I

1The reaction of the Labor government of Einar Gerhardsen to the United States’ Marshall Plan offer together with Norway’s subséquent policies within the Organization of European Economie Coopération (OEEC) and relationship with the Economie Coopération Administration (ECA) provide unique opportunities for studying the two most important issues of postwar Norwegian history ; western alignment and économie modernization. Within this context the issues are intertwined, ail political parties are involved together with the major interest organizations, and the Norwegian political processes are illuminated by the insights of strategically placed foreign observers, above ail by those of the ECA/Oslo.

2While in this context we are primarily concerned with the economic aspects of the Marshall Plan, some brief comment supon the security implications are pertinent. The initial Norwegian reaction to Marshall’s speech was one of extreme reluctance to take a stand. Foreign Minister Halvard Lange stated that Norway ought to remain outside if it were economically feasible. Nevertheless, Norway together with the other Scandinavian nations decided to attend the Paris conférence and in effect also to participate in Western économie coopération. Once it became clear that only Finland chose to remain outside together with the Soviet Union and the satellites, the Gerhardsen cabinet decided it would hâve to join for fear of being identified with the wrong side in the emerging Cold War. During the last year of the war and the first postwar years Norway had retreated from a strong North Atlantic orientation and pursued a foreign policy dubbed bridgebuilding, which in practice amounted to keeping a low profile while attempting not to antagonize any of the great powers. The policy was predicated upon Norway’s exposed strategic position, upon the hope that the great powers would be able to maintain reasonably friendly relations, as well as upon the realization that the wartime North Atlantic alignment could not be maintained in the face of both US universalist policies and domestic opposition to North Atlanticism. The Labor left, the Communists, who polled more than 11 per cent of the vote in the 1945 élections, and significant elements within the bourgeois parties were skeptical of a Western orientation. Yet Norway maintained strong functional ties with the West, with Britain in particular, of both an économie and military character. In fact, foreign policy makers and the inner circle of the cabinet of Einar Gerhardsen, foreign minister Halvard Lange, his primary foreign policy adviser Arne Ording, defense minister Jens Christian Hauge, the Prime Minister himself as well as the powerful party secretary Haakon Lie and the editor of the Labor party mouthpiece Arbeiderbladet, Martin Tranmæl, were clear in their minds that bridgebuilding entailed a fall-back position. If tension between the victors of World War II were to rise to a point where war seemed to threaten again, Norway would hâve to turn to the West for a formal Western commitment to préservé Norwegian sovereignty. The German attack of 9 April 1940 had convinced the responsible foreign policy makers that defense against great power aggression could not be improvised. The wartime expérience had persuaded the vast majority of Norwegians that isolated neutrality was no longer a viable option. Thus, while neither the average Norwegian nor the political parties were part to any consensus as to what kind of protection Norway should seek in case of increasing international tension, there was overwhelming agreement that Norway had to be better prepared for conflict than had been the case during the interwar period.

3Functional ties and the fall-back position as worked out by Labor’s foreign policy elite predisposed the nation to choose the Atlantic option. By early March of 1948, in the wake of Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin’s speech in January, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the Finnish crisis and rumors of a pact proposai for Norway as well, the Labor government had decided to approach the West for a possible security guarantee. Within another year Norway was one of the original signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the process Norway changed from a reluctant Marshall Plan member, down-playing foreign exchange needs, to an activist participant pushing very strongly its dollar demands.

4In the early phase of the Marshall Plan then, general foreign policy considérations were of overriding importance in determining Norwegian responses to the US proposal and to European endeavors to accomodate the Americans. The Norwegians advocated dispensing aid through the UN, a « shopping list » approach resembling the Soviet one, and generally tried to hold formai cooperative agreements to a minimum. This largely négative approach was only adjusted in the spring of 1948 when the government for security reasons decided to approach the West2.

5The fact that security interests dominated does not imply that considerations of économie policy and development played no rôle in Norway’s initial reactions to the Marshall Plan or in its later Marshall Plan policies. Leading Norwegian politicians and planners were clearly skeptical of US économie policies, and during the summer of 1947 many of them feared that participation might force Norway to abandon or at least modify its System of economie planning and that the United States might try to function as the « supply department » of Europe. While such fears were clearly subsidiary, there is no doubt that prominent members of the Labor government and other leading Labor politicians at least until the summer of 1948 harbored suspicions that Norway would not be allowed to maintain its System of economie planning and Controls at the desired level. Such fears were gradually dispelled, and by the summer of 1948 cabinet opinion tended more towards the views of Ole Colbjørnsen, economie counsellor of the Washington embassy, Marshall Plan negotiator and one of Norway’s pioneer économie planners of the 1930s. Concerning the économie provisions of the CEEC General Report he concluded that the provisions for increased production, financial stabilization and increased trade were « good things which we are trying to do anyway, and will continue doing to the extent that it is practicable and reasonable. » He found generally that the economie obligations « were of a rather general and formal kind and rather more of a moral than of a legal character3 ».

