A masterclass in justification
Francis I, Charles V and Pope Paul III in the 1540S
p. 397-419
Résumé
This article examines the arguments and language used in the propaganda of Francis I, Charles V and Paul III during 1540 to 1544, a period of great political instability and open warfare in europe, when compromising and cross-faith alliances that were ostensibly prohibited by christian traditions were in operation. it focuses on the debates around two of these : the alliance between francis i and the ottoman sultan, suleyman – which the pope refused to condemn – and that between charles v and the protestant princes – which he did condemn. the reason for such difference and its implications will be analysed, as will the justification offered by these three christian leaders for such « dishonest » and « dishonourable » alliances, which will be shown to have been heavily dependent on christian morality and terminology. it also proved necessary to develop further the emergent discourses of human rights and the rights of sovereigns, and to refine diplomatic and political norms in order to accommodate the complex political reality.
Texte intégral
The news gave the French ambassador (in Venice) such a shock that he fainted and collapsed behind a chest. He came to with considerable difficulty, weeping... He declared that they would soon see a forceful response to this incident, and that it was also the Serenity’s responsibility to ensure that satisfaction for such a grievous misdeed was given. They laughed and replied that they did not believe that Your Majesty had ordered this, and that even if they believed that he had done so, it was none of their business1.
1The violent reaction of a hardened diplomat to the events unfolding in July 1541 is as significant as the cynical response of his hosts. Francis I and Charles V had agreed to a ten-year truce in 1539 because they lacked the resources to continue fighting, but none of the major conflicts between them had been settled. By 1541 both were attempting to create coalitions powerful enough to destroy the other; a new war was merely a matter of time and opportunity. Francis I despatched Antonio Ricón and Cesare Fregoso to negotiate offensive alliances with the Ottoman Turks and Venice. To speed up their voyage, the two diplomats decided to go across the emperor’s lands in Milan secretly and in disguise. On 3 July 1541 they were ambushed by imperial troops and murdered, although this was not known until several months later2. The incident was used as the casus belli by Francis I in 15423. The war that ensued gave rise to vigorous propaganda campaigns. A pamphlet written by an imperial sympathiser posing as a Frenchman claimed that the French were using the printing presses to disseminate libellous and defamatory materials to justify and cover up their malevolent actions. Evidently, both sides were doing this4. Historians have begun the task of tracing and analysing the multiple publications5, but propaganda was also disseminated through public audiences and private letters. This article examines the arguments and language used by Francis I, Charles V and Paul III to justify their motives and actions, with particular emphasis on the manipulation of human rights and political norms, and their attitude to what they usually referred to as dishonest or dishonourable alliances.
2The French ambassador was right to expect that the abduction of the envoys would be condemned by all governments. Established diplomatic norms stipulated that ambassadors and embassies enjoyed immunity and had a right to protection. This was grounded partly on an understanding of human rights which were believed to include the right of humans to communicate with each other, and partly on the rights of sovereigns to exercise power unhindered. Since all sovereigns benefitted from the observance of these norms, they had a duty to punish infractions. The emperor and his leading officials immediately disclaimed all knowledge and responsibility for the attack6, and briefed senior officials on what to say. They were to explain that the governor of Milan, the marquis del Vasto, had undertaken a thorough investigation to find the perpetrators, and to stress that the French had no proof that either Charles V or del Vasto were involved. Consequently, there was no breach of the truce on their part. It was also made clear that neither Rincón nor Fregoso had formal accreditation as ambassadors, and had not solicited a safe-conduct for their journey. Without official diplomatic status there was no breach of diplomatic norms; without a safeconduct, there was no duty of protection. More importantly, as was widely known, Rincón and Fregoso were engaged in negotiations with the Ottoman Turks – « the common enemy of Christendom » – for an offensive alliance against the emperor, which the imperialists interpreted as an alliance against Christendom also. This was certainly in breach of the truce with the emperor, and consequently the two envoys could not be covered by its terms. It was also in breach of Christian morality which stipulated that Christians should not ally with Infidels against fellow Christians, so they were not covered by Christian treaties. Because of the secrecy surrounding the mission, the imperialists had no conclusive proof that the envoys were acting on Francis I’s orders, but they could say that the king knew what they were doing and had not impeded them7. By way of retaliation, Francis I took hostage the archbishop of Valencia and some Spanish nobles in transit through France with safe-conducts. This was in breach of prevailing laws, added to which the « exhorbitant » and defamatory language used by the French when referring to the disappearence of Rincón and Fregoso furnished the emperor with grievances of his own8.
3The reaction of Christian powers varied. Pope Paul III immediately denounced the incident as a serious breach that threatened the security of all diplomats, and he sent a secret mission to Venice to propose a defensive league against Charles V9. He had to condemn the imprisonment of the archbishop as well, but continued with the anti-Habsburg negotiations. This highlights the serious implications of a public condemnation: it was interpreted as tantamount to taking sides in the Franco-imperial conflict. Many Italian states were divided into opposing factions and aware this could cause internal unrest, as Rabà demonstrated with a telling incident in Modena on 7 May 1542. A local government official was seriously alarmed at the sight of children armed with wooden weapons fighting in opposing French and Imperial squadrons. He feared it presaged and might even provoke the division of Modena into real, armed camps10. Better to avoid involvement, which could be done since there was no proof that the assassination had been authorised by the imperial authorities. Paul III’s reaction has to be understood in the context of his internal policy at the time. He had launched an attack on key pro-imperial nobles in Rome and saw the incident as an opportunity to undermine Charles V.
4Henry VIII brushed aside the French ambassador’s exaggerated claim that all other powers had denounced what he termed a dirty, dishonest and despicable act and were expecting England to do likewise. The king would go no further than saying it was « fort estrange », and pointed out that Rincón was a Spaniard who had rebelled against Charles V11. The right of sovereigns to punish traitors was universally recognised, and the Venetian government seized on this to further justify their refusal to get involved12. In contrast, the Ottoman sultan fully supported his « good brother and friend » Francis I. He acceded to the king’s petition to imprison the Habsburg ambassador in Istanbul, and threatened to avenge the murder of Rincón (who had served as French ambassador at the Porte) by devastating Habsburg lands. Using both threats and blandishments, Suleyman tried to persuade Venice to ally with Francis I against Charles V. It was in his interests to create an anti-Habsburg coalition as he was facing competition from them in Hungary and North Africa13.
5Francis I felt the dishonour keenly and considered the assassination a sufficient justification for war, but he did not think it was in France’s interest to declare war at this juncture14. His advisers were deeply divided15. Several other factors contributed to the delay. The pope, having failed to organise an anti-imperial league, sent legates demanding peace and Christian unity for a war against Suleyman, and so as to organise a Council of the church to end religious divisions in Christendom16. Charles V and Francis I protested that the interests of Christendom were their main priority, but the emperor would not give up Milan and without this concession Francis I would not accept a settlement. Neither wanted to reopen peace talks but both had to respond positively to the papal summons because they were hoping to secure Paul III’s alliance and would not risk being labelled warmongers17. Further delay was caused when the emperor launched an invasion of the Ottoman protectorate of Algiers at the end of 1541. It was a longstanding Christian tradition that the possessions of those fighting the infidel should be immune from attack and Francis I accepted this with a grand show of magnanimity18. The campaign enabled the emperor to project himself as the military leader of Christendom against Islam, but for the Christians of Hungary and nearby Austrian and German lands devasted by Suleyman’s troops during 1541, the Algiers campaign was a betrayal of those very credentials. The accusation that Charles V had left for Algiers to flee a confrontation with Suleyman in Hungary figured in anti-imperial propaganda for the rest of his life. Arguably, the most important factor influencing the deferral of the war was that neither side had yet created a sufficiently powerful coalition.
