1 - Human Security and Migration

1.1 - Human Insecurities in Burma as Factors in Migration

“People move because of some threat to security or to improve their security. In so doing, they are often seen as a threat to the security of the receiving population, or at least sections thereof, particularly if the movement is large enough in numerical terms or dissimilar enough in qualitative terms.” (Graham, 2000)

1In Wongboonsin’s work on Human Security and Transnational Migration, she points out that the transnational migration of labourers in Thailand is induced by the problem of human insecurity within the countries of origin and results in a widening and deepening scope of human insecurity in both sending and receiving countries.17 At this point, I would like to clarify the dimensions and extent of threat and security in the above argument which is also referred to in this research. To Shan migrant workers, insecurity can be visible or perceivable only when the previous or current conditions of life are threatened. When people perceive threats to their immediate security, they often become less tolerant. The oppression and perceptions of injustice of Shan people inflicted by the Burma military, who invade their villages, take their food and land-the first two priorities in their hierarchy of needs-have led to a violent protest and armed conflicts against authoritarianism between the Shan and Burmese armies. These situations have also motivated Shan local people to migrate to where they believe they can broaden their range of choices in terms of economy, food, health and personal/political security. Moreover, their destination needs to be a place where they believe they can exercise these choices safely and freely, where they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today will not be totally lost tomorrow.18

2In the case of Shan migrant workers, migration is also driven by the many images and messages emitted particularly from Thailand through the development of global communications and entertainment networks. Shan migrant workers mostly receive outside information through radio and television. Personal networks also play a significant role through the accounts of returning migrant workers of life outside Burma. It has helped to expand awareness of life beyond the borders and to create the image of a more civilized and secure lifestyle in Thailand. “Imagination and Hope of Betterment” (according to Shan informants corresponds to the comparatively higher number of choices at the destination) and is the push factor influencing Shan migrant workers’ cost and benefit assessment of migration.

3However, whether Shan migrant workers can achieve the aim of widening their choices and whether a new form of insecurity must be traded off for the achievement of another will be discussed in the following section.

1.2 - More Human Securities or Less Human Insecurities? The Post-Migration Situation in Thailand

4Labour movements from the Shan State into Thailand create multi-dimensional impacts on both source and destination countries at micro and macro levels, affecting not only the migrant at an individual level, but also their family and community, and at national and regional levels. This issue is raised in order to explain how the forms and conditions of human insecurity change after the migration process.

1.2.1 - At the Individual Migrant Level

5Due to their illegal status and lack of skills, in the short term perspective, illegal Shan migrant workers are at risk of poor and abusive working conditions, coupled with irregular income. This economic insecurity causes both the unplanned or extended migration time frame in Thailand and their chronic migration after returning to the Shan State. In the short term, some may enjoy higher wages, but in the long run, some may end up in an unsustainable professional life in Thailand fraught with not only financial problems (debt repayments for migration fees and relatively higher living costs), but also with fewer opportunities in terms of skill development or even, in some cases, basic education. In this situation, it can be argued that the freedom of migrant workers’ in professional terms is defined by different actors such as the military government in Burma, Thai brokers, Thai employers and the Thai government. In terms of health insecurity, their hope of gaining a higher number of socio-economic choices has led to their assessment of health risks from poor working conditions as a mere trade-off for their higher income in Thailand.

6To summarize the issue of Shan migration in relation to human security, the number of choices and the opportunity to utilize these choices are indicators of improved conditions at the destination, not only for the individual but also for his/her children and the rest of the family back in the Shan State.

7Thus, in this sense, it is not necessarily the greater availability of commodities at the destination, but rather the command over goods and services, whether self-produced or otherwise, that attract migrant workers. Choices, to Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms of commodity possession. The more money they earn, the more commodities they can obtain, coupled with the relatively higher living standard in Thailand.

8Nevertheless, Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of this so-called betterment, often demanding higher investment, such as bribes to local Thai policemen as a guarantee to ignore their illegal status in Thailand.