6The key points in ColbjØrnsen’s analysis are his statements that the obligations the Norwegians would be taking on were fundamentally of a formai kind, that the Norwegians would adhéré to US and CEEC demands to the extent that they found them compatible with Norwegian planning and political purposes, and that generally there were no major divergencies in terms of goals or policies proposed. Colbjornsen’s analysis foreshadowed actual Norwegian policies within the OEEC and Norway’s relationship with the ECA in particular. At a very general level the EGA and the Norwegians agreed on goals, to a degree even on means of économie policies, but when the Labor cabinet felt that policies recommended or demanded by the ECA diverged too far from their own they were very frequently quite simply disregarded. In part this happened because the Labor cabinet, and particularly the main architect of postwar Norwegian reconstruction and modernization, Minister of Finance and later of Trade, Erik Brofoss, found ECA demands incompatible with established policies. In part Brofoss had to disregard American demands not because he disagreed with them but because he could not carry the cabinet or a majority of the Labor party and the trade unions along. As was the case in foreign policy there were significant différences of view within the Labor movement over économie policy means and ends. On the other hand Brofoss was aided by diverging views within the ECA as well. At times ECA/Oslo served as the first line of defense for Norwegian economie policies.

II

7The Norwegian Labor Party emerged from the war with an extremely ambitious program for reconstruction and further économie growth. Reconstruction was to be completed by 1950, requiring an annual import surplus of some 800-1000 million kroner (US $ 175-200 million at that time). Foreign exchange reserves at the end of the war amounted to about 2 billion kroner. Reconstruction policies were based on the assumption that foreign crédits would be easily available, and in particular that there would not be a dollar shortage.

8Rapid reconstruction and further économie growth were the overarching goals of the Norwegian Labor Party. In terms of economic policy the leading cadres as well as the party more generally were as strongly influenced by the interwar crisis as they were by the spring 1940 debacle in terms of foreign policy. Rapid expansion of the industrial base was considered the only road out of poverty and as a precondition for escaping large-scale underemployment and unemployment. Redistributive policies were still to be pursued to create greater equality, but above ail the Labor Party sought to make the pie larger rather than to divide it more evenly.

9In the immédiate postwar years the Norwegian Labor Party was probably more strongly wedded to economie planning and microeconomic Controls than any other Western European Social Démocratie party, its Scandinavian neighbors included. The planning bias is easily accounted for. As far as Labor was concerned the private sector did not function rationally on its own. The State had to improve upon its performance through the channelling of resources, through direct investments and State industries, and through more widespread participation by représentatives of workers’ organizations in economie decision-making. State planning and interventionism – compensatory entrepreneurship as Even Lange has characterized the establishment of State industries – and democratization of économie life were means for growth and the rational allocation of resources, and hâve been employed throughout the postwar period.

10In addition during the early postwar period the Labor party maintained and to a degree refïned and expanded the System of microeconomic Controls that had been set up during the period of German occupation. An immensely complex System of price and wage régulations, of export and import Controls and of allocation of factors of production was maintained. Clearly the System of microeconomic Controls was necessary in the transitional period from war to peace, in view both of the strong domestic inflationary pressures and of international dislocations and general shortages. Whether Controls and régulations were also intended for the longer run is still a matter for debate among Norwegian historians, though presently the prevailing view is that detailed Controls and régulations were primarily intended for the postwar transitional period. The debate appears now to be focussing on the issue of what constituted the transitional period – how long did Labor consider it to be ?

11This debate has wider ramifications. It also concerns the issue of whether in the long run the économie policies of the Labor government would in fact be compatible with the demands of a more liberal international order. There is no simple answer to this question. The large arsenal of régulations and Controls were intended to carry Norway through postwar scarcity and inflationary pressures. On the other hand many Labor politicians and planners and significant éléments among trade union leaders and rank and file soon came to see Controls and régulations as some sort of a substitute for socialization, which the Labor Party dropped from its program at the 1949 convention. It may also be argued that the central party leadership and planners until the summer of 1947 were more concerned with the advantages of Controls and régulations than with the problems that might ensue within a tightly controlled economy. They were necessary for international trade as well as presumed to be reasonably efficient means for the rational allocation of resources. Controls were also necessary because the Labor government deliberataly decided not to carry out any drastic réduction of the money supply after the Germans had financed their operations in Norway by the use of the printing press. Fearing a severe postwar recession or even a dépréssion the government saw advantages in easy money4.