6To attract allies a war of words was unleashed through embassies and negotiations as well as in print. By January 1542 imperial officials were complaining of the dissemination of « lies », especially the claim that Charles V had provoked Suleyman to invade Christendom19. Claims that the marquis del Vasto had ordered the murder of Rincón and Fregoso were so widespread that he prepared a public statement to be read before the pope defending himself and attacking the French. The emperor’s chief adviser, Nicholas Perrenot de Granvelle, and the imperial ambassador in Rome, the marquis of Aguilar, tried to stop him because they thought it would do more harm than good. It could raise awkward questions as to how much Charles V knew, and would also exacerbate tensions at a time when they needed peace while at war in Algiers. Del Vasto persisted as his reputation and honour were at stake20. Nor did he stop at Rome. Milan was an imperial fief and Francis I had sent envoys to the imperial Diet to present his case. The marquis demanded that his defence (provided in Latin and French) be read in public at the Diet and published. It offered a spirited justification of his and the emperor’s actions, stressed Charles V’s commitment to fight the Ottoman Turks and blamed Francis I for breaking the truce. Guillaume du Bellay, French governor of Piedmont, obtained a copy from a spy before it was sent and penned a response in both languages which he sent, along with del Vasto’s declaration, to Francis I hoping it could be rapidly disseminated21. The pattern for official publications was set.
7The Diet of Speyer was one of the most important fora for public declarations from both sides. After the opening proclamation of Charles V, the German princes listened to those of Francis I, del Vasto, and Mary of Hungary (the emperor’s governor in the Low Countries). The speeches confirmed the German princes in their belief that Suleyman’s success was due to the divisions in Christendom and they demanded peace among Christians and support from both Charles V and Francis I against the impending Ottoman invasion. Charles V promised to return and lead the imperial troops against Suleyman in Hungary22. Francis I dismissed this as a smokescreen, a mere pretence at a « holy expedition », but he appreciated it would persuade some people of Charles V’s zeal23. The implications of this for Francis I have not been appreciated. He could not declare war while the emperor was fighting Suleyman as this would alienate his German Protestant allies and hinder a possible alliance with the Pope and Venice, so he either had to declare war before the Hungarian campaign started, or defer it indefinitely. Aware if his advantage, at the end of June Charles V asked the German princes to send another embassy to the French court demanding an end to their unprovoked invasion of the emperor’s lands24. Before this could happen, Francis I declared war on 10 July 1542. The declaration stunned his opponents. Charles V could only think that Francis I had confirmation that Suleyman had sent aid. This was not the case. Negotiations were going well but they had not been finalised, and it was too late to organise a joint campaign in 154225. Francis I may have reckoned that there were benefits to declaring war at this juncture besides hindering the emperor’s campaign in Hungary. The imperial high command was taken completely by surprise and unprepared. They were convinced the war would not start until Ottoman help arrived because alone Francis I was too weak and would incur only defeat and shame. Later, the French king claimed that he had declared war then precisely to prove that he was powerful enough to act independently26.
8The proclamation of war enabled Francis I to publicise his grievances and justify his actions. Trumpeters were ordered to summon the population to hear town criers read it throughout the land. It was also printed27. It began by accusing Charles V of multiple, unspecified hostile acts, which the king had ostensibly dissimulated and endured for the sake of peace in Christendom. But recently ( « ces jours passez ») the emperor had perpetrated an inhuman and abhorrent act which violated the rights of sovereigns, that is the murder of « our ambassadors ». By avoiding dates and alluding to the time he had given the emperor to provide justice and reparation, the king elided the gap between the murder and the declaration of war. He also finessed the mission. The French had already informed the German princes and Henry VIII that Rincón and Fregoso had been instructed to negotiate a long truce so that Suleyman would not attack Christendom again28. In the proclamation there was no mention of the Ottomans, and the « ambassadors » were merely on royal business – « allans à Venize pour noz affaires »29. The declaration is rich in emotive language and lacking in specifics. For example, the emperor was accused of unspeakable cruelty and of ordering the assassination of other French officials, in transit in some other places – « a faict tuer (chose par trop cruelle) aultres de noz subjectz et serviteurs allans pour noz affaires en aulcungz lieux ». On such slender evidence, Charles V was condemned for acting contrary to divine and human rights, the rights of war, and the norms governing political relations between sovereigns, and blamed for breaking the truce30. It is a measure of the generic nature of official French propaganda that materials from the 1536 war were reprinted and sold as if written for « the present war »31. Similarly, Charles V’s oration to the cardinals in June 1543 was said to be largely a repetition of his 1536 declaration32.
9By the time Charles V obtained a copy of the French proclamation on 20 August 1542, Francis I had already invaded northern Spain and the Low Countries. Charles V’s anger was palpable in the speech he wanted delivered before the imperial Diet, where he explained that he must now defend himself and could not go to the German-Hungarian front33. As the aggrieved party (and one taken by surprise) he chose not declare war until he had secured allies, but this left him without the possibility of responding in kind to the French declaration. Instead, he addressed an international audience with a public letter to Paul III34.
10To understand the context we need to take into account that on 22 May 1542 Paul III had summoned all Christians to unite and participate in a General Council. The Bull was published, put up on the doors of churches and read aloud in mass. Most of it was concerned with the Ottoman danger rather than the religious divisions the Council would address. The Turks were described as a common, cruel and perpetual enemy to Christendom, and the pope declared that unless Francis I and Charles V united against Suleyman, Christendom would perish. The Ottomans would continue to conquer Christian territory. The wars between these « two pillars » of the Christian Republic were condemned as the chief impediment to all « necessary » and « holy undertakings » in Christendom35. Here, as elsewhere, Paul III declared his neutrality and historians have mostly taken his words at face value. As Bonora recently argued, however, he was not neutral36. His underlying hostility to Charles V was evident in the Bull, sometimes indirectly, as when he praised the aid and generous reception Francis I had given the emperor in 1539 when Charles V had crossed France to put down a rebellion in the Low Countries. The journey had been well publicised, as had the disappointment of Francis I who believed that Charles V had promised to return to him the duchy of Milan but who retracted this once he had restored his authority. At times, Paul III explicitly condemned Habsburg policy, as when he declared that the Hungarians had called on the Turks for protection because Ferdinand I had attacked them37. An imperial courtier bitterly denounced the Bull as proof of the pope’s lack of respect for Charles V, for Germany, and for those Christians under Ottoman occupation. He was also scathing of the pope’s refusal to condemn Francis I for beginning the war or for calling upon the Turks and Protestants to attack Christians38.
