Amīr ‘abd al-Qādir and the Damascus «incident» in 1860
p. 263-272
Texte intégral
1Urban peace was shattered in Damascus on July 9, 1860, when socioeconomic tensions culminated in an attack on the predominantly Christian and wealthy quarter of Bāb Tūmā in what became known as the «Damascus incident.» As important as the actual event was, it is the way it has been remembered and handed down from generation to generation that has shaped history. Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādīr (1808-1883), made famous by his benevolent role in the crisis, was a great figure, establishing a principle of intercommunal good will and respect for all religious communities in Syria and Lebanon that made him universally recognized as an individual who made a difference in history. Yet, ‘Abd al-Qādīr was only able to make such a difference because good relations between Christians and Muslims had already been established in Damascus. During and after the crisis, cooperation between Muslims and Christians, as well as the long-standing tradition of communal coexistence in the city, ensured the success of the opportunities for re-establishing communal order that he provided.1
2‘Abd al-Qādīr, who had led the resistance to the French occupation of Algeria between 1830 and 1847, finally surrendered and turned himself over to the French in December 1847, so that he could settle in Alexandria or Acre. He was taken, however, to France - first Toulon, then Pau, and finally Amboise - where he arrived just as the revolutions of 1848, which eventually established Napoleon III securely in power, were breaking out. His relations with the French government improved significantly in the following two years to allow him to return east to the Ottoman Empire, first, in 1852, to Bursa which was not his choice, and then in 1855 to Damascus, which he preferred and where he spent the rest of his life.2
3The French whom ‘Abd al-Qādīr had fought in Algeria became his protectors. They provided him and the retinue of Algerian men who accompanied him with funds and, as trouble loomed in Damascus, with arms. Already highly respected by the Damascene Muslims, among whom he was known for his heroism, his piety, and his being a descendant of the Prophet,3 he also became a hero to the Christians of Greater Syria for his help in returning peace to the city, and for his protection of the Christians of Bāb Tūmā. This act of heroism was long remembered by local communities and Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, and has been commemorated by the general public since.4
4The Damascus «incident» was not an isolated event. It had its roots in dislocations and reversais in the balance of power between a weakening Ottoman Empire and an industrializing Europe, and in the European commercial penetration of Greater Syria beginning in the late eighteenth century. It was reminiscent of sectarian clashes in Aleppo in 1850, similarly triggered by social unrest brewing in Mount Lebanon throughout the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, and erupting in episodes of violence between class and sect, the worst and the most recent of which had occurred in the mixed districts of the Mountain in May and June of 1860. The arrival of refugees in Damascus and the proximity of violence in Mount Lebanon fed older social tensions in the Syrian cities of the interior. Relations worsened among religious communities as a resuit of the privileges granted in the 1830s to the Christians by Egyptian rule in Syria, the Ottoman declaration of equality among all subjects in the Tanzimat decrees of 1839 and 1856 and related policies, the enforcement of conscription on Muslims and the exemption of non-Muslims from it and, most of all, the contrast in wealth between those who took advantage of the economic changes of the nineteenth century -among whom the Christians were conspicuous -, and the rest of the population. The latter included traditional artisans, craftsmen, and shopkeepers of the interior cities. It is signifīcant that the poor Christians of the Maydān quarter and the Jews of the city were not molested in the rioting because the main cause of the outbreak was not religious but economic.5