12Most of the arguments in favor of and the reasons for maintaing the strictly controlled economy in Norway were of a distinctly short term nature. At the same time prominent cabinet members made clear in public, as did Halvard Lange in 1946 shortly after he was appointed Foreign Minister, that restrictive trade practices were temporary measures. The National Budget of 1946 emphasized the need to integrate « the economy of our country... into world trade in the most suitable manner5 ».

13Such general statements of intent or prognosis do not in themselves warrant the conclusion that Labor in the longer run desired liberlization. However, seen in conjunction with the goals of Labor’s plans for modernizing the Norwegian economy these statements are significant. Planned growth in Norway was to corne about through the exploitation of Norway’s comparative advantages in cheap hydroelectric power and abundant natural resources such as forests, fish and certain minerais. Aluminum plants were built, partly through the completion of German projects, the hydroelectric base was to be vastly expanded, paper and pulp to be modernized and expanded, and fish exports to be increased and made more profitable through deep freezing plants and distribution chains. The Norwegian merchant fleet was rapidly rebuilt.

14Most of the products of the new major Norwegian industries were intended for world market. Thus the modernization policies of the Gerhardsen government presupposed a more liberal économie order. Labor deliberately reversed the trend towards a more inward-looking industrial structure that had developed during the 1930s. Indeed Labor’s économie policies at least in the longer run were predicated on a more favorable trade cycle than their socialist fears of a dépréssion or recession warranted. The latter dilemma appears never to hâve been systematically discussed or resolved by the planners. The actual course of development then removed it from the agenda.

15We may thus discern obvious elements of contradiction between the long term goals of Labor and its day-to-day policies. The contradictory éléments were indeed sufficiently prominent for both contemporary observers and later scholars to have been partly justified in pointing to the inhérent tensions between Norwegian planning goals and practices and the évolution of a more liberal international régime. Indeed they have also been able to point to the fact that manufacturing industries producing for the home market expanded more quickly than the new locomotives-to-be of Norwegian modernization. The growth of home market industries, footwear and textiles figureing quite prominently, was not planned. These industries were able to exploit the System of Controls for their own advance. Exposing them to international competition might then croate domestic political diffïculties6.

16More significantly the Labor strategy did not exclusively favor export industries based upon Norway’s comparative advantages. While the majority of the planners were concerned to promote export industries to earn sufficient foreign exchange to pay for the crash modernization program, a smaller number of industrializers favored developing manufacturing industries that would increase Norway’s selfsufficiency and thus both reduce the dependence on export industries and the need for foreign exchange. Their influence was far from negligible and tapped not merely the enthusiasm of socialists and social democrats fearing excessive reliance upon the capitalist world, but also appealed to traditional nationalist and neutralist sentiments within both Labor and the non-Labor parties. The iron and Steel works in Mo i Rana in the northern part of the country constituted the realization of an old dream of a national iron manufacturing industry that would liberale Norway from the grip of continental cartels. Olav Meisdalshagen, the successor of Brofoss as Finance Minister in late 1947, expressed that sentiment during the debate on the budget in March 1947 : « In our trade policies, as in other cases, we must aim at securing our neutrality and thereby safeguard the freedom of our people7. »

17Notwithstanding this confusing and contradictory picture and the evidence that points to desires to maintain Controls for their own sake and to achieve a greater degree of self sufficiency, the prevailing view among Norwegian historians today is that the Labor government did look towards the dismantling of direct Controls and a more liberal international économie System as being in the nation’s best économie interest. By the late summer of 1947 a sudden foreign exchange crisis forced the cabinet to revoke ail import licenses and restrict imports by 20 per cent. The government drew two important conclusions from the épisode. In the first place, primarily for general foreign policy reasons but also from the fear of loss of économie freedom of action, the government until that time had contemplated the option of not asking for Marshall Plan aid for économie policy reasons, while assuming that such a choice would have no significant économie conséquences. However, in the wake of the dollar crisis Brofoss emphasized that such a choice of policy, as well as the previous revoking of import licences, from a rational planning point of view represented the least desirable course of action. The intensive Norwegian reconstruction and investment program necessitated high imports as well as export markets for the new Norwegian products. Secondly, the System of detailed Controls and licensing had proved too complex to be manageable. Neither the System nor the persons running it were of sufficient quality to function as intended. In fact, as the cabinet and its planners realized at this time, the complex regulatory System created inflexibilities in the Norwegian industrial structure that were both unforeseen and undesirable8.