11The emperor’s anger was also evident in his letter to Paul III dated 28 August 1542, which was published in many languages and formats. Although it began with an allusion to the Council and refuted the accusations made by the pope in his Bull, the main purpose of the letter was to respond to the French declaration of war which was addressed in detail. Ultimately, Charles V hoped it would persuade Paul III to condemn Francis I and the Franco-Ottoman alliance39.
12The emperor criticised Paul III’s treatment of Francis I as an equal, which he likened to the parable of the prodigal son, suggesting that Cain and Abel provided the model to follow since it was imperative to distinguish between good and evil, and to reward the loyal and faithful son. Charles V repeatedly alluded to his record of fighting Muslims and attempts to persuade Protestants to return to Catholicism, and claimed to have done everything possible to maintain peace in Christendom, even risking his life several times by agreeing to personal meetings with Francis I and the Pope. The French declaration was described as cruel and dishonest, couched in outrageous language clearly intended to destroy the emperor, treating him worse than if he were a barbarian. The procedural point, that by the terms of the truce the French should have given prior warning before declaring war, was laboured, partly because it was a concrete legal and diplomatic infraction. To dispel accusations of ingratitude and belittle Francis I, the emperor gave a radically different interpretation of his journey through France in 1539. He claimed that he had preferred other routes but the king and his sons had solicited his presence so insistently that to refuse would have been construed as a deliberate attempt to dishonour them. Implausibly, he denied that there had been a crisis in the Low Countries, and added dark hints of plots to assassinate him in France. As for Milan, he had never promised to hand it back, but had offered alternative concessions40. The murder of Fregoso and Rincón was dealt with by the now familiar disclaimer of all knowledge and responsibility, assertions that justice had been done, and reiteration of the arguments that the envoys had no diplomatic immunity and were excluded from the truce. Francis I was portrayed as an aggressive, expansionist monarch who presented the gravest threat to Christendom and especially to Italy, where he had dispossessed his own uncle, the duke of Savoy, and was trying to annex Milan, Parma, Piacenza, Lucca, Siena, Naples, Sicily and even the papal states. His insatiable ambition was proven by his recent annexations, especially Merano, taken while Charles V was at war with Algiers41.
13The imperalists, as Francis I commented sarcastically in his response, wielded the Franco-Ottoman alliance as if it were the trump card in their propaganda. In the emperor’s letter it is labelled as « deshonneste » because the Turks were « the common enemy of Christendom » and because Francis I had asked Suleyman to attack Christian targets. The recent fall of Buda and the Ottoman annexation of large parts of Hungary were blamed squarely on French policy, and Charles V complained bitterly that he had been prevented by Francis I from going on campaign against Suleyman in Hungary in 154242. He also condemned French support for Janus Zapolya, who had placed himself under Suleyman’s protection in order to rule Hungary and exclude Ferdinand I, and been excommunicated as a result. The French alliance with German Protestants (also prohibited by Christian traditions) was evoked. There was only one way to secure peace and unity in Christendom and hold a Council, the emperor declared, and that was for Paul III to openly declare war on Francis I. This was, in any case, what he was obliged to do as pope43. These arguments were reiterated in the German Diet of Nuremberg, where the princes were informed that they needed to protect themselves as much from Francis I as from Suleyman since the two were one and the same thing.44 The phrase used – « être une mesme chose » – normally described the relationship between Charles V and Ferdinand I45.
14Paul III was unmoved by the emperor’s letter, and to the annoyance of both sovereigns, reasserted his neutrality and sent another peace legation. This prompted another vehement public statement from Charles V on 29 September 1542 reiterating his arguments and demanding that Paul III declare war on France. In an echo of his rival’s propaganda, the emperor accused Francis I of dissimulation, fraud and « violating all divine and human rights and many great oaths »46. These publications infuriated Francis I, who was particularly aggrieved that they had been so widely disseminated before he could respond. He had also been offended by derogatory pamphlets published in Germany, and by one in Italy that presented him as Catiline. By way of response, he published and disseminated his own letter to Paul III47. It was no more tendentious than the imperial ones that inspired it, but its length, repetitiveness and recourse to emotive flourishes make it seem so. Taking each of the emperor’s points in turn, insults and accusations were traded in equal measure.
15It was Francis I’s turn to complain about the dishonourable language of the emperor’s letter and its sophistry. He denied that the words used in his declaration of war had been offensive. The French habitually called things by their name: if they were unpleasant it was because they described the emperor’s actions. Sometimes Francis I protested too much, as when he claimed he had never been hostile or given any cause for war, and had never stirred unrest in Christendom. But then he was answering an equally broad condemnation by his opponents who held him solely responsible for the troubles besetting the Christian Republic. The emperor’s attempts to demean the hospitality he had received in 1539 were dubbed odious and mean-spirited. The claim that he had broken his word over Milan was repeated, although Francis I now admitted that an alternative had been offered, which is confusingly described as both substantial but insincere and malicious.
16Much of the king’s response was already familiar: the emotive denunciation of the assassination of Fregoso and Rincón as cruel and contrary to the truce, a breach of the rights of humanity (le droict des Gens), and of nature, as well as of the right of humans to communicate. But new material was added. At several points harrowing descriptions of the sack of Rome were used to destroy the emperor’s peaceful, pro-papal credentials, and to illustrate the harm he had caused Christendom in his ubounded pursuit of power, which was denounced as contrary to Christian morality, and to the reason and moderation that should govern politics. Charles V was accused of seeking hegemony and of corrupting people to this end, notably the constable of Bourbon who had betrayed Francis I. By contrast, Francis I claimed to be motivated solely by the desire to defend his lands and rights –which included Milan, Naples, parts of the Low Countries, Luxembourg, Navarre, Roussillon and Piedmont. He justified dispossessing his uncle because the latter had allowed imperial troops to invade France through Savoy and Piedmont.
17The most interesting aspect of this pamphlet is the prominence given to the alliances with Suleyman and the Zapolya. Francis I ridiculed the claim that they discredited him. His support for Zapolya had long been presented as the key to protecting Christianity in Hungary although it confirmed Suleyman’s sovereignty over the region. The Ottomans had settled for a protectorate in which Christians were not persecuted. Francis I’s support for Zapolya’s infant son and heir ( « le miserable pupile ») was repeatedly and proudly described, presenting the king as a man moved to pity by the plight of a defenceless and lonely Christian child whose very cradle the Habsburgs wanted to snatch. By refusing to accept him as the legitimate successor, it was argued, the Habsburgs were in breach of Christian political tradition. Crucially, their attempt to seize Hungary had also provoked Suleyman’s recent invasion and the Ottomans were now poised to annex the region. The Habsburgs were denounced as rank hypocrites for calling Suleyman « the common enemy » and criticising the Franco-Ottoman alliance although they were negotiating with the sultan and had offered to pay him tribute in exchange for Hungary. Francis I admitted that he had advised German princes not to take up arms against the Turks, claiming that it was because he knew they lacked the strength to win. He had been attempting to save them from the calamities that ensued. He excoriated Charles V’s record of war against the infidel, which he argued had brought nothing but misery to Christians. It amounted to a series of disastrous defeats – Prevesa, Modon, Coron, Castelnuovo and Algiers, that « belle entreprise » for which he had left Germany and Hungary defenceless against the Ottoman invasion. Even Tunis was nothing but a propaganda victory.
