a fifteen to twenty year old boat, suspicious details in the registration, late arrival in the loading ports, unanswered radio calls, Burmese, Indonesian or Filipino crew, absence of mail in the loading port, commission paid to the broker or even transfer of funds into personal accounts to pay transport expenses.

3.4. Para-Piracy

53Apart from piracy stricto sensu classified into three distinct categories by the IMO since 1993, it is only proper to mention two types of crime that are closely linked to the nautical world. For political organisations, piracy often represents a means of financing their main activities.

54During the meeting of the ARF in Bombay in October 2000, India, probably worried by the maritime activities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), tried in vain to get terrorist activities at sea classified as a form of piracy. But, for want of a consensus, the pirates could not be likened to drug traffickers, plentiful in the vicinity of the Indochinese peninsula227 – or to traffickers of arms, like those who sail the waters of Sri Lanka or Aceh. In its report in 1993, the IMO has however devoted a specific paragraph to terrorist involvement in certain pirate attacks228.

3.4.1. Attacks on villages

55Contrary to classical piracy, one part of para-piracy generally occurs on land, whether it takes the form of attacks on administrative or commercial establishments or on individuals. The hostage-taking, in late April 2000 on the island of Sipadan (between the coasts of Sabah and the Philippines) was particularly publicised, but it was far from being an isolated case. Jimlan Panglima, in charge of the security of Semporna near the island of Sipadan, reminded the Malaysian Star that his village had been attacked at least four times during the last fifteen years.

56The article concluded that it was not a question of random acts of piracy, but that of “rampant” piracy229. It should be noted, besides, that 600 men of the GOF (General Operating Force) are posted on around thirty-five islands of the Sulu archipelago, the majority in the vicinity of the maritime frontier of the Philippines.

57Despite the legal ambiguity that surrounds them, the case of pirate raids against certain coastal villages cannot be ignored. Semporna, a small town in the Province of Sabah in the Malaysian side of Borneo was pillaged and placed under the thumb of pirates in 1952 and in 1954.

The major pirate ports

58In September 1985, a little further to the north, Lahad Datu was in its turn attacked by about fifty pirates who took control of the city for around an hour. Ten people fell victim to this attack.

59At mid-day, the pirates disembarked, equipped with arms. The people took them for police forces. Gunfire erupted at the port. The pirates blocked access to the city, robbed a bank and then withdrew on hearing the Muezzin’s call for prayer from the mosque230.

60In September 1995, fifteen armed pirates killed eleven people in order to make away with 190000 ringitts (55000 euros) at the Standard Chartered Bank, in a city of Eastern Sabah. Not far from there, in the Semporna area, six pirates disembarked in February 1996. They threw indigenous bombs meant to be used for fishing by explosion on the police station before stealing a work of art in gold set with precious stones worth 100000 ringitts (approximately 29000 euros)231.

61In March 1996, again in Semporna, eight armed men robbed a jeweller’s store, swiping a booty estimated at 200000 ringitts (58000 euros). One of the thieves was killed, two others arrested, but the Police Station in this seaside resort still bears the stigma of these attacks. On 23^rd June 1996, the police opened fire on eight pirates who had robbed a fisherman near the island of Omadal. Seven other pirates were killed in 1998 during a robbery attempt in a supermarket in Tawau (Eastern Sabah).

3.4.2. Piracy and Hostage-taking

62Hostage-taking is generally linked to economic motives, but they occur most often in an unstable political context. The incidents in the southern part of the Philippines constitute a concrete example.

63Already on 14^th June 1999, two Belgians had been kidnapped on their yacht while on their way to Zamboanga on the island of Santa Cruz in the Sulu archipelago. The Islamic Front of Moro Liberation (FILM) which is fighting for the independence of South Philippines was immediately accused. But can one truly consider this movement as one of piracy?

