“The President Thein Sein, whenever he visits other countries, mentions the peace process. Sometimes he says that the armed struggle is due to extreme nationalists who have economic interests. He invites foreign investors to come to Myanmar. He thinks that if foreign direct investment increases, the armed groups will be satisfied and that they would be inclined to give peace a chance. His view does not reflect the reality. Armed struggle is not about money, it’s not because we don’t have any food to eat. It’s about political struggle, to retain our rights and to get others their rights.” Statement by a KIO representative from the Technical Assistance Team Office, supporting the peace process, Myitkyina, 2013.

1As in many other conflicts, the protagonists do not share a common view of the root causes of the conflict. Overall, Kachin’s narratives and accounts are more widely publicized, and easier to find, in comparison to the very scarce government sources that document their rationale – beyond the Border Guard Forces issue – for reengaging in armed conflict. A number of Kachin representatives have expressed frustration over the years, claiming that the actual causes of conflict have neither been properly identified, nor considered or analyzed by the government. Many feel they have made all possible efforts to engage with the government, hence their initial reluctance to re-start a process of negotiation in which a ceasefire is the first concrete step and modalities of political dialogue remain undefined. After discussing three main themes of the conflict (military, political, and ideological natures, respectively), the events leading to an escalation of the conflict will be examined in the following section. While most of the ethnic armed groups have laid down weapons, the KIO has returned to armed struggle and war. While this move seems to go against the mainstream of the current political transformation of the country, it actually highlights a shortcoming of this process, and tests its limits.

1 - The causes of conflict

2According to the field research, the contemporary conflict is the result of a mix of factors. Among the factors identified that triggered it, three pivotal elements – military, political, and ideological – precipitated the current armed conflict involving the KIO/KIA.

1. Militarily, pivotal to the re-ignition of the conflict was the failure to enforce the 1994 ceasefire, with both sides accusing each other of disrespecting the agreement. In addition, for the KIO, the ceasefire did not bring about the requested political dialogue. The build-up of Tatmadaw troops in areas surrounding KIA‑controlled territory during the ceasefire period, and more importantly prior to June 2011, created additional security concerns for the KIO. The BGF ultimatum threatened the KIA leadership and caused an aggressive military response. Both parties thought that the conflict would bring victory.

2. Politically, both parties have been unable to reach pragmatic and lasting political compromises during the ceasefire period. Rivalry and mistrust exist between the two sides, over a number of issues, including the question of natural resource sharing. A number of Bamar cronies and political leaders have benefited from economic deals that arose from the war economy.

3. Ideologically, KIO thought it could gain more authority by refusing to bend to the government ultimatum. The government could not indefinitely let the ethnic armed groups take profit from control of the border and trade. It seems that there was a miscalculation of the duration and costs (political, financial, and in terms of human lives) of war by belligerents, each of who believed fighting was the best way to reach their political objectives. On the Kachin side, the conflict is linked to nationalist feelings that were at play when defending their turf and community.

3The following section examines in greater detail and sheds light on current academic research on these military, political, and ideological factors that paved the way to the current conflict.

The military breach of the 1994 ceasefire

4The overarching factor that led to the return of war in Kachin populated territories was the failure on both sides to enforce the 1994 ceasefire, demonstrating a failure to reach a mutually advantageous and enforceable agreement.15 A number of contemporary issues related to security and politics in Kachin State have their roots in the limited and opaque 1994 agreement. This ceasefire was narrowly focused on military aspects of peace-making, such as troop positions and demarcations of areas of control. It also agreed to the establishment of KIO delegations in Myitkyina, Bhamo, and Kutkai (Northern Shan State) as well as twenty-two liaison offices throughout Kachin and Shan States and in Mandalay, to facilitate communications between both sides. From the perspectives of Kachin leaders, the ceasefire experience did not successfully bring peace. Yet, these leaders enjoyed largely unchallenged governance over large and often lucrative and strategic swathes of the territory. In contrast, for the Tatmadaw, this period enabled the deployment of more troops to secure the northern areas of the national territory and ensure better preparedness in case of future conflict.

