1While the violence that marked the late Republic came to an end with the advent of the Principate, Roman authors of the imperial period remained fascinated by the dysfunctional political life of that era.1 Its memory left a lingering trauma late into the first century CE and beyond and instilled a fear of civil strife that abided in our sources, most noticeably Tacitus, who often presents the early empire as vulnerable to similar civil dissensions between the princeps and those who were ambitious enough to test the limits of imperial power.2 Central to that conflict was the strife between those who followed a traditional path to political power, so-called optimates, and those who courted popular favor, populares. The present essay will explore the extent to which, at various points in the early Principate our sources portray the conflict between the princeps and the senate as one recalling that between populares politicians and the optimates of the late Republic.3 While the relationship of the princeps with the people of Rome at large has long attracted the attention of scholars, less attention has been given to opposition that attempted to usurp or was perceived to have usurped the emperor’s role by specifically courting popular favor.4 Millar’s study has been particularly useful in illustrating that the urban plebs were indeed a force with which to be reckoned: not only their votes, but their voice, collectively, was a formidable force in Roman politics.5

2The early emperors were careful to cultivate their role as a popularis in general, and against any opponent who arose. Augustus and Nero are particularly noteworthy for their success in this regard, while Tiberius, for a variety of factors, reveals the dangers of one less suited to the role. Perhaps remarkably, even under an autocratic regime, the Roman people, who maintained an admittedly privileged position, had the power to intimidate and to bend emperors to their demands. A simple anecdote is telling: Tiberius once appropriated a famous and beloved statue from a Roman bath for his private residence; there were popular demonstrations in the theaters at its removal, and he was compelled to return it.6 Obviously deeper, more urgent causes could lead to popular demonstrations: economic stress, including grain shortages, concerns over elementary rules of justice, and expressions of favor for or rage against specific politicians or members of the imperial family, were among these.7 The urban populace could not be ignored, and the emperor was, by virtue of his office and position, a popularis leader, by which we mean, he was both careful to maintain his popularity and to cultivate the urban populace. Nero was particularly adept at weaponizing that popularity and holding it in store for his own devices against his senatorial opponents. Augustus skillfully courted the urban populace, while his successor, Tiberius, regrettably allowed others to assume the role of popularis, leading to a series of perilous domestic crises. Such challenges to the imperial position as popularis, when they arose, were still at times understood in terms of the conflicts of the late Republic.

Augustus as popularis

3By the advent of the empire and the time of Augustus, a new era of peace and stability had put an end to the bitter and violent conflicts between the so-called optimates and populares. Augustus assumed tribunicia potestas, became the people’s champion, and that, essentially, ended matters. Indeed, Tacitus in his lament about the dreariness of his history notes the decided lack of conflict between optimates and populares, something that had made for exciting history in an earlier age.8 Yet each new emperor faced challenges: the princeps was compelled to reconcile all elements of Roman society, for the sake of harmony and concord, and not all were equally adept at maintaining senatorial support and respect, all the while pleasing the urban populace.9 And, at times, the emperor himself faced challenges to his own standing as a popularis.

4Augustus himself was in many respects an exemplar popularis as well as a “restorer” of the aristocracy, who skillfully courted the two elements, making a reality of Cicero’s much desired concordia ordinum.10 Integral to his role as restorer and his popularity was his program of civic revitalization. That the imperial capital needed improvements and repair of infrastructure is a factor that is not to be underestimated in Augustus’ popularity. Augustan building programs, how these programs helped to form and shape images and perceptions of the princeps, and the physical mark he left on the city, are all by now familiar territory. Famously, he allowed a number of his friends and even political opponents to construct or restore monumental public works.11 While these were independent of imperial patronage, they were for the most part minor in comparison with the refurbishments and improvements out of Augustus’ own purse. What his consolidation of power and civic improvements meant for the city tends to be the focus of less attention. In brief, it is hard to imagine, one suspects, the powerful impression it left on Rome’s residents, one of his immediate bases for support, and what it meant for them to have lived in the midst of the city’s vigorous revitalization.

