1 In the summer of 1948, at the outset of the Marshall Plan, Averell Harriman, reminded Secretary of State George Marshall and Paul Hoffman, the head of the Economic Cooperation Administration (EGA), that if the aid plan were to succeed it would have to be « 95 percent Europe’s job. »1 The United States was going to add only the critical five percent to Europe’s resources. Harriman, the ECA’s special representative in Europe, stressed that there was to be « no imposition on participators of [the] American economic system, much less American domination. » With respect to technical assistance in France this dictum was difficult to honor for in order to make the program work American officials were to seek ways to compel French industry and labor to adopt the American system. Such efforts did not always bring intended results and, in the end, aroused considerable Gallic resentment.

2The program of technical assistance, an integral part of the Marshall Plan, aimed at closing the so-called « productivity gap » between the United States and Europe. American officals became convinced midway through the plan that Europeans had to be shown how to run their factories, farms and stores so that they could take full advantage of economic assistance. Without higher productivity Europe, it was thought, could not reach the goals of the European Recovery Program (ERP). Raising productivity, from Washington’s perspective, seemed like a panacea for many of the Old World’s economic and political ills. It promised, among other things, to dampen inflation, reduce balance of payments deficits, ease the burden of rearmament, improve the condition of European labor, and combat communism. If American officials inspired the so-called « productivity drive, » the French responded with hesitation and skepticism.

I. Origins of the productivity drive

3It was the looming manpower shortage which faced those who were planning the nation’s reconstruction that generated the first serious study of the productivity gap. Jean Monnet and his team of experts at the Commissariat General au Plan established a Sous-Commission Productivite in April 1946 as part of its manpower studies. Monnet, it should be recalled, and some of his advisers had spent much of the war in the United States and had become familiar with American economic prowess and with the personnel in Washington who directed wartime mobilization. The moving forces in this sub-committee were Jean Fourastie, a statistician with the Plan, and Noël Poudeyroux, the head of a management-consulting organization (CEGOS). Their charge was to study the « human, » as opposed to the material, aspects of the productivity problem. Manpower, along with energy, transport, and foreign exchange, threatened to be a major goulot to recovery. While the work force was smaller than before the war productivity levels, according to early estimates, when compared to those of the United States, had been 1 : 3 in 1938 and would be 1 : 5 in 19462. In fact the Plan’s subcommittee was not sure of these estimates because it lacked adequate data. They were not even certain that current levels were more or less than those in 1938. Given the urgency of the situation one energetic planner recommended « répandre le plus tot possible dans le pays une atmosphere de stakhanovisme3. » But the Fourastie-Poudeyroux group fell dormant. Industry was content to leave the problem to the trade associations arguing that nation-wide studies were useless4. Privately sponsored exchanges of French and American engineers proved disappointing5. Thus while the Monnet Plan was put into operation in 1946-47 the productivity problem received no further attention.

4Abruptly, in 1948, the problem re-emerged as the Marshall Plan began. As part of the aid program the Americans expressed interest in subsidizing efforts at raising efficiency in Western Europe. At the same time the Poudeyroux-Fourastié subcommittee concluded that if France were to reach the production targets set by the ERP, productivity would have to rise rapidly6. American and British experts had begun to elaborate a productivity program for Britain and ECA officials made it known that they were willing to extend the same benefits to France. The ECA was considering a technical assistance program which would pay for an exchange of teams of American and French experts. Once again Jean Monnet intervened. With the help of the commercial staff of the embassy in Washington Monnet negotiated French participation in the new program. Monnet arranged an official invitation for his wartime friend James Silberman, the head of productivity studies in the Department of Labor in Washington.

5Silberman and Monnet appeared before the Plan’s moribund subcommittee in October 19487. Silberman, who had had a quick look at French industry earlier that year, explained to the planners how the United States Labor Department studied productivity and aided American industry. The American expert argued that the French could raise their productivity levels thirty to forty percent with existing equipment and thus lower prices and raise wages. What was lacking was the « know-how of mass production » meaning American-style plant layout, job simplification, materials handling, and budgetary control. It was more a matter of effective management and modern hand tools than it was heavy equipment. Silberman warned the French against falling behind and notified them that the United States was ready to receive visitors. As if to anticipate what was to come the subcommittee raised several objections to Silberman’s presentation. Markets in France were too narrow ; easy credit was lacking ; taxes weighed heavily ; labor was plentiful ; plants were too small ; and relations between employers and workers were not comparable to those existing in the United States. Neither Silberman nor Monnet were convinced. Monnet announced that a new Groupe de travail under Fourastie would take charge of the productivity problem. Monnet wanted this new study group to prepare the way for the establishment of a governmental productivity agency that could administer Marshall Plan aid. But months were to pass without much progress in implementing the drive8.

II. Early troubles, 1948-1950

6Fourastie’s study group worked on defining and documenting the gap and on procedures for sending missions, but little other activity occurred in 1948-49. In part this delay was due to the obstacle of demonstrating, in a quantitative way, the magnitude of the gap and the appropriateness of the American model. There was a prevailing perception that America was an economically privileged nation, with its generous endowment of natural resources and huge internal market, which seemed to make the American experience irrelevant. And the linkage between production and productivity was slow to come. Only gradually was it recognized that there was an alarming gap between French and American standards of living ; that American know-how was relevant ; that true recovery and an end to inflation depended on raising productivity as well as production. In addition the EGA itself had been slow to give priority to technical assistance. Only as the ERP reached its midpoint did the EGA take productivity seriously.

7Equally important in French procrastination was the political problem of mounting a program that appeared independent of American aid. The Fourth Republic worried lest technical assistance appear to be American-controlled which would arouse domestic opposition, especially from the Communists9. Unless the program was a French one, a French offical warned Hoffman, it would be easy for « certain groups » to kill it by staging a political fight arguing it was merely a way for foreigners to get a grip on the economy at the expense of the workers10.

8Grave trouble greeted the technical assistance program because of the Communist Party and the major trade union, the Confédération Générate du Travail (CGT), that was aligned with it. The first head of the ECA mission in France, David Bruce, acknowledged, for example, that the Silberman report had to be treated confidentialy because, given its highly critical tone, « Communist controlled groups » might use it « as evidence of American disdain for French technology and workers » to alienate non-Communist sections of the population11. In fact in October 1948 the CGT stalled the program by announcing its opposition to any cooperation with the ECA. Monnet’s subcommittee of planners insisted the program would fail should the CGT actively oppose it. But non-Communist unions and the Conseil National du Patronat Franiçais (CNPF) believed that including the CGT would allow Communist sympathizers to wreck the program from within. To the ECA’s dismay this issue divided the drive into two groups, one around Monnet which included CGT represenatives, and another around the Minister of Industry, Robert Lacoste. At one point the two groups were ready to propose competing projects for technical visits to the United States. Months went by while the French government procrastinated in organizing technical assistance. Some temporary modus vivendi was needed lest American aid escape altogether.

