1The narratives and “blame games” among parties to the conflict have long embodied their currently irreconcilable viewpoints. Official statements from the military about this conflict have been overwhelmingly security-oriented, highlighting the Tatmadaw’s focus on combating the insurgency threat, while later statements from the civilian government indicated commitment to reaching a mutually satisfying peace deal. On the other side, formal statements by the KIO/KIA show an “underdog” mentality, perpetuating the belief that the organizations are persecuted for political and economic reasons while their causes are overlooked. The grievances on both sides are summed up on one hand by the KIO view that the Kachin are oppressed by the much larger state and ethnic group in the country, the Bamar. This contrasts with the government/military view that their role is to unify and protect the Union. On both sides, such beliefs drove oppressive and heavy-handed campaigns that perpetuated conflict and complicated the political context. The divergence of narratives between the two sides – particularly on the causes of the conflict and the overall goal of peace talks – continues to affect relations.

2The third part of this paper explores differences and continuity in the approaches and experiences of both sides, through local perceptions of key episodes during the two conflict periods (1961‑1994 and 2011 until now) in Kachin territories. It also focuses on the construction of narratives about the continuity of the fighting for decades, despite a number of contextual changes. It then examines the new image that both sides have been promoting in the current political transition period, and concludes with an analysis of KIO leaders’ feeling of isolation and perception of being attacked on a pivotal element of their identity: their Christian faith.

1 - Amidst conflict, continuity, and changes

“It has already been fifty-three years since we got into this conflict.” KIO Public Relations Official, Laiza, 2013.

When words matter: expressions of uncertainty

3Each party to the conflict has starkly different ways to describe the conflict and its main stakeholders. The KIO/KIA blame the recent war on older and underlying issues, and uses specific terminology to describe this. As an example, after fighting rekindled in June 2011, the KIO/KIA initially referred to the renewed fighting as “ceasefire violations” by the Tatmadaw. As time progressed, it was referred to as a “war.” As hopes for peace began to fade away in 2012, the vocabulary used by the KIO/KIA and a number of civil society organizations to refer to the conflict as evolved. Kachin activists and external observers began referring to the fighting as the “re-ignition of the conflict” (Farelly 2012). For example, an event in June 2013 organized by an advocacy group, the Kachin Peace Network, was reported in the social media and marked the second anniversary of what it called the “resumption of the war in the Kachin Region,” whereas one year before, the same group held an event to mark the first anniversary of the recent “Kachin conflict,” as it was a standalone conflict.38 This shift in usage of terminology reveals the change of Kachin perspectives over the present conflict. Most Kachin interviewed for this study stated they viewed the conflict as continuous, rather than a war interspersed with periods of peace or no war.

4Field observations made by the author for this study showed a degree of conflation by the Kachin in their representations and perceptions of the government and Tatmadaw. For example, when a village was attacked, some informants mentioned a “government attack.” In numerous interviews with KIO representatives, they interchangeably mention the government and the army when they spoke of military offensives and government decisions. Even in government-controlled areas of Kachin State, members of religious and political elites use these terms interchangeably, as if these were one monolithic bloc.39 In addition, all state entities – the Tatmadaw and civilian government bodies – tended to be seen as predominantly predatory.

5On the government side, there is a tendency to systematically conflate traditional Kachin leaders with the KIO. The KIO is perceived as an extremist organization. An analysis of the few official statements and Myanmar Government-backed press articles on the conflict reveals uncertainty over how to describe the KIO/KIA and escalation of hostilities. The KIO/KIA was called a “ceasefire group” until the government’s Border Guard Force ultimatum in 2009. Then, it was referred to as an “insurgent group” just before the conflict resumed in 2011, for the first time since the early 1990s. In state-owned newspapers, the KIO/KIA were in 2011, the KIO/KIA were for the first time since the early 1990s described as “insurgents.”40 Then, in periods of intense fighting, the state media referred to the KIA/KIO as “terrorists.”41 In the public media, KIA is mainly blamed for injuring civilians and destroying infrastructure.