9In conclusion, there seems to be some recklessness in the assessment of costs and benefits on the part of Shan migrant workers, since they mostly assess improved conditions by the value of money they can earn from working in Thailand. On the contrary, they forget to take working conditions and the availability of merely temporary jobs into account. As a result, they can not live on a regular basis and rely more and more on the notion of chance.

1.2.2-At the Household Level

10Improved human security at the household level can be expected from migrant remittances. Many Shan migrant workers perceive the contribution of their migration to their household back in the Shan State merely in financial terms. However, the remittance may not improve their family’s living and economic conditions. In this research, we may find that most Shan migrant workers are subject to recruitment fees.

11As a result, these remittances become the main source of funding to pay back debts and interests. The financial burden created by the migration determines how long the migrants work in Thailand, depending on each informant’s situation. However, for some families, remittances play a prime role in minimizing household economic poverty and improving housing, education and healthcare.

12Even though the real benefits of these remittances are often questionable as to whether they are spent towards a productive investment or wasted on luxury non-productive consumption, remittances can help provide a stimulus for local suppliers and local industry.

13However, outward migration from the Shan State is also likely to cause family problems. The sizeable number of Shan female workers migrating to work in Thailand has produced a social and cultural gap of gendered contribution in the private sphere in Burma, creating a distortion in family- and child-care.

1.2.3 - At the Community Level

14Even though remittances may represent a considerable contribution to some families and even their community, they may also increase, and therefore worsen, the income gap between people and households within a certain community.

15The examples of successful Shan migrant workers induce more migration from the Shan State to Thailand.

1.2.4 - At the National Level

16-Boosting economic growth in the labour receiving country-

17Thai employers can enjoy cheaper Shan labourers, helping to fill the gaps in 3D (Dangerous, Dirty, Difficult) tasks avoided by domestic workers. Also, Thailand, as the labour-importing country, can use the availability of Shan migrant workers as a tool to keep a lid on rising wages.20 This means consumers generally benefit from cheaper goods and more affordable services, such as cheaper Shan maids who an increasing number of Thais are employing. Semi and unskilled jobs, which are mostly performed by Shan migrant workers, have contributed to higher production with lower costs for the export market and have come to be associated with the increase of the Thai national income. Thus, Shan migrant workers’ mobility can be seen as a variable boosting Thai economic activity.21

18Nevertheless, there are still concerns and dissatisfaction among domestic workers who are afraid that the influx of Shan migrant workers is synonymous with the displacement of local workers and the depression of their wages.

19-Negative impacts on long-term economic development-

20The unsystematic flows of Shan migrant workers not only lead to the failure of the Thai government to control the invisible flows of labour migration, but also affect the possibility for Thailand and Burma to reach higher capacities for their national economies and, especially in the case of Thailand, to upgrade its international competitiveness. According to the ADB22, Thailand is classified as a middle-income country moving towards more skill-intensive activities and production. Thus, as a result of the great influx and availability of low-skilled Shan migrant workers, both the governmental and private sector are less motivated to invest in more productive human resources, which is the main factor in gaining higher competencies in the world market. This has minimized the country’s ability to move into higher value-added economic activities. In the short term perspective, it may seem that Thailand gains huge benefits from cheap Shan labour. However, in the long run, the country will not be able to avoid facing severe competition from countries with high technological capacities and labour-intensive strategies of development, given the fact that the number of industrial countries with outsourcing market strategies is greatly increasing.23

21In turn, Burma, being the country that is sending its labour force elsewhere, is also losing the opportunity to develop its human resources of people of working age. Adequate human resources would have enabled the country to optimize its economic capacity and to be included in the category of middle-income countries at a further stage.24 Furthermore, with the minimal opportunities to develop labour skills while working in Thailand, these Shan migrant workers remain low-skilled labourers and unavoidably become part of the aging population, thus carrying a financial burden to society, rather than building a productive workforce. Unless awareness of this circle of circumstance is raised, the economic drive of the entire ASEAN region toward acquiring the sustained opportunities and choices for people to lead their daily lives and achieve the basic human needs of food, shelter, clothing, education and healthcare to their highest potential, may take too long.

