Okinawa’s Role

1For Japan, the Vietnam War was a decisive time for regaining political autonomy vis-à-vis its American mentor. Though the Japanese and the Americans had consensus on almost all issues after the Second World War, the Cold War in Asia gave rise to major differences of opinion. Technically, the Japanese were supposed to have been “neutralised” by a Constitution barring them from sending troops overseas and disallowing the armed forces any means of settling international disputes. This is to have been the effect of the famous Article 9 of the post-war Japanese Constitution, inspired by America. Few Japanese expressed sympathy for Communism. Neither were they convinced partisans of America’s military interventions in Indo-China, regardless of whether they were conservative or progressive. In fact, conservatives were highly sceptical about the likelihood of certain victory on a battleground that recalled to them the Imperial Army’s military campaigns in China.

2Most of the Japanese people were, then, in favour of a peaceful solution to the conflict that flared up in Vietnam. However, they could not remain neutral, as Shiina Etsusaburo, the Foreign Affairs Minister reminded them in May 1966. Their situation was further complicated by the United States’ use of Okinawa, part of their territory, to send troops to the battlefields. In the early stages of America’s military action in Vietnam, Okinawa was still occupied by North American troops. The island was returned to Japan only in 1973 and even then, the bases used by the American forces would continue to remain under their control.

3What made Japan’s situation ambiguous was that despite the strong opposition of the Japanese public opinion, increasingly frequent demonstrations to denounce the conflict, and the United States’ role in it, these movements never led to deep-rooted anti-Americanism, as was the case in other parts of the world. Moreover, despite profound disagreement with their trans-Pacific partner on the Vietnam issue, the Japanese remained its ally without ever questioning this alliance.

4In 1952, Article 6 of the San Francisco Mutual Security Treaty was the subject of lively debate. This Article defined the scope of the Treaty and its intention to “contribute to Japan’s security and to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far-East”.

5In the early 1960s, when American troops started getting involved in Indo-China, the Left opposition contested the use of American bases in Japan because the Japanese had earlier marked off those zones by military actions from the Archipelago’s bases in the north of Philippines. Nevertheless, other objections from opposition parties revealed that the Japanese political leaders, in their interpretation of the Treaty, had allowed Americans the liberty of using their bases freely for the Indo-China conflict.

6The Treaty of San Francisco was also an opportunity to decide the principle of payments for war damage reparations. Japan opted for settlement in kind, in the form of government and private loans to Asian countries that were victims of the conflict. This proved to be very favourable to Japan’s interests, due to its need to open to new markets, given that the American market of that time could not absorb Japanese products that were not adapted to America’s domestic demand. Thus, the decisions taken in 1952 gave Japan the Asian markets, and extensive infrastructure to be reconstructed.

7As for Vietnam, France had insisted that reparation be paid to it, though its infrastructure was, relatively speaking, spared by the Pacific war. Initially, the demand was $2 billion. In point of fact, about $55 million was paid to South Vietnam until 1965. Of this sum, $39 million was for repairing the Da Nhim dam’s hydro-electric power station, and the rest was in the form of government and private loans. Both the Right and the Left in Japan strongly opposed giving recompense to a country which had suffered very little damage on account of Japanese troops during the war, compared to massive destruction caused by Imperial troops in China and other Asian countries. Consensus was, however, reached on this issue, taking into account the amount of sympathy for this choice and the political stakes involved for Okinawa’s return at the end.

8For their part, the Vietnamese held the opinion that these payments were Japanese investments enabling their return to the Indo-Chinese market. In fact, exceptional financial means in the form of American and Japanese aid pouring into Saigon made it possible for the Vietnamese to source from Japan equipment that they needed most.

9Nevertheless, the terms of exchange were inequitable. Thus, in 1961, the year in which Japanese exchanges with South Vietnam reached their peak, its exports amounted to more than $65 million, against less than $3 million worth of imports from Japan.

