1The main Kachin armed group, the KIA, is the largest ethnic armed group still in conflict with the Tatmadaw. In resuming their conflict in mid-2011, KIO leaders questioned the intentions of the government concerning its vague commitments of future devolution of power and greater inclusion of ethnic minorities in government and political institutions at regional and national levels. The main KIO demand for many years has been greater political autonomy, which they believe was far from being achieved even during the seventeen-year ceasefire between 1994 and 2011. By unwillingly re-engaging in an armed conflict with Thein Sein’s government, they demonstrated some shortcomings of the current political reforms and peace process. The government’s push to achieve a nationwide ceasefire agreement with all armed groups in the country and the KIO’s engagement with NCCT in continued peace talks, however, gave hope that the process would ultimately lead to political dialogue.

2The broader Kachin identity has been shaped since colonial times by the need to distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups while strengthening ties between the Kachin sub‑groups and clans. Kachin identity is built on common (Christian) faith and the main language (Jinghpaw) as well as various traditions that differentiate them from other ethnic groups. Through modern history, the Kachin have cultivated these differences and leaders have striven to maintain their political influence over local populations. But Myanmar’s post-Independence state‑building project thwarted some of their ambitions. Alongside the push to rebuild relations with the central government emerged a radicalized ethnic identity and, along with it, more strident demands for autonomy. The KIO were soon frustrated at being deprived of political power over their ancestral territories and resources. The new border demarcation with China and the constitutional recognition of a state religion – Buddhism – that was not theirs was the final blow, and led to the first war with the Tatmadaw, which lasted thirty-three years (from 1961 to 1994) despite some attempts at peace negotiations.

3The former ceasefire brokered by Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt in 1994 was not viewed as a sustainable solution for the KIO leadership as it was predominantly a military agreement acknowledging troop positions along with assorted provisions of a military nature. It was not planned as a long-lasting arrangement but as a temporary deal, awaiting a civilian government to take over and solve pending political issues. Hence, seventeen years into this agreement, Kachin leaders saw little political progress. In the meantime, however, the KIO oversaw administration of a large swathe of territory, running a limited public administration structure that delivers justice, education, health, and other public services in areas it controls. Consequently, when the former junta issued the BGF ultimatum just before handing over power to the Thein Sein government, KIO leaders felt increasingly threatened. For the last few decades, interaction with the central government became gradually more difficult as mutual trust eroded amid repeated failures to achieve mutually agreeable compromises. Kachin narratives justifying the war tend to revolve around an unfair political process while the Myanmar Government’s and Tatmadaw’s narratives are inclined to focus on sovereignty and national security. Hence, as of July 2014, a number of ethnic armed groups, including the KIO, demonstrate cautious optimism for the government-led nationwide ceasefire, hoping it will be the first big step to longer-term political dialogue. KIO leaders may have different views on the process but they all want more guarantees and to ensure that political dialogue will logically and simultaneously go hand in hand with a ceasefire agreement.

4Several failed rounds of peace talks between 2012 and 2014 were interspersed with outbreaks of intense conflict between Kachin and government forces. Even after their tentative agreement of mid-2013 and continuing bilateral and NCCT talks, mutual suspicion lingers, despite public statements from both sides supporting the goal of forging a lasting peace. Various attempts to revitalize the peace process have had two main effects on “peace politics” at the national level. First, the KIO, after supporting, then challenging, and ultimately eroding cohesion among other ethnic armed groups, has managed in late 2013 and early 2014 to build momentum to get the multi-ethnic armed group UNFC alliance and its messages heard by a wider audience. Through its leadership in this platform in particular it has also rallied other ethnic armed groups around KIO demands, gaining leverage and legitimacy in the overall negotiation process. Second, it questioned and tested the government’s approach to peace, seeking commitments that the government-led UPWC will go beyond seeking peace solely from a military perspective. It questioned the limits of Myanmar’s democratic transition by demanding that priority be placed on enacting earlier government commitments on long-term political arrangements with armed ethnic groups, particularly the decentralization of power within a federal system. This was primarily to challenge the government’s initially short-term strategy of achieving a ceasefire agreement without commitment to devolution of power in ethnic areas.

5At the time of concluding this research, in July 2014, the recent process, with two initial rounds of promising peace talks in Myitkyina (in May and October 2013) and increased coordination among the ethnic armed groups since November 2013, seems to indicate that peace is closer than ever since the resumption of the conflict. Yet there are many factors at play influencing the process. One of the most significant of these issues is to agree on the sharing of revenues from natural resources and border trade, in order to avoid clashes over contested economic dividends and support longer-term stabilization of the area. In early 2014, fighting was still reported in Southern Kachin and North‑Western Shan States, suggesting that the Tatmadaw was attempting to undermine peace efforts, despite expressed goodwill and promises by the civilian government to reach out and build trust in its peace initiatives. Some among the KIO leadership currently appear to be keener to engage in efforts for peace than in the past. Yet the organization must still deal with the aspirations of supporters, who widely accepted the rationale for war and will need to be convinced that peace is preferable. Above all, the KIO/KIA, in order to trust the government peace delegation, will need strong evidence that the government is in control of the armed forces and not vice versa. Earlier military attacks in Kachin State, during and immediately after former peace talks, have greatly undermined government efforts to rebuild trust with the KIO leaders, and a large portion of the Kachin population.

6Finally, this conflict is particularly delicate for the government to manage as it raises questions about the country’s security sector and the future of the Tatmadaw and the ethnic armed groups. It ultimately highlights the need for reforming the country’s security and military structures. The wider role of the Tatmadaw in governance and its views on ethnic armed groups seem to remain fairly close to those of previous decades. The Tatmadaw has a considerable number of soldiers, financial resources, and power; its role was to deal with both internal and external enemies who were deemed to be undermining national unity and threatening sovereignty. In the context of a national level peaceful settlement, the future role of the Tatmadaw and the problematic integration of ethnic armed groups must be decided, and security sector reform remains key to the achievement of the overall political transformation. This is why KIO/KIA leaders, and those of a number of other ethnic armed groups, have decided to test the space and push the limits of this increasingly vibrant and more democratic – yet still fragile – reform process.