1.2.5 - At the Regional Level

22-Regional cooperation on international migration in ASEAN-

23Labour-exporting countries are keen to lower the barriers to international labour migration, while labour-importing countries have asymmetrical policies that regard the import of unskilled/semi-skilled workers as politically and socially sensitive, and are more inclined to favour flows of professional/skilled workers and business persons.25

24This situation is reflected in ASEAN cooperation. Prospects of an ASEAN free labour market remain remote as the vision for the ASEAN Economic Community, which is hoped to be realized by 2020, includes only free movement of skilled labour. Cooperation is still limited on the core migration issues, such as orderly recruitment of migrant workers, protection of migrant workers’ rights, acceptance of asylum seekers, compensation for the loss of skilled workers and the facilitation of circular migration and remittance flows. However, in reality, the influx of unskilled labourers within ASEAN is increasing heavily and the Thai government is failing to systematically manage its flow in accordance with legal procedures. My concern is that the lack in addressing this unsystematic migration movement represents an important barrier for ASEAN to reach the goal of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) in 2015 regarding the regulation of international migration flow.26 These failures are partly due to the low level of collaboration between governments and employers, especially to the reluctance of employers in labour-importing countries to commit themselves to improve the migrants’ working conditions and skills.

25What is still missing in the regional context is an institution established to formulate labour migration policies and to implement these on a regional level. I believe that the analysis of the perceptions of borders and the migration costs and benefits assessment of each actor involved constitute the essential ingredient that can lead to a new framework of human migration, borders and human security for policy-makers to approach and use in identifying the migration problem.

2 - Three Actors’ Perceptions of Borders, Their Cost-Benefit Assessment and the Migration of Shan Migrant Workers

2.1 - The Thai Government’s Perception of Borders: Legal Borders vs. Social Borders

26The objective of this section will be to identify how the different perceptions and functions of borders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers, and informal brokers shape the migration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and perpetuate the illegal migration phenomenon. In order to do so, we will engage in an in-depth analysis on how the various definitions and functions of borders according to the Thai nation-state and its active body, the Thai government, were formed and have effectively influenced governmental immigration policies at both macro and micro levels.

“In the indigenous polity in which the power field of a supreme overlord radiated like a candle’s light, the tiny tributaries were always located in the overlapping arena of the power fields. In the indigenous interstate relations, the overlapping margin of two power fields was not necessarily considered a problem unless it served as a bridge for the enemy to invade. For a modern state, however, the overlapping frontier is not permissible. The division of territorial sovereignty between states must be clear-cut at the point where both power fields interface. To transform a pre-modern margin to a modern territorial interface, or to create a modern edge of a state out of a pre-modern shared space, there could be more than one possible boundary, and all of them would be equally justified because the boundary could be anywhere within the overlapping arena, depending on how the sovereignty of a tributaries was decided.”

27In the wake of modern state boundaries, administration, boundary demarcation and mapping are equipped to keep boundaries fixed and sovereignty exclusive.27

28“There has always been a tension between the fixed, durable and inflexible requirements of national boundaries and the unstable and flexible requirements of people. If the principle fiction of the nation-state is ethnic, racial, linguistic and cultural homogeneity, then borders always give the lie to this construct.”28 According to Anderson29, borders (which Anderson refers to as frontiers) are both institutions and processes. In order to maintain state sovereignty and rights to individual citizenship, borders were institutionalized and employed by state governments. Borders function through the imagination of each individual within the state boundaries. Borders, thus, are made capable to control the people within them. Given this, they create a sense of both political and social separateness and otherness. This function of borders simultaneously excludes people who live in the border areas from national society. Borders emphasize people’s heterogeneity and create the phenomenon that distinguishes them from homogeneous and powerful zones at the state core. In other words, borders are also recognized by Anderson as the markers of political and socio-cultural identities of both the people and the modern state.30

29In an era of the cultural globalization and internationalization of economics and politics, the modern idea of defined legal borders has appeared, as opposed to the traditional concept of fluid borders. My concern is that globalization and liberalization have opened the border and eased state controls="true" for high-skilled workers, but have limited the movements of low-skilled workers, including their goods, capital and information. It is controversial that the nation-state in the era of capitalism demands a greater number of cheap labourers to fulfil its economic objectives, while it imposes selective immigration policies on migrants, especially low-skilled workers. In the case of the Thai government, they have to balance the needs of the nation’s two public entities: the Thai employers’ demand for cheap labour and the Thai working-class opposition to surpluses of foreign workers who increase competitiveness within the labour market. The government has to control potential effects on national unemployment, a drain on public and private funds, and public dissatisfaction, while maximizing its national economic capacities and interests. Borders for the Thai government sometimes serve as a tool to define the eligibility of required cheap migrant workers, and often act as a screen or filter which functions through a defensive legal wall. Borders, in this sense, determine who is eligible for the governmental protection of human security.