18Francis I’s friendship with Suleyman was presented as an asset to Christians. It enabled him to protect Christ’s sepulcre and the temple at Jerusalem, and help Christians living in the Ottoman empire. The alliance was licit and in accordance to Christian ethics and political norms which recognised the right of people to have contact and communication with strangers. By demanding the condemnation of the alliance, Charles V was trying to deprive Francis I of his fundamental rights. The imperialists were accused of implying that the Ottomans were a different human species, and worse than brutes and savages. They were certainly of a different faith and with different customs, but, Francis I argued, such differences were intrinsic to human nature and often the result of external conditions and did not bar them from the full gamut of human rights. Alliances were common among very diverse peoples. Having established these principles to his satisfaction, Francis I could now openly admit that Fregoso and Rincón were on their way to conclude an alliance with Suleyman; an alliance that he argued would have secured peace along the border with Germany, and left Hungary in Zapolya’s hands, and preserved peace in Christendom. By hindering it, Charles V had brought misery upon them all. Francis I also declared that « the Turks » had told him they had no fundamental quarrel with Christendom and were not opposed to Christians in general. They only had specific grievances against Charles V and Ferdinand I48.
19Francis I went on to deny vehemently that he had called upon Suleyman to attack Christendom. He acknowledged that this would be a grievous sin – and a serious error. Suleyman was so redoubtable Francis I would risk being reduced to taking orders from a Muslim ruler without means to escape his clutches. He declared that his hatred of Charles V, which was widely shared, did not extend to putting himself in moral and physical danger. The point was made to reinforce the claim that if the Turks invaded again it was due to Habsburg provocation, but it was surely unwise to include it when Suleyman’s fleet was on its way « to destroy your enemies » – at Francis I’s request49.
20Paul III, the main recipient of this printed propaganda, also had to endure its frequent reiteration in letters from the monarchs and his nuncios, by word of mouth from cardinals belonging to the two factions, as well as from the imperial and French ambassadors in Rome50. Charles V maintained relentless pressure to secure a public condemnation of Francis I’s declaration of war and of the alliance with Suleyman, and in heated exchanges accused the pope of failing in his duty. Stung by this, in January 1543 Paul III launched a violent attack on him51. He accused Charles V of refusing to back away from the war, although everyone knew that without peace Christendom would collapse, and that the only way to stop the Ottomans was by securing French cooperation. The Bible, Christian justice and his title of emperor required Charles V to make peace and to defend Christendom, the pope insisted. He reminded the emperor that the Pater Noster called for enemies to be forgiven, a precondition for God forgiving him. Although carefully prefacing his comments with the phrase « the king of France says », the pope reiterated French criticisms and accusations, including the claim that Habsburg ambition had provoked the Ottoman invasion of Hungary, and that Francis I had no option but to turn to a Muslim power to defend himself from Habsburg aggression. Since the emperor was also negotiating with Suleyman, Paul III claimed not to understand why Charles V wanted him to condemn the Franco-Ottoman alliance. Nor would he accept that the Most Christian King was untrustworthy when Charles V was willing to trust heretics. Paul III insisted that it was Charles V’s duty as emperor to reopen peace negotiations and offer concessions, if necessary relinquishing Milan52.
21The pontiff managed to control his temper better after this but refused to change his policy, although he resorted to more varied arguments. For example, in February 1543 he accused the imperalists of lying to him the previous year, when they said that French ports were being prepared to receive the Ottoman-corsair fleet, and claimed that there was no proof it would happen in 1543 either. Since the church could not judge things that were hidden – « la yglesia no juzga lo occulto » – it was fruitless for the imperialists to ask him to condemn this. The pope did his best to excuse (the term used by the imperial ambassador) the French so as to justify his refusal to denounce Francis I and the Franco-Ottoman alliance. He argued that the king of Poland, Ferdinand I and Charles V had also negotiated with Suleyman and were just as compromised. If he denounced one, he would have to denounce them all, and Charles V more than others since his imperial office placed greater duties upon him to uphold Christian values. Paul III admitted that he would do nothing that might persuade Francis I that he supported Charles V because this would drive the French « to despair » and to abandon the Catholic fold53. Such behaviour persuaded the cardinal of Ravenna that the pope was Charles V’s worst enemy54. Others accepted that if neither Venice nor the papacy supported Francis I, he had to turn to the Ottomans for help to contain Charles V’s bid for hegemony. This, as Giovio put it, almost justified ( « fa in qualche parte escusabile ») the friendship between Francis I and Suleyman55.
22Much of the fighting between Francis I and Charles V in 1542 took place along the borders with Spain and the Low Countries. The French invasions were repulsed, albeit after considerable devastation, and the emperor quickly defeated France’s Protestant ally, the duke of Cleves, in the spring of 1543. Suleyman had concentrated on the Hungarian front and Henry VIII on Scotland, therefore until this point the Catholic credentials of the two rivals were virtually undented. But there was growing unease from friend and foe alike as rumours spread of naval preparations in Istanbul and England. The endless conflict between Francis I and Charles V, their ambitions to conquer Italy and their morally compromised alliances with heretics and Muslims were seen by some Italians as the most serious threats to Italy. Giovio had warned Francis I against open military cooperation with the Ottomans although this could guarantee his victory. Italians would be disgusted and alienated by the sight of turbans mixing with crosses ( « turbanti mescolati con le croce bianche ») and once the Ottomans had a foothold in Italy again, they would not leave it. Ferrante Gonzaga, one of the emperor’s closest collaborators, was just as concerned. He attempted to dissuade the emperor from giving priority to the war against Francis I in 1543 arguing that he must defend Hungary if Suleyman invaded again. This would bring praise (laude) whereas the war with France would lead to further accusations of hegemony – monarchia – and prompt states to take sides to maintain the balance of power – « bilancia del pari »56.
23Perrenot de Granvelle had other fears. He believed that the emperor’s moral scruples would hinder an alliance with Henry VIII, who was a Protestant and excommunicated. According to traditional norms, there should be no communication with a heretic; any transgressions incurred the same penalty. Moreover, the English king had divorced Catherine of Aragon and so dishonoured her dynasty, now headed by Charles V. But by 1542 Catherine was dead and the pope hostile, and alliances between Catholics and Protestants common. Granvelle reckoned that the religious views of the English were more acceptable than those of some of the emperor’s Lutheran allies57. Whether Charles V agreed or not, his conscience did not stand in the way of the negotiations with « our very dear and good brother and friend » Henry VIII. Although they proved difficult, an offensive-defensive treaty was finally concluded at Westminster on 11 February 1543. In the English version it included Henry VIII’s title of Head of the Church in England. All versions specified that Charles V would protect him from any attack, even by the Pope. Charles V tried to avoid making these concessions but failed, with Henry VIII pertinently reminding him at one point that it was not the English who had sacked Rome and held a pope prisoner58.