5For both parties (including those who economically benefited from the ceasefire), it enabled a temporary “limbo” situation between conflict and ceasefire – or a time of “no peace, no war.”16 This was a period characterized by what the peace theorist Johan Gatlung refers to as a “structural violence.” (Galtung 1969). KIO leaders tend to re-examine this period in light of the rekindling of the conflict. Although the level of violence during the 1994-2011 period was low overall, sporadic violence was still perpetuated in some areas by Kachin armed factions and the Tatmadaw. Even though the majority of the Kachin people did not directly experience physical violence during these years, it is a posteriori referred to by many Kachin as a period of “violence and exploitation.”17 Documentation reveals that, in some areas, people had to continuously cope with post-conflict issues, for example, reports of landmines being laid by private companies exploiting natural resources,18 militarization with increased presence of Tatmadaw battalions,19 and taxation by various armed groups.20

6In June 2011, both sides accused each other of rekindling the conflict. The KIO/KIA contends that the government broke the ceasefire agreement. As a consequence, during unsuccessful negotiations before May 2013, they insisted the government recall soldiers to their former positions, away from KIA‑controlled territory, in order to return to a pre-June 2011 troop position, complying with the former ceasefire. They claim that the initial clashes came after Tatmadaw soldiers trespassed into KIA areas, despite a prior agreement between both sides that access should formerly be granted by the KIA to enter the area. The government in turn contends that it was the KIO/KIA that broke the ceasefire, as they first used force against Tatmadaw soldiers.

7At the beginning, it seems that both warring parties were envisaging a quick resolution to the armed conflict and assumed they would be soon able to force political dialogue on their terms. The Tatmadaw was most likely encouraged by its victory in a week‑long offensive over the Peung Kya Shin-led faction of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), an ethnic Kokang armed group based in Northern Shan State. The remaining faction of the Kokang MNDAA, supported by the Tatmadaw, turned into a Border Guard force. The KIA leadership took this as a warning that if their forces did not convert into a BGF, they could potentially suffer the same fate as the MNDAA. In this respect it can be assumed that asymmetric information in terms of the potential costs and benefits of the war precipitated the conflict, especially as the Tatmadaw leadership expected a quick military victory and under-estimated the tenacity of the KIA. Due to the disproportionate power balance, ranging from troop numbers and weaponry to access to technology, as well as sharply contrasting military strategies (i.e. guerrilla versus standing army), it was widely presumed that the KIA would not stand long against a Tatmadaw offensive.

8In addition, to understand a given party’s appetite for war, it is important to assess whether the leaders have made appraisals of the costs versus the benefits of war. Generally, optimistic assessments result in a belief that the war’s outcome is likely to be victory, or an absence of defeat (Stoessinger 2000). That was certainly the case with the Kachin conflict, as both parties expected a quick armed offensive and rated their losses as less costly than inaction. According the strategist Jervis (1989: 104), even if leaders of opposing sides believe the chances of victory are slim, they make a rational decision to fight “if the gains of victory are large and the costs of losing are not much greater than those of making the concessions necessary to avoid war.” The KIO leadership may not have been fully convinced it could achieve a military victory, but regarded the price of peace as too high in terms of honor, and also held assumptions about poor future political settlements for them and their people. Therefore, according to analysis from a think-tank focusing on ethnic conflict and political transition, “It was too late for the KIO to return to its pre-ceasefire condition without a very heavy cost” (Euro-Burma Office 2010). And more than a year and a half into the conflict, a KIO official speaking about the duration and intensity of the armed conflict in the post-airstrikes context, said, “We had never imagined facing this kind of crisis – ever! We had only seen this kind situation in the foreign movies -but this time it happened to us […].”21

9Once conflict resumed, it became clear that none of the parties had planned strategically for its longer term consequences. They initially tested each other to demonstrate their determination but soon after the start of armed hostilities, the situation escalated. What was expected to be a brief show of power and resolve turned into a protracted and bitter conflict that destroyed any remaining shred of trust. More importantly, it left each party contemplating how to break out of the vicious cycle of conflict without compromising honor.

Political inability to reach compromises

10The KIO contend that Kachin representatives have actively engaged in political dialogue forums since the inception of the Union of Myanmar, beginning with their support for the Panglong Agreement. The inability to reach a political compromise – before and since 1994 – has been a cornerstone of exacerbated tensions. The KIO leaders have certainly shared this feeling of frustration with their supporters. This enabled them to more effectively rally large support for the war. According to an interview with a representative of a Kachin civil society organization, “The KIO have enjoyed a strong relationship with their supporters and the Kachin public since the 1994 ceasefire.”²²