5‘Abd al-Qādir was not the only Muslim to help the Christians during the violence. The protection offered by prominent notables and even humble Muslims saved many lives and safeguarded relations among the city’s communities, once order was restored. According to French sources, Damascene Muslims came to the rescue of the Christians in «a rather considerable number». Abū al-Su‘ūd Ḥasībī, who was a witness to the events of 1860 when he was a young man and wrote about them later in his life, while recognizing that some upper-class notables had played a part in the massacres, drew a distinction between the helpful Damascene notables and the harmful populace, listing dignitaries such as Aḥmad al-Ḥasībī, ‘Abd Aghā al-Tināwī, Muḥammad Aghā Nimr, Shaykh Muḥammad Qaṭanā, al-Sayyid Ḥasan, al-Sayyid Maḥmūd Efendi Ḥamza and his brother Sharīf As‘ad Efendi Ḥamza, the son of Aḥmad Aghā al-Yūsuf, ‘Abdallāh Efendi al-‘Imādī, a merchant named Uthmān Jabrī, and a certain Fāris Aghā. The anonymous author of the Kitāb al-Aḥzān, acknowledged that many Muslims sheltered Christian friends and business partners. Ibrāhīm ‘Arbīlī, a Greek Orthodox immigrant to the United States whose memoirs describe the massacres of 1860 in Damascus, mentions that his father, Yūsuf‘Arbīlī, a physician, survived with the help of Maḥmūd al-Kḥadarī, a humble Muslim grocer and that many Muslims rescued Christians. Mikhā’īl Mishāqa (1800-88), whose memoirs cover the 1860 crisis in detail, noted that Ṣāliḥ Aghā Shurbajī al-Mahāyinī, Sa‘īd Aghā al-Nūrī, ‘Umar Aghā al-‘ābid and others kept the Maydān quarter under control despite the anarchy of the Maydān riffraff, and protected its Christians, saving hundreds of people and giving them shelter. Al-Sayyid Maḥmūd Efendi Ḥamza and his brother Ar‘ad and Shaykh Salīm al-‘Aṭṭār, important members of the ‘ulamā’, and many other Muslims also took Christians into their homes, following the example of ‘Abd al-Qādir. In all, Mishāqa estimated that these Muslims of various classes saved sixteen thousand Christian lives.6
6One source, referred to as «Turkish» by the British consul, denies that others acted as well as ‘Abd al-Qādīr, however. «In that distress there was no one but he and his followers who made any effort to save the Christians. «It is true,» he said, that «some persons among the Muslims took from the Christian quarter a few men, women, and children, and they also took some persons to their houses from the castle - asking the privilege of taking them as tho [sic] they had merciful intentions towards them»; but then he added, «Alas! for these poor people what harm and torture they inflicted upon them in their houses.» He claims the Christians were taken prisoners to extract information on where they had hidden their valuables; afterwards some were then returned to the citadel, others were compelled to become Muslims. A number of women and children were carried off. He himself witnessed «persons of the lowest class» picking out children and taking them away. No doubt some did take advantage of the chaos, but that Christians were coerced is unlikely: there is too much evidence that thousands of Christians escaped with Muslim help.7 Nonetheless ‘Abd al-Qādīr remains the single most important protector of Christians. Figures are unreliable, and the number of those the Amīr saved varied between 11,000 and 15,000.8 What is certain is that contemporaries and historians all credit him with saving thousands. Lanusse, the chief secretary at the French consulate and acting French consul (as well as Belgian vice-consul) in Damascus, wrote that 11,000 Christians owed their lives to him, and Maxime Outrey, who arrived in Damascus on July 19 as new French consul and who sent in his first report on July 28, heard that he had saved some 12,000 to 13,000 people from certain death.9
7In part the Amīr’s success was due to his leadership and important appearance. Fifty-two years old at the time of the crisis, he impressed visitors. Baptistin Poujoulat, a Frenchman who returned to Syria in 1860, some twenty-five years after an earlier visit, met with the amīr in November and found him dressed like a Damascene shaykh in a long, lined silk robe and sash, a red fez with blue silk and a white turban, white stockings, and yellow sandals.10 He referred to the grave dignity and perfect distinction of the amīr and his rare vigor; he also noted that the amīr had «very pretty hands». His features were regular, his complexion light, and his black eyes showed more energy than kindness. Poujoulat added that ‘Abd al-Qādīr truly was a lion in a golden cage and he wondered whether the quiet pace of Damascus suited a man of such energy.11
8The amīr’s ability to act had partly also to do with his close relations with the French government which were such that, by 1860, he had the power to act independently from the Ottoman governor in Damascus. When he had been set free by Napoleon III and allowed to settle in Syria, he was granted a pension of 200,000 French francs; by 1860 it had been raised to 300,000. Marcel Emerit, a French professor on the Faculty of Letters in Algiers in the 1950s, described that sum as «enormous», allowing ‘Abd al-Qādir to live like a great lord, to buy properties, and to feed his Algerian followers. French officiais commented, however, that ‘Abd al-Qādīr complained to them that it was not enough, but that may have referred simply to funds for dealing with the Syrian crisis, not the maintenance of his household.12