18Colbjornsen, in stating that the CEEC requirements for Marshall Aid only gave expression to what the Labor government was trying accomplish anyway, may hâve been a little ahead of main stream cabinet opinion. Essentially he was correct, though clearly the Norwegians were in less of a hurry to dismantle Controls than were the Americans in demanding change. The Gerhardsen cabinet was also extremely wary of any moves towards European intégration or any other introduction of supranational coopération. The anti-integration stand of the Norwegian government was later clearly set forth by Foreign Minister Lange in a speech to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York in December 1949 in response to ECA administrator Paul Hoffman’s speech to the OEEC council. However, in earlyl948 in terms of planned growth policies, industrial investments and an austere standard of living, Norway, as far as the Americans were concerned, was quite an acceptable OEEC nation. To Norway, once bridge-building had been abandoned, Marshall Aid was indispensable if the modernization program were to be carried out.

III

19The US embassy in Oslo had since the summer of 1947 been sending extremely favorable reports to Washington both about Norwegian reconstruction policies and Norway’s increasing Western orientation. Once Norway by February 1948 was clearly on the move to the West, Ambassador Charles U. Bay in a letter to the Secretary of State pleaded on behalf of his host country against further cuts in aid for Norway. Such cuts would be exploited by the Communists9.

20Marshall Aid to Norway was supported not only in a general way. Ambassador Bay and his staff repeatedly emphasized that the Norwegian economy developed « along Sound lines », and that Norwegian reconstruction policies conformed to the provisions in European Recovery Program (ERP) législation10. The ECA staff, First led by Eugene Staley and subsequently by John Gross, by and large concurred with Bay’s judgement. Norwegian austerity policies were widely admired, as were the initially very modest Norwegian demands for aid11.

21The counselor of the embassy, Charles Baldwin, dealt more specifically with Norwegian economie policies. By and large he concluded that the investment program « such as the reconstruction of the merchant fleet, further hydroelectric development. and the moderaization of key industries and of agriculture are logical and necessary ». Baldwin emphasized those éléments of Norwegian économie policies that were likely to appeal to Washington ; export-led growth, a general international orientation based on the exploitation of Norway’s comparative advantages, as well as the modernization visions – which obviously included productivity growth – of the Labor Party12.

22However, neither the Embassy nor the ECA was entirely taken in by the virtues of Norwegian reconstruction and growth policies. In early January 1948 Baldwin noted that « the total investment program is too ambitious under the présent circumstances and that some retrenchment in that direction might be bénéficiai. » He was also doubtful whether in fact the import program was designed entirely to bring économie benefits to Norway13. Participation in the Marshall Plan did paradoxically signal the possibility of US censorship of the Norwegian modernization strategy at precisely the same time that the Labor government decided that its Western realignment removed the obstacles for participating in the OEEC. At that time the Norwegians had not quite grasped the implications even if they were aware of their disagreements with the Americans. They were not to remain ignorant for long.

23In the fall of 1948 Norway presented its long term program to the OEEC. The program built closely upon preexisting Labor plans, and was heavily weighted towards large-scale industrialization, hydroelectric development and a considérable scaling-down of the agricultural sector. The program was accepted by the Storting against the votes of the Communists and two Agrarian parliamentarians. Near unanimity was, however, only achieved after protracted negotiations between Labor and the Conservatives. The compromise to some degree reflected opposition interests in agriculture and small-scale as opposed to large scale industrial enterprises. Above all, however, Labor and non-Labor agreed in order to isolate the Communists. The symbolic value of the long term program as a sign of Western orientation was for most of the bourgeois parties of greater importance than the économie issues involved. The struggle against Labor modernization plans could under any circumstances be carried on outside the Storting.

24The long term program thus represented a complex mix not only of the different strands of Labor planning, but also included some concessions to the opposition. The ECA, Oslo as well as Washington, had serious réservations about parts of the program. The iron works, the high and increasing subsidies, the detailed Controls and régulations, the agricultural support System and the reestablishment of Norwegian textiles industries all came in for heavy fire, though at this time mainly in intra-American communications14.

25During the subséquent two years US criticism mounted, at times taking on very shrill tones. It was presented directly to Norwegian authorities, orally and in writing. Significant éléments of Norwegian policies could certainly be seen as promoting closed rather than more open markets and to point towards decreasing rather than increasing productivity. The éléments of the Norwegian long term program that the Americans concentrated on could easily be considered evidence that Norway was moving towards self-sufficiency, protection, dysfunctional Controls and régulations and less than optimal exploitation of the total resources of Norway and of Western Europe.