9It required a complex bureaucratic organization in the spring of 1949 to resolve the problem : the CGT was invited to participate in the agency that was to administer technical assistance yet excluded from the committees that operated the missions. Under this interim arrangement the first French productivity team visited the United States in the summer of that year. But it was not till autumn 1949 that Paris had worked out a procedure for selecting and financing visiting missions12. The EGA could only express its disappointment with the slow progress France had made in implementing technical assistance13.

10In the National Assembly the Communist Party sought to halt subsidies to the program. From the party’s perspective the productivity drive was being run for and by the Americans. Its accomplices were « syndicalistes gangsters » and the trade associations14. The Communists noted that the productivity missions did not include delegates from the CGT. The drive, it was alleged, intended to divide the working class by promising the « secessionist » trade unions delete crumbs of capitalists’ surprofits. The CGT’s objections were similar to those of the Communist party. The federation stressed the drive aimed at releasing resources to aid rearmament, corrupt the labor movement, and weaken the CGT15. In retrospect these charges were not entirely unwarranted. Facilitating rearmament, but not an aggressive war, became an American goal in promoting productivity, especially in 1950-52. So was weakening the CGT. But to argue the drive sought to advance American imperialism is far-fetched. Rather the ECA sought to create a self-sustaining French economy. It is difficult to imagine how sharing American technical know-how would « vassalize » France. And, as we shall see, American officials tried their best to see that the French worker shared in the benefits of the drive.

11One must not underestimate the importance of the Communists’ opposition. The CGT commanded the loyalty of over half of organized labor and its attacks aroused the historic suspicions of labor in general toward every form of industrial rationalization. Non-Communist trade unions were extremely cautious, in part because of the CGT’s stance, about participating in the program16. Their principal fears were that raising productivity meant risking unemployment and that benefits would not be fairly shared with workers17. As one union official told the Americans : French workers were wary because the government and patronat had asked them after the war to « put their shoulders to the wheel and up to date they have not shared in the results of productivity as they should have18 ». Organized labor was not eager to follow the American lead.

12While the CNPF officially gave the productivity program its blessing, not all the patronat was enthusiastic. Misgivings surfaced quickly. The CNPF sought a loose, decentralized organization that would keep government dirigisme to a minimum, and the trade associations were to earn a reputation for blocking the program19. Owner-employers, were especially reluctant participants probably because they feared the ECA intended to push them into making changes which they believed were not in their best interest20.

13The French thus had some difficulty in assembling their first missions to the United States. CGT members stayed away and American immigration authorities refused entry to anyone with a Communist affiliation, present or past, which discouraged many labor officials. Financing the trips caused trouble as well. It was difficult to get funds from the government budget21. Moreover, while the ECA covered dollar expenses incurred in travel in the United States and the French government paid the cross-Atlantic fares, private employers paid salaries and wages of team members while they were away from work. This permitted employers considerable say in operations. The government had to depend on private enterprise for volunteers who then wanted a voice in team selection. French procedures for selecting delegations did not satsify the ECA. Americans working for the labor division of the French Mission complained bitterly that trade unions were being excluded from selecting delegates. The weakness of the non-Communist labor movement in many enterprises and the exclusion of the CGT, permitted this practice. Employers often nominated workers who were not union militants and in some cases were mere « stooges » amenable to management22. One French union reported the case of a shoe manufacturer who tried to get his son unionized so that he might become a delegate to the United States23.

14ECA/France complained that the French under-represented labor and over-represented technicians in the initial missions. The Americans wanted syndicalists more involved in selecting delegates rather than allowing employers select workers and technicians24. The ECA urged the CNP to send all-labor teams to allay workers worries about unemployment and excessive work loads. And at least one staff member thought excluding the CGT was unwise25.

15French officials were perplexed about what they viewed as a complicated and delicate matter. On the one hand they wanted a broad range of views, but the CGT abstained and reaching agreements with the litre syndicats as well as with the CNPF over selection procedures proved difficult. Moreover, it was not easy to obtain a broad range of private firms since only those employers who volunteered and contributed to paying mission expenses, were represent ed. In time a modus vivendi was worked out, but neither the ECA nor French labor were fully satisfied, for management continued to dominate team selection and union militants were under-represented26. Continued ECA complaints only aroused French officials to attack the ECA for interfering in team selection27.

16While French officials struggled to blend together recalcitrant unions and employers, keeping a watchful eye on the CGT and the Communists, they also struggled to keep the Americans at a distance. The productivity drive had to appear as a French program or else the Communists would, by ridiculing it as an instrument of American capitalism, discourage labor’s participation and wreck the effort. Thus introducing a Franco-American commission on the model of the Anglo-American Productivity Council which brought in American experts to help administer the program was anathema to the Fourth Republic28.

17Indicative of the republic’s sensitivity about foreign interference was the controversy over publicizing the Marshall Plan. Washington came to believe that Paris was renegging on its commitments to inform the French about the nature and purpose of American aid. In 1949 a Congressional report claimed the French people were the most poorly informed of all Europeans about the ERP. The report stated « that much of what is known in France about the Marshall Plan stems directly or indirectly from the Communist output » referring to the « staggering » amount of publicity the party had aimed against the ERP29. The Communists were winning the propaganda battle over American aid convincing the French that the Marshall Plan was both a desperate effort of American industry to force Europeans to buy its surpluses and a military project to secure Allies and build the West’s war-making capacity for an attack on the Soviet Union. This report laid much of the blame on the French government for « doing virtually nothing » to explain the aid program. This inaction, the report concluded, was due to fear that advocacy would make the government vulnerable to « the accusation of defaulting to a foreign power30 ». The ambassador in Washington warned Paris that this report might jeopardize future aid31. In fact there was an appalling ignorance of the ERP. Although EC A, for example, had allocated $11 million to help construct two rolling mills for the large steel company USINOR, the managers of the project, much less the workers, did not know the source of the funds or the machinery32.

18The republic refrained from effusive publicity of the Marshall Plan because it feared it would be counter-productive. The head of the French drive, for example, asked the ECA to delete from its productivity films the notice that « Ce film vous est offert par le Plan Marshall » because workers, most of whom sympathized with the CGT, would walk out of the documentary33. Or as one official, who argued against expanding governmental information services, stated privately : « Une campagne qui echapperait à son autorité risquerait, si elle ne tenait pas compte des légitimes susceptibilites de notre population, de heurter l’amour-propre national et, en fin de compte, d’aller à l’encontre du but proposé34. »

III. Eca initiative, 1950

19By 1950 ECA officials became convinced that technical assistance had to be pushed harder in Western Europe and that France was lagging behind. Barry Bingham, the head of ECA/France complained : « It is disturbing to find so little evidence of any determination on the part of the French to develop the concerted and vigorous productivity program so essential both to permit improvement in the standard of living and to support the requisite military defense effort. » He noted an « almost total absence of spirit and enthusiasm » among French officials35. After a disappointing meeting with the French the American mission chief noted « we must face the fact that the half-way mark of ERP has almost been reached without anything more than a mere beginning of a concentrated productivity effort in France. » French politics were so volatile and French bureaucrats so conservative and skeptical that Bingham concluded the program « is in a precarious state and will probably remain so for some time36 ».