10Though official exchanges took place easily with South Vietnam, which had been recognised by Tokyo since 1955, there were also private exchanges between Japan and North Vietnam through the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association (Nichietsu Boekikai). The Japanese were successful in working through what appeared to be a new contradiction between their political and economic interests. In fact, in the 1950s, despite an anti-Communist policy and a military alliance with the United States, the Japanese restored unofficial exchanges with Communist countries — some very actively — as with China in 1952, and USSR in 1956. For North Vietnam, Japan was a fairly important outlet for a part of its coal production at Hongay, but in fact all Japan did was merely resume the purchase of supplies that were started by the French during the colonial period. The volume of exchanges with North Vietnam was, however, hardly one-fourth of Japan’s trade flow with the Republic of South Vietnam in both directions. After 1965, Americans exerted pressure on their Japanese allies to put an end to exports of all products that could contribute to the Vietnam War effort, such as the copper and electric cables that Japanese companies were selling in North Vietnam. Nevertheless, business links were maintained at a low level and never came to a halt during the entire conflict.

The “Separation of Politics and Economics”

11In the early 1960s, under the Japanese Prime Minister Ikeda’s government, the “separation of politics and economics” (“seikei bunri” in Japanese) became a veritable principle of action. This can be interpreted in several ways, and the first one is cynical: that foreign policy action should not hamper the good functioning of business. The second implies a more realistic and pragmatic vision, wherein the pursuit of economic relations culminates in and finally contributes to an improvement in political relations. Truth to tell, Japan’s position regarding these two options was never clearly established. The Japanese themselves gave an explanation justifying this ambivalent attitude. Thus, Shibusawa Masahide expressed the opinion that “the concept of seikei bunri” represented the scepticism that was largely prevalent in Japan about the relevance of getting involved in the Cold War.1

12The Japanese were very comfortable with the principle of separa-tion of politics and economics, given that it contributed to the prosperity of their country. Though this stand was quite unpopular amongst the people, the Japanese government continued to defend the Vietnam War overtly, for two important reasons. The first was that it had to be alert to solve unavoidable trade problems with the United States that would only worsen with time. The second was that the Japanese authorities were waiting impatiently for Okinawa to be returned to their hands. Although we cannot say that the Americans were blackmailing their Japanese allies, the stakes involved in the Vietnam War were very apparent to all the protagonists. Oda Makoto, a Japanese intellectual, who was one of the leaders of a movement against the Vietnam War, summarises Japan’s situation in this conflict as follows: “Our country was a kind of ‘forced aggressor’ in the war. Because of the security treaty, Japan had to cooperate with the American policy of aggression. In this sense Japan was a victim of its alliance with that policy, but it was also an aggressor toward the small countries in Indochina.”2

13The polemics on the Vietnam War were all the more heated as a very large section of the Japanese press took up Vietnam’s defence, with not a single major daily supporting the bombing strategy. The involvement of the Japanese press in the war debate enabled it to regain an élan that it had more or less lost after the Nippo-American Security Treaty. The first anti-war demonstrations, organised by trade unions, started from February 1965. Thus, the big Sôhyô Trade Union and Churistsu Rôren demanded the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. In April, that very year, Japanese intellectuals, academics, writers and artists joined forces and sent the Prime Minister an appeal focussing on three main points:

1. Refusal of military operations undertaken from Japanese bases.
2. A demand to the American government to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam.
3. A demand to the Japanese government to talk to the warring parties so that they stop hostilities and open negotiations that would include the South Vietnam Liberation Front.

Japan’s Opposition to the Vietnam War

14Though the intellectuals’ movement did not shake the government’s stand, it instead gave rise to a large informal and unorganised gathering of people called the “League for Peace in Vietnam” (Betonamu ni Heiwa o! Shimin Rengo). Better known by its abbreviation, Beiheiren, it was an organisation inspired by its American twin and was open to all those opposing the war. Nevertheless, these movements against the Vietnam War did not give rise to an anti-American sentiment amongst the Japanese people. The Vietnamese, however, benefited from a wave of unconditional sympathy, without any criticism of the North. Many older Japanese who had experienced the Pacific War were of the opinion that the Americans would find themselves embroiled in a conflict which brought to mind their unhappy experiences fighting a nationalist guerrilla on its home terrain in China. Others felt that the Americans were supporting an already lost cause, considering the unpopularity of the pro-South regime. For them, the very convenient seikei bunri principle was akin to an “ostrich policy”, because by aligning themselves with the Americans, the Japanese gave them complete freedom to define the parameters of Japan’s international policy. The media, in this situation, effectively played its role of third power as well as the political leaders’ conscience. To quote Thomas Havens: “The Vietnam war was a big story in Japan from start to finish.”3 The Japanese Press is one of the most powerful in the world, and most widely read, with its record circulation. Already in the 1960s, the three big national dailies were printing more than 24 million copies, plus the additional 25 million copies of 168 other regional and local dailies. Although TV and radio also feature big press groups, the audiovisual sector participates much less in political debates, being, unlike the print media, highly dependent on advertisements. For the journalists of that time, the Vietnamese conflict was a veritable national cause, and not just the big post-war Japanese Press dossier. Consequently, the Press rightly considered itself to be more representative of public opinion than the Diet, which remained quite silent on the issue.