11Fundamental to the breakdown of the agreement was also the fact that it did not address the issue of the “indivisibility of resources” (Jackson and Morelli 2009) such as control of border trade and of the natural resources-dependent economy. According to research conducted by economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2000), wealthy countries are usually largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities – including agricultural products and natural resources – and are highly prone to civil violence. They argue that conflict may be explained either by grievance or greed. Nearly a third, or 31.2 percent, of Myanmar’s GDP comprises exports of primary resources, including 8 percent from the mining/energy sector (according to official sources - much more is sold on the black market and unaccounted for). Among other resources, Kachin State has massive reserves of jade that by some measures accounts for the extraction of more than 90 percent of the world’s stock (Mc Kinsey Global Institute 2013). Kachin State also has timber, gold, and rare earth metals as well as vast potential for development of hydroelectricity and agro-business. Most of these reserves were, during the ceasefire, in areas under the control of the KIO/KIA, and retaking those areas seems to have been a central concern for the Tatmadaw. During the former ceasefire, uneven access to resources resulted in quick and massive economic benefits for elements of the KIO and some Bamar and Chinese businessmen. This “ceasefire capitalism” enabled wealth accumulation through centralization and land securitization by entities controlled by the Myanmar government and armed groups that have signed ceasefires (Woods 2011). There is strong economic incentive for the central state to control these resources. Yet few justifications by the KIA can be found in public sources when it comes to the appetite for war to secure natural resources in the area.

Ideological links between community, nationalism, and conflict

12Even though it is difficult to have a sense of the opinion of the Kachin people as a whole due to divisions within Kachin society. Many Kachin disapprove of some of the positions adopted by the KIO/KIA. Even within the KIO/KIA there are differing views and factions. The sense of belonging experienced by the Kachin community seems to have been significantly influenced by the two episodes of armed conflict.

13Research has found that conflict can be correlated to the sense of belonging to a community. In the Kachin case, conflict has certainly played an important role, since Independence, in contributing to a feeling of belonging to the pan-Kachin community. According to the conflict theorist Suganami (2002: 310):

“The concept of war seems to contain the idea that those who engage in it have a clear understanding of what it is and that they are fighting on the behalf of and in the name of their society against another. War, there-fore, conceptually presupposes understanding, on the part of individual persons that they are members of a particular community and are fighting within the community’s authority structure.”

14Moreover, some scholars have demonstrated that war is not only caused by an appetite for fighting and fear, but also by what could be termed “spirit” (Lebow 2010). Nationalism, also, can be a mechanism of transmission linking individual interests with collective action. The Kachin, responding as a community, present a shared aspiration for the war as a mechanism to claim political rights denied to them through political dialogue. The KIO’s narratives of war are defensive, relying on a sense of community – based on blood, linguistic features, religion, and political ideologies. This has been reiterated by the Pan‑Kachin movement and resulted in the “buy‑in” of the broader Kachin community to the rationale for war. This is different from the majority of the Myanmar side, for whom this war is a distant reality, demonstrating the difficulty of making peace with the ethnic armed groups, and an inconvenience in asserting control over resources and frontier territories. Bamar nationalist sentiment is, however, stoked by government and the military to encourage support for war.

2 - Political transition vs. resurgence of the armed conflict

15Since 2010, Myanmar has been through a radical political, legal, and economic reform process, which has been described as an unusual case of a top-down and managed transition. The decision of Senior General Than Shwe to step back, followed by the retirement of senior junta officers to enable them to take on civilian functions as government staff, was followed by a number of reforms towards the establishment of a more democratic system. Part of this reform process is to achieve peace between the Tatmadaw and numerous ethnic armed groups. Three years after President Thein Sein took the reins of power, thirteen major ethnic armed groups have managed to reach a ceasefire (or confirmed pre-existing agreements).23 While this delicate top-down transition is complex and imperfect, many ethnic groups foresee room for constructive engagement with the government and an end to armed conflict.

16In the meantime, according to a number of interviews, the KIA/KIO generally tend to view themselves as innocent victims of Bamar duplicity. Their relations with Burmese leadership have been increasingly tense throughout the 2000s, tension peaking in 2009 with the BGF ultimatum and in 2010 with the rejection of the Kachin political party’s attempt to register to contest upcoming general elections. The KAI/KIO do not consider war as a retaliatory measure from their side, but as a response to external aggression, and a necessary attempt to stop confiscation of their land, identity, and resources. As with other ethnic armed groups in the past, the KIO/KIA perceives the Tatmadaw as an “invader” (Smith 1993: 258).Overall, among the Kachin, the war is justified as an act of self-defense, and as a reaction to external aggression. “We couldn’t stay passive,” is a sentence often stated by KIO leaders and supporters when asked about the KIA’s decision to fight. In retrospect, the earlier period of ceasefire is now perceived as no more than a progressive escalation to war, in spite of the reluctance of KIA to return to war.