9French protection allowed ‘Abd al-Qādir to arm his followers when the crisis came in the summer of 1860. The exact number of these Algerian followers varies: Poujoulat estimates them at 5,000;13 Emerit says the French government authorized some 1,000 to 1,200 Algerians to be at the Amīr’s disposai in Damascus, and that they came not from Oran where ‘Abd al-Qādīr had established a short-lived independence but from the areas of Algiers, Aumale, and Grande Kabylie. They were mostly Berbers. In the early 1850s they had tended to be impoverished uprooted men, but by 1860 a batch of better-off immigrants, former members of municipal councils and religious brotherhoods unhappy with some of the reforms imposed by the French rulers, joined his followers.14
10What ‘Abd al-Qādir could not afford but needed was arms. On June 19, 1860, Lanusse took it upon himself to authorize the funds that would save so many from death. He wrote to Edouard-Antoine Thouvenel, the French foreign minister, that ‘Abd al-Qādir had always behaved to the French consulate in a praiseworthy way and that, having learned of the dangers Europeans and Christians were in, the amīr had come to him, offered his services, and assured him of his help. He proposed to gather all the Algerians devoted to him and to lead them in the defense of the Christian quarter should violence break out. He did not think that he could save all the Christians, but that he could at least remove a great number. To achieve his aim, he asked Lanusse if he could borrow the necessary funds to arm 1,000 Algerians.15
11Lanusse then did something very unusual for a civil servant: he took a risk. On 19 June he wrote to Thouvenel that at first he had hesitated because he had not been sure that the measure proposed by the amīr was necessary, but that he had revised his opinion and authorized the amīr to spend whatever he thought necessary. He urged the amīr to act in secret in order not to arouse the suspicion of, or upset («ne pas porter aucun ombrage») the authorities. «I hope you will approve», wrote Lanusse, who added that ‘Abd al-Qādir also wanted the minister’s approval to assist the destitute Christians who had escaped massacres in the villages.16
12Outrey, who succeeded Lanusse, gave him credit for this action: By arming the Algerians, a daring measure which required determination, «everyone acknowledges today that he saved 12 to 13,000 people from certain death». all those who escaped owed their salvation to the intervention of the Algerians who showed admirable audacity, energy, and devotion. Outrey also suggests that it was Lanusse who had approached ‘Abd al-Qādir, but Lanusse’s own correspondence credits the amīr for the first move. Lanusse might have been covering his own back by attributing the initiative to ‘Abd al-Qādīr, but that would seem to be out of character for someone who unilaterally decided to arm the Algerians at a time -it is worth noting- when James Brant, the British consul in Damascus, was claiming that all was fine and there was no cause for alarm in the city.17
13Having managed to arm his Algerians in late June and early July, ‘Abd al-Qādir stayed alert to the possibility of danger in Damascus. On July 2, Lanusse wrote that «night and day», the amīr had watched over the general safety of the town and had succeeded until now to keep it safe. He praised ‘Abd al-Qādir effusively, saying that the amīr had given proof of his total devotion and personal abnegation for the cause he defended. While European consuls tried to pressure Aḥmad Pasha, the Ottoman governor in Damascus to take steps to safeguard peace in the city, ‘Abd al-Qādir was in touch with the ‘ulamā’, «the great of the land», and the leaders of the various quarters.18 Writing after the events, Outrey noted that ‘Abd al-qādir had worked ceaselessly for the defense of the city, surrounded himself with experienced men, and talked to ulema and notables in an effort to calm down the agitation.19
14Once or twice even before the outbreak of violence on July 9, ‘Abd al-Qādir helped avert trouble. On July 2, Lanusse thus remarked that «twice already», the admirable amīr had saved the city, especially its Christians, from the dangers hanging over them, when a plot had been hatched that the amīr was able to squash, though the details of this are unclear. One may have referred to the al-Aḍhā religious holidays which that year, exceptionally, caused some tensions for the Christians. To the relief of the Christians, the feast came and went peacefully. Soldiers were sent to the Christian quarter, a mixed blessing because rumors circulated among the Christians that many of those soldiers had participated in the massacres in the Anti-Lebanon. They kept the soldiers happy with food, drink, and presents until the alarm was over.20