Figure 3: “The heritage of our ancestors”

6The official status of the KIO/KIA is unclear in government pronouncements. The KIO/KIA was on the official list of illegal organizations under legislation known as the Unlawful Associations Act 17/1. Under this law, passed in 1908 and amended in 1957, an association that "interferes with the administration of the law and with the maintenance of law and order, or that constitutes as a danger to the public peace," may be deemed illegal. This law is also used to prosecute people on the ground if they are members of, or if they have had contact with, illegal organizations. Until recently, this meant that people suspected to be associated to the KIO could be subject to harsh punishment and lengthy prison terms. The KIA/KIO was due to be removed from the list of illegal associations in 2012, but individuals kept on being arrested and charged under this act.42 At the time of writing, the content, policy, and use of the list could not be clarified during interviews with lawyers and government officials.

From one conflict to another

7The recent freedom of expression allowed in the Myanmar media has made a dramatic difference in the emergence of contemporary narratives on the conflict throughout the country, especially among most educated groups of the population. It has also demonstrated the media’s ability to amplify the conflict, and its role in disseminating various versions of the history. A number of interviewees were asked to explain, according to their personal experience, the main differences between the current conflict and the pre‑1994 situation. The most common replies tended to be about the intensification of military activities and greater civilian losses. According to a KIO public relations officer, the use of disproportionate forces is a main difference:

“This war is very different to the situation before 1994. This time the army used airstrikes to fight. Now this is more like they were fighting against foreigners who were invading their country. They used airstrikes when ground forces couldn’t overrun the KIA posts.”43

8For the chairman of the KIO’s Internally Displaced Person and Refugee Relief and Rehabilitation Committee (IRRC), the main differences are the military tactics employed and their impact on civilians:

“Fighting before 1994 was just between combatants of the Tatmadaw and KIA. But this time, unarmed Kachin civilians were also targeted by the Tatmadaw, and their properties were destroyed. Most of the villages that have been destroyed by the Tatmadaw were under KIA protection during the [1994-2011] ceasefire period. Since last year those villages were no longer under KIA protection but were still destroyed by the Tatmadaw. Apparently, the Tatmadaw sees Kachin, even civilians, as KIA troops; as their enemy.”44

“In addition, economic drivers would also increasingly contribute to conflict dynamics. Trade and extraction of natural resources were mentioned by a number of interviewees as a central factor in the current conflict, in a more pronounced way than in the earlier period. This is partly due to the fact that many of these resources were discovered and exploited after 1994. Natural resource management was repeatedly mentioned as a local governance concern since Independence, and has been a source of increasing frustration for local communities as well as KIO leaders. Largescale jade extraction has been generating billions of dollars per year, that mainly benefit Kachin, Bamar, Wa, and Chinese businessmen. According to official figures, in 2011-12, Myanmar yielded 43,185 tons of jade, mainly from Kachin and Shan States, generating a profit of about 8.8 billion US dollars (Dapice and Thanh 2013: 5). However, official and written sources related to these profits are significantly scarce. One interviewee mentioned that the 1961‑1994 conflict was more about power sharing (a revolt against subjugation for the KIA, and a war against insurgents for the Myanmar armed forces), whereas most refer to the more recent conflict as being primarily about access to, and share of, natural resources, while political power-sharing is considered secondary.”45

9During the conflict, natural resources are still being extracted from Kachin State, and large-scale business goes on. Conflict is particularly intense in resource rich areas, such as the Hpakant jade mines. According to the official government figures, in spite of the conflict and the suspension of major mining companies’ operations, 15,061 tons of jade have been mined in 2013 – 2014 alone.46 An interviewee highlighted the continuation of intensive logging in some areas:

“In 1963, my school was closed. I remember every night the fighting was going on, all night. This time, people were more lenient. They don’t feel like fighting. Many civilians were killed and nobody cared. […] At this present time, business interests matter most. As we speak, logging trucks continue to go ‘silently’ into the Kachin hills.”47

Old conflict, new image?