15The press enjoyed total freedom of expression that it put into practice for the first time on the occasion of the Vietnam War. According to rumours started by the Americans, and subsequently in circulation, the media’s editorial rooms had been infiltrated by Communists. Some of them would go to the extent of calling the venerable daily Asahi Shimbun “Red”! All opinion polls, whether conducted by the government or the Press, corroborated the fact that Vietnam occupied the first place among the international topics that interested the Japanese. According to Asahi Shimbun’s survey in August 1965, 94 per cent of 3,000 adults interviewed were familiar with the conflict. Seventy-five per cent of them disapproved of the bombings in the North whereas only 4 per cent approved of them. The same survey showed that a majority of the Japanese feared that an escalation in the conflict would draw Japan into the war.4 But did Japanese public opinion of that period carry enough weight to change the government’s position?

16The Americans thought that opinion polls did not have any real in-fluence on the archipelago’s government’s stance. Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Japan, declared in December 1957, “forget about what the mass public tells in your opinion pools, because the men in Japan who really count are all on our side”.5 This cynical comment on Japan’s democracy is not invalidated by the fact that, without upsetting the strategic Nippo-American alliance, the media, supported by the majority of public opinion as well as all the movements opposing the conflict, posed an obvious limitation on the government’s assistance to its American ally in continuing the war. Thus, public opinion made it totally impossible to send non-combating troops to Vietnam, as once envisaged by the Kaya-Kishi faction of the Liberal Democratic Party. Rather than giving real military assistance, the Japanese government was maintained de facto in what the philosopher Kato Shuichi once described as “passive complicity” in the American War. The Japanese public was kept aware of the conflict, not only by the media, but also by many intellectuals who opposed the war. Apart from the Japanese Communist Party, the traditional Left, the ardent pacifists, including independent intellectuals such as the writer Oda Makoto, who later headed the Beiheiren, had a deciding influence on public opinion. Oda was one of the most controversial Japanese men of his time, along with, perhaps, Mishima Yukio and the Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. He was criticised by the Japanese Communists, who considered him too soft vis-à-vis the Americans, by the Socialists, who found him “petit bourgeois” and also by the Liberal Democratic Party, the conservative party in power that denounced his sympathy for a Communist Vietnam. Moreover, some intellectuals considered him élitist because the movement that he represented was strongly established and supported by students or graduates from Todai, the prestigious National University in Tokyo.

17It is true that the movement, though popular, scarcely reached the agricultural and working class sectors, bringing together mostly students, intellectuals and essentially urban salaried classes. Paradoxically, Oda and the Beiheiren, considered respectively Trotskyist organisation and anarchist by the CPJ, were attacked more, not by the conservatives, but by the Left, that considered them competition. Though repeatedly accused of being anti-American, the Beiheiren movement was not very different from active anti-war movements in the United States, when it did not openly imitate their methods of action and organisation. Also absent from the Beiheiren discourse was anti-Imperialist rhetoric, because the Japanese intellectuals, including Oda, had not forgotten the situation in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and had no sympathy for Mao or the Chinese cultural revolution. When the Americans got involved in the Vietnamese conflict, the Japanese public and most Beiheiren supporters knew nothing about Vietnam, whereas many of them knew and appreciated the United States, which post-war intellectuals saw as their liberators from militarism and the pre‑1945 authoritarian regime.

18In this context, Kato Shuichi remarked that for educated Japanese who were politically knowledgeable about the situation, “the Vietnam war was the first blow to American prestige in this country. By 1975 many of them were disillusioned with the United States.”6 As early as 1965, the Japanese government had lost some of the illusions it held about its American ally. In July, when the American bombings began, the American authorities informed the Sato government that due to a typhoon, the B52s based at Guam would be temporarily sheltered in Kyushu’s Itazuke airport. The planes were, in fact, flown to Okinawa and two days later, the American military authorities in Saigon announced an attack by about thirty B52s coming from Okinawa on Viet Cong positions situated about sixty kilometres south-east of the city.