64Doubts also linger as to the real nature of the hostage-taking of the 21 Western tourists by the Abu Sayyaf group in April 2000. Apparently marked by a strong political tinge, as is illustrated by the demand for the liberation of Islamic militants, this attack would only perpetuate an age-old pirate tradition founded on kidnapping and ransom.

65The Abu Sayyaf group had never really been credible at a strictly political level. The fact that to this list of demands was added the visit of Robin Padilla, a Filipino actor who specialized in the role of teenage rebels certainly did not help the reputation of the movement which consisted essentially of very young people234.

66Besides, rather than becoming a real movement, Abu Sayyaf has become, over these last few years, just a label used by a number of distantly linked sub-groups235. According to Nur Misuari, historical leader of the National Front of Moro Liberation, once Governor of the province before being incarcerated for rebellion, we would find ourselves facing veritable “modern Robin Hoods” who defend the people fallen victim to centuries of exploitation, war, famine and poverty236.

67In fact, one finds here a modern day version of what Ghislaine Loyré, specialist on the region, wrote on the subject of the Sulu pirates in the 19^th century:

68“Certainly, some ventures may have been prompted by strategic reasons, but the strongest incentive was the taking of booty. (…) In fact, [the pirates] would have acknowledged the authority of only those expedition chiefs capable of leading them. (…) Originally from Mindanao, they gradually moved towards the territory of Sulu and even towards Sabah. (…) In certain years, nearly a thousand people were taken in this manner237.”

69Let us now dare to reposition this hostage-taking in a larger debate. Would the incidents that took place on the island of Jolo in 2000 and 2001 herald a tendency the world over to associate terrorism in general and Islamist Terrorism in particular to more traditional forms of delinquency, maritime piracy being one of them238?

70In June 2000, a specialist on Algerian armed groups referred to the emergence in North Africa of a solid link between large scale crime and some fundamentalist groups. The primary cause for this could be the assumption of power by young leaders lacking either political or theological education. As in the case of Abu Sayyaf, these young troops would no longer share the same political or religious convictions239. Gilles Kepel, of course before the 11^th September 2001 attacks, even saw in this situation the emergence of an era of “postislamism240”.

71Since the year 2000, Kuala Lumpur stepped up efforts to cleanse its coasts of piracy. The Malaysian maritime police was thus given much more efficient equipment. In 2001 and during the first half of 2002, the IMB did not report more than 17 and 9 incidents respectively in the Malacca Straits.

72However, the attacks, though fewer in number, are more and more oriented towards human targets. The incidents of hostage-taking increased in the north of the Malacca Straits, in the areas disputed by Indonesia and Malaysia. The victims were very often fishermen.

73On 12^th and 13^th June 2001, four fishing boats and one tug were attacked by small armed groups in the waters of Sabah, not far from Sandakan. For each hostage, a ransom ranging between 5000 and 25000 ringitts (between 1400 and 7300 euros approximately) was demanded and paid241. A few weeks later at Butterworth, to the north of the Malaysian peninsula, the captain of the Tirta Niaga was kidnapped and then held somewhere on the island of Sumatra242.

74In July, a crew of fishermen was released not far from Aceh, after three weeks of captivity in the jungle and the payment of a ransom of 60000 ringitts to the Indonesian kidnappers243. When four of its sailors were kidnapped and taken to Jolo, a Singaporean maritime company finally decided that they would no longer sail the Sulu Sea. This measure was interpreted by the Port Authorities and the industrialists of the region as a signal that their trading associates could easily desert them if they were not guaranteed better safety.

75Further to the north, Thailand too is confronted with piracy founded on the taking of hostages. The IMB report for the year 2000 refers to the kidnapping of Malaysian fishermen. It is likely that the band responsible for these kidnappings used the nearby islands of Satun, in the extreme south of the kingdom, as a base. In April of the same year, fishermen were captured in the Gulf of Thailand and then transferred to the island of Milio. The pirates were able to add to their booty (thirty tons of fish, navigational equipment, nine radios and personal effects) the 10000 dollars that the owner of the boat had accepted to pay by way of ransom. The State is bypassed here, ignored, such is the disbelief in its capacity to intervene.