5The opportunities for employment as a result of so much activity, one can guess, were ample, even if one takes into consideration the likely involvement of soldiers and slaves in the work: the two forums of Caesar and Augustus, the new theaters and porticos, the Temple of Apollo on the Palatine, his Mausoleum, the numerous shrines set up at cross-roads and their superintendence, and the restoration of numerous temples very likely supplied a stream of steady employment and kept other Roman businesses humming. In addition there were the improved amenities of fire brigades and vigiles – finally, there was to be some proper policing of the city. The lares of the crossroads and the division of the city into distinct districts doubtless served to expand the number of Romans who felt they had a stake in Roman society, and in the city itself; such activity, and its economic and social consequences, ought not to be underestimated. On top of that he paid avid court to the people of Rome as is detailed in Suetonius’ biography;12 in addition he jealously guarded the privileges of citizenship,13 regularized the grain distribution,14 distributed largess from his triumphs,15 and provided many and remarkable entertainments and shared in the people’s enjoyment of them.16

6It is little wonder, then, that Tacitus notes the remarkable lack of opposition or challenges to Augustus: munia senatus magistratuum legum in se trahere, nullo adversante.17 Despite the small and dubious handful of conspiracies hatched against Augustus, there was only one instance in which anyone may have attempted to wrest the popularis mantle from Augustus: in 26 BCE Egnatius Rufus, a popular senator, was executed.18 A member of the senate, he had been elected aedile and proceeded to court the favor of the people (collecto in aedilitate favore populi) and reportedly increased their favor by creating his own fire brigade of slaves. That move won him the praetorship (illegally according to Dio 53, 24, 5), after which he immediately sought the consulship (according to Velleius, a detail Dio omits). Dio places these events in the year 26 BCE, and indicates cryptically that Egnatius’ actions in his aedileship forced Augustus’ hand: Augustus ordered the aediles afterwards to take precautions for the city against fire, and it is not too much to think that the event impelled him to create the vigiles though we cannot be certain. What occurred between Egnatius’ praetorship and his standing for the consulship is a matter of guess-work. Egnatius’ seeking of the consulship, as Velleius relates it, recalls the conspiracy of Catiline:

mox etiam consulatum petere ausus, cum esset omni flagitiorum scelerumque conscientia mersus nec melior illi res familiaris quam mens foret, adgregatis simillimis sibi interimere Caesarem statuit, ut quo salvo salvus esse non poterat, eo sublato moreretur. Quippe ita se mores habent, ut publica quisque ruina malit occidere quam sua proteri et idem passurus minus conspici.19

7An ambitious man who consorts with others of dubious character (adgregatis simillimis), who borders on insanity with the madness of his crimes (flagitiorum scelerumque conscientia), who, disappointed of his hopes for the consulship, prepared to assassinate those who had frustrated him, even if it meant his own death. The passage reads like a reprise of Catiline’s attempted coup.20 Augustus’ move was understandable. He was still consolidating power, and would not be usurped as the people’s champion. Egnatius and his fellow conspirators shared the fate of some of the more prominent of Catiline’s followers, were sent to prison and executed.21

8Augustus was never a fan of the senate.22 He did, though, have good enough political acumen so that he did not allow Egnatius, a Roman senator, to spoil his relations with that body, on which he relied for governance. More to the point, it is the first instance in the course of the Principate when a member of the senate launched a doomed bid to challenge the emperor’s monopoly in courting popular favor. Our sources presented and arguably understood that challenge in the anachronistic terms of the conflicts of the late Republic, an anachronism that appears repeatedly in authors of the period, Tacitus above all. This is most notable perhaps in his treatment of Augustus’ great-great grandson, Nero.

Nero and the weaponizing of a popularis

9Half a century intervened between Augustus’ death and Nero’s accession. Both shared an enthusiasm in courting the favor of the urban populace, although Nero is of particular interest in this regard since he used his popularity in part as political capital to weather rough patches in the course of his reign.23 In that respect he was a shrewd and clever politician. Several factors could further account for what appears at times to be political calculation on Nero’s part: he may naturally have wanted and needed the people within the city as an immediate base of support to compensate for his lack of military credentials (which he would never obtain, and in which he seemed disinterested), and his mother who pushed him to the forefront, may have inculcated in him a desire to win popular favor late in Claudius’ reign to cast shade over Britannicus. Indeed, Nero bursts onto the scene with popular applause in the most literal sense: at the celebration of the Ludi Saeculares in 47 CE, when Nero paraded with Britannicus, it was Nero who received the more enthusiastic applause, and Tacitus attributes this to Nero’s lineage as the sole direct male descendent of the popular Germanicus.24 In addition, at the time there appears to have been some sympathy for his mother, Agrippina, who was the object of Messalina’s wrath, and would have suffered dire consequences had not Messalina been distracted by her notorious affair with C. Silius. Upon the announcement of Agrippina’s betrothal to Claudius a crowd of popular supporters gathered in the forum and applauded the union.25 The marriage gave Nero close proximity to the throne, and he was soon betrothed (in 49 CE) to Claudius’ daughter, Octavia.26 Moreover, Agrippina was nothing if not astute about attempting to gage the popularity of her son in the face of those in the imperial house, the senate, and the Praetorian Guard who might be sympathetic to Britannicus.27