The Border Guard Forces ultimatum

17Various accounts on both sides illustrate the difficulties of ceasefire implementation. Some key structural reasons explain these difficulties. Long delays in junta responses to KIO political demands fuelled doubt on the part of the KIO about the actual will and ability of the government to transform the ceasefire into a mid-term peace agreement and a longer-term political settlement. The end of the SPDC had not brought about the changes the KIO wished to see. Several episodes contributed to building up of political tensions between them and the former members of the junta, many of whom are still in control of the key institutions of the country.

18A number of external observers note that relations between the junta and KIO/KIA deteriorated sharply well before the 2011 conflict broke out. These relations would have significantly deteriorated after the submissions of the KIO proposals to the National Convention in 2001, 2004, and 2007 requesting self-determination, a state-based constitution, and a number of demands regarding regional governance and autonomy. The Tatmadaw then adopted a harsher approach as relations with the KIO progressively deteriorated. Major-General Ohn Myint, commander of the Northern Region, reportedly stated in 2007 that, “KIO can be driven back to the mountains.”24 Then, according to the journalist Bertil Lintner, during a meeting with Myanmar Army’s regional commanders in mid-2009, Senior General Than Shwe said that, "We, the Tatmadaw, have to fight the KIA because they have not accepted our terms.”²⁵ The Tatmadaw position, as publicly stated, left few doubts about the potential resumption of the conflict and over a year before the first clashes, Lieutenant-General Ye Myint, the chief of the junta’s Military Affairs Security, stated, “If the KIO does not abide by the latest instructions, then relations will revert to the period before the 1994 ceasefire agreement.”26 In response, the KIA headquarters mobilized troops and prepared for the eventuality of the resumption of the conflict.27

19The junta’s BGF ultimatum put pressure on the KIA in the lead-up to the recommencement of conflict. Major-General Lun Maung, formerly auditor general of the SPDC, threatened the KIO/KIA: “We will try to convince the KIO to accept the Border Guard Force through words. If they do not listen […] we have to kick them and eliminate them.”28 The KIA viewed this threat as a violation of the ceasefire agreement. The KIA chief of staff, General Gam Shawng of the KIA, argued that turning into the Border Guard Force was the same as surrendering. In a press interview, his position is summed up as follows:

“The military government had promised the KIO that there would be no discussion of surrender or disarmament during the interim period [between the ceasefire and the start of political dialogue with future elected government], but had ultimately insisted that the KIA and other ceasefire groups subordinate themselves to Tatmadaw command as border guard forces, [which would be the] same as surrender.”²⁹

20A KIO Public Relations officer explained to the author the organization’s version of the final reply to the BGF ultimatum in August 2013:

“We ended up in BGF negotiations with no solution in a meeting held on August 22^nd [2010] in Myitkyina. Our KIO chairman was present in this negotiation, as proposed by the other party. But General Ye Myint only asked him twice to answer by ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ to the BGF ultimatum and our chairman up front replied ‘No’ to him. Then, General Ye Myint warned him that the situation would return back to the situation prior to the 1994 ceasefire, starting from September 1st. This was very short notice. We could determine that this was a declaration of war. […] Government set an ultimatum to the KIA to discharge all its offices, including liaison offices in government controlled areas on August 25th. This meant that KIA was not recognized anymore. And with the following intrusion by armed soldiers to other KIO territories, it was clear that the government was hell-bent on subjugation.”³⁰

21After it came to power in March 2011, the government of President Thein Sein withdrew the BGF ultimatum in an effort to lessen tensions with the ethnic armed groups. The gesture was meant to demonstrate goodwill and was a late effort to curb risks of escalation of the conflict. But it came too late. For the KIA, this episode demonstrated that the Tatmadaw will, sooner or later, try to take their turf militarily. Because of the lack of respect for the BGF ultimatum, the former KIO vice-chairman could not run for the 2010 general election. This was perceived by the Kachin as further evidence that the political transition the country was engaged in was not as deep as they expected and that long-promised political arrangements may be further delayed.