30However, many studies on borders and boundaries with regard to migration, when tracing the evolution of national and international boundaries and examining their structures and functions, are mostly focused on the formal arrangements made between states, often failing to take into account the needs, desires and other realities of the people who live at the borders, as well as the cultural significance of borders to the people living there.31

31The Thai government’s perceptions of physical and geographical borders can not solely explain the perpetuating illegal migration phenomenon. Addressing how the definition of social borders among the locals influence their migration will attempt to supplement the yet-lacking correspondence of border perceptions between state and non-state actors, which is the main barrier to decreasing the degree of illegal and unsystematic migration. Social borders, in the case of Shan migrant workers, are interpreted according to their socio-economic benefits. They simply perceive the border areas along the Shan State of Burma and northern Thailand as “the same social borders where individuals are aware that they share a common status, that they are a single social category.”32 The transfusion of racial, linguistic and other cultural characteristics of the Tai ethnic group who live primarily in the Shan State and northern Thailand has formed a cultural homogeneity for the sake of socio-economic benefits. However, the legal borders imposed by Burma and Thai legislation have become a significant factor in separating insiders from outsiders in terms of both legal status and social identity. I would like to conclude that perceptions of social borders among Shan migrant workers overlap each other when it comes to determining their migration behaviour.

2.1.1 - Benefits

32In conclusion, borders according to the Thai government serve as both a geo-political and economic line dividing two nation-states that practice two different legal systems and economies. Borders are formalized as a mechanism to create a sense of superiority towards the other and unity among their own, whereby a status of inferiority is attributed to illegal migrant workers, such as the Shan, who are considered an economic threat to Thailand due to decreasing job opportunities. Imagined borders are also utilized to formulate governmental immigration policies, which fluctuate between restrictive and welcoming ones depending on the economic demand of cheap migrant workers.

33Furthermore, borders defined by the nation-state lead to the emergence of local powers governing access to social and public services in Thailand. Thai local authorities, such as border patrol policemen or local government officers, at the border areas exploit the virtual existence of border lines and deportation laws as a means to gain both power and money from illegal Shan migrant workers.

2.1.2 - Costs

34The differences and lack of common perceptions of borders between the Thai government and non-state actors (Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers) are the main factors perpetuating the illegal and unsystematic flow of Shan migrant workers to Thailand. This situation is costly for the government both directly and indirectly. In financial terms, huge national budgets are spent on preventing and deporting illegal migrant workers. At the same time, the government fails to organize the national budget on social welfare for the unnumbered migrant workers.33

35It is controversial that the national budget on community and social welfare, which is supposed to be allocated for Thai citizens, is largely consumed by migrant workers by means of social services such as public health and education. This problem remains ineffectively managed mainly due to the unavailability of reliable statistics on migrants and their consumption in Thailand. Furthermore, as a consequence of illegal and unsystematic migration, border problems such as the trafficking of humans, drugs, and illicit goods have risen and have become more severe over time. In an effort to control this, the state allocates a greater number of human resources to patrol the borders.