10In his ascent, it appears at times as though there is almost a willful popularis stance designed expressly to weaponize his rule to the ultimate detriment of the senate.28 While that is said, of course, from a perspective of Nero’s reign where we can look back over the general trajectory of his entire tenure as princeps, it nonetheless is undeniable that Nero personally courted popularity from the start, and his mother happily assisted. Hence by 52 CE Tacitus says Nero had developed an interest in making a reputation for himself for eloquence and learning: to that end, cultivating a reputation for generosity, he spoke in favor of granting popular remissions of tribute to several cities throughout the empire, including Ilium, Bononia, Rhodes, and Apamea.29

11Upon his accession, Nero almost immediately showed himself to be a master politician under difficult circumstances. When his step-brother and rival Britannicus perished in 55 CE under suspicious circumstances, Nero through a diverse array of gifts and what we today would call a “public relations blitz”, attempted to court popular favor by various edicts and distractions to deflect any suspicion that he himself was involved in Britannicus’ death. His mother’s own actions may have impelled Nero to court public opinion aggressively, since after Britannicus’ death she attempted, according to Tacitus30 to create a faction against her son. Tacitus goes so far as to use the language of civil war, bringing up the bad old days of the late Republic. She approached friends, tribunes, centurions, and nobles: “It was as if”, says Tacitus, “she were seeking a leader and a party”.31 During this period Nero himself encouraged and tested the limits of public disorder within the city by his nocturnal riots and by removing guards from public games and spectacles until the disorderly factions that favored now one actor, now another, grew too dangerous and chaotic, resulting in the expulsion of actors from Italy, and restoration of public order at the games.32 Other measures designed to court popular favor were introduced, including a waiver on the four percent tax on the purchase of slaves and the dispersal of 400 sesterces to each citizen in Rome,33 followed in 58 CE by a popular general reform of the tax system which had the added effect, according to Tacitus, of easing grain importation.34 All of this will have helped Nero’s repute among the people at large, and may have been part of a larger, gradual attempt to gain favor as he prepared first to offset his mother’s power, and finally to remove her.

12When that removal came and at first did not succeed as planned (when she survived the destruction of her boat in the Bay of Naples), Nero panicked and was particularly concerned at the possibility that she could incite popular anger against him.35 The concern was not without merit, since Agrippina, as a daughter of Germanicus, remained popular with the crowds, even in the Bay of Naples, where, when she emerged from the bay safe after the first attempt at murder, a large crowd of well-wishers greeted her.36 Against this, however, we can set the general joy the people expressed at Nero’s safety throughout Campania after his mother had been eliminated.37 When Nero finally attacked her via letter in the senate, he went, in popularis terms, for the jugular, noting that she had opposed general gratuities to both the army and the people.38 To intensify any potential animus that remained against Agrippina and her memory (and to deflect any from himself) he gave amnesty to several of Agrippina’s victims.39 For all that, he lingered in Campania, nervous concerning the response not just of the senate, but of the Roman people as well, a baseless concern, since the crowds met him with great enthusiasm.40

13Nero read the plebs’ response as a permission to continue to press against Roman norms and imperial dignity. He had long had an interest in chariot racing and in performing on the stage, and he now sought to take his favorite activities public. His Praetorian Praefect, Afranius Burrus, and his tutor, Seneca, indulged him but also tried to keep his pursuits private in order to protect imperial dignity; however it was not long before the people were admitted to watch and did so with approval.41 He also distributed generous gifts at games and in public venues with a view to courting public favor,42 and himself took charge of games in the course of his reign so no praetor, consul, or any other official could seek favor through them. He also used the opportunity to humiliate some members of the ancient nobility (vulnerable due to their poverty), by forcing them to perform on stage.43 Soon afterwards he established the Juvenalia or Youth Games (still in 59 CE): without distinction of nobility, age, or honors held, many voluntarily participated in stage performances, and he courted both the high and the low at these games by allowing free reign to open debauchery and promiscuity, in which there were also distributions of monies.44 Dio further attests that Nero used the opportunity of the games' amusements to humiliate the nobility, some of whom, forced publicly to take to the stage, tried to hide their faces by wearing masks when impelled to give choral performances, to no avail, since Nero ordered the masks removed.45 Nero clearly tried to court or coopt as many supporters as possible, and Tacitus and Dio indicate that the equestrians (in general) were particularly enthusiastic in their support.46 Dio additionally reports the presence at the Juvenalia of a special corps of five thousand soldiers called the Augustans who led the applause and likely also surveyed the response of the prominent men in the audience when Nero himself performed.47 At the end of Nero’s own appearance on stage he regaled the people by giving a public feast on boats in Augustus’ Naumachia. Also no doubt intended to court popularity was Nero’s institution of a set of games to be held once every five years called the Neronia,48 which brought some criticism, according to Tacitus, since it gave the nobility the chance to degrade itself yet again by delivering dramatic orations or singing on the stage. Tacitus however goes on to say that the majority approved of the new games and the license it allowed.49 When the next set of games came in 65 the senate tried to avert disgrace by awarding him the prizes for singing and eloquence before the games even commenced, a useless measure since he again performed on stage to the delight of the crowd.50