19Once this news was made aware in Tokyo, it caused considerable turmoil amongst the leaders who had insisted that the Okinawa bases should not be used for raids on Vietnam. Caught between the conflicting pressures of public opinion and a security system that was totally under American protection, the government merely made an announcement of regret that the bombers had made use of Okinawa as base, through its spokesman Shiina Etsusaburo, then Foreign Minister. The Americans, already vexed by Japan’s trade agreement with China, became anxious about this attitude, one they thought comparable to that of Charles de Gaulle’s France’s spirit of independence regarding the Vietnam issue. After this bombing episode, which also had a negative impact on relations between the allies, the American ambassador in Tokyo, Edwin Reischauer, an eminent historian and specialist on Japan at Harvard, expressed his fears on the issue to his fellow-countrymen in Boston. In August 1965, he stated: “The loss of our close relationship with Japan because of Vietnam would be much more disastrous than anything that might happen in Vietnam itself except a world war.”7

20Beginning with a despatch of 3,500 Marines in March 1965, American involvement deepened in July of the same year, with the additional despatch of a new contingent of 50,000 soldiers; up to a total of more than 180,000 men in a year, accompanied by incessant bombings. Under pressure from the American President Lyndon Johnson, Prime Minister Sato was constrained to giving moral support to America in this war. In 1967, Miki Takeo, the Foreign Affairs Minister, who later rose to Head of Government, declared to the Diet: “Japan has neither the capacity nor the intention of undertaking a military intervention.” Yet Japan’s contribution to America’s war effort was not inconsiderable: American bases in Japan, playing an inestimable role, as the Americans acknowledged. Thus, Admiral Grant Sharp, Commander of the Pacific forces, admitted in 1965 that “without Okinawa, we could not have con-tinued the combat in Vietnam”. A report to the American Senate in 1966 stated that the installations of the American forces in Japan were vital.8 Besides, the Okinawa jungles served as training camp for thousands of Marines and the Green Berets, the special forces, between 1965 and 1973.

21If the Japanese refrained from any direct involvement in the conflict, the government, through the Transport Ministry, recruited civilian personnel for the Navy. Once embedded, they were posted to ships transporting troops or cargo. According to Honda Katsuichi, a journalist with Asahi Shimbun, some crews consisted of entirely Japanese sailors; others Korean sailors, wearing American uniform. In 1967, around 1,400 Japanese were employed by the American Navy. Besides, if no military person belonging to the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) was observed on the scene of operations, it was clear that the SDFs served as protection forces for American bases in Japan and in its territorial waters. Further, more Japanese soldiers (15,280) received training in the United States than South-Vietnamese soldiers (13,900) during the conflict. In addition, 70 per cent of the SDF officers went to North America to undergo training. This time marked the commencement of the early joint exercises that firmed up cooperation between the two armies. Right from 1969, the Maritime Self Defense Forces thus participated in the naval exercises in the Malacca Strait, along with Australian and Malaysian fleets. This led to an increase in Japan’s military expenses, especially when in 1970, Nakasone Yasuhiro, future Prime Minister, became the Secretary of State at the Defence agency. Japan undertook an ambitious development programme of its military forces. Lastly, at certain times during the war, SDF personnel could be seen in Vietnam as observers of the latest combat techniques and the use of new military equipment. In 1966, the presence of three Japanese Generals was also the target of sharp criticism in North Vietnam, which accused Japan of complicity in this imperialist war of aggression. Naturally, to many Americans, Japan’s participation appeared to be still very inadequate. Thus, in 1972, George Wallace, Alabama Governor and future candidate for the Presidential Elections, made no bones about his opinion on the issue: “the war in Vietnam would have been over a long time ago if the Japanese troops had joined us”.9

Economic Impact of the Vietnam War

22On the economic front, the Vietnam War proved to be a bonanza for the Japanese. Today, the cost of this war to America is estimated to be around $150 billion. And out of this amount, several billions were paid as remuneration to Japanese companies, suppliers of goods and services to American forces. Of course, the Vietnam War would not be as important as the Korean War for the Japanese economy, because the GNP was six times less in the early 1950s when the war broke out in the Korean peninsula, compared to in 1965 when the Americans entered into war with Vietnam. While Japan’s economic gains were estimated following the end of the Korean War, no precise figures are available on its returns from the Vietnam War. However, what was noted was a great increase in the American forces’ orders and tenders, when compared to their orders in peace time for the maintenance of their bases. In 1967, for example, out of a total of $516 million, $202 million could be imputed to war expenses.

