1The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and its armed wing, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), were among the first large ethnic armed groups to reach out and sign a ceasefire brokered by then-prime minister, General Khin Nyunt, in 1994. Yet, by mid‑2011, while many other ethnic armed groups had joined the government’s successful – and unprecedented – ceasefire initiatives, the KIA was returning to warfare. The shift in the KIO’s attitude, from cooperation to one of outright hostility, stemmed from various political issues analyzed in this research. This conflict results from the constant frustrations among a number of Kachin leaders and their perception of aggression coming from the central government.

2In the wider context, the conflict in Kachin State should not be misinterpreted as an isolated series of events caused by a handful of disillusioned ethnic leaders. In fact, the real reasons are more emblematic of attempts by successive governments to dominate minority ethnic populations, create a unified country and identity, and also take control of the territory vis‑a-vis natural resources. To understand the current situation and explain the motivations of key players, it is crucial to explore the fundamental misunderstandings between the two sides, summed up in the contrasting hopes of the Bamar-dominated central government, and ethnic groups at the outer edges of the country. There are a number of similarities between the root causes of this conflict and those experienced by other ethnic minorities in the country for decades. The KIO’s key claims bear a likeness to those of other ethnic armed groups demanding, for several decades, the devolution of political power. Through extensive field work including interviews and a comprehensive review of media reports and academic literature, this paper explores some aspects of the origins of Kachin politics and analyzes the root causes of conflict as well as the divergent views of the key players.

3The roots of the conflict in Kachin State between the KIO and government troops go back to grievances over control of the territory (and its lucrative natural resources) and the preservation of ethnic identity after the end of British colonial rule in 1948. At the 1947 Panglong Conference, the Kachin along with Shan and Chin representatives agreed in negotiations led by General Aung San to the formation of a Union of Burma in return for promises of full autonomy in internal administration and an equal share in the country’s wealth. The Panglong Agreement, signed on February 12, 1947 – now celebrated as Union Day in Myanmar – granted “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas” (the colonial administrative term for borderlands) in principle, and provided for the creation of a Kachin State by the country’s Constituent Assembly. But the promised autonomy and wealth-sharing failed to materialize and the Panglong Agreement later took on a mythical dimension. After the assassination of General Aung San and the Independence of the country, a series of rebellions among various ethnic groups intensified the atmosphere of growing mutual suspicion. During the late 1950s and 1960s, the Kachin, along with other ethnic minorities, finally rebelled amid growing discontent and a sense of betrayal prevailed over perceptions that the Rangoon-based government was ignoring ethnic interests and realities. A new border demarcation agreement with China, and the promulgation of Buddhism as the state religion, upset a number of Christian minorities, including the Kachin. In 1961, a group of young Kachin nationalists established the Kachin Independence Organization and started what became known as the first Kachin armed conflict. In the following year, 1962, a military coup led by General Ne Win set the seal on growing mistrust of the central government among several ethnic groups and ushered in decades of conflict. As an efficient fighting force, the KIO quickly gained control over large areas of Kachin and Northern Shan States. Alongside a number of military truces, KIO leaders took part in various rounds of ceasefire negotiations with the Rangoon-based military regime in the early 1980s. It was not until 1994, however, that a substantive ceasefire agreement was struck. The ceasefire was maintained from 1994 to 2011, a period during which a number of Kachin and Bamar leaders were able to improve their economic circumstances thanks to the exploitation of natural resources such as jade, gold, teak, and others. Increasingly, large Myanmar businesses profited from the situation and the region was militarized, creating tensions and a context favorable to the building up of popular support for resistance. Still hoping to achieve sustainable and mutually agreeable political arrangements, Kachin representatives demonstrated keenness to become involved in a political dialogue and even participated in the decade-long National Convention process that ended with the drafting of the country’s controversial 2008 Constitution, in a period during which a number of other ethnic armed groups were still fighting the military junta. However, Kachin representatives maintain that they were allowed no significant input, and that little attention overall was paid during the drafting process to addressing ethnic grievances.

4In many cases under successive military regimes from the early 1980s, ethnic complaints were deepened by official neglect or betrayal of earlier pledges. In the lead-up to the 2010 elections, the military junta backtracked on earlier promises to the KIO and other ethnic armed groups, demanding they transform their armed units into “Border Guard Forces” (BGF) under control of the Tatmadaw -the Myanmar Armed Forces. The KIA refused to accept the ultimatum. As a result of the stand-off over the border guard dispute, the government’s Union Election Commission refused to register a Kachin political party led by former KIO leaders to contest the general election of 2010, and shortly afterwards, the government declared the ceasefire null and void, setting the stage for a resurgence of hostilities.