20The Americans now believed that the Europeans had to be shown how to run their factories so that they could take full advantage of economic aid. Paul Hoffman, after expressing misgivings about the tardiness of the French in organizing technical assistance, told a French official in Washington that « 1’aide fournie sous forme de matières premières et d’équipement n’attaque pas assez directement à ce problème fondamental et se révèle insuffissante pour apporter des solutions tangibles et durables37 ». From ECA/Washington’s perspective productivity would make Europe’s exports more competitive, close the dollar gap, and reduce the burden of rearmament which was being stepped up with the beginning of the Korean war. National productivity centers, moreover, would not only coordinate activities and administer aid, they would also push the United States into the background38.

21Thus in early 1950 the EGA invited France to participate in a « greatly expanded program of technical assistance » as part of a broad plan to raise productivity and distribute its benefits equitably39. In addition to establishing a national productivity center American and French officials drew up a long list of features for this enlarged program. They included : expanded missions to the United States (there had been only two from France in 1949) ; a labor training program ; a staff of American consultants (for engineering and labor problems) ; and exhibitions of American machinery and products.

22In June 1950, upon the urging of American officials and Monnet, the government of Georges Bidault finally created a Comite National de la Productivite (CNP) composed of representatives from the administration, employers’ associations, and trade unions as well as outside experts and placed the center under the Secretary of State for Économic Affairs. Robert Buron, a strong proponent of the center, held the latter post and thus presided over the new agency.

23The operational head of the new productivity program was Pierre Grimanelli who functioned as both its secretary-general and as the director of economic programs in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs. Grimanelli chaired a small executive committee drawn from the CNP, which directed the center. The center’s charges were to : develop a productivity program ; coordinate the activities of the ministries and other interested bodies ; and advise the government. The forty-member CNP, which rarely met, had a parliamentary quality because it contained representatives of the ministries, business and labor. But organized labor was not truly represented. The largest labor federation, the CGT, refused to name a delegate to an agency whose purpose, the CGT believed, was to exploit the working class and advance the cause of American imperialism. The so-called litre, or non-Communist labor federations, the Confederation Françaises des Travailleurs Chretiens (CFTC), Force Ouvriere (FO), and Confederation Generale des Cadres (CGC), joined the CNP. However, they did so with some hesitation and set conditions for their participation, e.g., productivity gains must not bring unemployment and benefits must be equally shared with labor40. The CNPF proclaimed its unqualified support of the program, but in fact the employers’ movement fought a rear-guard action against it. Trade associations would do their best to limit the purview of the CNP and make certain productivity did not become an excuse for state dirigisme or for nation-wide collective bargaining41.

24While the CNP set policy and counselled the government the actual executor of programs was a semi-official agency, the Association Frangaise pour I’Accroissement de la Productivite (AFAP). It received subsidies from the French and American governments in order to, among other things, send the missions and publish their reports. Grimanelli’s executive committee also ran the AFAP.

25Funding of CNP-AFAP operations was complex but from 1950 to 1952 subsidies came from French and American sources. With respect to the missions, for example, expenses were covered partly by French budgetary allocations, partly by American credits, and partly by French private enterprise which paid their personnel who participated in the missions. After mid-1952 funding came for the most part from the Mutual Security Agency (MSA), the successor to the EGA. Until 1952 then the center had only a modest budget42. After the Marshall Plan the United States assumed the responsibility for directly financing special productivity projects and funding became more lavish.

IV. Missions

26After a slow start, some 40 missions comprising 511 « missionaries » visited the United States in 1950 and the pace accelerated in 1951-52. By the end of 1953, when activity began a long decline, some 300 missions and 2700 visitors had journied across the Atlantic to study everything from hybrid corn to antitrust legislation43. Some of these visits, which lasted an average of six weeks, were highly specialized, e.g. teams of consulting engineers, while others studied a broad sector or an intersectoral topic like advertizing or accounting. About two-thirds of the missions studied industrial problems ; of the rest most focused on the rural sector while relatively few were devoted to retail trade, crafts, and service. The tertiary sector proved the most refractory in accepting the program. Approximately 45 % of the missionaries were employers or cadres supérieurs ; 25 % were workers or contremaitres\ and the rest were mostly fonctionnaires44. Missions roamed over the entire American continent visiting factories, stores, universities, and research centers, talking to government officials, labor leaders, trade associations, research scientists, plant managers, engineers, and workers. They filed hundreds of reports some published by the AFAP in as many as 10,000 copies. This effort was designed to administer a shock, to make the French visitors want to adopt American techniques, and to « creer et d’entretenir ce virus de productivite45 ».

27This is not the place to review the missions’ findings ; I have done so elsewhere46. It is sufficient here to note that every mission concluded that, to some degree, imitation of American methods was both possible and desirable. But the New World was far from perfect and in many respects, at both the technical and the human levels, French industry, it seemed, could teach American industry. Some reports, despite careful editing by the AFAP, expressed skepticism about the transferability of American ways of management, industrial relations, marketing, and production. Different conditions called for different solutions. The Americans, for example, sought every means possible to economize on scarce labor, even at the price of wasting their abundant natural resources. Such a solution was not available to Europeans.

28One report warned against what had become a problem for the productivity drive – the tendency merely to copy production techniques and ignore the larger context of the American economy. Visitors tended to select only « les éléments qui s’harmonisent avec la satisfaction immediate de leurs interets particuliers et qui pretendent faire abstraction de tous les autres47 ». Industrialists could not improve human relations within their firms without making a sincere effort at understanding their workers’ needs. For the American model was built on mutual trust, respect for labor, open communication, and the allocation of responsibility to the simplest workers. A synthesis of the reports concluded : « La condition essentielle de la réussite de la croisade pour la productivité c’est donc la diffusion d’un climat de confiance et de loyauté dont on a rencontre bien des manifestations aux États-Unis. Un tel climat ne s’établira pas du jour au lendemain ; des incomprehensions, des heurts sont inevitables entre des hommes que les problemes de la productivié ont, depuis tant d’années, plus separes qu’unis48 ».