10Following internal power struggles in 2000s, the KIO/KIA’s political and military leaders have carefully forged a new public image through their regular public consultations on political issues with prominent members of the Kachin population. In June 2011, a public forum gave the KIA the mandate to fight with the aim of pursuing a political solution, and to accept a ceasefire only as part of a more permanent political settlement.48 A subsequent forum in March 2013 called for the maintenance of the KIA’s military strength. The results of these forums formalize communication channels between the KIO, civil society, and members of the community, ensuring a degree of political support for the KIO.

11As a consequence of this new public relations approach, it is commonly acknowledged that the KIO has recently shown new signs of enthusiasm for listening to the opinions of the Kachin people. One interviewee, who participated to these forums, mentioned:

“People in KIO areas suffer from the conflict but they support the KIO. If you compare to the former conflict, KIO is more transparent this time. We now know what is being discussed when the KIO and the government meet. Before we didn’t know anything. These days, the KIO officials ask for views and opinions from representatives of the Kachin people, and they then repeat these during the talks with the government. They take into account public opinion; and this is new.”49

12A Kachin Baptist leader, speaking at a public briefing to foreign diplomats in Myitkyina in early 2013, also mentioned this new approach:

“Before, there were hardliners within the KIO, now there are ‘soft liners.’ Nowadays, things have changed a lot. The KIO listen to the people. It is not the first time for them to negotiate a ceasefire. Nowadays, the people are really supportive of the ideas of KIO, especially because they [the KIO] are not the ones who broke the ceasefire. So trust in the government has been lost. This time, people are still willing to suffer, rather than getting a ‘cheap peace.’ The sentiment of the population is ‘let’s go and fight!’ What they want is welfare, rights of indigenous people, and religious and cultural rights in peace. The ceasefire is not enough. It can break at any time. That is our experience.”50

13This visibly more inclusive approach aims at strengthening KIO legitimacy. Furthermore, KIO views are not only disseminated in their own media or media that was biased towards them. They are also discussed in the churches, and in IDP camps. For example, near the gate of Hpun Lum Yang camp, in Laiza vicinity, a public board shows the pictorial narratives of the conflict. On a wooden board, photographs illustrate symbolic episodes of the conflict, including the first KIA soldiers who died, the first Tatmadaw officers captured as prisoners, the civilians fleeing Laiza under air attack, the first UN‑led humanitarian convoys, several rounds of peace talks, and others. These wordless narratives show, and disseminate, the history of the war from the prevailing KIO perspective. They can thus reach out, convince, and rally the support of the several thousands of Kachin who are settled in the camps, including those who are illiterate.

Figure 4: Board made of pictures depicting the key episodes of the armed conflict

14Nevertheless, not everyone is convinced about transformation in the KIO/KIA. Some consider it as merely cosmetic and primarily a change of communication style, as a Catholic leader explained: “Before, it was very different. The leadership adopted a very military style. Now, they engage with the people, though they still try to control the situation. Actually, they don’t really care about public opinion.”51 Aware of their past experiences and of the fact that they cannot represent all the Kachin, the KIO responds by inviting for more discussion. The organization’s Technical Advisory Team (TAT) in Myitkyina, which was created as a result of the May 2013 agreement to support the peace negotiations, invites anyone who has comments and positive or negative feedback to voice it to the team. Access to this offer is certainly limited to members of an elite as only they would have the confidence to respond, but it shows a drastic change of tone.

15Finally, through the political reform process, and some visits of its leaders, the government has also tried to change its image in the eyes of Kachin and is keen to convince ethnic peoples that it has gone through an irreversible change for the better. But many Kachin still see government gestures, even positive ones, as aimed at the international community, in order to gain support for national reforms. Overall, the Kachin are convinced that the degree of change is insufficient to tackle the most sensitive issues, such as the devolution of political power and the reform of the armed forces (including the integration of combatants from ethnic armed groups).

