Towards multilateral military cooperation in the Sulu et Sulawesi seas
p. 171-173
Texte intégral
August 2017
1The Sulu Sea (260 000 km²) is bordered to the north by Palawan Island, to the east by the Visayas, to the south by Mindanao Island and the Sulu archipelago and to the west by Borneo. It is at the confluence of three countries : the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The Spanish and then the American colonial powers called this semi-enclosed sea, highly pejoratively, “The Pirate’s Sea” or “the Moros Sea”. Since independence, successive Philippine governments have also called it “the southern backdoor”, indicating their inability to control both human and material trafficking. Since 2002, the American military in their fight against terrorism in South-East Asia has referred to the maritime zone comprising the Sulu Sea and the Celebes (or Sulawesi Sea) as the “terrorist transit triangle” (T3).
2The T3, also known by American security institutions as “infiltration routes” and the “terrorist corridor”, harbours the main guerrilla and radical terrorist groups of Southeast Asia. The transformation of Maoist and Muslim liberation movements, such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines into terrorist movements such as Abu Sayyaf has profoundly changed the strategic importance of this vast maritime area. The Sulu archipelago has become a regional and international hub for the trafficking of arms, ammunition and explosives. Furthermore, Sulu has become the capital of international kidnapping in Southeast Asia. Certain factions of the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group, based on Basilan Island and the Sulu archipelago, declared allegiance to Al Qaida and then to Daesh, and the kidnapping are their main source of financing. Between 2000 and 2016, 97 foreigners, representing 15 nationalities, were kidnapped directly or indirectly by factions of Abu Sayyaf, of whom, 63 % were residents of countries bordering the T3 (36 Malaysians and 27 Indonesians). Although these spectacular criminal activities targeted foreigners, 41 Filipinos were also kidnapped. Westerners attract the attention of international media ; however, the inhabitants of the T3 are by far the most numerous victims.
Bilateral military cooperation in the Sulu and Celebes seas
3In view of these many “non-traditional” threats, bilateral military cooperation between the Philippines and Malaysia includes a certain mutual distrust. Thus, since 1962, the Philippines has claimed the State of Sabah (north-west of the island of Borneo), which is recognized internationally as part of the Federation of Malaysia but which belonged to the Sultanate of Sulu until the end of the 19th century. In retaliation, Malaysia has actively supported the separatist movement MNLF, including organizing training camps on offshore islands, between the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1980s.
4The two countries have nevertheless attempted to overcome their territorial dispute through three agreements for cooperation : protocols to stop smuggling in 1967 and 1995 and a memorandum of understanding for defence cooperation in 1994.
5The Border Patrol Coordinating Group was the most active military cooperative activity between the two countries until 2008. Between 1994 and 2008, the naval, air and maritime police forces of the two countries participated in 18 border patrol operations to combat piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing. The patrols were, however, stopped in 2008 for technical reasons, as the Philippines navy had to reassign the ships used by the patrols for urgent anti-guerrilla operations on Sulu.
6For 18 years, the two countries have also conducted bilateral naval exercises, known as Malphi Laut, generally in the Sulu Sea and off western Mindanao. They also hold joint exercices of their aerial forces, known as Malphi Sarta, and of their land forces, known as Land Malphi.
7In February 2013, 235 men from Sulu, some of whom were armed, landed at Lahad Datu in Sabah and claimed the sovereignty of the Sultan of Sulu. This incident, which resulted in the deaths of 68 people (56 of whom were Sulu), had a dual effect on military cooperation between the two neighbours. The first was an end to their naval activities and reinforcement of the security of Sabah by establishment of a security zone along the coast, known as the East Sabah Safety Zone (ESSZONE) commanded by the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM). The second effect was awareness on both sides of the Sulu Sea of the importance of cooperation in matters of intelligence, as neither country had detected the movement of 235 men in time, and for multilateral naval cooperation with Indonesia (see below).
8Malaysia is strongly engaged in the peace process on Mindanao between the Philippine Government and the rebel Muslim movement the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Malaysia is the main actor in the international monitoring team, as it is responsible for ensuring that the cease fire is respected in the Muslim areas of Mindanao.
9Since the signature in 2014 of an agreement on an exclusive economic zone between the Philippines and Indonesia in the Celebes Sea, the two countries no longer have any territorial or maritime dispute. Since 1986, the two countries have organised coordinated naval patrols, known as Corpat Philindo, along the maritime border defined in 1975.
Towards trilateral military cooperation
10The Lahat Datu incident in 2013 and the spectacular increase in kidnappings and piracy in the region of the Sulu and Sulawesi seas (with, for example, 27 Indonesians and 10 Malaysians kidnapped between March and November 2016) finally pushed the three countries (the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia) to organize coordinated naval patrols.
11A trilateral agreement was signed on Bali on 2 August 2016 by the three ministers of defence, whereby the three countries agreed that their military personnel could cross national borders to pursue terrorists, kidnappers and pirates. The right of transnational pursuit was, however, limited to the sea (pursuit on land is currently excluded), with the agreement of the country to be entered and only in an emergency. Furthermore, three command posts were to be established (at Bongao in the Philippines, Tawau in Malaysia and Tarakan in Indonesia) to better coordinate naval patrols and develop operational intelligence. On 1 Octobre 2016, the three ministers of defence agreed to organise aerial patrols over the maritime zone of common interest.
12The joint naval patrols began on 19 June 2017 during the urban war led by the Philippine Government against hundreds of Islamic militants who had attempted to take control of the city of Marawi (in Lanao del Sur province). Most of the Islamist fighters had sworn allegiance to Daesh and were Filipino (the Maute brothers in Lanao del Sur and the Abu Sayyaf group led by Isnilon Hapilon in Basilan) ; however, dozens of foreigners participated in operations, including Indonesians and Malaysians of the Jemaah Islamiyah and
13Under the pressure of these events, the three neighbours overcame their differences and organized a common fight against the terrorism that threatened the region, as Malaysian and Indonesian fighters tried to return home after the defeat of Daesh in Syria and Iraq. This multilateral cooperation could eventually resemble the model of cooperation in the Straits of Malacca among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.
Bibliographie
Guéraiche, William (dir.), Philippines contemporaines, Bangkok/Paris, IRASEC/Les Indes savantes, 2013, 619 p.
Kane, Solomon, La croix et le kriss. Violences et rancœurs entre les chrétiens et musulmans dans le sud des Philippines, Bangkok/Paris, IRASEC/Les Indes savantes, 2006, 223 p.
Miani Lino, The Sulu Arms Market. National Responses to a Regional Problem, Singapour, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011, 214 p.
Vitug, Marites Danguilan & Gloria, Glenda M., Under the Crescent Moon. Rebellion in Mindanao, Quezon City, Quezon City, Ateneo Center for Social Policy-Public Affairs Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000, 327 p.
Auteur
Geographer, associated researcher at IRASEC and member of the South-East Asia Observatory
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