29This insight into the problems facing the productivity teams exposes the more profound issues underlying the entire campaign. As one American labor leader told his Gallic visitors – if American trade unions faced the same economic and political situation as French labor, they would behave as the French did49. The social climate determined behavior. Many visitors believed that in order to raise productivity there would have to be a revolution in existing social and economic institutions and behavior. According to one expert France must relinquish its old routines :

30« L’Americain n’a pas notre respect souvent paralysant des méthodes traditionnelles ou des situations acquises. L’esprit des pionniers subsiste. Les innovations et le progres technique sont toujours favorablement accueillies. Plus profondément, l’economie américaine est restée largement concurrentielle Le libéralisme n’est pas la-bas reduit au rôle d’un manteau dont on couvre hypocritement des pratiques et des situations qui en sont l’opposé. Aussi, sans cesse talonnees par la concurrence, les entreprises sont-elles obligées d’aller toujours de l’avant, de suivre le progrès, de se moderniser perpetuellement, sous peine de mourir. Tel est le climat de la productivite50. »

31Productivity required a truly competitive market. And the economy should function to benefit the consumer, not vice versa, as in France. In short, « pour promouvoir vraiment la productivité en France il faudra renverser complètement la vapeur51. »

V. The pap initiative, 1951

32As the war in Korea continued and the end of the Marshall Plan drew close the EGA again reassessed its strategy of technical assistance. Up to 1951 only a modest 34 million dollars had been appropriated for technical assistance for Europe52. Productivity had not been a high priority of the EGA. By this time, however, European rearmament was straining fragile economies. Higher productivity could ease the burden of rearmament, supplement the diminishing flow of dollars and merchandise in order to make European economies self-sufficient, and sustain the standard of living. It could also be redirected to fortify the European working class against communism.

33For over a year EGA labor advisers attached to the French mission had been besieging EC A/Washington with complaints about the operation of technical assistance. They stressed that French workers were worse off after two years of aid ; one report asserted wages were 20 percent below prewar levels53. Marshall Plan assistance had aided industry but not improved the purchasing power or the standard of living of workers. After a tour of French factories some American labor representatives concluded that the ERP had « failed miserably » to win over labor ; and low wages, poor housing, and exploitive employers, formed « the subsoil on which the Communists are nourished54 ». As one old-timer put it, « Tell them in the United States that we’re not against the Marshall Plan... us workers would just like to see a little more of it55 ». Visits to individual enterprises indicated workers were not even aware of the fact that their plants were being aided by the Marshal Plan. In short, according to labor advisers, if the ERP was going to win the battle against communism, it would have to overhaul technical assistance.

34EC A/Washington listened and in the spring of 1950 the assistant deputy administrator, Richard Bissell, concluded that a major policy change was needed : labor’s conditions had to be improved and free unions strengthened if the Marshall Plan was to win the political struggle against communism and reach its long-range economic goals. « A major objective of our policy in France should be to bring about a shift of real income in favor of wage earners and white collar workers at the expense of the profits of large enterprises and agricultural income because of the urgent political considerations... » Bissell argued French workers could not be persuaded of ERP goals unless they received « more tangible evidence than at present of the sincerity of our support56 ». Meanwhile New Deal senators in Washington pressed the EGA to find ways to assure that productivity benefits were shared by workers and consumers. And American trade unions urged EGA to use its leverage to strengthen the bargaining position of « democratic » European unions57.

35In Paris officials administering technical assistance worried that the demands of rearmament could not be met without harming the standard of living unless productivity were raised. France had no pool of unemployed to work in arms manufacturers. But raising productivity required credits that were beyond the means of the tight private financial markets. The answer to the capital shortage lay in some form of public-guaranteed loan fund. « Les industriels ne pourront s’inspirer de l’exemple americain, en matiere de productivite, s’ils ne disposent des facilites de credit necessaires58. » The EGA could provide just that help. At the same time officials complained to the EGA that its labor advisers, criticism of low wages was harming government efforts at wage restraint59.

36William Foster, deputy EGA administrator in Europe, used the occasion of the departure of the 1000th French expert to the United States in July 1951 to announce that the EGA had decided to elevate productivity to the top of its priorities arguing that only more intensive output could allow the free world simultaneously to develop its military defenses and raise living standards. Looking beyond the end of the Marshall Plan Foster noted that technical progress was the best way to assure continuous, long-term growth and prosperity in Europe after dollar aid ceased. In this way the United States could terminate its aid but European democracies would be sufficiently strong « to withstand the temptation to experiment with totalitarian political systems60 ». In addition to expanding certain features of the existing technical assistance program, Foster outlined the new approach of what was called the « Production Assistance and Productivity Program » (PAP) which would reach down to individual factories and trade associations to force them to abandon their restrictive cartel policies and to share productivity benefits with workers and consumers. The EGA now intended to use aid to compel manufacturers to enter into agreements with labor unions over wages, prices, and profit sharing. A new loan fund, supplied by counterpart deposits, would subsidize special productivity experiments or pilot projects at the enterprise or industrial level. European business was going to be forced to relinquish its traditional uncompetitive and unenlightened practices. An obvious consequence of this initiative would be to strengthen the free unions at the expense of the CGT. The EGA was intensifing the political character of the productivity drive.

37Such a bold initiative was bound to provoke a strong reaction in France. If the announcement of the PAP were not sufficient cause, a few weeks after Foster’s announcement, in a hard-hitting speech William Joyce, the EGA productivity chief, attacked the « feudal mentality » of French and Italian management. The French ambassador in Washington reported that many Americans believed that the strength of the Communists was due to the « caractere feodal du capitalisme français61 ».

38French business responded sharply against Joyce’s charge. The head of the CNPF, Georges Villiers, characterized the speech as the « greatest single boost to Communist propaganda in France during the past year. » To EGA staff Villiers appeared deeply injured by Joyce’s intemperate attack on management62. Businessmen in Bordeaux reacted angrily to Joyce’s attack and criticized the EGA for channeling its aid to nationalized companies rather than private enterprise63. The head of the small employers federation, Léon Gingembre, stung by American criticism, stated his objections directly to the ECA complaining of the Americans’ total misunderstanding of France, and small business in particular. After 1951 Gingembre’s federation abstained from participating in missions to the United States64.

39The left was, to be sure, pleased with the announcement of the new direction of technical assistance. The FO applauded the tough line ECA had taken against French business65. Even an outspoken anti-American intellectual like George Altman applauded the ECA’s new interest in helping labor66. But the didactic and interventionist tone of the ECA initiative was not welcomed. A friendly Gaullist paper chastized American business and the ECA for presuming to educate French employers about how to pay their workers while a journal of the moderate right criticized « our Yankee friends » for thinking that « their credits used by their technicians will work miracles and give France a « prosperity which will forever make it proof against communism67 ». American ignorance of French problems was a common complaint.

40In Paris those administering American aid welcomed the prospect of more assistance since the government was unable to help business experiments with productivity. But Grimanelli stressed that the new program must be the result of an « initiative française, » designed by French authorities in collaboration with the administration, trade associations, and unions if it were to succeed68.

