From influence to power

3However, in East Asia China has used a different approach to politics. The question there is no longer a matter of China’s influence but rather its power, which is exercised through a reaffirmation of China’s territorial sovereignty, a behavior that is essentially guided by geopolitical considerations. Through the development of a blue-water navy, continued efforts to prevent Taiwan from joining international organizations (even those non-political in nature), or the strengthening of its presence in contested waters regarded as “Chinese”, it is tempting to conclude that China is actively engaged on every front, starting with East Asia and, more specifically, in those areas that it considers to be part of its territory.

4In this context, in which Beijing endeavours to strengthen its ties with parts of the world that are less under the influence of the U.S. while making progress on geopolitical issues within the region, the Taiwan “question” appears to have been put on hold, especially as Beijing continues to enjoy a honeymoon with Taipei since the return of the Kuomintang (KMT) to power in 2008. The disappearance of belligerent language that characterized cross-strait relations between 1995 an 2008 has rid ­Beijing of a major headache; and while Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou’s reluctance to criticize Beijing over the Senkaku dispute constitutes, at best, an ambiguous signal of support for China, it is clear that Taiwan is no longer the enemy.

5A “pro Greater China” policy, rather than one that is clearly “pro China”, is now in effect in Taipei. Since 2000 following the end of the Lee Teng-hui presidency, the KMT has come under the control of the descendants of Chiang Kai-shek, who were spoon fed the “greater China” ideology. Although those Chinese nationalists do not represent a majority within the party, which has largely “Taiwanized” over the years, they nevertheless hold sway over it, with President Ma in the lead. Those scions of an elite that considers itself the Chinese nobility, and who regard it as their duty to protect that identity, concluded several years ago that their old nemesis, the Chinese communists, are now the lesser of two evils. In their eyes, a far greater threat to the Chinese nation is the growing support, as demonstrated by opinion polls, for Taiwanese independence.

The chinese nationalist party in Taiwan: a historical U-turn

6Since 2008, the KMT has toyed with ambivalent policies that, its leadership maintains, are realist, and whose goal is to protect the sovereignty of the republic while moving towards unification with China under terms that, if possible, would be advantageous to Taiwan. In doing so, the KMT has chosen to ignore the reality of Chinese irredentism that, having reached unprecedented proportions, does not give an inch on the fundamental and uncompromising objective of “retaking” Taiwan. Nor has Beijing abandoned the possibility of resorting to its increasingly potent military to resolve the matter.

7Those developments have led to the accelerating opening of various sectors of Taiwan’s economy to Chinese investment. This now includes the sensitive cultural sector, a crucial component in matters of national identity. Moreover, Beijing has used growing cross-strait exchanges and investment to apply pressure on Taiwanese businessmen in the hope that they in turn can influence political decisions in Taipei. China has also used the opportunity to substantially increase the number of intelligence officers on the island, while actively encouraging the creation of new organizations, associations, political parties, forums, foundations, and publications that openly support unification with China. However, what has caused the greatest apprehension among Taiwanese civil society is the government’s unwillingness (some would hint at something more obscure) to make public its negotiations with Beijing. Besides failing to provide impact assessments for cross-strait exchanges, the nationalist government has systematically turned to the courts, the police force, and the media to demonize its critics and to counter whoever agitates in opposition to the implementation of controversial agreements with China.

8Since 2008, Taiwanese social activists have accused the KMT on several fronts, from its China policy to urban renewal projects that went out of hand, its support for nuclear power plants in earthquake-prone zones to the politicization of the judiciary, and above all, on the lack of an oversight mechanism at the legislature to monitor the signing of agreements with China. This constellation of movements has called for the respect of the rule of law, as well as the protection of Taiwan’s independence and identity in the face of growing Chinese pressure. Demonstrations are now a regular occurrence in the streets of Taiwan; protest groups have proliferated at a rate hitherto unseen on the island, pointing to a new era of social activism.

A cartoon of President Ma published in an English-language opposition newspaper in December 2013.

Beacons of freedom

9But civic activism is also on the rise along China’s coast. In Hong Kong, Occupy Central appears to have been deeply impressed by the Sunflower Movement’s occupation of Taiwan’s legislature in March and April 2014. In Macau, protesters took to the streets to compel the authorities to retract a proposed pension scheme for senior government officials which was regarded as far too generous. Meanwhile in Guangdong, isolated albeit courageous protesters have challenged a common enemy: the party-state apparatus. In some instances, the militants have used Taiwanese activists, whose efforts they were able to track by bypassing Chinese censors, as a point of reference and source of inspiration – and a few even succeeded in posting messages of encouragement on Taiwanese web sites.

10Wherever they are, the activists deplore the accelerating efforts by Beijing to impose its views on the peripheries via its growing influence on local decision-makers and authoritarian system of governance. The economic ties established between China and business leaders within those three territories, whose interests are rarely aligned with those of the civil servants and the societies they serve, have forced civil society to take action. Worried and prepared to mobilize, they represent the last (or perhaps first) voices for freedom.

11The quasi-alliance between Taipei and Beijing on the Senkakus, not to mention the KMT rhetoric under President Ma that borders on anti-Japanese sentiment, has led many in Japan and the U.S. to worry about the reliability of Taiwan as an ally, divided as it is by the national question and confronted with an increasingly assertive China.

12Combined with Washington’s rebalancing to Asia, which has gradually taken shape especially following the establishment of China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea (which overlaps the Senkakus), does this all point to a fundamental shift in the geopolitics of East Asia? Such an outcome is unlikely in the medium term, as no one is willing to sacrifice economic ties with China for the sake of politics. Instead, all the powers involved will likely adopt a wait and see policy.

Taiwan and its immediate strategic environment.

13In the absence of actual armed conflict, regional players will likely adopt a strategy of soft and flexible management of small crises erupting over the territorial questions that have prevailed over the past 40 years. Given that a crisis involving Japan and China over the Senkakus/Diaoyutais could lead to major armed conflict, both sides have for the time being refrained from escalating beyond “mere” and occasional provocations.

Liberty guides the people… with the ROC flag. The placard reads “Protect our democracy, oppose ‘black box’ deals”, a reference to cross-strait negotiations that, according to the Sunflower Movement, were not properly supervised by the KMT-dominated legislature.

14Instead we should look at the processes, even perhaps unrelated to Beijing’s external disputes, that can engender internal restructuring (or de-structuring) within the wider Chinese speaking world for the probable causes of evolution within the region. It would seem that such a restructuring has indeed begun. However, for the time being it is difficult to predict where this will take us, among many possible outcomes: integration, disintegration, restructuring, recomposition, or destructuralization.