26The increasingly spécifie and heavyhanded ECA attacks originated partly in Oslo but primarily in Washington. Both the chief ECA economist in Oslo, Alice Borneuf – who later published a scholarly analysis of Norwegian économie policy during the period, Norway the Planned Revival – in late 1949 and acting ECA director William Z. Foster in August 1950 criticized parts of the Norwegian investment program. Alice Borneuf summed up her points of criticism to an ECA colleague :

27« Although there is no proof that shipbuilding, ship repairs, textile production and ammunition production cannot be carried on in Norway in the future as cheaply as in other countries, they are certainly as yet not the industries in which Norway has shown any great comparative advantage15. »

28Foster in his communication was strongly concerned with the establishment of « uneconomic facilities in Norway for the manufacture of goods which can be produced more efficiently in other participating countries16 ».

29By late 1949 the strong concern with the direction of Norwegian investments and with spécifie investment projects were no longer primary points of criticism. Norwegian modernization policies were attacked more broadly. Foster was concerned with the level of investments which he found uneconomic. Hoffman criticized the program for « containing inflationary pressures /as/ entirely inadéquate ». In general he considered the économie policies of the Gerhardsen cabinet as lacking in realism17.

30The Norwegian investment rate reached 38 % of BNP in 1949 and then averaged around 35 % during the subséquent decades. The ECA maintained that Norway would be able to reduce its balance of payments déficit much quicker through a « considerably smaller investment program. » Scaling down investments would also lessen the strong inflationary pressures in the Norwegian economy which made it necessary for the government to retain the System of Controls and régulations to a far greater degree than the ECA was willing to accept. Norway was notoriously slow in dismantling its quantitative restrictions as decided by the OEEC. Mutual recriminations in December 1949 reached a level where the Spécial Représentative, W. Averell Harriman asked Brofoss point blank whether he « did not feel liberalization of trade and payments within Europe important to achievement economc objectives in Norway. Brofoss replied bluntly, « no18 ».

31Obviously we cannot interpret Brofoss literally. Norwegian reconstruction and growth policies would turn out miserable failures if European and global liberalization did not materialize. In the short run, however, Brofoss and the rest of the cabinet were more concerned with managing inflationary pressures, with the rapid growth of home market industries, the relatively slower growth of the export sector and poor productivity growth. The cabinet also had to worry about domestic political support. By bowing to US pressure Brofoss would not only move counter to éléments of the construction program that he genuinely believed in, he would simultaneously on other counts encounter stiff opposition from within his own party and from the non-Labor opposition. Inflationary pressures, agricultural support, home industry investments were not the least the results of the inter- and intra-party horse trading necessary to promote the fundamentals of the modernization program.

32Brofoss certainly realized that a good part of ECA criticism was well founded. The Americans argued strenuously from early 1949 that on the one hand US assistance was to be phased out by 1952, on the other hand Norwegian policies appeared to be based on the assumption « that there will be until the very end of this program continuously a very high level of assistance19 ». After the initial hésitations of 1947 the Norwegian government dramatically raised their demands for aid, and allocations were in fact increased the first few years rather than scaled down. By mid 1950 the ECA, however, was no longer willing to play along. Hoffman would not accept « increases in aid to Norway if such aid is to be used merely to cushion existing inflationary pressures on consumption and investment. » Hoffman and his closest aides were of the opinion that the Norwegian government had « placed pressure on both consumption and investment to an extent which was beyond means and time at its disposai. » Export growth was slower than anticipated because considérable resources were channeled into « non essential investment and consumption ». The ECA concluded that significant changes of économie policy were necessary for Norway to be viable by 195220.

IV

33The ECA tried in a number of ways to pull the Norwegian government onto the straight and narrow path of fiscal responsibility, open markets and économie transformation and growth. Verbal admonitions clearly had only very limited impact. The ultimate weapon in the hands of ECA/Washington was to eut proposed ECA funding to Norway. As the relationship between Washington and Oslo reached its nadir in the spring of 1950 the ECA approached the State Department concerning retaliation against Norway. The State Department was « told informally by ECA that a refusal by Norway to modify certain of its policies in order to provide greater incentives to business and to increase exports might resuit in ECA’s withholding funds up to 40 million in the 1951 program for Norway21 ».