2 - The KIO’s perception of the war

Isolation and marginalisation

“Nobody supports our struggle from outside. We are on our own. We are here until today thanks to the support of our people. That’s why we keep on struggling.” Technical Assistance Team leader, Myitkyina, 2013.

“We are angry, we are sad, and we feel alone.” Kachin school teacher in KIO‑controlled area, interview by the author, August 2013).

16Interviewees often mentioned a feeling of isolation, both from Bamar people and also, especially in 2011 and 2012, from other ethnic armed groups, some of which were criticized for being the first in signing a ceasefire agreement in the 1990s, and then making their own peace agreements as the KIO resumed armed conflict with the Thein Sein government.52 Geographic and administrative isolation may have been an asset for the KIO to set its own direction during the ceasefire period, but it has now emerged as a hindrance. The Kachin feel forgotten and misunderstood. Even on a practical level, the lack of communications, transport, and basic infrastructure, including roads and bridges, in Kachin State hinders exchanges both within the region and beyond, thereby reinforcing the sense of isolation.53

17The feeling of isolation among the Kachin has been reinforced by the belief that even opposition leaders and civil society representatives operating on a national level do not understand them and, worse, do not care. For example, when the Tatmadaw escalated its offensive against the KIA/KIO and launched air attacks on KIA bases in late 2012, some Kachin had hoped for a strong statement from opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, at least urging the government to protect civilians, especially after air attacks in December 2012. A Kachin religious leader said, “She is not talkative now, before [when she was not a member of parliament], she surely was, but now, she remains silent. She is seen as superficial. She has no more interest in ethnic people.”54

18A Kachin humanitarian worker said, “Aung San Suu Kyi does not know much about the context. Not only about the Kachin, but about all ethnic groups. She does not know about the country very much. She has a theoretical knowledge only, but she tries to be pragmatic. She tries to be a successful politician. People should not say that NLD is an opposition party – the UNFC [an alliance of armed groups] is!”55 Other interviewees suggested Aung san Suu Kyi was not fully informed of the extent of the military offensive in Kachin State, hence her silence.

19The Kachin leaders also feel abandoned by the international community as they expected greater support from Western governments to international organizations after the recent conflict broke out. Many Western governments and international organization have, however, shifted focus in their humanitarian-focused aid agenda to provide support to the central government and its reform process.57 The KIO hoped for some forms of international condemnation of the use of violence by the Tatmadaw, especially for violence against civilians. They wanted their status of victims to be acknowledged by Western powers. In their view, this would have provided them with greater political leverage to negotiate peace. General Gun Maw emphasized during his visit to Washington in April 2014, his keenness to see the US become an observer of the talks, along with China and the United Nations.58 The view that international observers would help the Kachin to reach peace appears to be commonly shared. A Kachin community elder told the author during an interview in September 2013, “Nowadays, we can only find a real and genuine peace with the support of international community. With the presence of representatives of the international community, nobody can obstruct our movement.”

20Overall, many Kachin doubt that the current government has undergone significant political transition as far as ethnic minority rights are concerned. They have adopted a very critical perspective about the role of some Western countries that provide funding and assistance to the new government, including engagement with the Tatmadaw, despite having formerly reproved Myanmar due to repeated violations of human rights and armed conflict in ethnic areas. According to a senior Kachin humanitarian worker:

“Until now, I don’t see any improvement in Kachin State, but many social services have improved in cities like Yangon, Mandalay, and Nay Pyi Taw. The European Union should have lifted sanctions in some sectors to support economic development [EU sanctions were dropped in 2012]. But they should seriously consider the situation of the country. When the United Kingdom and United States announced their collaboration with the government in the military sector, we became deeply concerned about their support to the Myanmar military.”59

21The feeling of isolation, both physical and political, has been echoed in concerns related to the preservation of Kachin identity markers. Some nationalists even considered that the conflict directly targets them as a group: “After a seventeen-year ceasefire failed to result in a political solution, the Myanmar government led by ex‑general U Thein Sein began a military offensive against the KIO/KIA on June 9, aimed at the elimination of the Kachin people.”