14The senate did little under Nero to help itself collectively and seemed at times intent on self-inflicted damage. A remarkable example of this is the case of Pedanius Secundus in 61:51 Pedanius was the praefectus urbis, and was murdered by one of his own slaves. By law, all slaves living under the same roof had to be executed, women and children included. The plebs were incensed at the cruelty of the punishment, besieged the senate house and rioting eventually broke out. But the majority of the senate believed that the law ought not to be changed, with the noted and pedigreed jurist C. Cassius Longinus delivering a severe opinion that ultimately prevailed. The plebs threatened violence with stones and torches, and was publicly rebuked by Nero (populum edicto increpuit), who was forced to post guards on the route to execution as a precaution.52 But the senate could not leave well enough alone, and Cingonius Varro proposed that freedmen from Pedanius’ household should be deported from Italy,53 delivering to Nero an opportunity to advertise his clemency and cast into relief the senate’s brutality: id a principe prohibitum est, ne mos antiquus quem misericordia non minuerat per saevitiam intenderetur.54 In general we can view this action as a part of Nero’s courting of public opinion for the sake of show. Hence, as Suetonius notes, Nero became popular for his public displays of clementia and had rumors circulated that he disliked signing death warrants.55

15It may have been that Nero’s attempt to be a popular princeps helped him to weather serious political situations in which the plebs very vocally expressed their opinions, not always to his advantage. An instance of this arose in 62 when Nero divorced his wife, Octavia, Claudius’ daughter. Tacitus presents Nero as motivated to be rid of Octavia due in part to the imperiousness of Poppaea Sabina, the imperial mistress who had long since gained power over Nero. Octavia was accused of adultery, an accusation that Poppaea was behind; Octavia’s slaves were tortured, and though most maintained her innocence, Octavia was banished.56 There were public and open protests by the people, and Nero was forced to acquiesce to the crowd for the moment, proclaiming that he would remarry Octavia.57 The people showed their approval by climbing the Capitoline, tearing down Poppaea’s statues, and parading with Octavia’s on their shoulders, showering them with flowers and setting them up in temples and the forum; crowds once again sang Nero’s praises and even filled up the Palatine with shouting.58 But Poppaea soon convinced Nero to act contrary to popular sentiment and sent the guard to break up and disperse the mob, with Poppaea herself afraid of the people and the violence that could break out,59 berating Nero that Octavia’s clients and slaves had coopted the name of the plebs, that they had taken arms up against the emperor, and that they only wanted a leader who would rescue Octavia and lead her to the city itself, where the people rioted at her nod.60 The language Tacitus uses recalls that of civil war, looking back to similar language he employed in his narrative about the conflict between Tiberius, Sejanus, and Agrippina the Elder (ducem tantum defuisse qui motis rebus facile reperiretur).61 Nero acquiesced to Poppaea’s fear-mongering, and proceeded against Octavia with the help of his agent Anicetus, who fabricated a false accusation of adultery,62 and, more alarmingly, accused Octavia of trying to corrupt the fleet at Misenum in the hope of rebelling against Nero,63 on the basis of which charge she was cruelly executed.64

16For all his vicious absurdity, Nero was a shrewd and calculating manipulator of public opinion and a clever opportunist. He was well aware that the people gave him an added base of support in light of senatorial opposition that, in 62, was growing in light of his behavior, and was soon to break out in the Pisonian Conspiracy and its aftermath. Whatever the popular sentiment against Nero after Octavia’s demise, in the next year we see Nero taking pains to keep grain prices under control after an unfortunate nexus of catastrophes (storms and fires) that threatened Rome’s grain supply after which he introduced a subsidy for it and thereby reminded people of his generosity.65 It may have been subsequent to the crisis of the grain supply that Nero cancelled a planned trip to Greece,66 putting out as a pretext for the cancellation the dejection of the plebs, who would grow despondent at his absence, but who also feared a food shortage and enjoyed Nero’s frequent entertainments.67 The senate however had a decidedly different take on the possibility of Nero’s absence, and was unable to decide if it was better to have him present or not. Tacitus follows this episode with Nero’s notorious water festival, where he feted the public with feasting, prostitutes, and exotic animals,68 culminating in marriage with his male consort, Pythagoras. It is likely the same festival to which Dio refers69 in which he forced members of the nobility to work as prostitutes in the brothels, subjecting them to the rabble and yet again humiliating those of higher status.70