5After seventeen years of ceasefire, a minor skirmish near the Taping River hydroelectric project on June 9, 2011 became the ultimate trigger for the resumption of war. Within a few days, violence escalated and thousands had to flee their homes. Soon after, the fighting spread to eastern and southern areas of Kachin State. Amid fierce fighting, government troops managed within less than two years to reclaim a number of strategic locations formerly under KIA control, including the vicinity of the KIA headquarters at Laiza, securing access to strategic locations including lucrative jade mines around Hpakant, about eighty miles west of Myitkyina. More than 100,000 civilians had to flee their homes due to fighting or fear of it.

6Fighting in Kachin state flared back up just months after President Thein Sein came to power in March 2011.The new civilian government almost immediately began negotiating a series of peace agreements with ethnic armed groups declaring that a nationwide ceasefire with all ethnic armed groups would be a priority for this first civilian administration, to be signed under his tenure. After fighting escalated in Kachin State in late 2012, both sides finally began uneasy rounds of talks. In May 2013, the KIO signed a tentative agreement, although it stopped short of a ceasefire. While fighting largely subsided in most of the major ethnic areas from early 2012, tensions between the KIA and government troops continued to simmer, erupting in local-level conflicts in pockets of Kachin and Northern Shan States, generating suspicion over the government’s stated intentions to achieve peace. Central to the Kachin position have been persistent doubts about whether Minister U Aung Min, a key reformist from the President’s Office team who has largely led the talks since 2013, is really able to make commitments regarding military aspects of a peace agreement while not being officially in control of the Tatmadaw. Since resuming the old conflict with the government, KIO leaders have insisted on political dialogue to officially reach a degree of political autonomy, in line with the aspirations of the Panglong Agreement.

7By convincing the majority of groups involved in armed struggle against the Tatmadaw to sign ceasefire agreements, the predominantly civilian government of President Thein Sein succeeded in winning some credibility, both nationally and internationally. But amid this striking shift, it is also important to consider how three inextricably interwoven but highly delicate reform processes are at the heart of the emerging new dynamic: political change, economic transformation, and the peace process. At the same time, several old fault lines have re-emerged, among them the conflict in Kachin and Northern Shan States. To all sides in the peace process, the rekindling of this old conflict serves as a powerful reminder of the fragility of certain aspects of the transition process led by the Myanmar (quasi) civilian administration. Yet, the conflict does not appear to have a significant impact on the economic reforms since extraction of natural resources in Kachin State continues amidst fighting. Besides, a large volume of business is done at Yangon and Nay Pyi Taw levels, so these important centers experience a very marginal impact from the conflict.

8The setback to conflict and blockage of peace process with the KIO shows that some structural political issues remain, such as the recognition of local power structures and decentralization. National reconciliation will require a significant shift in attitudes of all parties and ability to compromise. The fact that some of these pivotal issues have not been addressed for more than four years after the new government took over its functions invites questioning of the depth of the contemporary political transition. Obviously, each ethnic political and armed group has its own (vested) interests in negotiating peace with Nay Pyi Taw. Some wish to end an armed conflict that has lasted several decades as a priority. They consider that the political dialogue has been initiated with the peace talks and that sustainable political arrangements will follow. Others, like the KIO, doubt that the ceasefire agreements systematically pave the way to negotiation of further decentralization and officially secure increased political power. They have experienced decades of political stalemate and hence demand stronger guarantees from President Thein Sein and his Tatmadaw. The pivotal issues raised by the KIO tackle the most sensitive areas such as the future of the ethnic armed groups and potential reform within the army, the long term arrangements for redistribution of national resource income, and the degree of political autonomy ethnic minority groups can expect in the newly born democratic system. The KIO is currently testing the depth of the political will for peace in a government that is mainly made of former junta members and military officers but also has leading reformers who clearly appear in favor of a peace deal as soon as possible. Starting in 2013, a number of military attacks interfering with – and apparently contradicting -the peace process created, for a number of domestic and international observers, the impression that there is a difference of intent between the civilian administration and the military leadership, while the KIO has been perceived as unwilling to strike a peace deal. Thus, analyzing the causes of the conflict and current impediments to peace in Kachin territories provides an illustration of the limits of the transition process. Ultimately, the findings highlight certain trends of continuity in the role played by the Armed Forces in politics since Independence.