15On July 9, when the uprising broke out, ‘Abd al-Qādir was at a village some three to four hours travel away from Damascus. Some later suspected that he had been taken to that village by Druzes deliberately to guarantee his absence from Damascus on that day, but he managed to return in time. His armed Algerians searched the streets for Christians and Europeans, took the wounded to the military hospital, and led the others to ‘Abd al-Qādir’s house which was near the Christian quarter by one of the town’s gates. Brant was sent a guard by ‘Abd al-Qādir,21 and the French, Russian, and Greek consuls were also taken to his house.22 Although the convents of the Lazarists and of the Sisters of Charity were looted and burned down, ‘Abd al-Qādir safely delivered to Lanusse all the people inside them.23
16As more and more people needed shelter, ‘Abd al-Qādir had them taken to safe Muslim houses or to the Citadel.24 Lanusse wrote that the 11,000 he saved were partly in his house and partly elsewhere in his quarter, but the largest number were in the serai where, against his will, Aḥmad Pasha received them. Lanusse himself had been forced to accept the pasha’s hospitality when the French consulate was attacked and he and his staff threatened.25 Even Brant, who tended to be sparse in his praise for ‘Abd al-Qādir, if only because the amīr was close to the French, warmed up to him. On July 16, he talked of the «several hundreds» the amīr had saved, but by July 24, he had joined the others in boundless gratitude and wrote that ‘Abd al-Qādīr was «beyond all praise» for his aid during the riots. Somewhat inaccurately, given the role of many Muslim notables in saving the Christians, Brant added that it was generally believed that without him not a Christian would have survived, thousands of Christians owed him his life, and his house had become a refuge for them.26
17For weeks after the riots, ‘Abd al-Qādir and his men insured the safety of Europeans in and around Damascus. Cyril Graham, an English traveler connected to the British government, came to Damascus in July, escorted into town by sixty Algerians and fifteen Druzes. An additional fifteen of ‘Abd al-Qādir’s men met Graham and his party at Dīmās.27 Later in August, Graham toured Rāshayya and Ḥāṣbayya in the anti-Lebanon, escorted by Algerians from ‘Abd al-Qādir’s following.28 The amīr also arranged with Lanusse for an escort of Algerians and Druzes to take the first expedition of 500 to 600 Christians from Damascus to Beirut. This caravan was soon followed by others, all of them organized through the combined efforts of ‘Abd al-Qādir, the consuls, and the Ottoman authorities.29
18To Europeans and locals, he had become a hero that they praised lavishly.30 To pay him tribute for his services, Outrey on arriving in Damascus to assume his new post, stopped at ‘Abd al-Qādir’s on his way across town.31 He was also showered with praise from the Porte and from European governments. The Ottoman sultan invested him with Mejidie of the first class in recognition of his services;32 Greece gave him the grand cordon de l’ordre du Sauveur, Pope IX, Sardinia, Savoy, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Spain rewarded him with important medals. The British contented themselves with an officiai thank you delivered by Brant.33
19Perhaps it was the French admiration that is the most interesting: France honored the enemy in Algeria with the Legion of Honor.34 French trust in ‘Abd al-Qādir seems to have led some to consider making him ruler of an Arab kingdom that would stretch from Syria and Mesopotamia to the Arabian peninsula and make a buffer state between Egypt, where the French had a vested interest in the Suez canal, and Anatolia, where the Ottoman resistance to the canal was centered. The creation of such a buffer state would force the Ottomans to stop interfering with the Suez project and would enhance French economic and other interests in the region.35 Nothing came of it, but it is fascinating to see how the man France had feared and tried to keep confined a decade earlier had by 1860 become a trusted hero.
20To those who lived through the «incident» of 1860 in Damascus, ‘Abd al-Qādir was a hero. To those who can look back on that period with the advantage of hindsight, he made a signifīcant contribution to Franco-Arab relations and to the long-term harmony among communities.