34As the Korean War intervened, Norway’s exports grew, terms of trade improved, and the Government moved to change somewhat its inflationary policies and also approached OEEC standards for quota réductions, the threat never materialized. Clearly, however, the situation was critical in the spring of 1950. Norwegian réluctance to bow to American demands for liberalization and to eut investments in considération of inflationary pressures and declining aid were not the only reasons for the clash. The Norwegians also felt that the Americans were inconsistent in their pressures to make Norway conform. Brofoss, as mentioned above, accepted to a certain degree the rationale behind ECA demands. At the same time he had to move carefully because strong éléments within the Labor party, also cabinet members, wanted to pursue even more inflationary policies. While Brofoss was struggling to contain his big spenders, the ECA in the fall of 1949 and spring of 1950 proposed that Norwegian counterpart funds be released for investment purposes. The funds until that time had primarily been used to retire the wartime debt run up by the German occupation authorities.

35To put increasing pressure on Norwegian authorities to make them adhere to US investment preferences the ECA proposed that the counterpart funds be released for investment purposes. Brofoss thought the Americans inconsistent in their approach. If counterpart funds were released the resuit in his opinion would be an avalanche of investment proposais from the Storting for any number of national and local purposes. Obviously domestic demand would be boosted while exports would not increase at nearly the same rate. Brofoss gave vent to his feelings in a conversation with Alice Borneuf in March 1950. He was, she reported, « obviously extremely disturbed, angry and generally disgusted at the whole business22 ». Fuelling the anger of Brofoss, we may assume, was a feeling that he was being deserted by the Americans. Normally he could count on them for support against those of his cabinet colleagues and other Labor and trade union politicians who were prone to wishful thinking.

36As was the case among the Norwegians, there was also divided counsel on the US side. ECA/Oslo was consistently supportive of Brofoss and the cabinet even while disagreeing on spécifie points of policy or pointing out the inflationary effects of the high investment rate. The ECA mission argued very strongly that Washington in particular but also the Office of the Special Representative in Paris, had to make a greater effort to understand the Gerhardsen cabinet’s premises for the Norwegian approach to the inflation and investment issues : « Government view is that big investment program is only hope of eventual viability and therefore, although cuts in less critical sectors must be carried out, general aims must be a) to somehow obtain sufficient crédits and aid to carry out most of original investment program and b) to go further on trade liberalization only to the extent possible without serious interférence with investment program23. »

37Members of the mission in Oslo generally worked on the assumption that they would have a greater impact on Norwegian policies by working as insiders trying to wield influence by rational arguments rather than by trying to hâve their way by applying overwhelming power. Members of the mission were convinced that generally the Norwegian authorities kept them well informed of their plans, problems and achievements. They were convinced that Brofoss and his colleagues understood that the ECA did not intend to write a blank check for future aid, and that the ECA could not be expected to continue providing aid if Norwegian policies in their opinion were misguided or inadequate for the purpose of growth and modernization24.

38As previously mentioned both the ECA Mission and the Embassy strongly admired Norwegian postwar économie policies. They thought the Norwegians had made « maximum efforts to further their own recovery. They hâve deliberately chosen to live on a rather austere standard of living in order to use a large part of their resources for constructive investment25. » Within half a year of arriving in Oslo Staley put the matter very clearly to Harriman : « If the other sixteen nations cooperated as well as Norway, the job of utilizing ECA aid to accomplish a true recovery would be greatly simplified. In Norway each dollar is producing results26. » In retrospect it is tempting to note that their enthusiasm to some extent got the better of their judgement. The point, however, is that they were the men on the spot, and they felt that they had both a much clearer view of developments in Norway and a much better understanding of how the minds of Norwegians worked than did the Washington and Paris offices.

39Staley, his successor Gross and their staffs were accutely aware of Norwegian fears of being dominated by outside powers. Norwegians, they noted, were concerned to « préservé their independence at ail costs ». This attitude would inevitably create problems for the ECA. The Norwegians were on the one hand generally willing to deal calmly with suggestions and reasoned proposais. However : « Any attempt to implement a request with economic pressure will meet with quick resentment and résistance. » Staley was of the opinion that his hosts were far too preoccupied with their modest numbers and invariably tended to move into défensive positions for fear of being exploited by others. « ECA must always keep this national characteristic in mind in evaluating Norwegian attitudes which, to the American mind, may at times appear to be sheer stubbornness27. » Ambassador Bay in 1951, after six years in Oslo, concurred :

40« If their sensibilities as a small, independent nation are not disregarded Nors will be genuinely cooperative as ECA expérience over past several years here demonstrates. Best way to influence them in right direction, from both short range and long term viewpoint, is by leadership, consultation and persuasion based on the concept of partnership28. »

41ECA/Oslo argued strongly that the European Recovery Program left it to the participating nations to decide on how to use Marshall aid, whether for investment on consumption. Furthermore, by the early 1950s some increase in the consumption of consumer goods was necessary if « political and social stability are to be maintained29 ». The Mission also brought to bear security policy arguments. Staley thought the Norwegians ought to be rewarded for the « the courageous stand they had taken in connection with the Atlantic Pact ». He pointed out that while the « ECA is not directly concerned with the political implications in the Atlantic Pact stand, their stand is likely to produce economie difficulties30 ».