76In November 1999, a Thai Admiral recalled that piracy and kidnappings also represented a real problem along the Cambodian border. Ransoms here often exceed 400 000 bahts per boat (9200 euros). Some have gone to the extent of suspecting the involvement of corrupt elements of the Cambodian Navy244.

3.4.3. Maritime piracy and freedom movements

77The LTTE of Sri Lanka widely resorts to armed robbery at sea. Is it due to the origins of its chiefs, natives of Velvettithurai and originating for the most part from the fisher folk, or is it simply the consequence of the fact that the country is an island?

78Whatever be the case, the maritime dimension of the struggle of the Tamil Tigers cannot be ignored. Let us keep in mind the suspicions that surround the autonomist organisation, accused by some as having used the Alondra Rainbow, hijacked off the coast of Sumatra, for drug trafficking (see Boarding Incident 10).

79On 25^th May 1999, the Sik Yang, a Malaysian boat, was lost off the west coast of Sri Lanka shortly after having left the Indian port of Tuticorin248. Immediately, the Tamil separatists who were trying to control these waters to establish their sovereignty there came to mind.

80The LTTE is especially suspected because its organisation and its maritime arsenal are impressive. Its capabilities are far superior to those of traditional pirates. The maritime operations of the Tamil rebels are managed by a structure which is divided into twelve departments: regiments for surface attacks, underwater demolition teams, commandos for infiltrations from the sea, the section in charge of the construction and the maintenance of the equipment, the surveillance and telecommunication units, the units in charge of the arms repository, a naval school which organises around fifteen hours of teaching per day, a recruitment group, a political and financial section, a logistics support team, reconnaissance units and finally social security249.

81The 3000 odd “Sea Tigers” are recruited from among the Tamil fishermen and smugglers who have a perfect knowledge of the sea. Thanks to them, some groups of the LTTE were able to acquire a real aptitude for sailing both on the high seas as well as near the coasts250. They even have a suicide marine commando unit-the “Black Sea Tigers”. It should also be noted that there is, in the LTTE, a combat team of swimmers which has conducted several raids against anchored Sri Lankan ships.

82In 1999, the movement would have had several hundreds of lightweight fibreglass boats, armed with machine guns and rocket launchers and equipped with powerful motors permitting them to attain speeds greater than 30 knots (around 55 km/hour). The objective was to rapidly cross the Palk Straits and bring men and supplies from the coasts of Tamil Nadu to the areas held by the Tigers251. Five or six ships sporting foreign flags would also have served to transport arms and equipment.

83Finally in 2001, the sea Tigers would have wanted to procure a submarine from South Africa and ten, of more modest size, from North Korea. Another investigation showed that other military equipment such as 107 mm rockets, 60 mm mortars and especially stealthy motor boats propelled by 200 hp motors had been delivered by Pyong Yang252.

84The seas to the Northeast of the island were declared by the rebels as “the territorial waters of the Tamil Eelam”. Thus, each ship not belonging to the separatist movement could be targeted.

85Some ports too were attacked. Here there is no petty crime as in the great Southeast Asian archipelagos, only the destruction of a few ships matters. In April 1996, there was an attack on the port of Colombo during which three foreign ships were affected. On 19^th April 1995, the assault against two Sri Lankan patrol ships, on the way to Trincomalee, had marked the beginning of what is called “the Third Tamil War”. The attack had been led by several combat swimmers, one of whom was a woman. The attack on the MV Cordiality, while it was anchored less than a mile from Pulmoddai, can be added to this list. The rebels attacked the ship while it was being loaded. Thirty-three sailors were killed. The confrontation with the Sri Lankan patrolmen led to a real naval battle.