Notes de bas de page
1 For help with this paper, I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Da‘d Hakim, Director of the Markaz al-Wathā’iq al-Tārīkhiyya, who has graciously put manuscripts on Amīr ‘Abd al-Qādīr at my disposai, to Fuad Debbas for his help with primary sources, and to Professor Abdul-Karim Rafeq for his excellent suggestions.
2 Temimi A., «Lettres inédites de l’émir Abdelkader,» Revue d’Histoire Maghrébine, nos. 10-11, 1978, p. 159-201; Aouli S., Redjala R., Zoummeroff P., Abd El-Kader, Paris, Fayard, 1994, p. 384-86, 405, 413, 444.
3 UsṬuwanĪ M. al-, Mashāhid wa ahdāth dimashqiyya fī muntasaf al-qarn al-tāsi ’ ‘ashar. 1840-1861, ed. A. al-Usṭuwānī, refers to ‘Abd al-Qādīr as «Sayyid» throughout his text, in recognition of his descent from the Prophet.
4 The town, Elkader, lowa, adopted the name of ‘Abd al-Qādīr ca 1844, in admiration of the Amīr. I am grateful to L. Carl Brown for this information.
5 Consult the works of Abdul Karim Rafeq, including Buhūthfi al-tārīkh al-iqtiṣādī wa al-ijtimā’ī li-bilād al-Shām fi al- ‘aṣr al-ḥadith, Damascus, 1985; ibid., «The Impact of Europe on a Traditional Economy: The Case of Damascus, 1840-1870,» Economies et sociétés dans l’Empire ottoman (fin du xviiie-début du xxe siècle), Actes du colloque de Strasbourg (1er-5 juillet 1980), ed. J.-L. Bacqué-Grammont and P. Dumont, Paris, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983, p. 419-432; ibid.,»New Light on the 1860 Riots in Ottoman Damascus,» Die Welt des Islams, vol. 28, 1988, p. 412-430. For the events of Aleppo, see Masters B.,»The 1850 ‘Events’ in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria’s Incorporation in the Capitalist World System,» International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 22, no. 1, February, 1990, p. 3-20.
6 ‘Arbīlī I., «al-Ḥāditha,» al-Kalima, 9, no. 3, March 1913, p. 55-56; ibid., 9, no. 4, April 1913, p. 226-228; Anonymous, Kitāb al-Aḥzān fi tārīkh wāqi ‘at al-Shām wa Jabal Lubnān wa mā yalī-himā bi-mā asāba al-Masīḥiyyīn min al-Durūz wa al-Islām fi 9 tammūz 1860, MS, Jafet Library, American University of Beirut, p. 25-26, 34, 130-131, 210; Saad E., The Damascus Crisis of 1860 in the Light of Kitab al-Ahzan, an Unpublished Eye Witness Account, M. A. thesis, American University of Beirut, 1974, p. 27, 34, 51, 59-60; Mishāqa M., Kitāb mashhadal-a‘yān bi-hawādith Sūriya wa Lubnān, ed. M. Abdū and A. Shakhāshīrī, Cairo, 1908; Mishāqa M., Murder, Mayhem, Pillage and Plunder: The History of the Lebanon in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, trans. W. Thackston, Jr., Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 1988, p. 30, 249, 251; United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Archives, London (henceforth referred to as F.O.), series 195, volume 601, Brant-Russell, No. 5, 18 June 1860; Salibi K.,»The 1860 Upheaval in Damascus as Seen by al-Sayyid Muhammad Abu’l-Su‘ud al-Hasibi, Notable and Later Nagib al-Ashraf of the City,» in Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century, ed. W. Polk and R. Chambers, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 191-93, 195-197; Schatkowski-Schlcher L, Families in Politics: Damascene Factions and Estates in the 18th and 19th Centuries, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1985, p. 87; for the role of the Maydani notables in protecting Christians, see ibid., p. 98-99, and passim; Anonymous, Tanahhudāt Sūriya, MS, Jafet Library, American University of Beirut; Anonymous [possibly N. Al-Qasāṭilī; Hasr al-lithām ‘an nakabāt al-Shām, Cairo, 1895, p. 224, 235; France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris, Series; Correspondance politique de l’origine à 1871, Turquie, Consulat Divers, Correspondance des consuls, Damas (henceforth referred to as CPC/D), vol. 6 (1860-1861), Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860; Ḥasībī M. al-, «Lamaḥāt min tārīkh Dimashq fī ‘ahd al-Tanẓīmāt,» ed. K. Salibi, al-Abhāth, vol. 21, nos. 2-4, December 1968, p. 121, 125, 129.