24Paul III regarded Henry VIII as the « son of perdition and of Satan » and immediately denounced the alliance and the emperor’s pacts with Protestants in Germany59. Threatened by an invasion from England, Francis I asked for his help on the grounds that a Protestant was attacking a Catholic realm. While the pontiff refused to be drawn into open collaboration, he demanded that Charles V break the alliance and stop the invasion. Naturally, this provoked great anger at the imperial court. They could have accepted it more readily if the pope had denounced the Franco-Ottoman alliance, but considered it hypocritical and partisan to denounce their alliance and excuse that of their opponents. The emperor bluntly told the papal envoys that it was the pope’s fault he had allied with Protestants. He had warned that unless the pope supported him against Francis I « we could not remain in isolation », and would take all necessary measures60. In a desperate attempt to redress the balance in his favour, Charles V called for a summit with Paul III. As he prepared to leave Spain for Italy and the Low Countries in May 1543 he wrote to his son that he was risking his life and finances, his honour and reputation, and perhaps even his soul61. It is the closest we have to an admission of the moral compromises he was making.
25Yet when he confronted the pope in Busetto in June 1543 he defended his policies with forceful « arguments and justifications » . He claimed to have convinced the pontiff that he had no reason to be displeased « but on the contrary to be very satisfied » with imperial policy. If the pope drew any satisfaction from the encounter, it was not from this but from the emperor’s willingness to sell Milan to the Farnese62. Significantly, some imperial councillors advised against an alliance with the pope because it would imperil relations with Henry VIII and the German Protestants. Others wanted to retain Milan and were relieved when the negotiations were dropped as the two sides could not agree conditions63. Remarkably, even with Suleyman and his armies in Belgrade and the Turkish fleet off Messina, Paul III insisted there was no reason to condemn the Franco-Ottoman alliance as there was no evidence a joint offensive was planned. He reiterated his conviction that a condemnation would cause Francis I to break away from the Church64. In other words, his justification was one of defence, of preserving the Catholic Church.
26During the summit a number of cardinals denounced Charles V’s alliance with England as a blow to Catholicism and the honour of his dynasty. Some accused him of provoking unrest in Christendom. His sudden departure for Algiers in 1541 was raised, with veiled allusions of cowardice and dereliction of duty. Others openly accused him of abandoning Hungary to the Ottoman hordes in 1541 just as he was now abandoning Italy to the Ottoman fleet and heading for the Low Countries which were not in such danger65. Charles V’s defence and attack on his rival were dismissed as a repetition of what he had said in Rome in 1536. There was something new, however, in his open admission of the alliances with Protestants, which he justified on the grounds that the pope and college of cardinals had failed to assist him and to condemn the Franco-Ottoman alliance66.
27After the brutal sack of Reggio and other imperial possessions the Ottoman fleet docked off Ostia on 29 June. Panic spread in Rome, but the French ambassador reassured the inhabitants that they had nothing to fear. Suleyman had agreed to Francis I’s request that papal possessions and the lands of French allies would be left in peace. As Claudio Tolomei commented « here is a new religion of which we were not aware »67. Far from harming Francis I’s reputation, this substantiated his claim that the Ottoman alliance could be of benefit to Christians, and crucially, that Suleyman was not the enemy of Christendom but of the Habsburgs. Ironically, it deepened the hostility of some Italians towards Charles V whom they held responsible for provoking the invasion and the harm it caused68. Attitudes gradually changed as accounts of the warm reception of the Ottoman fleet in Marseilles and the joint Franco-Ottoman attack on Nice circulated. Francis I appreciated that he would have to justify this unique development and he did so aggressively and with considerable ingenuity as can be seen by the oration of his special envoy, Jean de Montluc, intended for delivery in several Italian and German courts69.
28Montluc started and ended his formal speeches by blaming the emperor for the evils besetting Christendom. In the version delivered in Venice, Charles V was accused of wanting to dominate Italy and the war was presented as much for the « liberation of Italy » as for the defence of France. Charles V was portrayed as ungrateful, a liar, unscrupulous and dishonourable. The sack of Rome remained an essential reference, as were accusations of Habsburg hypocrisy with regards to alliances with Muslims and Protestants. Charles V’s friendships with North African rulers were described, as well as details of his and Ferdinand I’s negotiations with Suleyman70. The emperor’s demand for the condemnation the Franco-Ottoman alliance was presented as a frontal attack on the principle that sovereigns had a right to ally with those of a different faith for defensive purposes. With an impressive list of biblical and historical examples it was demonstrated that such alliances were common, and, Montluc argued, licit and praiseworthy ( « lecito et concesso... et ... si deve, non dico escusare, ma lodare »)71. Human rights of communication were again evoked and defended. Montluc also referred to the benefits of the Franco-Ottoman alliance for Christendom, amply demonstrated recently when Venice, the papal states, Genoa and Siena were spared at Francis I’s request. The joint fleets had (it was claimed) a sole target, the emperor, and had shown more restraint and mercy than any Christian fleet. Their soldiers were said to have done less damage than the Germans and Spaniards in the imperial forces. The French claimed to be acting in self-defence and not out of a desire to impose hegemony or in revenge, and so they were reinforcing Christian morality. Charles V had endangered it with his inconsistent demands for Christians to help him destroy Protestants whom he was now embracing, and to condemn alliances with Muslims even as he negotiated them72.
29The language used throughout is striking. Even when dealing with concepts we associate with real politik, Christian terminology and examples were used. Biting criticisim of the emperor’s policies were couched in a series of rhetorical questions with Christian imagery: what holy motive had led him to invade Christian France or Milan? Was it the Holy Spirit who had inspired him to ally with the traitor Bourbon? Was he following biblical commandments when he allied with a Protestant to partition Catholic France73? Charles V’s agreements with the German Protestants were likened to an alliance between Herod and Pilate against Christ – who, by implication was identified with Francis I. The French had received Charles V in 1539 as they might have received Christ, Montluc stated, and in the past had saved Spain from the Saracens and conquered Jerusalem for Christendom74.
30By now, the French were as critical of the pope’s refusal to choose sides as the imperialists, and echoed their criticisms. Paul III was accused of failing in his duty as an Italian, a Christian and a Pope. On all counts, they argued, he should have joined Francis I against the emperor. If France was defeated, Italy would be subjugated75. Even after Toulon was emptied of its Christian inhabitants and handed over to the Ottoman-corsair fleet for the winter, pro-French cardinals defended Francis I’s policy on grounds of political necessity and stoked fears of the « tyrannical emperor ». Pro-imperial cardinals countered with emotive descriptions of enslaved Christians sold in Toulon’s markets and of churches turned into mosques. This display of partisanship prompted the acid comment that they should be forgiven since it was natural for hungry dogs to bark76. Paul III continued to work covertly for an anti-Habsburg Italian league and in April 1544 Venice found itself hosting his latest envoy as well as the Ottoman and French ambassadors, all pressing the republic to join the coalition, to the disgust of the imperial ambassador who thought the pope shameless77.