86We also note the taking of hostages as in the summer of 1997, when the victims were thirty-two Muslim fishermen as also twenty-two boats. But what is important is the attacks against ships at sea. In August 1996, a ship registered in the Philippines, the MV Princess Wave, became the target of the Tamil rebels while they were transporting a cargo of sand towards Pulmoddai. Other victims: a 500 seater ferry flying the Indonesian flag (the MV Misan), a merchant ship flying the Korean flag (the MV Morang Bong), etc.

87In late August 1997, the Stillus Limmasul, a ship sporting the Greek flag and carrying 32400.81 mm mortar shells purchased in Zimbabwe, was heading for Sri Lanka when it disappeared in the middle of the Indian Ocean. Despite its denials, it clearly appears that the LTTE was responsible. The operation, led partially from South Africa, would have been commanded by Kumaran Padmanathan. This Tamilian, better known by his initials “KP” is none other than the logistics officer of the rebellion253. He is directly answerable to Velupillai Prabhakaran, the chief of the LTTE, for everything relating to supplies ofarms, ammunition, explosives and uniforms. “KP”, today wanted by Interpol, would probably be controlling the maritime operations of the LTTE. Three dummy companies (Delta Marine Ltd., Plymouth Marine Ltd. and Marine Shipping and Trading Ltd.) were spoken about, that would help cover the activities of five or six ships which included the Sweeny (Malta), the Nifly (Panama), the Showa Maru, a Liberian tanker. These boats would serve in the trafficking of arms via the international maritime routes of the East coast of Sri Lanka254.

88Without the knowledge of the Sri Lankan buyers, the cargo of arms from Zimbabwe would have been loaded onto a ship belonging to the Tamil Tigers. This ship which was disguised and not listed in the Lloyds Register of Ships would then have taken the place of the expected cargo ship. This is a South Asian variant of the “phantom ship” technique. Certainly, not a single ship is captured. But the loaded boat is not the one it is believed to be.

89To the north of Sumatra, at the entrance of the Malacca Straits, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) has been fighting since 1976 for the independence of the Indonesian province of Aceh. During the year 2001, several ships were attacked at sea and their crew taken hostage. In August, for instance, six sailors of the Ocean Silver were freed against the payment of a ransom of 300 million rupiahs (40000 euros). The GAM could try to force ships crossing the Malacca Straits to seek the authorisation to do so255. More likely, the rebels would thus like their cause to be spoken about on the international scene. The GAM failed, judging that its actions do not improve its image. However whether the separatist movement is united remains questionable.

90Not all its members would be completely under the control of its Chief, Hasan di Taro, refugee in Stockholm.

3.4.4. Piracy and terrorist psychosis

91After the attacks on the towers of the World Trade Center at New York, the United States was worried that suicide attacks would target their interests at sea. Referring to the feats of the Tamil Sea Tigers, the Admiral Dennis Blair, commanding officer of the American fleet for the Asia-Pacific, assured that “he was taking the threat very seriously256”

92Thus, the Unites States proposed to Malaysia the creation of a combined antiterrorist centre. Combined patrols of the American and Indian Navy were also planned257. Consequently, on 1^st August 2002, Washington signed an agreement with the various capitals of the region to fight terrorism and training was given to the Navy and maritime police of Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia258.

93In this tense situation, the favourable welcome extended to the Chief of the Islamist radical group Lascar Jihad in Batam and Bintan made Washington anxious especially as these Indonesian islands are at the mouth of the Malacca Straits. In December 2001, thirteen militants of the Jemah Isamaiah, another Muslim activist movement, were arrested in Singapore. It is likely that they were on the point of attacking ships and a shuttle used by American sailors with four tons of ammonium that they would have stocked in Malaysia. In July 2002, a former counsellor of Chuan Leepkai, former Prime Minister of Thailand from 1997 to 2001, maintained that the Al-Quaeda was responsible for a large number of the 649 boarding incidents in the Malacca Straits. This organisation, he claimed, wanted to equip itself with nuclear waste in order to fabricate “crude bombs”259. These accusations were never proved; they were refuted by the IMB, which hastened to point out that ships carrying hazardous material are provided with a military escort260.