23Other sources estimate the profits of the Japanese enterprises connected with the Indo-China war to be, on an average, one billion dollars per annum between 1966 and 1971.10 The figures are not satisfactory because the proportion that can be directly imputed to war expenses can pass from single to double digits, depending on estimates. However, the sources from the Bank of Japan are more specific, with respect to public contracts for Vietnam (Betonamu Tokuju), or the sales of goods and services to the United States or South Vietnam, for use in the combat zone. These orders amounted to $292 million in 1967 and went up to $467 million three years later. But all this was only the tip of the iceberg. A not inconsiderable part of the Japanese exports, especially components for the arms industry, passed via Korea, Taiwan or some other Southeast Asian country, to be re-exported later to Vietnam. The most profitable economic development for the Japanese civil industries came, in fact, from the opening of the American market to the archipelago’s consumer products. And contrary to what was generally believed overseas, Japanese leaders, whether they were industrialists, bankers or sôgô shôsha directors, were all in favour of the Vietnam war being brought to an expeditious end, as they were more interested in the revival of American consumerism and the expansion of their trade in Southeast Asia than the windfall of possible American Army orders. Lastly, studies evaluating the financial importance of this war to Japan, those undertaken by the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry, those of the Miti, the Nihon Sangyô or Sanwa Banks, and also the reports submitted by think-tanks such as the Nomura Research Institute, showed that exports to the USA and Southeast Asia were of greater value in terms of profitability for the national economy than the direct impact of the war.

24War orders, therefore, did not exceed 7 to 8 per cent of total Japanese exports, against 63 per cent at the time of the Korean War. This modest figure, however, was a stimulant at a time when the Japanese economy was undergoing a slight depression. The injection of fresh money helped considerably in the revival of the Japanese economy.

25Paradoxically, the most significant long-term consequence was Japan’s replacement of the United States, as the main economic partner of the Southeast Asian countries. It is especially in this regard that Japan can be considered the big winner in the Indo-Chinese conflict. A journalist with Asahi Shimbun, summarised the situation with this remark: “the Vietnam war to Japanese conservatives was an opportunity, not a problem”.11 In fact, the American Army orders served to strengthen existing relations between the United States and Japan and contributed to a substantial improvement in the profits of Japanese companies, traditional supporters of conservative Japanese, as well as agriculturists.

26In the beginning, mostly Japanese small-medium enterprises (SMEs) catered to orders covering all types of goods necessary for the war, such as uniforms, rangers and barbed wire. Later, with the escalation of the war, big industrial groups and major trading companies such as Mitsui Bussan and Sumitomo Shoji took over the orders. The list of Japanese products for the US Army was very diverse, ranging from construction materials like cement to jeeps as well as toilet paper and electric generators. It was said that the American soldier drank Kirin beer, chewed Lotte chewing-gum and ate Chiba lettuce.

27More controversial were the accusations made against Japanese industries that supplied napalm to the US Air Force. In April 1966, the China News Agency announced that 92 per cent of napalm used by the Americans in Vietnam was of Japanese origin. Some Japanese companies were singled out. However, nothing was proved conclusively, because a lot of ammunition passed between the American ammunition depots of the United States and Korea, via Japan. According to the daily Mainichi, nothing proved that napalm was manufactured in Japan at that time.