31In the event, the much-feared Franco-Ottoman campaign was a failure. Francis I lacked a sound strategy and sufficient finance, and Suleyman was right to conclude that his resources had been wasted in 1543. The allies had found it difficult to coordinate and realised they would be more effective working independently. In May 1544 the Ottoman fleet left for home, raiding Charles V’s possessions on the way78. The defeat of the duke of Cleves had already demonstrated that France lacked the means or the will to defend its northern, Protestant allies against the emperor79. Despite the propaganda, the reputation of the Most Christian King was damaged, as he probably realised80. We need only compare the positive way the Ottoman alliance was presented and given such prominence in 1543 with du Bellay’s near-contemporary chronicle that all but erases it from history, while denouncing the emperor’s alliances with heretics81. Clearly, the Anglo-imperial alliance had proved toxic for the emperor’s reputation and further damage was done by the closer links he forged with German Protestants. Faced with another Ottoman invasion of Eastern Europe the German princes had turned to the emperor for help. He offered to suspend religious persecution and promised help against Suleyman if they first helped him to defeat France and end that war. They agreed, and refused Montluc a safe-conduct to put the French case to them. Holding fast to the principle that heretics were worse than infidels, who did not have the benefit of having known the true God, Paul III denounced the agreement and accused Charles V of betraying Catholicism despite the fact that their ultimate purpose was to defend Christians against Ottoman aggression. The imperialists accused him of hypocrisy and partiality towards the French, and the Protestant leaders Luther and Calvin defended Charles V82.
32But no new religion was established. The war quickly exhausted both contenders. Francis I had to sue for peace once the English invaded France. On the verge of financial collapse and no nearer to a decisive victory, Charles V agreed to a truce in August 1544 which rapidly culminated in the peace of Crépy. As Granvelle put it when advising Charles V to break his oath and betray Henry VIII, in politics « one should be realistic about the matter in hand, opting for what is possible and achievable, according to God and reason, rather than to take risks and run danger because of fears grounded on insubstantial scruples »83. Clearly, real politik was well and truly engrained. But the propaganda reveals that it was natural for Christian powers to use Christian morality and terminology to justify their policies. Both Christians and Muslims had found ways of justifying these theoretically forbidden, cross-faith alliances, and to align these relationships with prevailing religious and political principles. Significantly, even when denigrating « unlawful » alliances, they avoided the use of powerful terms such as « unholy » or « irreligious ». They were all too compromised to risk such language, which would surely be used against them in retaliation.
33Just as important, the Catholic rulers chose to restore tradition. In the treaty of Crépy Charles V and Francis I united in « perpetual peace and friendship » [...] « for the service of God, our Supreme Creator, for the benefit of Our Holy Faith and Religion », and « to save Christendom » . They also bound themselves to « drive out the Turks and other Infidel enemies », and to « reduce and pacify religious dissent » both by holding a general Council and by force of arms84. It was as if nothing out of the ordinary had happened during 1542-4. Except that notwithstanding these oaths and reaffirmation of tradition, neither side abandoned their cross-faith alliances. When war reignited in 1552, the coalition of the Most Christian King included Suleyman and the Pope, Protestant and Catholic princes, while Charles V called on Protestants and Muslim allies as well as on Catholics85. Not for the first or the last time, the European political system functioned despite the enormous gulf between tradition and ideology on the one hand, and political expediency on the other.
Notes de bas de page
1 Archivo General de Simancas (AGS) Estado (E.) 1317 f. 8 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (imperial ambassador to Venice) to Charles V, Venice, 12 July 1541.
2 AGS E.1317 fol. 70-1 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles V, 12 July 1541 where he quaintly notes that the two envoys had been ‘lost’ (se perdieron). A detailed contemporary account in Les Memoires de Mess. Martin dv Bellay Seigneur de Langey. Contenans le discours de plusieurs choses aduenües au Royaume de France, depuis l’an M.D.XIII. iusques au trespas du Roy François premier, ausquels l’Autheur a inseré trois liures, & quelques fragmens des Ogdoades de Mess. Gvillvme dv Bellay seigneur de Langey son frere. I have used the Paris, Olivier de P. l’Huillier, 1569 edition fol. 273v-275v. The bodies were discovered in October.
3 J. Zeller, La diplomatie Française vers le milieu du XVIe siècle d’après la correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier Évêque de Montpellier, ambassadeur de François Ier à Venise (1539-1542), Paris, 1881, p. 239-266. M.K. Williams, ‘Re-orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic cause célèbre: the 1541 Rincón-Fregoso Affair’, in S. Brezezi ski and Á. Zarnóczki (eds.), A Divided Hungary in Europe. Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541-1699, II, Diplomacy, Information Flow and Cultural Exchange, Cambridge, 2014, p. 11-29.
4 C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d’état du Cardinal de Granvelle, 9 vols., Paris, 1841-52 (henceforth Papiers d’état de Granvelle) II, n. CXLVI, p. 650-657, cit. p. 654.
5 S. Astier, La place de l’imprimé dans la guerre entre François Ier et Charles Quint (1542-1544). Un affrontement de papier, École Nationale des Chartes, 2009; resumé at http://theses.enc.sorbonne.fr/2009/astier, consulted 30 October 2016. See the pamphlets in O. Bosc and M. Hermant (eds.) Le Siècle de François Ier. Du roi guerrier au roi mécène, Chantilly, 2015, p. 50-1.
6 The official version of events: AGS E.638 fol. 130 Charles V to the Cardinal of Toledo, 17 July 1541; K. Lanz (ed.), Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1844-6 (henceforth CKK), II, p. 315-8, Charles V to François Bonvalot, his ambassador in France, 23 July.
7 AGS E.638 fol. 97 Memorandum s.a., s.d. The author and date identified from E.638 fol. 163, Juan Vázquez de Molina to Francisco de los Cobos, Ratisborn, 18 July 1541. Granvelle repeated these arguments to the Pope, AGS E.870 fol. 80.
8 CKK, II, n. 474 p. 315-8, Charles V to his ambassador in France, 23 July 1543; n. 478 p. 324-6, ambassador to Charles V, Molins, 3 August 1541. AGS E.870 fol. 82, Marquis of Aguilar (imperial ambassador in Rome) and Nicholas Perrenot de Granvelle to Charles V, Rome, 14 November 1541. M.K. Williams, Re-orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic cause célèbre..., p. 17-20.
9 AGS E.1317 fol. 5-6 Diego Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles V, Venice, 21 July 1541.
10 M. Rabà, Potere e poteri. « Stati », « privati » e comunità nel conflitto per l’egemonia in Italia settentrionale (1536-1558), Milan, 2016, p. 9. I am very grateful to Michele Rabà for sending me a copy of his book.
11 M.K. Williams, Re-orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic cause célèbre..., p. 20-21.
12 AGS E.1317 fol. 8, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles V, Venice, 12 July 1542. They did not comment on the fact that Fregoso was a Cremonese in the service of France.
13 I. Ursu, La politique orientale de François Ier (1515-1547), Paris, 1908, stressed their good relations, p. 128-9; cit. p. 131, reactions p. 134-5 and p. 139-40 in Venice; M.K. Williams, Re-orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic cause célèbre..., p. 17, p. 21.
14 Conversations with the Venetian ambassador in France in J. Zeller, La diplomatie Française..., p. 265 (8 June 1541) and AGS E.1317 fol. 86-7, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles V, Venice, 2 November 1541.
15 Du Bellay, Memoires, fol. 284v-287v.
16 This aspect of Paul III’s policy is stressed by Géraud Poumarède, Pour en finir avec la Croisade, Paris, 2004, especially p. 210-218.