7 F.O. 78/1519, Copy of a Letter from a Turkish Muslim in Damascus (translated from the Turkish), in Moore-Russell, no. 27, 4 August 1860; Fawaz L., An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1994, chap. 4.
8 The number of those saved varies in the sources. The figure of 11,000 to 15,000 is cited in Aouli et al., Abd El-Kader, p. 460; 11,000 in Emerit M., «La crise syrienne et l’expansion économique francaise en 1860,» Revue Historique, vol 207, 1952, p. 215-216 p. 213; 12,000 in Churchill C., The Druzes and the Maronites Under Turkish Rule from 1840 to 1860, London, Bernard Quartich, 1862, p. 215.
9 A.E., CPC/D/6, Lanusse-Thouvenel, no. 88, 17 July 1860; A.E., CPC/D/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860.
10 Poujoulat B., La vérité sur la Syrie et l’expédition française, Paris, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1861, p. xxi, 9.
11 Poujoulat B., La vérité sur la Syrie, p. 427.
12 Emerit M., «La crise syrienne», p. 215-216. We can estimate the rate of exchange, but without being certain of the exact amounts being discussed. The qurš, the silver coin introduced around 1688, was known to Europeans as the piaster. In 1829, 104 piastres equaled one pound sterling, for the period 1860-1888 the exchange rate was 125 piasters for a pound sterling. The pound sterling approximated 25 French francs, which meant that 5 piastres equaled one French franc.
13 Poujoulat B., La vérité sur la Syrie, p. 428.
14 Emerit M., «La crise syrienne,» Revue Historique, vol. 207, 1952, p. 212-232. See «Al-jazā’iriyyūn fī-makhṭūṭāt wa awrāq markaz al-wathā’iq al-tārīkhiyya,» at Markaz al-Wathā’iq al-Tārīkhiyya in Damascus, put at my disposai by the generosity of Mrs. Da‘d Hakim.
15 A.E., CPC/D/6, Lanusse-Thouvenel, 19 June 1860.
16 Ibid.
17 A.E., CPC/D/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860. Brant wrote that in his opinion there was no danger of the Muslims attacking the Christians of the city if Aḥmad Pasha acted with firmness and discretion. F.O. 195/601. Brant-Russell, no. 5, 18 June 1860.
18 A.E., CPC/D/6, Lanusse-Thouvenel, no. 87, 2 July 1860. When Outrey came to Damascus, he referred to similar threats thwarted by ‘Abd al-Qādir by writing that all the reports indicated an attack was planned for 30 June, the day of Bairam, but that ‘Abd al-qādir and his followers had defeated the plot. Outrey added that the calm that prevalled was in retrospect meant to mislead Abd al-qādir. After eight days, confidence returned, and Christians began to reappear from their places, jewelry came out of hiding, and everyone thought the danger was over. ‘Ulamā ’, notables, the authorities themselves, all swore to ‘Abd al-Qādīr that nothing was to be feared: A.E., CPC/D/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860.
19 A.E., CPC/D/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860.
20 F.O. 406/10, Robson’s Memorandum in Dufferin-Russell, no. 187, 23 September 1860; F.O. 78/ 1557, Brant-Russell, 26 June 1860 (note that in the letter dated 26 June. Brant mentioned the festivities of the Bairam begun on that day); Abkarius I., Kitāb nawādir fi malāḥim Jabal Lubnān, MS, Jafet Library, American University of Beirut, p. 129; Anonymous [N. AL-Qasāṭilī], Ḥaṣr al-lithām, Cairo, 1895; A.E., CPC/D/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, 28 July 1860; ibid., Lanusse-Thouvenel, No. 87, 2 July 1860.