42Both the Embassy and the ECA Mission staffs thus served as the spokesmen of Norway to the ECA and the State Department as much as American représentatives in Norway. As is recognized by government officiais as well as historians, this kind of reverse rôle adaptation occurs frequently. Alice Borneuf was painfully aware of the problem when she protested against proposed cuts in aid allocations for Norway in 1949 :

43« I feel as though the Mission has clearly donc an inadequate job on this matter and that the Norwegian government cannot help but think so. It is not that we failed to présent their views but that we completely failed to présent in a convincing manner the Mission’s own views31. »

44ECA/Washington obviously regarded their représentatives in Oslo as the spokesmen of their host country rather than for themselves. During the 1950 struggles over the investment programs of the OEEC nations Norway became an important bone of contention. Lincoln Gordon, speaking for the home office, pointed out that as far as Norway was concerned « the lack of agreement between Washington and the Mission and Paris had been a « running sore » in ECA – that he felt very strong personal views had been reflected in many of the lengthy cables, etc.32 ».

45The Department of State by the spring of 1950 had concluded that the differences of opinion between the Norwegian government and the Mission on the one hand and the ECA in Washington on the other had developed to the point where the problems were nearly impossible to solve. The Mission in Oslo was considered more as an apologist for « the Norwegian government than as the local exponent of the views of ECA Washington. » The State Department in fact feared that US demands would not be taken seriously by the Norwegians if transmitted by the Mission, because it was considered to be « on very close personal terms with the Norwegian Minister of Commerce. » ECA/Washington as well as the European Bureau of the State Department were considering replacing the head of ECA/Oslo33. On the basis of presently available materials the issue never made it beyond the European Bureau. Most probably the Korean War put an end to the plan.

46ECA/Oslo, and its few supporters in Washington, felt on the other hand that criticism emanating from their home office was based less on actual understanding or analysis of what was going on in Norway than on anti-socialist bias. In an April 1950 memorandum for Lincoln, Gordon Maurice Ash argued the case : « I believe, that some of those who deal with Norway are intellectually and emotionally biased against socialism and government planning and therefore fear and distrust the Labor Government’s program34. » Even the State Department worried about heavy-handed tactics. When the issue of US pressures was raised the Department replied : « This is a serious matter in itself but it is made worse by the likely interprétation in Norway that we are trying to impose our capitalistic System on their Socialist country35. »

V

47During early 1950 Norwegian authorities and EGA/Washington appeared to be on collision course over the modalities for growth and transformation of the Norwegian economy. Brofoss on the one hand and leading EGA officiais on the other were strongly at odds. Less than two years later the situation had been tumed upside down. In early February 1952 leading EGA officiais contemplated increasing aid allocations to Norway :

48« On the assumption that this can be donc without violating our basic principles of aid allocation I should hope we could give sympathetic considération to the Nor « sit (uatio) n » and to the personal position of Brofoss36. »

49Part of the reason for this rapprochment must be sought in changes in Norwegian policies. The Labor government carried out quota reductions at an accellerating pace. At the same time the investments in the export industries finally appeared to be paying off, and the government became increasingly aware of the necessity for export promotion. Fears of a postwar dépréssion abated, reducing the need to maintain in full the System of Controls. At the same time the government became more concerned with getting rid of ail the unwanted « ashtray » industries that had been established within the regulated economy. Liberalization finally came to be seen as an excellent means to achieve that goal37.

50In adjusting their policies the Norwegians thus had corne doser to the US position. It does not seem likely, however, that the new rapport between the two parties could hâve corne about merely through these Norwegian adjustments – which also included a strong productivity drive on the part of the Labor Party and the Trade Unions with the Employers’ generally acting as reluctant participants or merely being bystanders38. An exogenous factor, the Korean War, made a major contribution. The growth of Norwegian export earnings was one consequence of the war. In the eyes of US policy-makers Norwegian shipping services acquired markedly greater importance. Skepticism towards the expansion of the Norwegian merchant fieet evaporated39. Wartime exigencies mandated better relations.