2.2 - Shan Migrant Workers’ Perception of Borders: Borderless or Ethnic Borders-An Interpretation of Socio-Economic Demand

36A Border commonly refers to the modern concept of nation-state boundaries, which is a static dividing line, developed and employed by political geographers. These kinds of national boundaries deal with its form, rather than its functions. This is a systematic accompaniment to the building of modern nation-states. An individual state is forced to form the more specific definitions of the locations of boundaries in order to claim the nation’s wealth and political unit contained within that defined territory.34

37The borders, which are the main subject of this section, can not be understood in the above definition of boundaries. It can not be denied that modern boundaries constitute a formidable legal barrier in terms of migration. Nonetheless, in the societies along the borders of the Shan State and northern Thailand, this research has found that Shan people do not wholeheartedly perceive or commit themselves, whether economically and culturally, to either the Shan State or Thailand. Socio-economic assessment has become the significant factor in defining their social identity.35

38Over the period of boundary demarcation, the individual nationstate attempts to integrate as many frontier peoples as possible in order to accumulate human resources, natural resources and land.36 Deprived of ethnic and social trust, the resistance from the Shan army and the quiet social conflicts among Shan individuals toward the Burmese government has risen during this process. The extremely unequal distribution of income and social welfare at the place of origin creates an impetus that drives Shan migrant workers to move near or across the borders where there may have perceivably greater socio-economic opportunities.

39The existence of national boundaries creates concepts of cross-border activities, such as human migration, and requires the establishment of a governing administration. In other words, the movements of migrants need to be approved by both the sending and receiving states by means of formal administration. An individual person’s identity and travelling rights are defined by passports, passbooks, visas, and work permits. The governmental definition of boundaries as the legal spatial delimitation of nations is applied to people on both sides of the Thai-Burma border, neglecting sociological attributes.

40“Few people cross many boundaries, and when they compare one boundary with another they naturally consider their own personal experience; they usually have little opportunity and less inclination to perceive the many functions which boundaries serve today and to discover what the boundary means in the lives of the people concerned, especially those who live nearest to the frontier.”37 Borders to Shan migrant workers and local people, therefore, are various cultural zones or spaces, independent from formal boundaries. This perception is out of tune with the governmental view on the issue of migration.

41As mentioned earlier, the existence of artificial nation-state boundaries is more recognized than its functions for local people. It can be explained that people in each delimited territory would not necessarily recognize the status of the boundaries that have been agreed to both by the individual state and its neighbours. “The recognition of one state as an international unit by another state does not necessarily assume that the recognizing state acknowledges the status of the boundaries of the recognized state.”38

42The following case study supports the above idea and the main argument that the different perceptions and functions of borders among the different actors and the lack of correspondence between them perpetuate the flow of illegal migration.

43The migration of people residing in the border areas is distinct from that of ones staying farther inland from the borders. Shan migrant workers from the Shan State clearly demonstrate their exclusive perceptions of borders. Since they do not recognize the legal existence of delimited boundaries, Shan migrant workers perceive the action of border-crossing as a general movement, not international migration, derived from the evolution of modern boundaries. Consequently, they lack the concept of committing their movement to formal state immigration policies and legislation. Furthermore, the nature of the borders39 virtually facilitates their ability to move, while making the everyday informal deportation of Shan migrant workers by Thai border patrol authorities at the border ineffective.

44Their behaviours in informal migration, such as cyclic migration, daily migration, become illegal in the eyes of Thai government. This is because there is a lack of correspondence between the borders defined by these two different entities. Shan migrant workers acknowledge the nature of borders more as cultural zones where the movement of people along the borders implies a hidden meaning in their lives’ securities. Examples of these securities are trading, working and earning money on the other side of the border, thus affirming their economic securities at both individual and household levels.

45The functions of borders from a local perspective regarding to the movements of humans and goods fluctuate between the informal and formal governance of local authorities, which is somewhat conditioned by local corruption and the connections between local authorities and people.

46On the other hand, the Thai nation-state perceives the concept of state borders more in terms of a delimitation of geographical boundaries-the invisible lines that separate the Thai state from others, whereby “boundaries in the state mind are paper walls created by the contractual relations with the mutual agreements among modern nation states.”40

2.2.1 - Benefits

47According to the above case study on Shan migrant workers, the border between Burma and Thailand is perceived as an indicator of their potentially expanding choices in terms of income, benefitting from the currency exchange rate from the expensive Thai Baht to the cheap Burma Kyat, and access to public services such as education and health care, which are inadequate in the district of origin.