21 F.O. 195/601, Brant-Bulwer, no. 24, 11 July 1860.
22 A.E., CPC/D/6, Le capitaine de vaisseau de La Roncière au ministre de la Marine, B, 11 Juillet 1860.
23 A.E., CPC/D/6, Lanusse-Thouvenel, no. 88, 17 July 1860.
24 F.O. 195/601, Brant-Moore, no. 13,10 July 1860, in Brant-Bulwer, no. 24, 11 July 1860; Saad E., «The Damascus Crisis of 1860,» p. 52; Ḥasībī M. al-, «Lamaḥāt,» al-Abhāth, vol. 21, nos. 2-4, December 1968, p. 132-133; Salibi K., «The 1860 Upheaval in Damascus,» p. 196.
25 A.E., CPC/D/6, Lanusse-Thouvenel, no. 88, 17 July 1860.
26 F.O. 195/601, Brant-Bulwer, no. 27, 24 July 1860; F.O. 195/601, Brant-Russell, no. 8, 16 July 1860.
27 - F.O. 78/1519, Graham-Moore, 26 July 1860, in Moore-Bulwer, no. 54, 28 July 1860.
28 F.O. 195/601, «Report of Cyril Graham on the condition of the Christians in the districts of Hasbeya and Rasheya,» in no. 33 to Bulwer.
29 A.E., CPC/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, Damas, 28 July 1860.
30 Salibi K., «The 1860 Upheaval in Damascus,» p. 196; Ḥasībī M. al-, «Lamaḥāt,» al-Abhāth, vol. 21, nos. 2-4, December 1968, p. 129; Anonymous [N. Al-Qasāṭilī], Ḥaṣr al-lithām, Cairo, 1895, p. 230-234; Anonymous, «Tanahhudāt Sūriya,» p. 32ff; Mishāqa M., The History of the Lebanon, p. 249-250; Abkarius I., The Lebanon in Turmoil, p. 134; Schatkowski-Schlcher L., Families in Politics, p. 99; ‘Arbīlī, «al-Ḥāditha,» al-Kalima, vol. 9, no. 5, May 1913, p. 301, also praises ‘Abd al-Qādīr.
31 A.E., CPC/6, Outrey-Thouvenel, Damascus, 28 July 1860.
32 F.O. 78/1519, Moore-Bulwer, no. 69, 5 September 1860.
33 Poujoulat B., La vérité sur la Syrie, p. 425-27. Poujoulat refers to a «Mr. Ban» delivering the British thanks, but he must have meant Consul Brant. I have found no documents stating whether the British eventually awarded the amīr a medal.
34 Aouli et al., Abd el-Kader, p. 463.
35 Emerit M., «La crise syrienne,» p. 211 -232; Schatkowski-Schlcher L., Families in Politics, p. 92.
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Aḥmad bin ‘Alī bin Muḥammad Ibn Ḫātima[Abū Ǧa‘far Ibn Ḫātima al-Anṣārī] Suzanne Gigandet (éd.)
2010
Les stratégies narratives dans la recension damascène de Sīrat al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Baybarṣ
Francis Guinle
2011
La gent d’État dans la société ottomane damascène
Les ‘askar à la fin du xviie siècle
Colette Establet et Jean-Paul Pascual
2011
Abd el-Kader, un spirituel dans la modernité
Ahmed Bouyerdene, Éric Geoffroy et Setty G. Simon-Khedis (dir.)
2012
Le soufisme en Égypte et en Syrie
Sous les derniers mamelouks et les premiers ottomans. Orientations spirituelles et enjeux culturels
Éric Geoffroy
1996
Les maîtres soufis et leurs disciples des IIIe-Ve siècles de l'hégire (IXe-XIe)
Enseignement, formation et transmission
Geneviève Gobillot et Jean-Jacques Thibon (dir.)
2012
France, Syrie et Liban 1918-1946
Les ambiguïtés et les dynamiques de la relation mandataire
Nadine Méouchy (dir.)
2002
Études sur les villes du Proche-Orient XVIe-XIXe siècles
Hommage à André Raymond
Brigitte Marino (dir.)
2001