51 We can observe this even more clearly in the greater weight that Americans awarded non-economic factors in approving Norwegian investment proposais. By 1950-51 another major aluminum plant was planned in another outlying Coastal community in western Norway. For such modernization projects aid was still necessary. EGA concluded that the project was important not the least because of the necessity for building « morale and confidence in areas located in such positions in Norway40 ». As the war led to US demands for accellerated rearmament in Western Europe, the Americans saw the need for concessions to offset mounting criticism against increasing military expenditures and yet another postponement of a higher standard of living.

52Under such circumstances the relatively austere Norwegian postwar économie policies and extensive set of economie Controls were no longer quite so undesirable. Some domestic régulations and Controls and relative austerity were necessary éléments of a program designed to augment military capability and to contain inflation. In Oslo Gross drew up such a program which he concluded the Norwegian government would hâve no difficulty in adhering to41.

53The Labor government proved adept at exploiting the new climate of coopération. When the régional development program for North Norway was launched in 1951, Brofoss maintained that the investments that were required could not be generated in Norway. A program including électrification, industrial development, improved communications, manpower training and education more generally was put together. During a trip to the US in May 1951 Prime Minister Gerhardsen solicited US support for the program, pointing in particular to the strategie importance and exposed géographie position of North Norway. By exploiting the new climate the cabinet could make sure of continued dollar gifts even after the termination of the Marshall Plan. EGA officiais both in the Oslo Mission and in Washington favored the Norwegian plans42.

54We should not interpret this willingness to give spécial treatment to Norway in general and Brofoss in particular as proof of a final meeting of minds, however. It is true that the two parties had moved doser to one another on issues of substance, that the Americans needed dependable allies in a difficult situation and that the Norwegians were perfectly willing to exploit the fact. Yet the Labor cabinet was still more strongly comitted to planning than were the Americans, and even if quotas were being removed at a quicker pace the planners kept dragging their feet on the issue of import régulations. The Norwegians had moved somewhat doser to their professed beliefs in the advantages of a more open world economy. Yet they were still uncertain both of the short term effects and the long term durability of their modernization, efforts. The situation permitting they tried as before to hâve their cake and eat it too.

55En annexe à son article, nous publions l’intervention qu’a faite Helge Pharo à l’issue de cette séance.

« Si mon sujet était la Norvège, il me semble intéressant d’aborder brièvement un autre pays nordique, la Suède.
La Suède est, dès les années 30, un pays avancé, et cette avance explique que, malgré les dommages causés à sa structure industrielle par la guerre, sa situation au sortir de la guerre n’est pas catastrophique. La Suède ne comptait donc pas trop bénéficier du Plan Marshall et, de fait, ce ne sont que les petits prêts dont elle bénéficia dans le cadre du Plan Marshall. Plus que des questions de politique économique, la Suède était préoccupée des questions de politique étrangère. A l’été 1947, la Suède s’est opposée aux plans américains, a réagi au rapport de septembre et refusé pendant un temps un traité bilatéral avec les États-Unis. De la même manière, au cours des négociations de l’OTAN et de la mise en place de l’AELE, la Suède tenta de garder la sorte de domination qu’elle exerçait sur les pays Scandinaves. Elle était prête, pour cette raison, à faire des concessions considérables à la Norvège, dans le cadre de la négociation sur l’OTAN ; c’est pour cette raison également qu’elle lui en consentit lors de la mise en place de l’union douanière.
Extrêmement préoccupée par les questions de neutralité, la Suède dut se résoudre à adhérer au plan Marshall pour ne pas se démarquer du Danemark et de la Norvège, après que ceux-ci l’eurent fait, respectivement durant l’été 1947 et à la fin de 1947. Seule la Finlande resta en fait exclue du Plan Marshall. M. Frank a remarquablement résumé les relations étroites que la Norvège entretenait avec la Grande-Bretagne. Quelques explications peuvent être trouvées à cette proximité. La Norvège entretient depuis longtemps, dès les années 30, des liens privilégiés avec l’Angleterre et plus généralement les pays anglo-saxons. La période d’exil du gouvernement norvégien à Londres a bien sûr renforcé ces liens. Forte de cette proximité, la Norvège s’attend à ce que sa volonté tout à la fois de sécurité et d’indépendance soit prise en compte par les Britanniques et les Américains. Cette double volonté est d’ailleurs un des élements déterminants de la politique étrangère de la Norvège après la guerre, et explique à elle seule l’attirance norvégienne pour une orientation Atlantique nord. »