9While much has been written in the media about the legal, economic, and political reforms in Myanmar; academic research about the Kachin conflict, as well as firsthand information remains scarce. This research attempts to highlight a more nuanced reality, mainly through data collected in the field. It illustrates the personal experiences and beliefs of a strong sample of influential Kachin people, and also examines the Kachin’s reinterpretation of those experiences and beliefs for political purposes. It indicates the complexity of Bamar-Kachin relations through modern history, the roots of mistrust, misunderstandings, and fundamentally diverging points of view. The overall objective of this paper is to question, and in some cases deconstruct, some overly simplistic versions of the current armed conflict by proposing a more empathic vision of the local realities. As the following sections present a number of unpublished sources, their content can inform future research on the dynamics of the conflict in the area and its protraction, and provide unique firsthand material to support practitioners to understand an under-documented and seldom independently analyzed situation. These experiences of the conflict show the complexity of notions of war and peace in the collective Kachin memory, as well as the reinterpretation of these by local leadership for political ends.

10After presenting briefly some salient elements of the Kachin context, this paper aims at highlighting historical, cultural, social, and economic dimensions of the current conflict, through the lenses of personal experiences of those who directly contributed and experienced it. This requires examining the ways Kachin individuals, communities, and leaders live, perceive, and speak about the conflict. Each side felt deceived by the other at various points over the years leading up to recent hostilities. Both miscalculated the price of war in terms of economic, human, and political costs; and both utilized armed force as a way to force their political agenda on the other side. Media coverage of the conflict in Kachin State from media outlets inside the country has been relatively scant and poor due to language barriers; safety and security issues; difficulties and cost associated with accessing conflict areas; and state-ownership and control of TV and radio stations by government affiliates. Ethnic media report regularly from the conflict areas via radio and online media but are widely seen as politically partisan. Overall, it appears that the Kachin political opposition has been perceived by Bamar as difficult to deal with, while government-friendly or nationalistic media have generally portrayed the Nay Pyi Taw administration as enthusiastically pursuing peace through its nationwide ceasefire plan.

11This research, which was first commissioned by an international organization working on the peace process in Myanmar, proposes an analysis of the views, appeals, and experiences of war and peace in Kachin areas at a certain point in time. It is based on observations, interviews, and primary and secondary sources in English, Myanmar, Jinghpaw, Lisu, and Shan languages – including media, academic papers, and various unpublished sources. It encompasses analyses based on data collection in various locations in Kachin and Northern Shan States between May 2009 and December 2013. It also relies on over a decade of study, research, interviews, and observations of Myanmar by the Myanmar‑language-proficient author. A number of the sources have been collected during missions conducted by the author for professional purposes, while she was working for international organizations in the aid sector in these geographic areas. A particular challenge in the data collection process was gaining access to official primary sources (both Tatmadaw and government); however this was counterbalanced by interviews and open sources used to inform the analysis. The paper focuses on the experiences of political and religious leaders, civilians, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also has a particular focus on KIO/KIA’s views, as the main political and armed group among the Kachin opposition. Most of the interviews quoted in this research have been conducted with members of the Burmese and Kachin political, military, and religious elites, within both government and KIO controlled areas. The paper does not aim at proposing a comprehensive summary of the varied views of the Kachin people, but rather at highlighting some perspectives, with a particular focus on those of decision-makers. As such, it is a canvas of testimonies, an unprecedented documentation of the Kachin conflict experience at a point in time. It highlights some aspects of the Kachin politics, through personal lenses. Hence, the methodology used is closer to the participant observation approach found in anthropology than the purist external observer tendency of political sciences. This methodology has been chosen as the author feels that these original testimonies, in various meaningful contexts, have an intrinsic value. The present paper aims at providing a picture of the situation, during a limited period of time, between the resumption of the conflict (June 2011) and the end of the research work (July 2014), in a particularly fluid political context.

12The first part, based on secondary sources, succinctly describes some aspects of the Kachin historical and social contexts with particular attention to the emergence of the modern Kachin political formulation. This contributes to illustrating the relationship between Kachin political identity and armed conflict, as it became a justification for gaining control over a resource-rich and strategically important territory. The research then focuses on data collected in the field and presents the various empirical experiences and re-interpretation of the conflict in a highly politicized, and polarized, context. It demonstrates hardly reconcilable views of the past and present conflict, the KIO’s view to pursue the same struggle since the 1960s, as well as the KIO’s perception of being isolated and under attack. In the last part, the research proposes an explanation of the various hindrances to peace, as well as some economic and political incentives for the warring parties to postpone ending the current armed struggle. By exploring a number of hindrances to peace, and the elements of continuity in the Kachin claims, the paper attempts to explore some limits of the current political transition in Myanmar.