17 AGS E.871 fol. 32-3, Papal Bull, 12 November 1542; reply from French ambassadors, E.870 fol. 79 and imperial ambassadors fol. 80. E.870 fol. 82 and f. 78 (sic.) Aguilar and Granvelle to Charles V, Rome, 14 November 1541.
18 AGS E.870 fol. 82 and fol. 78, Aguilar and Granvelle to Charles V, Rome, 14 November 1541. J. Zeller, La Diplomatie Française..., p. 269ff., this at p. 279.
19 A. Fontán and J. Axer (eds.), Españoles y polacos en la corte de Carlos V, Madrid, 1994, n. 86 p. 265, C.D. Schepper to J. Dantisco, Brussels, 30 January 1542.
20 AGS E.870 fol. 82 and fol. 78, Aguilar and Granvelle to Charles V, Rome, 14 November 1541.
21 M. Du Bellay, Memoires, fol. 276v-278r includes Vasto’s letter and his response fol. 278r-284v.
22 CKK, II, documents relating to the Diet of Speyer, n. 480-5 p. 328-44; Charles V’s offer p. 328; Mary’s denunciation of French actions – « pour ce elle auoit fait lung escript » – Charles V to Naves, 26 January 1542 p. 337. Some of Francis I’s letters arrived too late, II, n. 487 p. 345, Naves to Charles V, 18 May 1542. J. de Vandenesse, Journal des Voyages de Charles-Quint, de 1514 à 1551 in L.P. Gachard (ed.), Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas, II, Brussels, 1874 (henceforth, J. de Vandenesse, Journal) p. 203-206.
23 M. Du Bellay, Memoirs, fol. 284v-287v., « les fumées d’vne expedition » fol. 287r.
24 CKK, II, n. 488 p. 346-9, especially 348, Charles’ instructions, 29 June 1542.
25 CKK, II, n. 491 p. 350-4, Charles V to Ferdinand I, 20 August 1542. This is the line taken by Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel. The Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century, London, 2011, p. 122. Negotiations in I. Ursu, L’alliance Franco-Turque, p. 135-140.
26 AGS E.1375 f. 72 Doria to Francisco de los Cobos, Genoa, 28 May 1542; Francis’ words reported by Paul III, AGS E.871 fol. 91-2, Aguilar to Charles V, Rome, end of February 1543.
27 Hence its title: Cry de la guerre ouverte entre le roy de France et l’Empereur, roy des Espaignes, et ce à cause des grandes, exécrables et estranges injures, cruaultez et inhumanitez desquelles ledict Empereur a usé envers ledict roy, et mesmement envers ses ambassadeurs; à cause aussi des pays qu’il luy détient et occupe indeuement et injustement. A copy in J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 212-214 and also in Papiers d’état de Granvelle, II, p. 628-31. Another version Bosc and Hermant (eds.), Le Siècle de François Ier, p. 50: La Desclaration de la guerre, faicte par le très chrestian (sic) Roy de France contre l’Empereur et tous ces subjectz tant par mer que par terre, [Rouen] Jehan Lhomme, 1542. S. Astier, La place de l’imprimé..., section II chapters iii and iv.
28 M.K. Williams, Re-orienting a Renaissance Diplomatic cause célèbre..., p. 20.
29 Cry de la guerre in Vandenesse, Journal, p. 212-3. The point was made by Marcello Simonetta who kindly sent me his contribution « Le Roi et l’Italie: l’attraction fatale » to Bosc and Hermant (eds.), Le Siècle de François Ier..., p. 31-55.
30 J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., Cry de la guerre, p. 213.
31 S. Astier, La place de l’imprimé..., section II chapter ii. Guillaume du Bellay’s Discours of 1536 appeared in 1542 as Differens qui sont entre le Roy treschrestien & l’Empereur & les motifz de la guerre presente (Guillaume de Quelques, Lyon) with the Epistre traduicte de Latin en Francoys descouvrant l’intention de Charles Cesar & l’innocence & juste querelle du treschrestien Roy Francoys premier de ce nom par ung Aleman envoyée aux tresillustres Princes des Alemaignes, a pirated copy of an anonymous text printed in 1536.
32 P. Giovio, Libro de las historias y cosas acontencidas en Alemaña, España, Francia, Italia, Flandes, Inglaterra, etc., Valencia, Juan Mey, 1562 fol. CCXXVI.
33 J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., Cry de la guerre, p. 212, p. 214 gives 21st, but Charles V’s instructions to Ferdinand I in response to events and the declaration are dated 20 August 1542, CKK, II, n. 491 p. 350-4.
34 In May 1543 he and Henry VIII presented France with an ultimatum and declared war on 22 June, R.J. Knecht, Renaissance warrior and patron. The reign of Francis I, Cambridge, 1994, p. 486.
35 J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., includes a French copy of Paul III’s Bull of 22 May 1542, p. 217-227.
36 E. Bonora, Aspettando l’imperatore. Principi italiani tra il papa e Carlo V, Turin, 2014, especially ch. 6, p101ff. Calling him a neutral, she argues (p. 101) is « quasi come un ossimoro ». My thanks to Raffaele Tamalio for bringing this book to my attention.
37 Paul III’s Bull 22 May 1542 in J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 223.
38 J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 217.
39 A French copy of Charles V’s letter to Paul III, 28 August 1542, in J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 227-236; p. 232 complaint about the declaration: « en la déshonneste et cruelle forme, et plus pirement [que] si ce fust contre les barbares ». Copy in C. Weiss, Papiers d’état de Granvelle, II, n. cxliv, p. 633-644. These letters were forms of official propaganda and while authorship is attributed to the sovereigns, it should be understood that at most they contributed to the work of their officials.
40 Charles V to Paul III, 28 August 1542, J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 229-30.
41 Ibid., p. 233-4, Savoy p. 230, Merano p. 232.
42 Ibid., p. 230-2, p. 234-5.
43 Ibid., p. 236: « faire ce qu’elle est obligée à son aucthorité et du sainct-siége apostolicque et sa réputation, elle se doibt déclarer ouvertement contre luy ».
44 CKK, II, n. 491 p. 351, Charles to Ferdinand, 20 August 1542. Further instructions for the Diet of Nuremberg, n. 488 p. 346-9, Monzon 29 June.
45 M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, Charles V and the dynasty, in H. Soly (ed.), Charles V. 1500-1558 (English ed., Mercatorfonds, Antwerp, 1999) p. 27-111 this at p. 41-2.
46 French version of Paul III’s Bull of 26 August 1542 in J. de Vandenesse, Journal..., p. 237-8; with Charles V’s response p. 238-242, cit.239: « violant tout droict divin et humain et infiniz grands serments »; both also in Papiers d’état de Granvelle, II.
47 TRASLATION DE L’EPIstre du Roy Treschrestien Francois premier de ce nom, a nostre sainct Pere Paul troisiesme, par laquelle est respondu aux calomnies contenues en deux lettres enuoyees du dict sainct Pere par Charles cinquiesme Empereur, l’une du XXV. iour d’Aust, l’aultre du XVIII Octobre M.D.XLII. Paris, Robert Estienne, 1543, unfoliated. See also Guillaume Paradin, Le discours des Guerres dv Roy et de Lempereur, Latin and French, Paris 1543/4; S. Astier, La place de l’imprimé..., section II chapter iv works printed by Robert Estienne at royal command.