The Church under attack

22Political marginalization, economic predation, and physical threats due to military offensives reinforced the ethnic dimension of the conflict and were perceived by many Kachin as direct attacks on their ethnic identity.60 This became apparent when symbols of the Kachin culture and identity were damaged during the Tatmadaw offensives. Churches were used in military operations or damaged as a result of the conflict. In several reported incidents, Tatmadaw used local churches to lock up villagers in order to interrogate them, and to prevent them from escaping and alerting the KIA to their presence.61 For example, in a case well‑known in Kachin State, a church was used as a detention center to interrogate civilians in the village of Hpaikawn.62 Churches were also used for temporary physical protection, because local residents believe that, “The Tatmadaw knows that KIA would not attack a church.”63 As results of skirmishes, the Nam Lin Pa Catholic Church was damaged, a catechist house destroyed by artillery fire, and five civilians killed in mid-2013. In this event, the Tatmadaw surrounded the village, captured villagers, and locked them in the church until nightfall.64 In Sine Lone, the Catholic Church was also used by soldiers for accommodation.65 In Hpakant, the Mawwan Baptist Church was damaged by mortar fire on January 16, 2013.66 These events, along with similar incidents, antagonized the local population, including even the most moderate elements.

23In addition, armed offensives scaled up in December 2011 and 2012 during the Christmas period, the most important spiritual festival for the predominately Christian Kachin, were seen as attempts to destroy their culture and faith.67 This also laid the foundations for increased radicalization of Kachin people, some of whom may not have previously supported the KIO.68 A few months into the conflict, for many, neutrality was no longer an option and speaking about peace was viewed as traitorous. The head of the influential Kachin Baptist Church, Reverend Samson Hkalam, was quoted in a press interview, speaking about the resurgence of KIA support due to these threats: “People are committed to this fight. Young men who were previously skeptical of the Kachin Independence Army are volunteering to join. It’s a miracle — the people’s spirit and motivation.”69

24Besides, some religious leaders have used religious discourse to justify and encourage the war. The KIO leadership is ostensibly Baptist and the KIA chief of staff, General Gam Shawng, reportedly prays three times a day, invokes the Bible in his public speeches, and casts the war in religious terms. In one of his speeches quoted in the media, he intoned, "God above is judging the Myanmar Army and humiliating them. If they keep coming at us they will lose. Our struggle is an investment in something God condones. We are standing on the righteous path."70 A number of pastors also encouraged the Kachin combatants, mentioning war in their sermons, holding commemoration masses, and declaring their support for the KIA.71 For example, soon after the conflict broke out, special prayer services were held on the first Saturday of every month in Laiza, the KIA headquarters, “for the triumph of the Kachin revolution.”72 Prayers are still reportedly held regularly for those who died in conflict, and combatants who died fighting are hailed as martyrs. Furthermore, the church plays a central role in supporting victims of the conflict and displaced families, and healing their trauma.

25Finally, several interviews revealed a shared perception among many Kachin that their participation in the war was the right choice or a “just war.” One interviewee explained he believed in fighting and defended the call for war from religious leaders, quoting St. Augustine (who, in the fifth century, elaborated the theory of the “just war” (jus bellum iustum) called by a legitimate authority, for a just cause and the right intention) saying that longer-term peace may require initial fighting.73 Persistent poverty, lack of government services, and other hardships have also given many Kachin justifications for armed conflict as a means to achieve lasting peace.

26These Kachin perceptions of the conflict are widespread, especially in KIO‑controlled areas, and, overall, have contributed to support the KIO’s new-found legitimacy in a protracted conflict. But they also impact on the environment of the peace negotiations, making it more challenging, with the absence of common views and willingness to compromise on political issues.