41Even the ECA mission in France, which endorsed the PAP as a way of overcoming stubborn employer resistance and helping weak free trade unions, expressed doubts about strict enforcement of advance productivity agreements with business. And if the new drive must increase American supervision, the mission warned ECA/Washington, it must be « primarily a French organization69 ».

42The uproar unwittingly ignited by the ECA embarrassed Washington. Secretary of State Dean Acheson privately acknowledged that the PAP announcement had received a bad press in Europe though this was due, in his view, to newspapers’ distorting the program by emphasizing the ECA intended to « go round European governments and go directly to organizations and individuals in Western Europe70 ». From then on the ECA stressed European responsibility for running the program.

43When the Marshall Plan began in 1948 the United States believed it could help Europeans without imposing American economic ways. As it turned out, however, the ECA intervened far more than originally intended in order to make technical assistance effective. French procrastination frustrated the Americans and led ECA administrators to an increasingly muscular style of intervention which, in turn, roused Gallic complaints about Yankee inability to understand and adapt to French ways.

44In December 1951 French officials learned that because of the PAP program more funds would be made available for technical assistance, but that the focus of aid would shift « not exclusively but principally » to defense production ; « defense » was broadly defined to imply maintaining the standard of living71. In addition to military projects the ECA, and its successor agency MSA, was looking for pilot projects that would yield rapid results – demonstrating the benefits of productivity to workers and consumers. One of these projects was the foundry program.

VI. The foundry program

45Begun in mid-1951 this pilot program was to disintegrate in controversy in 1952 leading to a major overhaul of the entire French productivity program. At issue was the extension of a training program operated by the CNP in nine pilot companies to another hundred foundries as well as to a small number of manufacturers of men’s clothing and shoes. In fact the foundry experiment was a small operation that had yielded mixed results after a year of operation. By late 1952 it could claim : the introduction of productivity bonuses ; wage levels that were slightly higher than regional competitors ; and virtually no layoffs (or none connected with the program)72. Yet these pilot companies had not yet shown higher profits or lower prices. Workers who had had experience with the program acknowledged an improvement in many cases in work conditions, but complained that they rarely benefited from bonuses and, despite rare layoffs, almost unanimously feared unemployment73.

46In the fall of 1952 the syndicalists on the CNP, prodded by American labor advisers, asserted themselves. Trade union support had always been tentative and non-Communists unions charged the CNP with neglecting organized labor74. The CFTC, the FO, and the CGC, which had previously accepted the ad hoc arrangements made between employers and workers in the original foundry experiment, now demanded guarantees to expand the program75. These unions were especially annoyed that the national labor federations were being bypassed by the pilot project76. The three labor federations registered different demands with respect to extending the foundry program with the FO assuming the most aggressive stance and threatening to withdraw from all productivity agencies77. Victor Reuther, representing the CIO, urged the FO to make continued participation in the program contingent upon guarantees and ECA/MSA labor advisers lobbied at FO meetings for the union to take a hard stance78. These American advisers had become convinced early on that foundry owners would resist any agreements on profit sharing and urged the ECA to stop funding the project until labor demands were met79. French syndicalists accordingly insisted on formal, nation-wide agreements between employers’ associations and trade unions defining the principles of the productivity program and elaborating guarantees that covered a wide range of issues such as sharing benefits, unemployment, and work conditions. No longer satisfied with mere representation on the CNP the free labor federations, supported by American labor, wanted to turn to collective bargaining to gain a larger, formal role in developing the productivity program. Syndicalists had become frustrated by the refusal of the employers to bargain collectively, unhappy with their nominal role in formulating CNP policy, and anxious that the pilot program might be detrimental to the national unions’ and the workers’ interests.

47The CNPF was willing to negotiate with the labor federations over a statement of productivity goals, but refused to make further commitments. Villiers called raising productivity a national necessity, but asked for flexibility in determining how its benefits were to be shared, i.e. leave the question to individual enterpris80. CNPF officials argued they could not impose collective bargaining and productivity contracts on either trade associations or on individual firms. They were free to do as they pleased81. In fact the trade associations opposed any contractual agreements that would assure labor bonuses in advance. Individual employers might be willing to cooperate, but the employers’ movement in general was not82. The national employers’ federation was apparently afraid of the drift toward cogestion represented by labor’s demands. Moreover, the employers knew that non-Communist unions were weak – in most of the pilot foundries the CGT was the largest union and the other unions were often altogether absent. Thus the CNPF saw no value in reaching an accord at the national level with syndicalists who could not control the work force at the plant level83. These trade unions were playing a weak hand, perhaps trying to use the productivity program to strengthen themselves vis-à-vis the rival CGT, and the employers knew it.

48The CNP had to abandon the foundry program because the trade associations refused to yield to the labor federations. The agency could not bring employers and employees together to negotiate. CNP administrators, like Grimanelli, wrung their hands helplessly as the government refused to intervene in the dispute. And ECA/ MSA staff tried, using their control of credits, to force contractual agreements, but, like the CNP, failed84.

49The training program limped along in late 1952 despite labor’s opposition. A narrow (8 to 6) vote within the normally harmonious CNP continued subsidies. The CFTC and CGC were able, eventually, to negotiate a contract with the respective trade associations in mens’ clothing and shoes, but the FO remained adamant. In November 1952 it voted, by a slender majority, to resign from the joint syndical body which was operating the foundry program85. The following spring the FO, dissatisfied with the negotiations over guarantees, resigned from the CNP/AFAP altogether. This resignation led to a complete overhaul of the productivity program. Jean Fourastie, the de facto founder of the drive, also resigned stating that he could not continue to participate in agencies which had such a « tres faible représentation des salairiés86 ». Given the stalemate in negotiations between industry and labor the MSA, in early 1953, decided to discontinue funding the program87.

50On the French side there was resentment about the role the Americans had played in the debacle. Villiers criticized the ECA/MSA approach to national agreements as too rigid and he attacked American labor advisers for prodding the FO to adopt a hardline over collective bargaining88. Even the FO came to blame American labor for their lobbying efforts which had led the union to adopt unrealistic resolutions89. Some non-Communist union leaders complained that ECA/MSA labor policy was being run by the CIO and AFL who clumsily interfered in their affairs. One CFTC militant reportedly complained : « Those MSA labor fellows with their big cars and ideas have no understanding of French labor and neither has French labor of them90 ».

51At the governmental level Thierry de Clermont-Tonnerre, a spokeman for the CNP, blamed the Americans for trying to force binding, industry-wide agreements on business and labor. « I do not believe », he informed the head of MSA/France, « that these agreements constitute the best formula of guaranty for the workers ; I am convinced that this new requirement had complicated the already difficult problem of establishing sound cooperation between management and workers, and done so in a gratutious manner91 ».