17Soon after, in the wake of the great fire of 64 CE, Nero had yet another opportunity to exhibit his generosity, when he undertook enormous relief efforts on behalf of the urban populace. This infamously included supplying the mob with scapegoats for the fire, the Christians, whose punishments were so severe that Tacitus notes that at least a certain portion of the urban populace felt sympathy for their plight. Of course, in antiquity and today, the culpability for the fire remains in question, and there were doubtless some elements in the city that blamed Nero for it.71 The question is to what extent that was offset by three actions Nero undertook in the fire’s wake: first, he provided for relief for those who suffered loss from the fire; second, he used the tragedy to undertake an extensive building program that consisted of his palace, to be sure, but also of vast parklands and public spaces that the public could access; finally, the results of all of this would have been a great deal of available employment as Rome rebuilt in the wake of the destruction – indeed, in scale it was likely larger than what Augustus ever undertook. If Nero were trying to ameliorate or squelch rumors among the urban populace about his possible culpability for the fire, he had several means to do it.

18Thus far in following Nero’s reign we see a princeps who possibly out of design, but likely in part as a result of temperament as well, seemed intent on courting the urban populace. Popular support had been shown for his wife Octavia and his mother Agrippina, but this does not appear to have impacted Nero’s popularity in any noticeable way, although certainly the language of civil war is in evidence, as noted, in the episode with Octavia. It is, in fact, with the Pisonian Conspiracy and its aftermath that the language of civil war and strife, hearkening back to the late Republic, is especially noteworthy in Tacitus.72 In introducing the Pisonian Conspiracy Tacitus indicates that senators and equestrians were eager to join, but also remarks that Piso had an excellent reputation with the people, was eloquent, a defender of citizens, and of an affable temperament,73 all qualities of a popularis type politician and ones Tacitus chose to emphasize. In addition, during the plot Piso and his co-conspirators kept a close eye on popular sentiment; hence Claudia Antonia, Claudius’ daughter, was to be brought out and associated with the plot in order to curry popular favor,74 though Tacitus doubts this part of the story. The plot was ultimately betrayed, and relations with the senate, of which Nero was never fond, were irreparably poisoned.

19It is perhaps not a coincidence then that Tacitus in the wake of the conspiracy reverts to the language of conflict that recalls the late Republic, as the animus between Nero and the senate grew more apparent.75 One noteworthy instance of this is after the second Neronia in 65, when Nero attacked C. Cassius Longinus, in part, states Tacitus, for idolizing his ancestor C. Cassius (Caesar’s assassins) and honoring him in a way that recalled the partisan battles of the late Republic, dedicating an image of Cassius with the inscription, “To the leader of the party.”76 The meaning was clear: according to his accuser Cassius was trying to plant the seeds of civil war and looking to foment rebellion from the house of the Caesars.77 Cassius stood as a part of the ancient reminder of the nobles who had challenged Caesar, and Nero was swift to act: Cassius was exiled to Sardinia, where he died in old age, while an accomplice, L. Silanus, was first exiled, then executed. The language used to describe Silanus similarly calls to mind the leaders of the republic as they faced off against Caesar: he is variously described as iuvenem genere nobilem (a youth of noble lineage), animo praeruptum (reckless in mind), and most tellingly of all, bent on revolution (novis rebus).78 Nero would have none of it.

20The climax of this conflict as presented in the extant portion of Tacitus comes with the deaths of Barea Soranus and Thrasea Paetus. Thrasea and his circle are often referred to as the Stoic Opposition, but as Strunk points out, Thrasea was prosecuted not for his Stoic beliefs, but for his political stance.79 It is perhaps striking that Tacitus introduces Thrasea’s prosecution with the phrase Trucidatis tot insignibus viris ad postremum Nero virtutem ipsam excindere cupivit. The word virtus is evocative for Tacitus. In the Agricola he uses it four times in the opening paragraph, where he laments that while there was space for virtus and its celebration in the Republic, he lived in a time hostile to it (infesta virtutibus tempora).80 Thrasea in particular, with his stern demeanor and disapproval of the princeps, was the embodiment of an ancient republicanism, and the notorious accuser, Cossutianus Capito, did not allow Nero to forget Thrasea’s comportment and his quite visible opposition to Nero over the years. These included leaving the senate when discussions arose about condemning Agrippina the Younger after her death, his insufficient enthusiasm for Nero’s Juvenalia, and his argument for leniency in the case against Antistius Sosianus.81 It also included a three-year retirement from public life, between 63 and 66 CE, something that, as Strunk notes, mirrors Cato’s withdrawal from public life during Caesar’s consulship.82 Years of hatred were about to come to a head, and in Tacitus’ account Thrasea would play Cato the Younger to Nero’s Julius Caesar. In order to drive home the point, Tacitus, when reporting Capito’s alarmist words to Nero, represents the conflict as parallel to those of the late Republic:

“Vt quondam C. Caesarem” inquit “et M. Catonem, ita nunc te, Nero, et Thraseam avida discordiarum civitas loquitur. Et habet sectatores vel potius satellites, qui nondum contumaciam sententiarum sed habitum vultumque eius sectantur, rigidi et tristes, quo tibi lasciviam exprobrent.83

21The phrase avida discordiarum civitas recalls and threatens the disorders of the late Republic, with the connections between Thrasea and Cato, Nero and Caesar, made clear. The terms sectatores and satellites further recall the factional gangs that set the city on edge at various times, particularly in the 50s BCE. Finally, Capito portrays Thrasea’s stern imitation of the likes of Cato, as a reproach to Nero’s more facile temperament.84 Capito further intimated that Thrasea had a formidable following in the provinces and armies who were noting carefully Thrasea’s actions,85 and his screed reaches a crescendo at 16, 22, 7-9:

Ista secta Tuberones et Favonios, veteri quoque rei publicae ingrata nomina, genuit. Vt imperium evertant libertatem praeferunt: si perverterint, libertatem ipam adgredientur. Frustra Cassium amovisti, si gliscere et vigere Brutorum aemulos passurus es.

22Favonius recalls a prominent optimate and close adherent to Cato the Younger, and connects Thrasea to “names that were not pleasing to the old Republic”: Capito also renders suspect the term libertas, which in his view is a mere pretense for overthrowing empire, but we note that libertas is always a very loaded word for Tacitus, with its clear associations with the Republic.86 Moreover he explicitly connects the recent prosecution of C. Cassius Longinus with Thrasea’s when he asserts that he is little better than a Brutus, standing with another Cassius. Thrasea’s assumption of a stern demeanor worthy of Cato is further enforced later on by his rejection of a proposal of one of his followers, Arulenus Rusticus, who suggested in his capacity as tribune that he could veto anything the senate decreed concerning Thrasea’s fate.87 Thrasea’s refusal to use a tribune to cause trouble is a direct rejection of the popularis exploitation of the office so relatively frequent in the late Republic. Apparently Thrasea’s comportment was to be one in the mode of the ancient nobility to the very end.

23It may be perhaps noteworthy, in this regard, that Tacitus mentions the specific venue of the trial, the Temple of Venus Genetrix, in Caesar’s forum. The site is significant for a number of reasons: the first discrete forum built by a Roman grandee, it was started by Julius Caesar then finished by Augustus, and was arguably intended as a testament to the concentration of power under the Principate, hovering over and dwarfing the newly restored senate house that had burned in January of 52 BCE. The senate’s meeting place was a small appendage to Caesar, reflecting its reduced role and power subservient to the princeps.88 When the senators met that day there were armed men with swords non occultis, not hidden, says Tacitus, unlike the conspirators who treacherously cut down Caesar who had bestowed his generosity on the people of the city, as had Nero. He had been repaid with betrayal. Now Nero set out a stark reminder to them of their past. He would abide no challenges, and Thrasea soon perished by suicide, as had Cato. Nor did it end there. Space does not permit, but were we to explore further we would find that Tacitus (inter alios) viewed the subsequent conflict between Vespasian and Thrasea’s son-in-law, Helvidius Priscus, in similar terms in which the late republican past loomed large.

24In general, Nero’s courtship with the plebs was a success. His popularity with the people survived him, to the point that rumors circulated that he was not in fact dead and that he would one day return.89 Tacitus indicates that one of the more significant lost episodes in his Historiae was the appearance of a false Nero in the East. Further indication of his popularity is that, upon his succession, Otho was obliged to erect statues of Nero once again.90 The push back against Nero’s popularity, when it did come, emerged from senatorial historians; the knives were sharpened and the name Nero became synonymous with tyrant.