48The number of choices and the migrants’ capability to utilize these choices indicate the improved conditions of human security at the destination. According to Amartya Sen41, “capability of a person is a freedom or ability of the person to choose the desired function of a commodity and his command over it.” In the case of Shan migrant workers, the higher capability or freedom, according to Sen’s definition, expected through migration is not only for the individual, but also for his/her children and the rest of the family back in the Shan State. Migration, thus, is done with the expectation of expanding their capability in their command over goods and services, in exchange of cash which is not allowed at the place of origin under the authoritarian regime.

2.2.2 - Costs

49Choices, in the case of Shan migrant workers, refer to choices in terms of the purchase and possession of commodities. The more money they earn, the more commodities they can obtain, in addition to a relatively higher living standard in Thailand. Yet Shan migrant workers seem to ignore the costs of this so-called betterment. New forms of economic and individual insecurity may appear from the beginning of their migration process.

50The degree of costs incurred by each migrant depends on the main actors involved, therefore on Burma and/or Thai informal brokers, Burma and Thai local authorities, the Thai government and Thai employers. They unavoidably pay the price of becoming migrant workers through the invisible health risks, unexpected accidents42, unstable working conditions, the temporary nature of available jobs (farming, construction, etc…), legal trouble, fraud, and bribery burden.

Shan migrant workers on an orange farm

51“Functioning”, according to Amartya Sen, of Shan migrant workers in pre-and post-migration is different. “Functioning or the use of a commodity may determine the state of a person.” (Sen, 1992) Here, the state refers to the utility or satisfaction met by using the commodity in a specific way. Shan migrant workers might lack the freedom or ability to choose the desired function of a commodity or/and to function their possessed commodity at the place of origin.

52Due to political coercion, forms of exploitation limiting the potential functioning of commodities at the place of origin have manifested themselves in the post-migration destination in different ways. The essence is that their commodities and forced commitments to the Burma military at the pre-migration situation are transferred to different actors in post-migration. Commodities, such as agricultural products, and the commitment to the military in the form of unpaid labour, are replaced by new forms of exploitation such as bribes or gifts to Thai local authorities and the new commitment to Thai legal requirements or employers’ demands.

53In conclusion, their potential to expand their commodities in Thailand depends on informal brokers and Thai employers, while their freedom or ability to utilize these commodities, such as education or healthcare, as a migrant worker is stipulated by the approval of the Thai government.

2.3 - Thai Employers’ and Informal Brokers’ Perception of Borders: Economic Advantages from the Multi-Perceptions of Borders

54Although human movements predate the globalization process, the scale and scope of human migration have expanded to unprecedented levels. The movement of people is, thus, one of the most fundamental aspects of the idea of a shrinking world, where transactions, trade, economic and cultural intercourse are conducted with fewer barriers of physical distance.43

55However, labour movements still seem to be the only feature excluded from any free movements facilitated by the spirit of globalization and liberalization. “There is a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls="true" for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization. But when it comes to immigrants and refugees […] the national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders.”44 “Labor remains grounded by state boundaries and policies. In the case of labor import, national boundaries have traditionally been employed by the state in the interests of core capital to regulate the quality and quantity of alien labor with scant interference from the exporting government.”45 Ironically, too many restrictive immigration policies lead to the increase in numbers of cases of alien smuggling. This is because the recent restriction policies46 contradict each other over national boundaries: to a certain extent, they open borders to international capitals and information, while failing to manage and legalize a pool of foreign labourers who make use of the features of globalization, such as the availability of transportation and linkages in the migration system47, in seeking and migrating to the location where their labour can be exchanged for more desirable wages and living conditions.

56In the regional and global free market, labourers become the most popular commodities that function through middle non-state actors, such as informal brokers, who the conventional state actors fail to take into account in the migration phenomenon. They become a significant entity in facilitating the illegal process of migration over the years. They represent a legal grey zone48 both in the labour market and in border areas to run the broker business of informal recruitment, a process that had never existed in traditional human movements before the drawing of nation-state boundaries. Informal brokers somewhat perceive the theory of static clear-cut lines, as defined by the nation-states, but simultaneously take advantage of the practice of fluid movements in border areas.