52Robert Buron, the head of the CNP, acknowledged the pilot project debacle demonstrated the existing structure of the CNP was inadequate. Making policy by majority rule had collapsed. Buron recommended establishing a new Commissaire General who would consult with interested parties, make recommendations to the government which would make the final decisions92. The state had to be summoned because employer-employee corporatist interests could not resolve their differences.

53Yet formal structure was not the real issue. As one CFTC official observed the problem with the program lay elsewhere.

54« Les difficultes devant lesquelles la Commission [executive committee] se trouve aujourd’hui placee viennent de ce que depuis quatre ans le Comite [CNP] n’a jamais ete appele a definir une politique de la productivité qui recueille l’accord du patronat et qui soit conforme aux desirs legitimes de salaries.... L’esperance de I’augmentation du niveau de vie général qui a motivé à l’origine la participation des syndicats libres au mouvement en faveur de la productivité n’a pas été suivie d’effets réels : 1’accroissement de la productivité réalise dans certaines branches d’activite a ete detourne de ses fins sociales. »

55And this situation was likely to continue as long as « les travailleurs ne seront pas associés aux efforts entreprise à tous les stades et dans tous les cas93 ».

56What was the significance of the foundry controversy ? When real stakes were at risk, in this case defining the goals, procedures, and benefits of an expanded productivity program, the drive collapsed because of disagreements between organized business and labor. At the national level weak non-Communist trade unions were unable to force collective bargaining on employers. A weak, and unwilling, CNPF could not impose its will on the trade associations or firms. The stalemate over the pilot program ended the Monnet-style, consciousness-raising, consensual approach to productivity. The approach Monnet had used so successfully in the first economic plan could not be adapted to productivity. Henceforth the program would be in the hands of a commissioner and the government. And, as it turned out, what could not be negotiated through nation-wide bargaining, could be accomplished, at least in part, at the local level between unions and employers.

VII. After the Marshall Plan

57The second stage of the productivity campaign, which I shall only sketch here, began as the Marshall Plan came to a close in 1952.

58Administratively the Commissariat Général à la Productivité (CGP), which survived until 1959, replaced the CNP. The first phase had ended with a stalemate within the CNP over the pilot programs. Gabriel Ardant, an expert on efficiency in public enterprise and friend of Pierre Mendes France, was selected to head the CGP by the government of Edgar Faure. The new productivity agency was far larger than its predecessor, more bureaucratic, and more governmental. The days of a parliamentarystyle of policy-making under the CNP were over.

59Concurrent with the stalemate between organized business and labor came an intiative from Washington which forced the French government to once again reorient technical assistance. In June 1952 the U.S. Congress adopted legislation, the so-called Moody amendment, which elaborated a new direction for economic assistance to Europe and increased funding. Before 1953 the United States had allocated only a modest $40 million for technical assistance. Now a $100 million was targeted for Europe to create revolving funds and promote free enterprise. France, under an agreement of May 1953, was to receive a $30 million grant. In principle mutual security was to be enhanced by developing healthy economies capable of raising their standards-of-living. Such economic expansion required opening European economies to competition and free enterprise.

60France and Italy were singled out by American Congressmen, business, labor, and the press as examples of frozen economies reluctant to embark on a circuit of steadily rising production and widening markets. Americans openly criticized the French for their restrictive practices and Malthusian mentality. One United States Senator told the MSA that he and other senators were « getting a bid fed up at the relative failure of the [productivity] program to help the great masses of the people » and warned that he would carefully scrutinize MSA projects to see they « actually reach the little people of Europe94 ». Aid was not only to stimulate free enterprise, but also the benefits from productivity gains were to be shared equally among business, labor, and consumers.

61Faced with such criticism from home MSA officials defended their record. They insisted aid had helped the little people of Europe by creating jobs, raising incomes, and making more goods available while admitting the distribution of income in countries like France was not as favorable as it was in the United States. Officials also argued it was unrealistic to ask the MSA to improve dramatically the living standards and bargaining power of workers in France. Much had been accomplished but « it is impractical to believe that habits, attitudes, fears, prejudices, and inertia rooted in practices that go back many generations can be sensationally changed in a few months or even a couple of years. We are still at the stage of planting seeds95 ».

62At this point the anti-Communist character of technical assistance became explicit. Aid under the Moody amendment was to strengthen non-Communist trade unions as Washington heightened the partisan character of economic assistance to Europe. The MSA informed Paris that a primary goal was « de prendre toutes les mesures pratiquement realisables pour favoriser le renforcement des syndicats libres96 ». American public opinion, as understood by the CNP, was displeased that up to then economic aid had not benefited wagearners or consumers, « ce qui expliquerait le maintien du pourcentage des voix extremistes...97 ».

63Productivity subsidies and loans, rather than missions and propaganda, were now the order of the day. Some of the new aid subsidized a wide range of industrial and agricultural programs aimed at directly raising the standard of living, e.g. consumer products, housing, food. The rest of this aid funded a loan program to help private enterprise purchase equipment and services and reorganize and expand plants – on condition competition was maintained and benefits equitably shared.

64The results of this loan program were mixed. The CGP paraded the successes of the program before the public, but the achievements were probably less glorious. After an intial surge of eager applicants who apparently anticipated easy government credit, interest in the program faded quickly. Ardant’s agency carefully screened applications making certain they met the program’s aims and banks were slow to provide supplemental credit. Demand for productivity loans fell rapidly after 1954. Businessmen guarding the secret des affaires hesitated to sign contracts which required a specific distribution of productivity benefits and they were reluctant to admit worker participation in the operation of such programs98. With respect to raising wages one authority concluded the results were only « imparfaitement obtenus99 ». And trade associations, as opposed to individual industrialists, frequently acted as obstructionists100. An accurate assessment is difficult here, but it is likely that the CGP’s loan program was small in scale and modest in achievement.

VIII. Rising productivity after 1952

65Whatever the actual effects of the technical assistance program may have been, productivity officials began to take pride in the rising curve of national productivity rates by the mid-1950s. The gap was closing. The governments of Mendes France and Edgar Faure in 1954-55 were even more committed to the cause than their predecessors. By 1955 the Minister of Finance predicted half of the nation’s anticipated 8 percent growth would come from productivity gains101. The planning commissioner predicted productivity would rise at an annual rate of 4 percent over the next decade raising the nation’s standard of living by 50 percent. The head of the CNPF claimed that there had been a considerable improvement in the « climat social » over the past five years. Only the trade unions continued to complain, for example, that the program paid too much attention to shop floor problems and ignored creating a more favorable « esprit de coopération. »

66By 1955-56 overall gains in productivity were visible – advancing at an extraordinary annual rate of 5 to 6 percent. Official statistics showed between 1949 and 1956 productivité globale progressed at an annual rate of 3.7 percent which represented doubling production in twenty years. And labor productivity rose even faster – at 5 percent annually compared to 5 percent between 1900 and 1939102. The CGP singled out specific clusters of manufacturers, who were loan recipients, for praise. It identified four hand tool companies, for example, which in six months had raised productivity between 20 and 30 percent103. Whatever the cause the gap was disappearing.