Tiberius the unpopularis

25What happened when a princeps was not comfortable or sufficiently assertive in his de facto role as popularis? Tiberius offers us a case study in an emperor who, fairly or not, did not have a good relationship with the people of Rome, despite his very frank acknowledgement that a princeps had to consult public opinion and was not an entirely free agent.91 His personality was undoubtedly a part of the problem, since from everything we know, Tiberius (despite his military and public service) was considered morose, reclusive, and an exemplar of Claudian arrogance.92 In addition Augustus was a difficult act to follow, an affable and approachable man who had a strong bond with the people. Unlike Augustus and Nero, Tiberius was not one to indulge the passions and pleasures of the populus Romanus. There are few instances that come to mind of his attending games and enjoying them with the people; indeed, he was famously known for his disdain of such activity.93 He also undertook fewer building programs than his predecessor, and these not particularly noteworthy (these included the Temple of the Divine Augustus, the restoration of the Theater of Pompey and the Temple of Concordia, and the continued expansion of the Palatine into an imperial palace complex), hence there was less opportunity for urban employment.94 To top it all off, he appears to have little but disdain for the city, which, prior to his principate, he left for long terms of military service, then for nearly a decade of self-imposed exile on Rhodes, before retiring for good to Capri in 27 CE. His lack of popularity was underscored by two attempted revolts from imperial pretenders, the first of a false Agrippa Postumus (in reality a certain Clemens) in 16 CE,95 and then by a false Drusus (popular son of Germanicus) in 31.96 His poor relationship with the Roman people was exacerbated and cast into relief by the popularity of his nephew, Germanicus, and Germanicus’ family in general.97 As a result, a series of unfortunate incidents conspired to allow others under Tiberius to curry the favor of the Roman people and present, at times, serious difficulties and challenges for him. Two of the major complicating factors at work were his niece, Agrippina the Elder, who placed her family’s claims to the throne front and center, and the ambitions of his Praetorian Praefect, L. Aelius Sejanus.

26Agrippina’s popularity was a natural extension of her husband’s, Germanicus’ own popularity. Aware of this, Agrippina exploited it starting immediately upon her husband’s death in 19 during his funerary rites.98 She further incited public sympathy against Piso, Germanicus’ alleged murderer, during his trial, and continued to seek popular support at times until her exile a decade later in 29.99 The claims she put forward concerning her sons’ rights to the throne, as the direct descendants of Augustus, met an obstacle in Sejanus. Now Sejanus had none of the built in advantages of Agrippina of birth, popularity, or proximity to the imperial family; resourceful and ruthless, he had to work at creating alliances and establishing his own reputation. Sejanus recognized the three main fulcrums of power in Rome on which the princeps relied to be the senate, the military power of the Praetorians (and the military in general), and the people, and he courted all three. By 20 CE he had famously consolidated the Praetorian Guard into a single camp in order to court their favor.100 He also was careful to cultivate – as son of an equestrian from a municipium – members of the senate by bestowing offices.101 He notoriously seduced Livilla, Tiberius’ niece, and proceeded to poison Tiberius son (Livilla’s husband), Drusus in 23 CE; at the same time he used his influence with Tiberius to turn him against Agrippina and her family, according to Dio.102 Also by 23, Tiberius was allowing statues to be set up in Sejanus’ honor, and Dio tells us (albeit only in the most vague terms)103 that speeches started to be delivered in Sejanus’ honor on a number of occasions, both before the senate and the people. Moreover his door was now crowded with men of standing, with even consulars at the early morning salutatio.104 It was the year after Drusus’ death, in 24, that Sejanus planted the seed in Tiberius’ mind that Agrippina and her family were tantamount to a faction, creating, in effect, a cold civil war in which people were now choosing sides between her family and Tiberius: instabat quippe Seianus incusabatque diductam civitatem ut civili bello: esse qui se partium Agrippinae vocent, ac ni resistantur, fore pluris; neque aliud gliscentis discordiae remedium quam si unus alterve maxime prompti subverterentur.105 For the next five years (24-29 CE), Sejanus, presumably with Tiberius’ blessing, proceeded to attack Agrippina in a series of proxy prosecutions, and attacked in addition any senators who opposed him.106

27Perhaps the most interesting and remarkable of these cases is the prosecution in 25 CE of Cremutius Cordus, accused by two of Sejanus’ agents.107 What is significant about the case, for our purposes, is Cremutius’ rhetoric and what it might tell us about how Sejanus was proceeding and what he potentially was telling Tiberius. Tacitus introduces the case by informing us that Cremutius was charged with having praised Brutus in his histories and calling Cassius “the last of the Romans”: Cremutius mounted a robust defense, noting in the speech’s climax that Brutus and Cassius were not in arms at Philippi at the moment, and that he was not publicly attempting to incite to civil war. Dio adds the detail that Cremutius had also verbally assailed the people and the senate.108 Clearly, given the nature of Cremutius’ defense, Sejanus had played on fear of factionalism within the state. Brutus and Cassius never were neutral figures, as the ban on their images indicates, and Agrippina and her claims had perhaps at this date created enough fear in Tiberius for Sejanus to exploit imperial anxiety.109 Cremutius’ prosecution indicates Sejanus exploited the ancient divisions of the Republic that arrayed the ancient nobility against his and the emperor’s more “popularis” position as benefactors of the Roman people. Tacitus, as has been demonstrated, presented the episode as an instance of “cold civil war” during the early Principate, and it was a preview of the rhetoric that Sejanus was to employ against Agrippina as their competition for power grew more acute.110 We note too that in Tacitus’ initial brief portrait of Sejanus there are clear echoes of Sallust’s characterization of Catiline, himself a notorious popularis type leader.111 That certainly underscores Sejanus as one interested in establishing as much as possible his popularis credentials.