2.3.1 - Benefits to informal brokers

57Informal brokers benefit from the process of informal recruitment, allowing them exclusive rights to dictate the conditions of repayment and employment. First, concerning the repayment of broker fees, the nature of the non-written contract between the broker and the Shan migrant worker leads to trickery through the imposition of broker and transportation fees, coupled with unstable and unfair interest rates. Furthermore, informal brokers profit greatly from the chronic selling of Shan migrant workers who are mostly incapable of paying off their huge debts to their Thai employers. Second, being in command of their employment status, informal brokers’ have the negotiating power for the price of labourers, which varies according to the employers’ need for cheap migrant workers and the availability of qualified labour. In order to continue reaping the benefits from the broker business, informal brokers accept to pay a certain amount of money to local border authorities to guarantee their status outside legal lines.

2.3.2 - Benefits to Thai employers

58Thai employers view borders as a means to ensure the availability of cheaper cross-national labourers. The hiring and use of Shan migrant workers, a relatively cheaper commodity, is profitable for business. In the agricultural sector, Thai employers not only cut costs by hiring cheap Shan migrant workers, but also increase productivity by using pesticides which have a highly detrimental effect on their health. Moreover, low-standard accommodation and working conditions are commonplace in any low-skilled migrant job sector. The practice of informal recruitment and the existence of legal grey zones are at the root of these working conditions, allowing Thai employers to enjoy a privileged space of non-commitment to migrant lives.

2.3.3 - Costs to informal brokers and Thai employers

59While informal brokers and Thai employers are reaping the benefits from these various perceptions of borders, the legal risks of trafficking and employing illegal Shan migrant workers come at a cost. Bribery and voting for local authorities and politicians, such as village and township heads, are thus common practices for many employers as a means to manage these risks. Furthermore, nearby communities and the surrounding environment are affected by contamination from the use of pesticides on farms. Ironically, the contaminating products are distributed in the market where the buyers are Thai employers themselves as well as other Thai people.

2.4 - The “Acquiescent Reciprocity”: A factor in the migration phenomenon

60In addition to the different perceptions and functions of borders, socio-economic acquiescent reciprocity between the three entities is another significant factor that characterizes 1) The trend or changes in Thai immigration control 2) The migration behaviours of Shan migrant workers and 3) The degree of adherence to the law of Thai employers and informal brokers.

Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers

2.4.1 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government, Thai employers and informal brokers

61The Thai government’s immigration policies can not be formulated without the consideration of the Thai employers’ demand for cheap labourers, since the latter’s economic performance sustains and affects the national economy. Thus, the Thai government to a certain degree formulates and implements open immigration policies, not only to serve the previously mentioned purpose, but also to decrease the illegal broker business. However, Thai employers recognize that they must abide by the law to a certain extent in order for the Thai government to maintain and/or formulate open immigration policies.

2.4.2 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between the Thai government and Shan migrant workers

62Due to the large scale of employment of cheap migrant workers from Burma, the Thai government realizes the extent of Shan migrant workers’ contribution to the Thai GDP. Immigration policy formulation is, therefore, highly influenced by this. Shan workers’ migration behaviours are, on the other hand, shaped by the Thai government’s immigration policies. Their life strategies after their migration to Thailand are formulated and adopted based on their need for social welfare and legal status. For example, they acquiesce to practicing bribery due to their illegal status or they acquiesce to a high price for a fake alien card because they are desperate for healthcare services.

2.4.3 - Acquiescent Reciprocity between Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers

63Because of their desperation for cash income, Shan migrant workers also acquiesce to the low standard of working conditions provided by Thai employers. On the other hand, Thai employers realize that they have to provide Shan migrant workers with basic needs such as accommodation or shelter, regardless of their quality in order to guarantee the availability of cheap migrant workers.

3 - Differences in the Perceptions of Borders and the Perpetuation of Illegal Migration

64Based on the borders approach, I would like to conclude that differences in the perception of borders between the Thai government, Shan migrant workers, Thai employers and informal brokers, in addition to each actor’s cost-benefit assessment, not only perpetuate the flow of illegal migrant workers from the Shan State to Thailand, but also create human insecurities for Shan migrant workers.