67National pride in French performance emerged suddenly in the mid-1950s. If in 1955 some 59 missions still visited the United States, France was now the host to 29 missions who arrived from other European and non-European countries. Emulating America ceased being de rigueur. One business journal reported the story of two comparable textile plants, one in Roubaix constructed in 1953 and another in Rhode Island. The French factory, due mainly to low wages levels, had lower production costs. The more mechanized Roubaix plant also used 30 percent less labor than older French plants. In contrast workers in the American plant impeded productivity by refusing to do more than specified in their contracts : they wouldn’t, it was alleged, « donner un coup de chiffon sur ses machines104 ». The inferiority complex that had been so evident a few years was disappearing. Productivity seemed to be advancing spontaneously.

68The productivity movement had gained sufficient momentum by the mid-1950s that it would continue to develop without further loans, missions or propaganda. The shock had been administered and there was no need to continue the crusade-like atmosphere of the early 1950s. Productivity no longer depended on the government’s efforts : it had become self-sustaining because of the dynamism furnished by an expansive economic environment. Productivity and economic growth became mutually reinforcing. This achievement, however, did not mean that France now enjoyed the vaunted American « social climate. » Organized labor was not content. The CGT continued its opposition and the non-Communist labor federations warily watched productivity grow while trying to protect workers from its harmful consequences such as unemployment, fatigue, and unfair wages or bonuses105.

69French productivity grew, in the end, irrespective of trade associations and trade union federations whose contentitiousness harmed the program yet did not paralyze it. Rising productivity did not, as program administrators and most missionaries believed, depend on nation-wide improvement in industrial relations.

70The posturing of trade associations and labor federations did not prevent progress at the grass roots. At the firm level incremental gains occurred in spite of the indifference, even the hostility, of the national trade unions and trade associations. And in many cases individual firms and local unions worked together to implement the productivity program. The example of a small shoe company in Fougeres illustrates the point106. In a region where similar companies were closing their doors because of competitive pressures, Etablissements Rehault, which had some sixty employees, signed a productivity contract in 1953 with its Comité d’entreprise whose majority belonged to the CFTC. This contract, elaborated with help from experts affiliated with the productivity agency, provided guarantees against lay-offs and defined bonuses and other benefits. Everyone was pleased with the results. The shoe company’s labor costs diminished and its orders increased. Labor received productivity bonuses and more jobs were created. At the local level the CFTC cooperated with the program once it was convinced that management would do its share and once organized labor was allowed to participate and worker benefits were guaranteed. In short, despite the opposition of the CGT and the hesitation of the non-Communist labor federations, despite the rigidity of many employers and their associations, arrangements were made at the level of indidvidual enterprise. The social climate was was not uniformly hostile to productivity.

71Private enterprise acted on its own, more or less with labor’s cooperation, in an incremental way to raise efficiency. Organized business or labor federations often had little to do with this grass-roots change. What really raised rates were the thousands of firms who : standardized their products ; retrained their workers and managers ; measured company productivity ; made market studies ; installed new equipment and manufacturing processes ; initiated quality control ; remodeled their plants ; reorganized their work methods ; improved their accounting system ; made more efficient use of equipment in handling materials, etc. For example, some fifty forging and stamping companies reorganized their sales and accounting methods107. Several silk manufacturers installed new equipment and reorganized their management. An electric bulb company installed gravity conveyor rollers which trimmed the number of handling-workers in half, sped shipments, saved space, increased production capacity and led to hiring more workers. With the help of American consultants the iron mines introduced new preventive methods in the underground haulage system which reduced accidents by 50 percent and allowed a raise in hourly wages. As several missions concluded – there were no « remèdes spectaculaires » in American industry : what was needed was paying attention to details108. Some of these incremental improvements were directly connected to the productivity drive. Others were not.

72What is at issue here is less assessing the contribution of the drive than understanding how it was accomplished – in this incremental, grass-roots manner by thousands of enterprises.

IX. Assessments

73By way of self-assessment the ECA/MSA staff at the end of the Marshall Plan found technical assistance to have been only a limited success and they were not optimistic about the future109. They considered its greatest achievement was winning the French public to accept « productivity » as a national goal. This accomplishment was attributed to the missions and to information programs. They also praised the dissemination of technical know-how to producers and the creation of insitutions, like the CNP and the AFAP, to administer productivity programs. Yet « toward the major goals of increasing productivity and improving the standard of living accomplishments remain extremely modest. » Data available to ECA/MSA in 1952 suggested that whatever productivity gains had occurred could be attributed to postwar recovery and re-equipment independent of the technical assistance program. Nor had the program had time to influence many producers to distribute benefits equitably. As the Marshall Plan ended MSA predicted « resistance to the re-orientation of production will be strong and progress slow because of four major obstacles ». These were ; the French tradition of « protectionism, » referring to tariffs, subsidies and cartels and a conservative entrepreneurial class ; the weakness of free trade unions who had been unable to win productivity benefits for the workers ; the lack of funds appropriated by the French ; and, « the relatively minor status of productivity in the French government program. »

74In private MSA placed heavy blame on the French government for failing to take productivity seriously. The head of the MSA mission, Henry Labouisse, observed : « Bitter truth is that French government has not yet really wanted productivity program, and this has placed us at a constant disadvantage110 ». Indecisiveness at the highest political level in Paris, according Labouisse, « combined with the emphasis US government places on productivity, has inevitably caused the program in France to take on an « American » cast which has in turn militated against its receiving wholehearted French backing. »

75The estimate from Paris was quite different. Grimanelli, the head of the program, was aware of the Americans’ criticism. He recognized ECA/MSA disapproved of the feeble appropriations allocated by the French ; the way workers had not profited as they should have from recovery ; and the protection awarded situations acquises. All this confirmed the Americans’ belief that the government in Paris, especially the Ministry of Finance, had given technical assistance « une adhesion superficielle111 ».

76Yet Grimanelli could not contain his resentment. In general, he stated, « l’administration américaine tend à concevoir l’assistance technique de son point de vue outre-Atlantique, sans s’attacher suffisamment à examiner avec attention nos propres besoins exprimés et nos propres conceptions112 ». One example was the clumsy way ECA/MSA had handled publicity for technical assistance113. Grimanelli also singled out the divisive intervention of American unions in French labor policies. And he concluded : « II est certes tres difficile et delicat d’aider un pays etranger sans faire de maladresses. Mais nos amis americains ne doivent pas oublier que la politique de productivité est avant tout une politique d’union. Toute action qui tend a diviser est contraire à notre politique. Elle est interdite à un allié correct114. »

77Can the historian plumb this issue more deeply, move beyond American and French administrators’ general appraisals and accusations and estimate what the direct results of the productivity drive was ? It is difficult, of course, to assess, in any quantitative way, the results of the productivity program, but we do have some data.