28Those credentials were in fact honed over many years as Sejanus attempted to court the favor of the plebs and fill a void Tiberius had left by virtue of his parsimony and personality.112 This was not lost on our sources, and Velleius compares him to M. Agrippa, who had been a champion of the plebs and not of high birth.113 As he climbed his way to the top he attacked senators and equestrians who opposed him, all the while attending to the plebs. He consequently built a number of granaries to ensure the city’s food supply, and his quick action saved the Theater of Pompey, and possibly the city, from fire in 22 CE.114 In a famous article Syme summed up nicely not just the relationship Sejanus cultivated with the people at large, but specifically with the plebs.115 He notes that Sejanus famously owned a very ancient statue of Fortuna (who had deep ties with the plebs), one which purportedly once belonged to King Servius Tullius, himself a champion of the plebs and of humble origins.116 Moreover as Syme observes, the consular elections for 31, which Sejanus won, took place on the Aventine, a site with deep associations with the plebs.117 In addition, when he entered office in January of 31, Dio emphasizes the large crowds that attended and waited upon him, even separating him from his bodyguard as he descended the Capitoline after assuming the consulship.118 Finally, Sejanus’ charisma should not be underestimated: Dio, for one, tells us that he maintained illicit relations with numerous wives of distinguished men in Rome as a means to spy on them, and he (in)famously succeeded in seducing a married princess of the imperial house, Livilla;119 we should not discount his ability to use a personal charm offensive in achieving his success. By the time we reach one of the critical points of his career, in 29 after he removed Agrippina the Elder and Nero as political threats, all were paying him court.120

29That is hardly surprising. In 27, Tiberius retired for Capri for good, leaving Sejanus to work his mischief and effectively isolating Tiberius.121 In 29, when Sejanus finally moved to be rid of Agrippina and her son Nero once and for all,122 it turned into a partisan battle with the people choosing sides. Letters were produced denouncing Agrippina and Nero, and notably, says Tacitus, the charges were not concerning insurrection or revolution, but “insolence and illicit sex”. When the matter was brought up before the senate Junius Rusticus led a futile push back against Sejanus’ designs, while the people, carrying images of Agrippina and Nero, protested in the streets, claiming the letters were forgeries of Sejanus and excusing Tiberius.123 In an effort to quash dissent Sejanus complained to Tiberius that false letters were being circulated against him, including some with the names of former consuls, and that the people were near a state of rebellion.124 Sejanus, again employing the language of civil war and dredging up bad memories of the late Republic, urged Tiberius to remove Agrippina and Nero permanently: descivisse populum; audiri iam et legi novas contiones, nova patrum consulta: quid reliquum nisi ut caperent ferrum et, quorum imagines pro vexillis secuti forent, duces imperatoresque deligerent? Tiberius, alarmed at Sejanus’ portrayal of Rome falling into civil strife, rebuked the people and forced the senate to act.

30As already noted, Sejanus had courted the plebs earnestly. There still remained, however, Caligula, the one surviving member of the imperial house who was popular, and caused Sejanus some concern. Sejanus’ end is shrouded in mystery; as noted above, by January of 31, he stood at the very peak of the Roman state. In the course of that year indications are that he saw his position increasingly imperiled due to a growing alienation from Tiberius, and started to panic. Part of that panic may have been the result of an erosion of popular support,125 since Dio states126 that Sejanus was ready to launch a rebellion, but that Caligula’s popularity discouraged him. Tiberius, as he prepared to eliminate Sejanus, ensured the loyalty of the Praetorians, gaged senatorial and popular opinion, and was encouraged.127 When Tiberius made his move the senate, noting the discontent of the Roman people, and the neutralized Praetorians, voted for Sejanus’ execution, while, once he fell, the people famously abused his body and pulled down his statues.128 That fall dragged a number of senatorial supporters with it. Sejanus’ trajectory and the ensuing conflicts that arose from it are portrayed in terms of civil strife reminiscent of the late Republic. However the very fact of Sejanus’ rise is arguably due to an emperor who was by temperament and personality not a popularis. That left it to members of Tiberius’ family and Sejanus himself to fill the void, and the resulting conflict, played out on the streets at significant moments, is the tragedy of Tiberius’ reign.