28Nevertheless, the peaceful Japan would develop an armament industry in spite of a very strict regulation in this field, which formally barred overseas sales of military material. The Japanese argued that it was difficult to draw a clear line distinguishing between civil and military material, because it was the usage that determined the purpose. Thus, for example, in the 1970s, American missiles or smart bombs were guided by systems using components manufactured by Sony. In practice, Miti, that held the controlling authority over international trade and technological exchanges, strictly enforced the regulation with communist countries and countries at war, or those barred by the UN. Companies were, however, called into question by those who opposed war. Protestors marched several times in front of the Head Office of Mitsubishi Heavy Industry, the biggest supplier to the American Army. Other sectors benefited from the windfall from the American forces, particularly companies engaged in repair and maintenance of equipments of all kinds. Thus, the biggest workshop for the repair of American Army tanks in the Pacific was in the Kanagawa administrative area. The Japanese University circles were the subject of violent controversy in 1969 when a Japanese government enquiry revealed that a dozen universities operated, with the aid of American funds, 279 non-declared research projects, some of which had military applications.

From Peaceful Movement to Anti-war Struggle

29The beginning of the Paris peace negotiations in 1968 coincided with a change in the ideology of the anti-war movements in Japan. Their opposition became more radical, and the peaceful movements, particularly, were submerged by a more violent wave of opposition. The situation in Japan worsened. Pitched battles against the police multiplied with the arrival of violent student movements such as Anti-war youth committees (Hansen Seinen Iinkai ) on the public scene. The committees set up on the initiative of the Socialist party and the Sohyô central Union in 1965 (Hansen) became rapidly aware of the involvement of Japanese companies in the war. “For (the Hansen), the fight against the Vietnam War was no longer a meaningless political slogan; it had to be an everyday reality, a fight that had to be carried on in the very midst of the capitalist and imperialist system.”12

30Two series of official trips by Prime Minister Sato to Southeast Asia were the cause for an upsurge in violent demonstrations. These government-planned trips were with regard to Japan’s new economic presence in this region and its increasing role in the field of development aid via the Asian Development Bank, initiated by Japan. On the political front, the Japanese government aligned itself more and more on America’s side, because it considered the bombings unavoidable to force North Vietnam to stop fighting and start negotiating.

31However, the Japanese government’s submissive attitude concealed a double preoccupation. One was commercial, with mounting tensions owing to the increase in America’s trade deficit with Japan, which was the site of the Trade War that poisoned relations between the two nations in the following decades. The other, more diplomatic, was the return of Okinawa’s control. This open support to American policy led to increasingly violent opposition. The student organisation, Zengakuren, turned out to be one of the world’s most resolute student movements. Other Japanese organisations were more discreet in their actions against the war, such as Jatec (Japan Technical Committee for Assistance to Anti-war U.S. Deserters), a Japanese aid association, established in seven countries, that was considered one of the most efficient of its kind amongst the 33 organisations providing aid to deserters. In 1969, it organised the flight of 51 American soldiers. Yet, images of spectacular confrontations between the police and student demonstrators were regularly in the news. One such incident on 21 October 1968 marked the peak of the violence. In fact, there were unprecedented confrontations in several central quarters of Tokyo, including Roppongi and the Shinjuku railway station, where thousands of students revolted against 25,000 policemen and Kidotai, the Japanese Security police, amidst tens of thousands of passengers. The Shinjuku episode resulted in the cancellation of more than 700 trains transporting 340,000 passengers, 200 arrests at Roppongi and 500 at Shinjuku and damages worth over $18 million. However, the anti-war movement would gradually be in competition with other protests, particularly the anti-nuclear protest arising from the presence of American ships equipped with nuclear arms. The Japanese student movement aimed at a general involvement of the society, on the lines of the student movements in the United States or France. Among the more radical movements, the one initiated by the United Red Army (Rengo Sekigunha) in 1971 even resorted to terrorist actions. But their actions never had any connection with the movement against the Vietnam War.

32For the Sato government, the return of more than one-third of military installations to their hands at the end of December 1968 helped ease the tension to a certain extent. Richard Nixon’s becoming the President changed the situation, at first, by the changes he made to America’s strategy in the conflict, and also through the role that the American authorities wanted Japan to play at the end of the conflict. Despairing at not being able to involve their Japanese allies any more, they wanted them to contribute to Indo-China’s economic revival so as to share some of their responsibilities in Asia. The extension of the Mutual Security Treaty thus aimed at forcing Japan to get involved in regional security through economic aid.

33One of the Beiheiren leaders, Tsurumi Yoshiyuki, summarised the position of the Japanese in this conflict quite effectively: “The Vietnam War was not a fire on a far-away bank; it was a war that necessarily affected all the Japanese in one way or the other.”13