78We know productivity rose dramatically after 1953 with France leading most other West European nations and that rising productivity was a major cause of the prosperity of the late 1950s and 1960s. We kriow the French productivity drive was, among those mounted in Western Europe, perhaps the biggest115. We know that changes occurred at the plant level that included everything from installing florescent lighting and conveyer belts to redesigning production lines. But we do not know how many of these changes were due to the productivity movement.

79Follow-up studies executed in 1951 by the EC A indicate a mixed reception to initial efforts at introducing American-style productivity measures116. In a few instances eager missionaries revolutionized their firm’s operations, but others either ignored what they had seen, encountered stiff opposition, or at most introduced piece-meal innovations that yielded little in the way of gains. Some plants with strong CGT unions obstructed anything that resembled productivity reform, but in other factories or offices such changes occurred with the compliance, or in spite, of a CGT local.

80Years after the close of the Marshall Plan the AFAP also tried to assess the impact of the program. Enquetes sent to former participants in 1955-56 revealed only modest results117. To be sure the experience of seeing the American way was a « shock » to everyone and stimulated a general effort to improve operations. Yet the poor response to the questionnaire led the AFAP to infer that perhaps as many as half the missions were « sterile. » Among the respondents, however, there was virtual unanimity that the new knowledge gained in America had been applied in some manner. Significantly, however, it was rare for these applications to have been labeled « productivity programs. » Such programs were introduced de facto or carried a different appelation because productivity per se encountered such mefiance that it was wiser to avoid such an identification.

81About thirty percent of those attempting innovation encountered interference. The source of these objections was equally divided among boards of directors, cadres, and workers and in most instances the opposition was not overcome. In some cases the returning missionary, according to the enquêtes, faced indifference, even hostility among his peers which isolated him and dampened his enthusiasm. In other instances once a firm had introduced change and gained a competitive advantage there was little incentive and insufficient training to continue innovation. Sometimes efforts to raise productivity were blocked by hidebound suppliers and clients. Without cooperation at each stage of the manufacturing-marketing process, prices were not lowered and competition not enhanced. Thus productivity advocates were unable to demonstrate sufficient gains so that their firms abandoned old routines118. In these circumstances, the AFAP concluded, results were inevitably limited.

82Too many visitors, in the eyes of the AFAP, preferred copying technical aspects of American manufacturing rather than familiarizing themselves with broader American methods of management or human relations. While the teams perceived the social and psychological aspects of the problem, few, in practice, awarded them priority. The visits, the agency acknowledged, were usually too brief to master the more complex features of American enterprise such as management, organization, and marketing. From the AFAP’s perspective there had been too much literal copying of American machinery and manufacturing processes and not enough learned about American methods to enable the French to find their own solutions to their problems.

83Even witnessing the « glass-house » of American business first-hand did not alter the closed character of the missionaries’ own entreprises. Only one-third of the chefs d’entreprise (who responded to the questionnaire) had called upon outside consultants for advice. This reluctance the AFAP attributed to the secretive wavs and to a « certaine amour-propre mal placé » among heads of family firms119. Of these chefs d’entreprise only 3.5 percent would allow visits to their plants from competitors. Only 10 percent would accept visits from former camarades de mission !

84When asked to quantify the gains made by their innovations most participants replied that productivity had been raised, but that they could not be more specific. Most often the respondents answered plaintively that productivity was « une affaire de climat et que rien de durable et definitif ne pourra etre fait dans ce domaine tant que les positions syndicates et ouvrières, voire patronales, ne seront pas foncièrement modifiees120 ».

85If the productivity drive’s contribution cannot be measured beyond such assessments, what can be said about its role in this economic expansion ? And if it did not yield better results, why not ?

86It seems likely, given the scope and energy of the drive, that it did communicate the productivity message to large numbers of businessmen, technicians, labor leaders, and officials if not to the public at large121. It was said, for example, that French business audiences were so saturated with talk of American efficiency that they asked speakers to avoid the subject. Government, both French and American, made the productivity gap a major public issue in the 1950s. Public officials framed the problem : France was behind in how it produced and sold goods and services and the consequence was a lower standard of living. Officials also supplied the answer : adopt American methods. It seems unlikely that awareness of this problem would have occurred without the government-sponsored drive. The shock administered by the program mattered even if the immediate, direct results of the drive were disappointing to the most ardent crusaders.

87Still it would be an error either to attribute the productivity gains of the 1950s entirely to the public program because most of the changes which formed the annual 5 percent rate of increase occurred independently. While it is impossible to measure the part the productivity drive played in postwar recovery, it seems fair to conclude that the contribution of technical assistance to rising productivity rates was rather modest. The missions tended to neglect transferring basic techniques of management and marketing and they often encountered opposition from business and labor when they tried to implement American ways. While the immediate results of the effort disappointed the productivity crusaders, some grass-roots changes were due directly to the program. Productivity increased during the mid-1950s at the firm level in incremental fashion for several reasons – one of which was the technical assistance program.

88Technical assistance was only a modest success because American efforts encountered Gallic reluctance from most every quarter and because of the Cold War. In general French government, labor and industry, doubted that the American model could be readily transferred across the Atlantic. For the Fourth Republic there were fears that the program might make Paris appear subservient to Washington and subservience was a sure formula for failure given Communist surveillance of the republic’s independence. The CGT refused to participate and the non-Communist labor federations cooperated hesitantly before withdrawing their support. Trade associations harbored serious reservations and refused to enter into binding contracts with organized labor. Only individual enterprises and local unions proved willing to experiment. Yet, of all the handicaps which encumbered technical assistance in France, the most crippling was its subordination to Cold War politics. Together the Americans and the Communists converted what might have been a non-partisan technical aid program into a political-ideological issue that deprived it of much of its appeal122.

89The promise of higher wages, shorter hours, lower prices, increased profits, and more goods – in short the promise of the American way that would have benefited French workers, business, and consumers – was damaged, but not paralyzed, by an ideological contest.

NOTES FROM EGA ARCHIVES

90The abbreviations used in these notes from the EC A archives are : EGA : Economic Cooperation Administration

91OSR/E : Office of the Special Representative in Europe ME : Mission to France

92OD : Office of the Director

93OFD : Office Files of the Director

94CRU : Communications and Records Unit

95GSF : General Subject Files

96CSF : Country Subject Files

97P/TAD : Productivity and Technical Assistance Division LID : Labor Information Division

98TA : Technical Assistance

99MSA : Mutual Security Agency