The human cost of war

“We, IDPs, suffer the most from this conflict.” Je Yang Kha IDP camp manager, Laiza, September 2013.
“Third countries could suggest [ways that] the KIO and government leaders should find an exit to the conflict, and only then, a genuine peace would be achieved. The Tatmadaw soldiers are killing our people and even children are traumatized. They are afraid that Burmese Army would kill them and hurt their mothers and sisters as they have heard and witnessed such things happening. So, when they will grow up, these children will still fear the Burmese Army soldiers will treat them brutally [as they have done] in the past.” A Kachin elder, Myitkyina, September 2013.

22The conflict in Kachin State is not only the product of two opposing political blocks, or business interests trying to secure revenue sources. For most of the Kachin population and also some Shan and other ethnic nationalities, the conflict is the result of willful neglect of ethnic based groups’ claims by central authorities since the inception of modern Myanmar. To fully understand the extent of grievances, it is important to note the suffering encountered by Kachin civilians, including the large numbers who fled their homes, and/or were victims or witnesses of violence by a range of armed groups, more often than not, the Tatmadaw. The following section explains the humanitarian situation, and the current politics of aid that tend to provide more legitimacy to the KIO, which is perceived as a protector by many members of the community that has been displaced.

23As of early 2014, there were more than 92,000 IDPs in about 160 locations scattered throughout Kachin and Northern Shan States, with greater concentrations in and around main cities, such as Myitkyina, Bhamo, Laiza, Lweje, and May Ja Yang (some of these located in government-controlled areas and others in KIA-controlled locations). Most of the camps outside urban areas, particularly those in KIO areas, remain not easily accessible. In addition, a few thousand civilians who fled their homes remained unaccounted for by humanitarian agencies, as they were believed to be hiding in terrain near their villages for fear of further aggression by armed groups. Others initially took refuge in camps in China. A majority of the IDP camps are managed by religious organizations, though some are managed directly by the KIO. Many of those who fled their villages found safe havens in religious compounds. Most of the displacement occurred between mid‑September 2011 and mid-January 2012, although IDP numbers in border regions surged in December 2012 and January 2013 following air attacks by the Tatmadaw on KIA strongholds.31

Figure 2: Map of IDP camps in Kachin and Northern Shan States (as of September 2013)

24Many IDPs noted that political affiliations or sympathies played a part in their decision as to where they turned for safe haven.32 Many based their decision on which areas (government-or KIO-controlled), they saw as more secure. Nonetheless not all IDPs in KIO-controlled areas are pro-KIO, and vice versa. Fear of being interrogated or harassed by armed forces was often the reason IDPs chose to stay in the whatever place they first arrived. Unable to find sufficient income, many depended on food aid. For those staying in government-controlled areas in Christian churches or Buddhist monasteries, the religious communities initially provided for their needs but soon struggled financially.33 A few months into the crisis, a few NGOs and UN agencies came to their aid.

25Any international agency staff movement in Kachin State must still be cleared by the government. International organization employees are very rarely authorized to access the KIO-controlled areas. Occasionally, the government or army officers have organized rice distribution in some locations, with reported episodes of bullying of IDPs by local officials or army officers who exhorted them to return to their villages.34 Overall, access to IDPs in KIO-controlled areas has been conditional on political and security considerations. When there was a political deadlock among the warring parties, international agencies could not access IDPs there. When discussions were gaining ground and belligerents were keener to establish a dialogue, humanitarian access was authorized on a case-by-case basis. All the while, the international community has had to rely on local civil society organizations to reach out to victims of conflict.

26The bulk of international aid has been channeled to the most accessible IDPs, in the vicinity of Myitkyina and Bhamo towns. Domestic support groups, meanwhile, such as faith-based and civil society organizations, managed to reach out to IDPs in remote areas. Overall, the political dividing lines between IDPs located in government-and KIO/KIA‑controlled areas reinforced a form of segregation between victims of the war. Those who are associated to, or more supportive of, the KIO find themselves in camps where their survival depends on the aid delivery administrated by the organization.

27While some progress has been made at the central levels of the Myanmar government to move towards a democratic system, the Kachin conflict appears to demonstrate that some in-depth issues and long term root causes of conflict are not yet open to discussion and resolution. A mix of military and ideological factors explains the resurgence of the conflict that has forced thousands to flee their homes. They now depend on humanitarian aid, that is itself part of the bigger political game, to survive. While the current peace process is more comprehensive than any other previous attempt, it remains weakened by the Kachin deadlock. The KIO demands to discuss long term political and military arrangements probably fall beyond the contemporary views and strategies of the Myanmar government and army. The following section will focus on the development of diverging narratives that have been both justifying the conflict and hindering the peace process.