48 The whole of this section is based on the unfoliated Traslation de l’epistre.
49 Traslation de l’epistre. I. Ursu, L’alliance Franco-Turque, Suleyman to Francis I, p. 141 « à la ruine de tes ennemis ». A partial response to the Traslation in Papiers d’état de Granvelle, II, n. CXLVI p. 650-7. As with other materials later it tends to repeat previous arguments albeit with more invective.
50 Paul’s frustration with Charles V and Francis I in P. Giovio, Lettere (ed. Giusseppe Guido Ferrero), Roma 1956, 2 vol: I, n. 154, 157, 158.
51 As reported by Aguilar to Charles V, Rome, 14 January 1543, AGS E.871 fol. 84-5.
52 AGS E.871 fol. 84-5, Aguilar to Charles V, Rome, 14 January 1543. Secret negotiations with Suleyman: Archives Génerales du Royaume, Brussels, Audience 70 fol. 5r-7v, Charles V to Granvelle, 23 January 1543.
53 AGS E.871 fol. 91-2, Aguilar to Charles V, Rome, end of February 1543: « lo escuso », « tomo la mano muy de veras en escusar al rey », « todo su hecho fue escusar al rey » .
54 E. Bonora, Aspettando L’imperatore..., p. 3 and p. 112-3.
55 P. Giovio, Lettere..., I, n. 145 p. 282-8, c. June 1542, cits. p. 285.
56 Ibid.; AGS E. 1116 fol. 3, Gonzaga to Charles V, 14 February 1543.
57 K. Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, London, 1970, p. 470.
58 Charles V’s familial terminology in Papiers d’état de Granvelle, II n. CL p. 678, 12 September 1543. Negotiations: C.J. Black and C.E. Challis (eds.), Henry VIII to his Ambassadors at the Diet of Ratisbon 17 June 1541, York, 1968, p. 11-12; Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic of the Reign of Henry VIII 1509-1547, eds. J.S. Brewer, J. Gairdner and R.H. Brodie, 21 vols., London, 1862-1910, (henceforth LP) vols XVII and XVIII, especially Introduction vol. XVIII (i) p. xx-xxi, p. xlv. Henry’s comments: XVII, n. 1017 p. 575, Eustache Chapuys to Charles V, 2 November 1542.
59 LP, XVIII (i), n. 31, p. 20, Paul III to James V, January 1543. Rows over the Lutherans A. Kohler, Carlos V, Madrid, 2000, p. 303-5.
60 M. Fernández Álvarez (ed.), Corpus Documental de Carlos V, 5 vols, Salamanca, 1971-1981. (henforth CDCV), II, p. 79 note p. 76 extract from AGS E.434 f. 46 Charles V’s statement 26 May 1543 « diximos expresamente a Su Santidad que estando las cosas públicas de la Cristiandad y las nuestras como estaban, si el rey de Francia nos rompiese la guerra y no fuésemos asistidos de Su Santidad no podríamos quedar solo y miraríamos lo que convenía ».
61 CDCV, II, n. CCLII p. 105 secret instructions to prince Philip, Palamos, 6.5.1543 « hago este viaje; el cual es el más peligroso para my honra y reputación, para my vida y para my hacienda que puede ser; plega a El que no lo sea para el alma » .
62 AGS E.1461 fo.100, Charles V to prince Philip, Trent, 5 July 1543.
63 CDCV, II, n. CCLVIII esp. p. 126-9, Charles V to prince Philip, Cremona, 19 June 1543.
64 AGS E.1461 fol. 100, Charles V to prince Philip, Trent, 5 July 1543.
65 P. Giovio, Libro de las historias..., fol. CCXXV; Giovio, Lettere, I, n. 147, p. 289, to Nicola Renzi, [July 1542]; n. 159 p. 305-6, to the duke of Florence, 9 February 1543; and n. 162 p. 30, 1 April 1543.
66 P. Giovio, Libro de las historias..., fol. CCXXVI.
67 R.J. Clements and L. Levant (eds.), Renaissance Letters. New York, 1976, n. VII.10, p. 321, Claudio Tolomei to Giovanni Francesco Bini, 30 June 1543; C. Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel, p. 123-5. I. Ursu, L’alliance Franco-Turque, p. 141-154 an account of the joint campaign.
68 Archivio di Stato di Firenze, MP5 f. 249 (MAPDS 3910), Francesco Campana to Giovanni Battista di Simone Ricasoli, 9 August 1543; P. Giovio, Libro de las historias, fol. CCXXIIIr.
69 Papiers d’état de Granvelle, III, n. I, p. 1-11, Harangue… de Jean de Monluc to the Venetian Senate, s.d. (1543).
70 Ibid., p. 2.
71 Ibid., p. 2-4, cit. p. 2; « si può senza replica alcuna dire chel nostro utile particolare era in questa parte congiunto con il beneficio publico di tutta la christianità » p. 5.
72 Ibid., p. 5-6.
73 Ibid., p. 6-7.
74 Ibid., p. 7-9.
75 Ibid., p. 9-10, cit. p. 9.
76 P. Giovio, Historia..., ch. LXII fol. CCXXI, « perdonadle señores, que con razón ladra quien tiene ha [m] bre » .
77 AGS E.1318 fol. 6-7, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza to Charles V, Venice, 8 April 1544; Ibid., fol. 37, 13 July.
78 I. Ursu, La politique Orientale..., p. 143-9, p. 155-6; C. Isom-Verhaaren, Allies with the Infidel, p. 125-138.
79 CKK, II n. 509 p. 396-9, Ferdinand I to Charles V, 18 October 1543; K. Brandi, Kaiser Karl V. Werden und Schicksal einer Persönlichkeit und eines Weltreiches, vol. II, Quellen und Grörterungen, Berlin, 1941, p. 339.
80 Giovio thought so: Historia..., cap. LXVI fol. CCXXVI verso « sabia hauer de ser cosa odiosa a su nombre, y de grande infamia »; fol. CCL exonerates the king: « con honrado y religioso pensamiento se determinó dar licencia a Barbarroxa » . I. Ursu, La politique Orientale..., p. 150.
81 M. Du Bellay, Mémoires..., Barbarroxa is mentioned briefly at fol. 303v, fol. 316r-v; attack on the Anglo-imperial alliance, fol. 329v.
82 K. Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, p. 513-4.
83 Papiers d’état de Granvelle, III, n. VII p. 27: Granvelle, s.d. (end of 1544) « il y a, sire, une maxime en matières d’estat comme en toutes choses, que il faut regarder plus à la réalité des choses que se traictent, en y conjoignant ce qu’est possible et faysable selon Dieu et raison, que de advanturer et hazarder pour crainte de scrupules non fondez ».
84 AGS E. Libro XIV (Berzosa mss) fol. 157 ff. K. Brandi, Kaiser Karl V, II, p. 350-1.
85 M.J. Rodríguez-Salgado, The Changing Face of Empire. Charles V, Philip II and Habsburg Authority, Cambridge, 1988, p. 44-7.
Auteur
The London School of Economics and Political Science
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